Compass Points - PAACK-P Project
More funding for development and integration.
August 6, 2025
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The Marine Corps says it needs more funding to leverage previous work on a project called PAACK-P which stands for Penetrating Affordable Autonomous Collaborative Killer-Portfolio. It is all part of ongoing experimentation with unmanned aircraft like the XQ-58 Valkyrie.
The funding request makes clear the crucial importance of development and integration. Long before any metal is bent, or components are assembled, combat development and integration provides the foundation.
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The Marine Corps wants $58 million in fiscal 2026 to support the next phase of its collaborative combat aircraft initiative, according to budget documents.
Nearly $20 million would go to air vehicle development and about $15 million to mission systems development and integration. The rest of the funding would be allotted for systems engineering, control segment development and integration, and development support.
Officials noted that the spending plan for 2026 increased since the last budget submission.
The project, known as MUX TACAIR increment 1, will leverage previous work that the Corps has done for its Penetrating Affordable Autonomous Collaborative Killer-Portfolio (PAACK-P), which received funding in previous years under the Pentagon’s Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve initiative.
-- Defense Scoop
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As important as it is for autonomous aircraft to have a foundation of combat development and integration, it is even more important for the broader Marine Corps. The future Marine Corps begins first with combat development and integration.
Marine Lt. Gen Eric E. Austin commands the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and also serves as the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. The MCCDC / CD&I are responsible for building the Marine Corps of the future.
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MCCDC was created Nov. 10, 1987 with a central role in developing concepts, plans, doctrine, training and equipment for the 21st Century. In 1995, MCCDC became home to MCWL with a mission to conduct experimentation in 21st century warfare. In 2005, the commanding general for MCCDC was dual hatted as the deputy commandant for CD&I, with MCWL and the Capabilities Development Directorate aligned under CD&I. Today, CD&I leads Marine Corps force development in collaboration with numerous stakeholders across Headquarters, Marine Corps, the Fleet Marine Force and the supporting establishment.
-- DIVIDS, MCCDC
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MCCDC was established as home for comprehensive combat development including concept development and education. Beginning in 1987, the foundational doctrine, concepts and publications that under-gird the modern crisis response Marine Corps were put in place.
FMFM-1 Warfighting and all the related publications on warfighting transformed not only the Marine Corps, but military forces around the world. Even today, the MCCDC model of putting both concept development and education under one combat development commanding general is still influencing other military services.
Unfortunately, the Marine Corps has recently fractured its original unified combat development even as other services begin to see the wisdom of it. For example, the US Army just announced it will reorganize its own combat development in a way that follows the original Marine Corps model, where concept development and education reside under one commanding general,
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The U.S. Army will consolidate its Futures Command with its Training and Doctrine Command under a new command called the Army’s Transformation and Training Command, Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George said during a House Appropriations defense subcommittee posture hearing Wednesday.
The naming comes a week after the service announced sweeping changes to its command structure and formations, with the intention to transform the force while scrapping programs that don’t meet current threats or its vision of overmatching those threats in the future.
-- Defense News
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The Marine Corps combat development process is complex but no more complex than it needs to be to create the future force. A simplified version of the Marine Corps combat development process involves 8 steps. These 8 steps are not strictly sequential but instead are iterative cycles, repeated again and again, as a new solution is developed.
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1. Concept Creation.
The future Marine Corps begins with a concept, a picture, a scenario of future conflict.
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2. Capability Comparison.
Current Marine capabilities are compared to capabilities needed in the future.
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3. Gap Analysis.
Capability gaps are identified that need filled so the future force will be ready for future conflict.
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4. DOTMLPFP Review.
DOTMLPFP is an acronym for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership & education, personnel, facilities, and policy. In other words, a capability gap that needs to be filled might be filled, not by a piece of gear, but by a new school, new training, new facilities, or new policy.
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5. Testing & Experimentation.
Possible DOTMLPFP solutions must undergo rigorous testing and experimentation.
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6. Integration.
Integrate and coordinate within the Marine Corps and with joint and combined partners.
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7. Requirements.
Define requirements for acquisition.
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8. Programming.
Support the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) process.
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Together, the eight steps build the future Marine Corps. It all begins with a concept.
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Marine Corps concepts propose new and innovative approaches for addressing current or future gaps, shortfalls, or challenges for which existing methods or capabilities are ineffective, insufficient, or nonexistent.
-- MCO 5401.1 Concept Generation
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It is unfortunate, however, that just as the Army admits the wisdom of the Marine Corps' comprehensive combat development, where concept development and education reside under one commanding general, the Marine Corps itself has abandoned comprehensive combat development. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command has been fractured. Concepts and education are no longer side by side under one commander. The Marine Corps has broken off education from combat development. Training and education are no longer part of combat development command, but are a separate command under their own 3 star general.
This separation has fragmented the successful comprehensive combat development process. The separation has also seen the creation of a new three start billet. The Department of Defense today is stalking unnecessary 4 star and 3 star billets. The Marine Corps has unnecessarily created another 3 star billet.
LtGen Austin, the Commanding General of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, needs to take the lead in putting combat development back together again.
Concept development and education can and should be put back together. Does comprehensive combat development matter? Yes it does. Nearly six years ago, Marine Corps leaders largely ignored and by-passed the proven, comprehensive combat development process. The result was a rash and hasty hijacking of the focus of the Marine Corps from worldwide crisis response to regional sensor and missile units on islands off the coast of China. It was not the Marine Corps Combat Development Command at Quantico that drove the Marine Corps to destroy or degrade so many combined arms units, equipment, and capabilities including armor, artillery, air, infantry, engineering, snipers, and more.
As important as it is for autonomous aircraft to have a foundation of combat development and integration, it is even more important for the broader Marine Corps. Comprehensive combat development in the Marine Corps has been fractured, bypassed, and too often ignored. The result has been a misguided mess of a sensor and missile plan that threatens to change the Marine Corps from an offensive force to a defensive force, from a global force to a regional force, and from a flexible combined arms force to narrow island missile units.
Compass Points salutes all the Marines and friends of the Corps working to put back together both comprehensive combat development and the global combined arms Marine Corps.
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Defense Scoop - 07/09/2025
Marine Corps requests more funding for collaborative combat aircraft development
By Jon Harper
https://defensescoop.com/2025/07/09/marine-corps-cca-mux-tacair-fy26-budget-request/
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DIVIDS Hub - 08/09/2024
Lt. Gen. Karsten S. Heckl transfers command to Lt. Gen Eric E. Austin during MCCDC Change of Command
By Cathleen Close
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Defense News - 05/08/2025
Army names newly combined futures and training command
By Jen Judson
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2025/05/08/army-names-newly-combined-futures-and-training-command/
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I commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command when it first reached full operational capabilities after the yeomen efforts of Generals Boomer, Krulak, and Wilhelm to turn General Gray’s vision into reality. It was the smoothest functioning command I ever led. The command had four generals, a three-star, a two-star, and two one-stars. The Warfighting Lab at the time was led by a colonel. Later the Warfighting Lab’s charter expanded, and it was commanded by a one-star. In summary, I was able to exercise command with four generals counting myself and had no issues in doing so.
When the 38th Commandant and future 39th Commandant split doctrine, training, and education away from MCCDC into a new Training and Education Command they destroyed the synergy that General Gray and my predecessors created . One could consider this the original sin in what I personally consider two failed commandants and the antecedents of Force Design 2030. TECOM now has five generals and MCCDC four generals. Nine generals overseeing the functions of what under a single command required four generals, five counting the larger Warfighting Lab. I wish I could say I was able to do with four generals what now takes nine generals, but the reality is the separation of doctrine, training, and education from MCCDC was pure stupidity.
Working on improving my cutting score so I wrote this Book Report: Strategic Missteps in Before the First Shots Are Fired and Chowder II’s Opposition to Force Design 2030
Introduction
General Anthony Zinni’s Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win or Lose Off the Battlefield (2014), co-authored with Tony Koltz, provides a critical framework for understanding the strategic prerequisites for successful military operations. Drawing on Zinni’s extensive experience as a Marine Corps officer and former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, the book emphasizes the alignment of political and military objectives, the integration of non-military instruments, and the necessity of adapting to modern warfare. However, the irony of Zinni’s involvement with Chowder II, a group of retired Marine generals opposing the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, reveals a disconnect between the book’s principles and their actions. This paper evaluates Chowder II’s campaign against Force Design 2030 through the lens of Zinni’s strategic lessons, highlighting critical mistakes that undermine their critique and offer lessons for future military leaders.
Summary of Before the First Shots Are Fired
Zinni’s book argues that wars are won or lost through decisions made before combat begins. Using historical examples such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Zinni identifies systemic failures in U.S. strategy, including misaligned political-military objectives, under-resourced civilian agencies, and outdated approaches to warfare. His key lessons include:
1. Political-Military Alignment: Success requires synchronized political and military goals to avoid mission creep and strategic failure.
2. Strengthening Non-Military Instruments: Agencies like the State Department and USAID must be adequately funded and structured to support military efforts.
3. Adapting to Modern Warfare: Fourth Generation Warfare—characterized by non-state actors, cyber threats, and hybrid conflicts—demands flexibility over traditional firepower.
4. Learning from History: Past failures, such as inadequate post-war planning in Iraq, must inform future strategies.
5. Defining Success Metrics: Effective strategies prioritize long-term stability over short-term tactical victories. Zinni advocates for a “whole of government” approach, urging reforms like a professional civilian national security corps to enhance strategic coherence. The book’s clarity and historical grounding make it a valuable resource for military planners.
Chowder II and Force Design 2030
Chowder II, a group of retired Marine generals including Zinni, echoes the WWII-era “Chowder and Marching Society” that defended the Marine Corps from post-war cuts. Their current mission opposes Force Design 2030, a Marine Corps initiative under General David Berger to reorient the service toward great power competition, particularly against China. Force Design divests legacy systems like tanks and artillery to invest in anti-ship missiles, unmanned systems, and agile, expeditionary units optimized for Indo-Pacific operations. In a series of articles published in The National Interest, Chowder II argues that this shift renders the Marine Corps “irrelevant” to global contingencies, logistically unsupportable, and overly focused on a single threat. Their proposed alternative emphasizes a return to traditional capabilities, including heavy armor and larger infantry formations.
Analysis: Chowder II’s Missteps Through Zinni’s Lens
The irony of Zinni’s leadership in Chowder II lies in their disregard for the principles articulated in his own book. Below, Chowder II’s campaign is evaluated against Zinni’s five key lessons, highlighting critical strategic mistakes.
1. Failure to Align with Political-Military Objectives Zinni’s book underscores the necessity of aligning military strategy with national political priorities. The 2018 National Defense Strategy prioritizes great power competition, particularly with China, necessitating a Marine Corps optimized for maritime and littoral operations. Chowder II’s advocacy for a tank-heavy, globally deployable force ignores this strategic pivot, reflecting a disconnect with current political guidance. Zinni’s own emphasis on alignment suggests that Chowder II’s resistance risks rendering the Marine Corps irrelevant to national priorities, a direct contradiction of his book’s guidance.
2. Neglect of Non-Military Instruments Zinni argues that underfunded civilian agencies, such as the State Department and USAID, are critical to achieving strategic objectives. Chowder II’s critique focuses exclusively on military hardware—tanks, artillery, and infantry—without addressing the broader interagency context. This omission disregards Zinni’s call for a “whole of government” approach, leaving their vision incomplete and misaligned with the integrated strategy Zinni champions.
3. Resistance to Modern Warfare Adaptation Zinni’s book stresses the need to adapt to Fourth Generation Warfare, characterized by dispersed, technology-driven conflicts. Force Design 2030’s emphasis on anti-ship missiles and small, expeditionary units aligns with this reality, particularly in the Indo-Pacific’s contested maritime environment. Chowder II’s insistence on reinvesting in legacy systems like tanks reflects a preference for conventional warfare models, contradicting Zinni’s advocacy for flexibility and innovation. This resistance risks preparing the Marine Corps for the last war rather than the next.
4. Ignoring Historical Lessons Zinni’s analysis of historical failures, such as Iraq’s lack of post-war planning, emphasizes learning from past mistakes. Chowder II’s critique of Force Design’s “divest to invest” strategy fails to account for the lessons of recent conflicts, where heavy armor proved ineffective in Ukraine. By advocating a return to capabilities ill-suited for modern contingencies, Chowder II disregards Zinni’s call to apply historical insights, undermining their credibility.
5. Lack of Clear Success Metrics Zinni’s book emphasizes defining success beyond tactical victories, focusing on long-term stability and societal outcomes. Chowder II’s articles offer vague assertions about a “more capable” Marine Corps without articulating specific metrics or a coherent alternative to Force Design. Their reliance on ad hominem attacks, such as labeling current leadership “operationally incompetent,” further violates Zinni’s principle of constructive critique, weakening morale and cohesion.
Critical Mistakes and Implications
Chowder II’s most significant error, led by Zinni, is their failure to propose a viable alternative strategy. Zinni’s book demands a forward-looking, integrated approach that adapts to emerging threats and learns from history. Instead, Chowder II offers a nostalgic vision that prioritizes outdated capabilities over strategic relevance. Their public campaign, marked by inflammatory rhetoric, risks undermining Marine Corps unity and public confidence, a direct violation of Zinni’s call for disciplined, constructive dialogue. The irony of Zinni’s involvement is profound: his book provides a blueprint for strategic success, yet his leadership in Chowder II exemplifies the very missteps he critiques.
Conclusion
Before the First Shots Are Fired offers a timeless framework for strategic planning, emphasizing alignment, adaptability, and historical awareness. Chowder II’s opposition to Force Design 2030, led by Zinni himself, fails to heed these lessons, resulting in a critique that is strategically incoherent and divisive. For Marine Corps officers at the Command and Staff College, this juxtaposition serves as a cautionary tale: even seasoned leaders can fall prey to nostalgia and lose sight of their own principles. Future leaders must prioritize strategic alignment, embrace innovation, and offer constructive solutions to ensure the Marine Corps remains relevant in an evolving global landscape.