I commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command when it first reached full operational capabilities after the yeomen efforts of Generals Boomer, Krulak, and Wilhelm to turn General Gray’s vision into reality. It was the smoothest functioning command I ever led. The command had four generals, a three-star, a two-star, and two one-stars. The Warfighting Lab at the time was led by a colonel. Later the Warfighting Lab’s charter expanded, and it was commanded by a one-star. In summary, I was able to exercise command with four generals counting myself and had no issues in doing so.
When the 38th Commandant and future 39th Commandant split doctrine, training, and education away from MCCDC into a new Training and Education Command they destroyed the synergy that General Gray and my predecessors created . One could consider this the original sin in what I personally consider two failed commandants and the antecedents of Force Design 2030. TECOM now has five generals and MCCDC four generals. Nine generals overseeing the functions of what under a single command required four generals, five counting the larger Warfighting Lab. I wish I could say I was able to do with four generals what now takes nine generals, but the reality is the separation of doctrine, training, and education from MCCDC was pure stupidity.
Except for an article by Owen West several years ago and a more recent one by Ben Connable, War on the Rocks has appeared to be a HQMC "mouthpiece." Our team submitted an article some time ago and the editor never acknowledged it even when queried. Today's article spends most of its words attacking the "messengers" while not addressing our message. I see the editor as a "lightweight" and pay little heed to his publication.
Working on improving my cutting score so I wrote this Book Report: Strategic Missteps in Before the First Shots Are Fired and Chowder II’s Opposition to Force Design 2030
Introduction
General Anthony Zinni’s Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win or Lose Off the Battlefield (2014), co-authored with Tony Koltz, provides a critical framework for understanding the strategic prerequisites for successful military operations. Drawing on Zinni’s extensive experience as a Marine Corps officer and former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, the book emphasizes the alignment of political and military objectives, the integration of non-military instruments, and the necessity of adapting to modern warfare. However, the irony of Zinni’s involvement with Chowder II, a group of retired Marine generals opposing the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, reveals a disconnect between the book’s principles and their actions. This paper evaluates Chowder II’s campaign against Force Design 2030 through the lens of Zinni’s strategic lessons, highlighting critical mistakes that undermine their critique and offer lessons for future military leaders.
Summary of Before the First Shots Are Fired
Zinni’s book argues that wars are won or lost through decisions made before combat begins. Using historical examples such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Zinni identifies systemic failures in U.S. strategy, including misaligned political-military objectives, under-resourced civilian agencies, and outdated approaches to warfare. His key lessons include:
1. Political-Military Alignment: Success requires synchronized political and military goals to avoid mission creep and strategic failure.
2. Strengthening Non-Military Instruments: Agencies like the State Department and USAID must be adequately funded and structured to support military efforts.
3. Adapting to Modern Warfare: Fourth Generation Warfare—characterized by non-state actors, cyber threats, and hybrid conflicts—demands flexibility over traditional firepower.
4. Learning from History: Past failures, such as inadequate post-war planning in Iraq, must inform future strategies.
5. Defining Success Metrics: Effective strategies prioritize long-term stability over short-term tactical victories. Zinni advocates for a “whole of government” approach, urging reforms like a professional civilian national security corps to enhance strategic coherence. The book’s clarity and historical grounding make it a valuable resource for military planners.
Chowder II and Force Design 2030
Chowder II, a group of retired Marine generals including Zinni, echoes the WWII-era “Chowder and Marching Society” that defended the Marine Corps from post-war cuts. Their current mission opposes Force Design 2030, a Marine Corps initiative under General David Berger to reorient the service toward great power competition, particularly against China. Force Design divests legacy systems like tanks and artillery to invest in anti-ship missiles, unmanned systems, and agile, expeditionary units optimized for Indo-Pacific operations. In a series of articles published in The National Interest, Chowder II argues that this shift renders the Marine Corps “irrelevant” to global contingencies, logistically unsupportable, and overly focused on a single threat. Their proposed alternative emphasizes a return to traditional capabilities, including heavy armor and larger infantry formations.
Analysis: Chowder II’s Missteps Through Zinni’s Lens
The irony of Zinni’s leadership in Chowder II lies in their disregard for the principles articulated in his own book. Below, Chowder II’s campaign is evaluated against Zinni’s five key lessons, highlighting critical strategic mistakes.
1. Failure to Align with Political-Military Objectives Zinni’s book underscores the necessity of aligning military strategy with national political priorities. The 2018 National Defense Strategy prioritizes great power competition, particularly with China, necessitating a Marine Corps optimized for maritime and littoral operations. Chowder II’s advocacy for a tank-heavy, globally deployable force ignores this strategic pivot, reflecting a disconnect with current political guidance. Zinni’s own emphasis on alignment suggests that Chowder II’s resistance risks rendering the Marine Corps irrelevant to national priorities, a direct contradiction of his book’s guidance.
2. Neglect of Non-Military Instruments Zinni argues that underfunded civilian agencies, such as the State Department and USAID, are critical to achieving strategic objectives. Chowder II’s critique focuses exclusively on military hardware—tanks, artillery, and infantry—without addressing the broader interagency context. This omission disregards Zinni’s call for a “whole of government” approach, leaving their vision incomplete and misaligned with the integrated strategy Zinni champions.
3. Resistance to Modern Warfare Adaptation Zinni’s book stresses the need to adapt to Fourth Generation Warfare, characterized by dispersed, technology-driven conflicts. Force Design 2030’s emphasis on anti-ship missiles and small, expeditionary units aligns with this reality, particularly in the Indo-Pacific’s contested maritime environment. Chowder II’s insistence on reinvesting in legacy systems like tanks reflects a preference for conventional warfare models, contradicting Zinni’s advocacy for flexibility and innovation. This resistance risks preparing the Marine Corps for the last war rather than the next.
4. Ignoring Historical Lessons Zinni’s analysis of historical failures, such as Iraq’s lack of post-war planning, emphasizes learning from past mistakes. Chowder II’s critique of Force Design’s “divest to invest” strategy fails to account for the lessons of recent conflicts, where heavy armor proved ineffective in Ukraine. By advocating a return to capabilities ill-suited for modern contingencies, Chowder II disregards Zinni’s call to apply historical insights, undermining their credibility.
5. Lack of Clear Success Metrics Zinni’s book emphasizes defining success beyond tactical victories, focusing on long-term stability and societal outcomes. Chowder II’s articles offer vague assertions about a “more capable” Marine Corps without articulating specific metrics or a coherent alternative to Force Design. Their reliance on ad hominem attacks, such as labeling current leadership “operationally incompetent,” further violates Zinni’s principle of constructive critique, weakening morale and cohesion.
Critical Mistakes and Implications
Chowder II’s most significant error, led by Zinni, is their failure to propose a viable alternative strategy. Zinni’s book demands a forward-looking, integrated approach that adapts to emerging threats and learns from history. Instead, Chowder II offers a nostalgic vision that prioritizes outdated capabilities over strategic relevance. Their public campaign, marked by inflammatory rhetoric, risks undermining Marine Corps unity and public confidence, a direct violation of Zinni’s call for disciplined, constructive dialogue. The irony of Zinni’s involvement is profound: his book provides a blueprint for strategic success, yet his leadership in Chowder II exemplifies the very missteps he critiques.
Conclusion
Before the First Shots Are Fired offers a timeless framework for strategic planning, emphasizing alignment, adaptability, and historical awareness. Chowder II’s opposition to Force Design 2030, led by Zinni himself, fails to heed these lessons, resulting in a critique that is strategically incoherent and divisive. For Marine Corps officers at the Command and Staff College, this juxtaposition serves as a cautionary tale: even seasoned leaders can fall prey to nostalgia and lose sight of their own principles. Future leaders must prioritize strategic alignment, embrace innovation, and offer constructive solutions to ensure the Marine Corps remains relevant in an evolving global landscape.
"For those of you who haven’t been following the biggest family feud the Marine Corps has had in generations, let me quickly catch you up. In response to congressional scrutiny, presidential policy, and secretary of defense guidance, Gen. (ret.) David Berger, as commandant, launched ambitious reforms known as Force Design 2030, beginning in 2019. "
"They call themselves “Chowder II” after the Chowder Society, an informal group of Marine officers formed in 1946 to defend the institutional independence and future of the U.S. Marine Corps after World War II. Their methods have been unprecedented. They have employed doomsday rhetoric and distortions with such shameless fervor you’d think Force Design 2030 was a Chinese plot and not a strategy to stop one. Neither Congress nor three presidential administrations (Trump I, Biden, and Trump II) have found any merit in the arguments of the Chowderites."
An example of USMC’s “fractured unified combat development system” is its dalliance w battery powered WIG craft. H.I. Sutton is an expert in the study of this technology. His summary of why WIG will not work can be viewed on You Tube. Today one can also see Regent Air making a commercial for their WIG using an Active Duty Marine from the MCWF LAB taking a test ride in their craft. Grok on HI Sutton and WIG:H.I. Sutton, a noted defense analyst, has not explicitly detailed why Seagliders or Wing-in-Ground (WIG) craft are unsuitable for warfare in a single comprehensive source, but insights from his work and related analyses provide a basis for understanding their limitations in military contexts. Drawing from available information, including web sources and posts on X, here are the key reasons why Seagliders and WIG craft may be considered unsuitable or challenging for warfare applications, despite some military interest:
1. **Operational Limitations in Rough Seas**: WIG craft, including Seagliders, are highly sensitive to sea state, typically limited to operating in Sea State 4 (2.5m waves) or lower, which equates to Beaufort Force 5 winds (up to 20 knots). Rough seas with higher waves reduce their efficiency and safety, as they rely on stable ground effect for lift. This makes them unreliable for military operations in adverse weather, where consistent performance is critical. For example, historical WIG designs like the Soviet ekranoplans struggled with poor wave tolerance, and while modern Seagliders incorporate hydrofoils to improve this, they still face limitations in high sea states compared to traditional naval vessels.[](https://www.regentcraft.com/news/why-the-seaglider-craft-will-succeed-where-the-ekranoplan-failed)[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)
2. **Maneuverability Challenges**: WIG craft have a large turning radius at their typical cruising speeds (100–150 knots), which makes them less agile and a potential hazard in areas with small vessels like fishing boats or recreational craft. In warfare, this lack of maneuverability could hinder evasion of threats or navigation in congested littoral zones, where rapid response to enemy actions is essential. While digital radar and collision avoidance systems are being developed to mitigate this, these are not yet fully proven in combat scenarios.[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)
8. **Specific Military Use Case Limitations**: While REGENT is collaborating with the U.S. Marine Corps to explore Seagliders for logistics–
*My apologies for the incomplete response. I got a bit carried away with summarizing the limitations of Seagliders and WIG craft!* 😅 Let me wrap this up concisely and directly address why they may not be suitable for warfare, based on the available context and critical analysis:
H.I. Sutton, known for his naval and defense analysis, often focuses on practical and strategic considerations for military platforms, but no direct quote from him specifically dismisses Seagliders or WIG craft for warfare. However, drawing from his broader work on naval technology and the provided sources, several factors highlight why these craft may be unsuitable for military applications, despite some interest (e.g., U.S. Marine Corps testing):
“As of August 6, 2025, the current U.S. law regarding post-retirement employment of generals and admirals includes the following key points:
- **Foreign Employment Restriction (37 U.S.C. § 908)**: Retired officers, including generals and admirals, must obtain approval from the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State before accepting employment with a foreign government or its agents, including roles in military equipment procurement or R&D. Violations can result in forfeiture of retirement pay.
- **Procurement Integrity Act (41 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.)**: Prohibits involvement in procurement activities for one year post-retirement if they had access to non-public, source-selection information during service, applicable to those in acquisition roles.
- **Post-Employment Restrictions (18 U.S.C. § 207)**: Imposes a one-year cooling-off period during which retired officers cannot represent others before the government on matters they worked on while in service. For senior officials, this may extend to two years depending on their prior roles.
- **DoD Ethics Regulations (DoD Directive 5500.07-R)**: Encourages avoiding positions that exploit military experience for personal gain, though this is a policy guideline rather than a legal mandate.
There is no blanket ban on employment with U.S. defense contractors in procurement or R&D, but compliance with conflict-of-interest laws and ethical guidelines is required, with enforcement varying case by case.
_Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don't share information that can identify you._”
Status of Grok:”The Penetrating Affordable Autonomous Collaborative Killer-Portfolio (PAACK-P) program is an ongoing initiative primarily led by the U.S. Marine Corps, focused on experimenting with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to develop affordable, autonomous, and collaborative platforms. As of August 2025, the program continues to evolve, with significant testing involving the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie drone. The Marine Corps has conducted multiple flight tests, including the first on October 3, 2023, and subsequent tests in February, September, and October 2024, with the latest during Emerald Flag 2024 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. These tests have evaluated the XQ-58A's capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), autonomous electronic support, and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with platforms like the F-35B.
The program has progressed through six planned test flights, with objectives including integrating Link-16 tactical data links and demonstrating the drone's role as a forward-deployed sensing platform. In April 2025, Kratos officials indicated they are close to finalizing production versions for the Marine Corps, with at least two mission configurations (possibly for electronic attack and kinetic strikes) in development at their Oklahoma facilities. The PAACK-P is transitioning into the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Unmanned Aerial System Expeditionary (MUX) Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) program, with a $34.9 million contract modification in January 2025 supporting further development and flight tests.
The XQ-58 Valkyrie, a key platform in this experimentation, has been tested for its stealth, long-range (over 2,000 nautical miles), and high-subsonic capabilities, often alongside F-35s and other joint forces. However, the program remains in the experimental phase, with no public confirmation of full operational deployment. Challenges include defining clear leadership and integrating advanced technologies, while the focus on affordability and attritability suggests a strategic shift toward cost-effective mass deployment, though specifics on production scale or operational readiness remain undisclosed.”
What is Skyryse? Grok:”Skyryse is an aerospace technology company founded in 2016, headquartered in El Segundo, California, focused on revolutionizing aviation safety and accessibility. It develops SkyOS, a proprietary flight operating system that simplifies aircraft control using a single control stick and two touchscreens, supported by a triply-redundant fly-by-wire system. SkyOS can be retrofitted onto various aircraft, including helicopters and fixed-wing planes, aiming to reduce pilot workload, enhance safety, and enable novices to fly with minimal training. The company's first product, Skyryse One, is a modified Robinson R66 helicopter powered by SkyOS, featuring automated safety features like dynamic envelope protection and autorotation. Skyryse has raised over $290 million from investors and is working on FAA certification, with applications extending to partnerships with the U.S. Army and urban air mobility.”!
Current disposition of said GO, Grok:”Lt. Gen. Karsten S. Heckl retired from the U.S. Marine Corps on August 9, 2024, after relinquishing command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the office of Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. Since retiring, he has taken on roles as a strategic advisor for Skyryse® and a member of the Senior Advisory Board for Xiphos Partners, focusing on advanced technology and military applications.”
I commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command when it first reached full operational capabilities after the yeomen efforts of Generals Boomer, Krulak, and Wilhelm to turn General Gray’s vision into reality. It was the smoothest functioning command I ever led. The command had four generals, a three-star, a two-star, and two one-stars. The Warfighting Lab at the time was led by a colonel. Later the Warfighting Lab’s charter expanded, and it was commanded by a one-star. In summary, I was able to exercise command with four generals counting myself and had no issues in doing so.
When the 38th Commandant and future 39th Commandant split doctrine, training, and education away from MCCDC into a new Training and Education Command they destroyed the synergy that General Gray and my predecessors created . One could consider this the original sin in what I personally consider two failed commandants and the antecedents of Force Design 2030. TECOM now has five generals and MCCDC four generals. Nine generals overseeing the functions of what under a single command required four generals, five counting the larger Warfighting Lab. I wish I could say I was able to do with four generals what now takes nine generals, but the reality is the separation of doctrine, training, and education from MCCDC was pure stupidity.
The current SecDef desires a reduction in GOs the SecNav should seek your advice and return to the Original MCCDC !
General,
I am sure you are aware of the article I just posted. He basically calls you disingenuous in your arguments.
And worst, he actually is making an underlying argument for the Corps to rid itself of the MEU.
Except for an article by Owen West several years ago and a more recent one by Ben Connable, War on the Rocks has appeared to be a HQMC "mouthpiece." Our team submitted an article some time ago and the editor never acknowledged it even when queried. Today's article spends most of its words attacking the "messengers" while not addressing our message. I see the editor as a "lightweight" and pay little heed to his publication.
Working on improving my cutting score so I wrote this Book Report: Strategic Missteps in Before the First Shots Are Fired and Chowder II’s Opposition to Force Design 2030
Introduction
General Anthony Zinni’s Before the First Shots Are Fired: How America Can Win or Lose Off the Battlefield (2014), co-authored with Tony Koltz, provides a critical framework for understanding the strategic prerequisites for successful military operations. Drawing on Zinni’s extensive experience as a Marine Corps officer and former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Central Command, the book emphasizes the alignment of political and military objectives, the integration of non-military instruments, and the necessity of adapting to modern warfare. However, the irony of Zinni’s involvement with Chowder II, a group of retired Marine generals opposing the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030, reveals a disconnect between the book’s principles and their actions. This paper evaluates Chowder II’s campaign against Force Design 2030 through the lens of Zinni’s strategic lessons, highlighting critical mistakes that undermine their critique and offer lessons for future military leaders.
Summary of Before the First Shots Are Fired
Zinni’s book argues that wars are won or lost through decisions made before combat begins. Using historical examples such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Zinni identifies systemic failures in U.S. strategy, including misaligned political-military objectives, under-resourced civilian agencies, and outdated approaches to warfare. His key lessons include:
1. Political-Military Alignment: Success requires synchronized political and military goals to avoid mission creep and strategic failure.
2. Strengthening Non-Military Instruments: Agencies like the State Department and USAID must be adequately funded and structured to support military efforts.
3. Adapting to Modern Warfare: Fourth Generation Warfare—characterized by non-state actors, cyber threats, and hybrid conflicts—demands flexibility over traditional firepower.
4. Learning from History: Past failures, such as inadequate post-war planning in Iraq, must inform future strategies.
5. Defining Success Metrics: Effective strategies prioritize long-term stability over short-term tactical victories. Zinni advocates for a “whole of government” approach, urging reforms like a professional civilian national security corps to enhance strategic coherence. The book’s clarity and historical grounding make it a valuable resource for military planners.
Chowder II and Force Design 2030
Chowder II, a group of retired Marine generals including Zinni, echoes the WWII-era “Chowder and Marching Society” that defended the Marine Corps from post-war cuts. Their current mission opposes Force Design 2030, a Marine Corps initiative under General David Berger to reorient the service toward great power competition, particularly against China. Force Design divests legacy systems like tanks and artillery to invest in anti-ship missiles, unmanned systems, and agile, expeditionary units optimized for Indo-Pacific operations. In a series of articles published in The National Interest, Chowder II argues that this shift renders the Marine Corps “irrelevant” to global contingencies, logistically unsupportable, and overly focused on a single threat. Their proposed alternative emphasizes a return to traditional capabilities, including heavy armor and larger infantry formations.
Analysis: Chowder II’s Missteps Through Zinni’s Lens
The irony of Zinni’s leadership in Chowder II lies in their disregard for the principles articulated in his own book. Below, Chowder II’s campaign is evaluated against Zinni’s five key lessons, highlighting critical strategic mistakes.
1. Failure to Align with Political-Military Objectives Zinni’s book underscores the necessity of aligning military strategy with national political priorities. The 2018 National Defense Strategy prioritizes great power competition, particularly with China, necessitating a Marine Corps optimized for maritime and littoral operations. Chowder II’s advocacy for a tank-heavy, globally deployable force ignores this strategic pivot, reflecting a disconnect with current political guidance. Zinni’s own emphasis on alignment suggests that Chowder II’s resistance risks rendering the Marine Corps irrelevant to national priorities, a direct contradiction of his book’s guidance.
2. Neglect of Non-Military Instruments Zinni argues that underfunded civilian agencies, such as the State Department and USAID, are critical to achieving strategic objectives. Chowder II’s critique focuses exclusively on military hardware—tanks, artillery, and infantry—without addressing the broader interagency context. This omission disregards Zinni’s call for a “whole of government” approach, leaving their vision incomplete and misaligned with the integrated strategy Zinni champions.
3. Resistance to Modern Warfare Adaptation Zinni’s book stresses the need to adapt to Fourth Generation Warfare, characterized by dispersed, technology-driven conflicts. Force Design 2030’s emphasis on anti-ship missiles and small, expeditionary units aligns with this reality, particularly in the Indo-Pacific’s contested maritime environment. Chowder II’s insistence on reinvesting in legacy systems like tanks reflects a preference for conventional warfare models, contradicting Zinni’s advocacy for flexibility and innovation. This resistance risks preparing the Marine Corps for the last war rather than the next.
4. Ignoring Historical Lessons Zinni’s analysis of historical failures, such as Iraq’s lack of post-war planning, emphasizes learning from past mistakes. Chowder II’s critique of Force Design’s “divest to invest” strategy fails to account for the lessons of recent conflicts, where heavy armor proved ineffective in Ukraine. By advocating a return to capabilities ill-suited for modern contingencies, Chowder II disregards Zinni’s call to apply historical insights, undermining their credibility.
5. Lack of Clear Success Metrics Zinni’s book emphasizes defining success beyond tactical victories, focusing on long-term stability and societal outcomes. Chowder II’s articles offer vague assertions about a “more capable” Marine Corps without articulating specific metrics or a coherent alternative to Force Design. Their reliance on ad hominem attacks, such as labeling current leadership “operationally incompetent,” further violates Zinni’s principle of constructive critique, weakening morale and cohesion.
Critical Mistakes and Implications
Chowder II’s most significant error, led by Zinni, is their failure to propose a viable alternative strategy. Zinni’s book demands a forward-looking, integrated approach that adapts to emerging threats and learns from history. Instead, Chowder II offers a nostalgic vision that prioritizes outdated capabilities over strategic relevance. Their public campaign, marked by inflammatory rhetoric, risks undermining Marine Corps unity and public confidence, a direct violation of Zinni’s call for disciplined, constructive dialogue. The irony of Zinni’s involvement is profound: his book provides a blueprint for strategic success, yet his leadership in Chowder II exemplifies the very missteps he critiques.
Conclusion
Before the First Shots Are Fired offers a timeless framework for strategic planning, emphasizing alignment, adaptability, and historical awareness. Chowder II’s opposition to Force Design 2030, led by Zinni himself, fails to heed these lessons, resulting in a critique that is strategically incoherent and divisive. For Marine Corps officers at the Command and Staff College, this juxtaposition serves as a cautionary tale: even seasoned leaders can fall prey to nostalgia and lose sight of their own principles. Future leaders must prioritize strategic alignment, embrace innovation, and offer constructive solutions to ensure the Marine Corps remains relevant in an evolving global landscape.
https://warontherocks.com/2025/08/the-marine-corps-americans-want-cant-be-derailed-by-a-fake-crisis/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
"For those of you who haven’t been following the biggest family feud the Marine Corps has had in generations, let me quickly catch you up. In response to congressional scrutiny, presidential policy, and secretary of defense guidance, Gen. (ret.) David Berger, as commandant, launched ambitious reforms known as Force Design 2030, beginning in 2019. "
"They call themselves “Chowder II” after the Chowder Society, an informal group of Marine officers formed in 1946 to defend the institutional independence and future of the U.S. Marine Corps after World War II. Their methods have been unprecedented. They have employed doomsday rhetoric and distortions with such shameless fervor you’d think Force Design 2030 was a Chinese plot and not a strategy to stop one. Neither Congress nor three presidential administrations (Trump I, Biden, and Trump II) have found any merit in the arguments of the Chowderites."
Great article!!
Thanks for posting.
An example of USMC’s “fractured unified combat development system” is its dalliance w battery powered WIG craft. H.I. Sutton is an expert in the study of this technology. His summary of why WIG will not work can be viewed on You Tube. Today one can also see Regent Air making a commercial for their WIG using an Active Duty Marine from the MCWF LAB taking a test ride in their craft. Grok on HI Sutton and WIG:H.I. Sutton, a noted defense analyst, has not explicitly detailed why Seagliders or Wing-in-Ground (WIG) craft are unsuitable for warfare in a single comprehensive source, but insights from his work and related analyses provide a basis for understanding their limitations in military contexts. Drawing from available information, including web sources and posts on X, here are the key reasons why Seagliders and WIG craft may be considered unsuitable or challenging for warfare applications, despite some military interest:
1. **Operational Limitations in Rough Seas**: WIG craft, including Seagliders, are highly sensitive to sea state, typically limited to operating in Sea State 4 (2.5m waves) or lower, which equates to Beaufort Force 5 winds (up to 20 knots). Rough seas with higher waves reduce their efficiency and safety, as they rely on stable ground effect for lift. This makes them unreliable for military operations in adverse weather, where consistent performance is critical. For example, historical WIG designs like the Soviet ekranoplans struggled with poor wave tolerance, and while modern Seagliders incorporate hydrofoils to improve this, they still face limitations in high sea states compared to traditional naval vessels.[](https://www.regentcraft.com/news/why-the-seaglider-craft-will-succeed-where-the-ekranoplan-failed)[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)
2. **Maneuverability Challenges**: WIG craft have a large turning radius at their typical cruising speeds (100–150 knots), which makes them less agile and a potential hazard in areas with small vessels like fishing boats or recreational craft. In warfare, this lack of maneuverability could hinder evasion of threats or navigation in congested littoral zones, where rapid response to enemy actions is essential. While digital radar and collision avoidance systems are being developed to mitigate this, these are not yet fully proven in combat scenarios.[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)
3. **Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement**: Although Seagliders offer reduced radar and infrared signatures due to their low-altitude flight (within one wingspan of the water), they are not invisible to modern sensors. Operating above sonar but below long-range radar makes them harder to detect in some scenarios, but advanced naval radar systems, anti-ship missiles, and airborne sensors could still track and engage them, especially in contested environments. Their low-altitude operation limits their ability to evade high-altitude threats or missile systems designed for low-flying targets.[](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/us-company-regent-craft-partners-with-uae-to-produce-the-viceroy-seaglider-as-the-us-marine-corps-explore-its-military-potential)[](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/the-us-marines-are-going-back-to-their-roots-with-seagliders-wl)
4. **Limited Payload and Range**: Current Seaglider designs, like REGENT’s Viceroy, have a payload capacity of around 3,500 pounds or 12 passengers and a range of 160–400 nautical miles (electric version) or up to 1,400 nautical miles (hybrid). While suitable for logistics or small-scale operations, this is significantly less than traditional naval vessels or aircraft like the C-17 Globemaster, which can carry much larger payloads over greater distances. For warfare, where heavy equipment, troops, or sustained operations are often required, WIG craft may lack the necessary capacity.[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)[](https://www.twz.com/sea/seaglider-aims-to-deliver-small-groups-of-marines-low-over-the-waves)[](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/the-us-marines-are-going-back-to-their-roots-with-seagliders-wl)
5. **Historical Precedent of Limited Military Success**: The Soviet Union’s ekranoplans, such as the Lun-class, were developed for military purposes (e.g., fast surface attack and anti-submarine warfare) but saw limited operational success. Their high maintenance costs, complexity, and operational constraints in rough seas led to their eventual abandonment after the Cold War. This historical failure suggests inherent challenges in adapting WIG craft for scalable, reliable military use, particularly in high-threat environments.[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)[](https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/top-5-ekranoplans-understanding-wig-craft/)
6. **Dependence on Advanced Technology and Human Skill**: Earlier WIG designs, like ekranoplans, required highly trained pilots to manually control the unstable ground effect, introducing risks of human error. Modern Seagliders use digital flight control systems to address this, but these systems are still in development and untested in combat. Any reliance on complex electronics in warfare could be a vulnerability to electronic countermeasures or system failures under battle conditions.[](https://www.regentcraft.com/news/why-the-seaglider-craft-will-succeed-where-the-ekranoplan-failed)[](https://www.regentcraft.com/news/how-the-seaglider-wing-is-different-from-the-ekranoplan-wing)
7. **Regulatory and Safety Concerns**: WIG craft are classified as maritime vessels under U.S. law and regulated by the Coast Guard, which imposes less stringent standards than the FAA for aircraft. However, their hybrid nature (operating as boats, hydrofoils, and low-altitude fliers) creates safety concerns in combat, where rapid evacuation or collision avoidance is critical. Their aircraft-like construction increases the risk of damage from collisions with surface objects, and limited egress points could complicate emergency evacuations.[](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ground-effect_vehicle)[](https://www.flightglobal.com/airframers/but-is-it-an-aircraft-faa-undecided-on-critical-question-as-regent-seeks-seaglider-guidance/154119.article)
8. **Specific Military Use Case Limitations**: While REGENT is collaborating with the U.S. Marine Corps to explore Seagliders for logistics–
*My apologies for the incomplete response. I got a bit carried away with summarizing the limitations of Seagliders and WIG craft!* 😅 Let me wrap this up concisely and directly address why they may not be suitable for warfare, based on the available context and critical analysis:
H.I. Sutton, known for his naval and defense analysis, often focuses on practical and strategic considerations for military platforms, but no direct quote from him specifically dismisses Seagliders or WIG craft for warfare. However, drawing from his broader work on naval technology and the provided sources, several factors highlight why these craft may be unsuitable for military applications, despite some interest (e.g., U.S. Marine Corps testing):
1. **Environmental Sensitivity**: WIG craft, including Seagliders, are limited to Sea State 4 (2.5m waves) or lower, making them unreliable in rough seas common in combat zones. Their ground-effect operation requires calm conditions for safe takeoff and landing, unlike robust naval ships or aircraft.[](https://www.regentcraft.com/news/why-the-seaglider-craft-will-succeed-where-the-ekranoplan-failed)[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)
2. **Poor Maneuverability**: At cruising speeds (100–150 knots), WIG craft have large turning radii, reducing agility in dynamic combat environments or congested littoral areas, increasing collision risks with smaller vessels or obstacles.[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)
3. **Vulnerability to Threats**: While Seagliders have low radar and infrared signatures, modern naval sensors, missiles, and airborne systems can still detect and engage them, especially in contested waters where high-altitude or missile threats persist.[](https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/us-company-regent-craft-partners-with-uae-to-produce-the-viceroy-seaglider-as-the-us-marine-corps-explore-its-military-potential)[](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/the-us-marines-are-going-back-to-their-roots-with-seagliders-wl)
4. **Limited Payload and Range**: Seagliders like the Viceroy carry only 3,500 pounds or 12 passengers with a 160–400 nautical mile range (electric) or 1,400 miles (hybrid). This pales in comparison to military vessels or aircraft designed for heavy payloads or long-range operations, limiting their utility in large-scale warfare.[](https://www.twz.com/sea/seaglider-aims-to-deliver-small-groups-of-marines-low-over-the-waves)[](https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/the-us-marines-are-going-back-to-their-roots-with-seagliders-wl)
5. **Historical Failures**: Soviet ekranoplans, like the Lun-class, were abandoned due to high costs, maintenance issues, and operational limitations in rough seas, suggesting WIG craft face inherent challenges for scalable military use.[](https://ams-grp.com/pause-for-thought/use-of-wig-wing-in-ground-effect-vessels-in-the-offshore-ogp-sector/)[](https://aerospaceglobalnews.com/news/top-5-ekranoplans-understanding-wig-craft/)
“As of August 6, 2025, the current U.S. law regarding post-retirement employment of generals and admirals includes the following key points:
- **Foreign Employment Restriction (37 U.S.C. § 908)**: Retired officers, including generals and admirals, must obtain approval from the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State before accepting employment with a foreign government or its agents, including roles in military equipment procurement or R&D. Violations can result in forfeiture of retirement pay.
- **Procurement Integrity Act (41 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq.)**: Prohibits involvement in procurement activities for one year post-retirement if they had access to non-public, source-selection information during service, applicable to those in acquisition roles.
- **Post-Employment Restrictions (18 U.S.C. § 207)**: Imposes a one-year cooling-off period during which retired officers cannot represent others before the government on matters they worked on while in service. For senior officials, this may extend to two years depending on their prior roles.
- **DoD Ethics Regulations (DoD Directive 5500.07-R)**: Encourages avoiding positions that exploit military experience for personal gain, though this is a policy guideline rather than a legal mandate.
There is no blanket ban on employment with U.S. defense contractors in procurement or R&D, but compliance with conflict-of-interest laws and ethical guidelines is required, with enforcement varying case by case.
_Disclaimer: Grok is not a lawyer; please consult one. Don't share information that can identify you._”
Status of Grok:”The Penetrating Affordable Autonomous Collaborative Killer-Portfolio (PAACK-P) program is an ongoing initiative primarily led by the U.S. Marine Corps, focused on experimenting with unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to develop affordable, autonomous, and collaborative platforms. As of August 2025, the program continues to evolve, with significant testing involving the Kratos XQ-58 Valkyrie drone. The Marine Corps has conducted multiple flight tests, including the first on October 3, 2023, and subsequent tests in February, September, and October 2024, with the latest during Emerald Flag 2024 at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. These tests have evaluated the XQ-58A's capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR), autonomous electronic support, and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) with platforms like the F-35B.
The program has progressed through six planned test flights, with objectives including integrating Link-16 tactical data links and demonstrating the drone's role as a forward-deployed sensing platform. In April 2025, Kratos officials indicated they are close to finalizing production versions for the Marine Corps, with at least two mission configurations (possibly for electronic attack and kinetic strikes) in development at their Oklahoma facilities. The PAACK-P is transitioning into the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Unmanned Aerial System Expeditionary (MUX) Tactical Aircraft (TACAIR) program, with a $34.9 million contract modification in January 2025 supporting further development and flight tests.
The XQ-58 Valkyrie, a key platform in this experimentation, has been tested for its stealth, long-range (over 2,000 nautical miles), and high-subsonic capabilities, often alongside F-35s and other joint forces. However, the program remains in the experimental phase, with no public confirmation of full operational deployment. Challenges include defining clear leadership and integrating advanced technologies, while the focus on affordability and attritability suggests a strategic shift toward cost-effective mass deployment, though specifics on production scale or operational readiness remain undisclosed.”
What is Skyryse? Grok:”Skyryse is an aerospace technology company founded in 2016, headquartered in El Segundo, California, focused on revolutionizing aviation safety and accessibility. It develops SkyOS, a proprietary flight operating system that simplifies aircraft control using a single control stick and two touchscreens, supported by a triply-redundant fly-by-wire system. SkyOS can be retrofitted onto various aircraft, including helicopters and fixed-wing planes, aiming to reduce pilot workload, enhance safety, and enable novices to fly with minimal training. The company's first product, Skyryse One, is a modified Robinson R66 helicopter powered by SkyOS, featuring automated safety features like dynamic envelope protection and autorotation. Skyryse has raised over $290 million from investors and is working on FAA certification, with applications extending to partnerships with the U.S. Army and urban air mobility.”!
Current disposition of said GO, Grok:”Lt. Gen. Karsten S. Heckl retired from the U.S. Marine Corps on August 9, 2024, after relinquishing command of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and the office of Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration. Since retiring, he has taken on roles as a strategic advisor for Skyryse® and a member of the Senior Advisory Board for Xiphos Partners, focusing on advanced technology and military applications.”