The question that nagged me about the Artillery topic is: Should a US Marine discussion about artillery also include Naval Gun Fire support? Very early in my Marine career, the Marine leadership would frequently lament the loss of Naval Gunfire capabilities. I have not heard that lament in a long time.
During WW2 and Korea, Naval Gunfire proved to be essential for not only amphibious operations but also ground support. Naval Gunfire also contributed to Viet Nam ground operations. In Desert Storm the Naval Gunfire plan for the Marine Corps amphibious “faint” included the USS New Jersey. The USS New Jersey conducted fire missions in support of the Saudi Forces (with attached Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams) attacking up the Kuwait east coast.
The Mark 45 - 5 inch/54 caliber gun (and latest MOD 62 caliber) is the standard for the US Navy Arleigh Burke Destroyer. In fully automatic mode, the MOD IV can fire 20 rounds without any personnel inside the mount. In 2024–2025, U.S. Navy destroyers in the Red Sea increasingly employed the Mk 45 gun to defend themselves and merchants against one-way attack drones, launched by the Houthi rebels from Yemen during the Red Sea crisis.
Amphibious Doctrine use to call for a destroyer in direct support for each Colored/Numbered Beach (ie, Red 1 and Red 2) with a cruiser in general support of the Color Beach.
The Naval Gun Fire support missions include pre-landing bombardment, covering landing assault craft (with suppression and direct fire), and supporting ground advances.
Marines are familiar with the massive pre-landing bombardments in the WW2 Pacific Theater. In the European Theater, when the landing on Omaha Beach was in question, the British Admiral ordered destroyers to close on the beach in order to provide direct fire to help the assault troops get off the fortified beach. In both the Italian Sicily and Salerno invasions, the near successful German counter attacks on the landing beaches were stopped with the light cruisers 6 inch (152mm) guns.
Let’s not forget this quote from a German Officer captured during the Sicily counterattack on the USA 1st and 48th Infantry Divisions landing beaches.
“Dazed survivors, from the famed Herman Goering Division, taken prisoner, wondered what terrible new anti-tank weapon the Americans had. They had never experienced anything like the rapid fire of a 15-gun battery 6" cruiser, and they had no idea that what had hit them came from the sea. Naval support fire was most effectively controlled by cruiser observation planes and by shore fire control parties, landed with the troops, which had been previously trained for this role in the Amphibious Force schools.”
The accuracy of Naval Gun Fire also impressed the US Army at Normandy, especially when the Heavy Cruiser, USS Quincy (9 x 8 inch guns 203mm), fired 19 counter battery missions during the Cotentin Peninsula operations to capture the Port of Cherbourg.. General “Lighting Joe Collins” VII Corps artillery observers were greatly impressed with the accuracy and ”lethality” of the 8 inch Naval Gun and appreciated the help.
As Marines, we also need to remember Admiral Richard “Close In” Conolly, who fundamentally changed Naval Gun Support Doctrine after the WW2 Tarawa Amphibious Assault. He rewrote the U.S. Navy playbook that supported Marines and Soldiers going ashore.
Admiral Conolly changed doctrine by embedding naval gunfire liaison teams with Marines; creating real time communication loops between ships and shore; and timing fire missions to match infantry movement minute by minute. Making Naval gunfire a living part of the battle and not a pre landing ritual.
Before Admiral Conolly, Naval Gunfire ships fired (bombarded) from 10,000–12,000 yards offshore. Creating poor accuracy due to dispersion and flat trajectories with frequent over-shots and under-shots. Ship Captains were a;so fearful of accepting risk from reefs, mines, and costal guns.
After Admiral Conolly’s changes, destroyer and cruiser Captains were ordered to close to 3,000–4,000 yards and sometimes even less. This reduced shell dispersion dramatically increased accuracy. His philosophy: “You can’t hit anything if you can’t see it.” Naval gunfire became surgical instead of symbolic. The clincher for me was his quoted belief: “Better to risk a ship than a Marine.”
Amphibious Naval Fire Support Doctrine, weapons and coordinated fire support doctrine have come a long way since WW2. Today’s complexity of supporting arms not only requires complex training and planning but also PRACTICING. Consequently, can the Arleigh-Burke Destroyer, and/or Close Air Support, and/or Drones match the coordination and “lethality” of Admiral “Close-in” Conolly’s Naval Gun Fire Support Doctrine? S/F
Excellent points 👉 and truth! When I served with 26th MEU (SOC) from 1987-90, we actively trained with naval gunfire, calling in strikes from battleships and destroyers assigned to our ARG... it seems like this capability has been lost or forgotten or forsaken over the past 3 decades especially with the battleships getting retired in the early 90s and the age of technology and laser guided munitions, missiles, and air support... I concur 💯 with your observations and views on this lethal, efficient, and inexpensive support especially with amphibious assaults... Semper Fi sir!
I was privileged to have a 5 inch Destroyer and an 8 inch cruiser for an op in? RVN. THAT firepower was amazing. 5X54 is a hose of fire! Unfortunately the proximity to the beach is a vulnerability as even in a moonless night—-flash is easily seen
NGF was, indeed, a given. We trained to that effect long after it was no longer available. NGF gave up on the Marines long before Marines gave up on Naval
Gun Fire. What exactly will the Marine Infantryman have to support him in combat? Tanks? No. Artillery? No. Naval Gun Fire? No. Attack helicopters or aircraft in an environment with air defenses? Questionable. How could any rational leader think this makes sense? This is criminal incompetence.
Drones definitely have a place in our arsenal but we must develop anti drone weaponry (preferably laser tech weaponry to effectively destroy drones) to counter this immediate threat, as proven by the Ukrainian War and the current Iran 🇮🇷 War (I refer to it as Operation EPIC FAILURE because of Trump's refusal to follow the sound advice and plans already in place for dealing with the contingencies stemming from the onset of the war, which has the disastrous impact of Iran 🇮🇷 basically controls the Strait of Hormuz 🇮🇷)...
As for war ships, investment must immediately be made in immediate construction of more amphibs and the restoration of having a 24/7 MEU/ARG forward deployed in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific as was the case for decades until 2019ish... our Corps must continue to modernize our warfighting capabilities while not "divesting" proven and essential platforms and capabilities that made us our nation's "Force in Readiness" and able to fulfill our Title 10 mission... as we've seen on several occasions now and our enemies observe, FD2030 has ruined our MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities, to be on station and able to respond to any crisis in every clime and place!
Late entry for CP – Artillery Alive.
The question that nagged me about the Artillery topic is: Should a US Marine discussion about artillery also include Naval Gun Fire support? Very early in my Marine career, the Marine leadership would frequently lament the loss of Naval Gunfire capabilities. I have not heard that lament in a long time.
During WW2 and Korea, Naval Gunfire proved to be essential for not only amphibious operations but also ground support. Naval Gunfire also contributed to Viet Nam ground operations. In Desert Storm the Naval Gunfire plan for the Marine Corps amphibious “faint” included the USS New Jersey. The USS New Jersey conducted fire missions in support of the Saudi Forces (with attached Naval Gunfire Liaison Teams) attacking up the Kuwait east coast.
The Mark 45 - 5 inch/54 caliber gun (and latest MOD 62 caliber) is the standard for the US Navy Arleigh Burke Destroyer. In fully automatic mode, the MOD IV can fire 20 rounds without any personnel inside the mount. In 2024–2025, U.S. Navy destroyers in the Red Sea increasingly employed the Mk 45 gun to defend themselves and merchants against one-way attack drones, launched by the Houthi rebels from Yemen during the Red Sea crisis.
Amphibious Doctrine use to call for a destroyer in direct support for each Colored/Numbered Beach (ie, Red 1 and Red 2) with a cruiser in general support of the Color Beach.
The Naval Gun Fire support missions include pre-landing bombardment, covering landing assault craft (with suppression and direct fire), and supporting ground advances.
Marines are familiar with the massive pre-landing bombardments in the WW2 Pacific Theater. In the European Theater, when the landing on Omaha Beach was in question, the British Admiral ordered destroyers to close on the beach in order to provide direct fire to help the assault troops get off the fortified beach. In both the Italian Sicily and Salerno invasions, the near successful German counter attacks on the landing beaches were stopped with the light cruisers 6 inch (152mm) guns.
Let’s not forget this quote from a German Officer captured during the Sicily counterattack on the USA 1st and 48th Infantry Divisions landing beaches.
“Dazed survivors, from the famed Herman Goering Division, taken prisoner, wondered what terrible new anti-tank weapon the Americans had. They had never experienced anything like the rapid fire of a 15-gun battery 6" cruiser, and they had no idea that what had hit them came from the sea. Naval support fire was most effectively controlled by cruiser observation planes and by shore fire control parties, landed with the troops, which had been previously trained for this role in the Amphibious Force schools.”
The accuracy of Naval Gun Fire also impressed the US Army at Normandy, especially when the Heavy Cruiser, USS Quincy (9 x 8 inch guns 203mm), fired 19 counter battery missions during the Cotentin Peninsula operations to capture the Port of Cherbourg.. General “Lighting Joe Collins” VII Corps artillery observers were greatly impressed with the accuracy and ”lethality” of the 8 inch Naval Gun and appreciated the help.
As Marines, we also need to remember Admiral Richard “Close In” Conolly, who fundamentally changed Naval Gun Support Doctrine after the WW2 Tarawa Amphibious Assault. He rewrote the U.S. Navy playbook that supported Marines and Soldiers going ashore.
Admiral Conolly changed doctrine by embedding naval gunfire liaison teams with Marines; creating real time communication loops between ships and shore; and timing fire missions to match infantry movement minute by minute. Making Naval gunfire a living part of the battle and not a pre landing ritual.
Before Admiral Conolly, Naval Gunfire ships fired (bombarded) from 10,000–12,000 yards offshore. Creating poor accuracy due to dispersion and flat trajectories with frequent over-shots and under-shots. Ship Captains were a;so fearful of accepting risk from reefs, mines, and costal guns.
After Admiral Conolly’s changes, destroyer and cruiser Captains were ordered to close to 3,000–4,000 yards and sometimes even less. This reduced shell dispersion dramatically increased accuracy. His philosophy: “You can’t hit anything if you can’t see it.” Naval gunfire became surgical instead of symbolic. The clincher for me was his quoted belief: “Better to risk a ship than a Marine.”
Amphibious Naval Fire Support Doctrine, weapons and coordinated fire support doctrine have come a long way since WW2. Today’s complexity of supporting arms not only requires complex training and planning but also PRACTICING. Consequently, can the Arleigh-Burke Destroyer, and/or Close Air Support, and/or Drones match the coordination and “lethality” of Admiral “Close-in” Conolly’s Naval Gun Fire Support Doctrine? S/F
Excellent points 👉 and truth! When I served with 26th MEU (SOC) from 1987-90, we actively trained with naval gunfire, calling in strikes from battleships and destroyers assigned to our ARG... it seems like this capability has been lost or forgotten or forsaken over the past 3 decades especially with the battleships getting retired in the early 90s and the age of technology and laser guided munitions, missiles, and air support... I concur 💯 with your observations and views on this lethal, efficient, and inexpensive support especially with amphibious assaults... Semper Fi sir!
I was privileged to have a 5 inch Destroyer and an 8 inch cruiser for an op in? RVN. THAT firepower was amazing. 5X54 is a hose of fire! Unfortunately the proximity to the beach is a vulnerability as even in a moonless night—-flash is easily seen
NGF was, indeed, a given. We trained to that effect long after it was no longer available. NGF gave up on the Marines long before Marines gave up on Naval
Gun Fire. What exactly will the Marine Infantryman have to support him in combat? Tanks? No. Artillery? No. Naval Gun Fire? No. Attack helicopters or aircraft in an environment with air defenses? Questionable. How could any rational leader think this makes sense? This is criminal incompetence.
Drones definitely have a place in our arsenal but we must develop anti drone weaponry (preferably laser tech weaponry to effectively destroy drones) to counter this immediate threat, as proven by the Ukrainian War and the current Iran 🇮🇷 War (I refer to it as Operation EPIC FAILURE because of Trump's refusal to follow the sound advice and plans already in place for dealing with the contingencies stemming from the onset of the war, which has the disastrous impact of Iran 🇮🇷 basically controls the Strait of Hormuz 🇮🇷)...
As for war ships, investment must immediately be made in immediate construction of more amphibs and the restoration of having a 24/7 MEU/ARG forward deployed in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific as was the case for decades until 2019ish... our Corps must continue to modernize our warfighting capabilities while not "divesting" proven and essential platforms and capabilities that made us our nation's "Force in Readiness" and able to fulfill our Title 10 mission... as we've seen on several occasions now and our enemies observe, FD2030 has ruined our MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities, to be on station and able to respond to any crisis in every clime and place!