This whole endeavor is fraught with peril! This would have been a very good fit for Navy Amphip CBs and Marine Landing Support (if they still have such an animal) along with some trigger pullers for security. This is what these units do while in harm's way. Not to take anything away from the Army 7th Trans Brigade who I am sure are fully capable but probably not so much in a semi hostile/chaotic environment. Not to be a Debbie downer but this could be disastrous if it proceeds as we are told. Too bad our former Commandant let our Amphib lift go to hell in hand basket along with innumerable other things. I will hope for the best and trust that those in charge are prepared for the worst!!!!
I concur with Major DiMarco, a retired Marine who spent many years and deployments in the embarkation field. As those of us who have experienced amphibious operations know, what is practiced on land is far more difficult once in the water. Just think of the last time you observed an efficient causeway operation from an LST. As for security at the beachfront, transportation soldiers are not selected for their combat capability. A QRF will be needed on stand by. Hopefully this entire boondoggle is nothing more than a political dream and the IDF will have operational control of Gaza before the first boat leaves Ft. Eustis.
Alibi round...once again I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with you. I'll see your 'Navy' and raise one 'time for the USMC to become more aggressive about Navy (mis)Management of Amphibious assets'. Yes, it's a glass house, but the time for passive acceptance and public support for reduced (31) capability is over.
Where are the amphibs? Well, USS Kearsarge is in dry dock, USS Wasp was broken badly and finally got underway, USS Iwo Jima is having issues getting lit off, USS Boxer is also broken badly and USS Makin Island is in drydock.
Funny thing (not haha funny) is that Iwo Jima and Wasp and Boxer all just got out of extensive dry dock periods (2+/- yrs) and they are so broken they are having issues getting underway. Boxer was supposed to deploy last Nov, and Wasp was supposed to be deployed already.
What is going on in the yard periods? The Navy can say what they will about the old MSMO (Multi Ship Mulit Option) contracting style....ships came out of the yards fixed. They switched to a fixed price model and now........the results speak for themselves.
Where are the amphibs? Well, USS Kearsarge is in dry dock, USS Wasp was broken badly and finally got underway, USS Iwo Jima is having issues getting lit off, USS Boxer is also broken badly and USS Makin Island is in drydock.
Funny thing (not haha funny) is that Iwo Jima and Wasp and Boxer all just got out of extensive dry dock periods (2+/- yrs) and they are so broken they are having issues getting underway. Boxer was supposed to deploy last Nov, and Wasp was supposed to be deployed already.
What is going on in the yard periods? The Navy can say what they will about the old MSMO (Multi Ship Mulit Option) contracting style....ships came out of the yards fixed. They switched to a fixed price model and now........the results speak for themselves.
I don't think anyone is advancing the idea of an amphibious assault into Gaza. However, we are advocating here on Compass Points for a strategically mobile, rapid deployable, 911 force the US Marine Corps needs to be and is not today. In 1992 President Bush order USCENTCOM to conduct Operation Restore Hope to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Somalia. The waring factions were preventing the UN from executing their humanitarian operation. CENTCOM's JTF commander used a MEU to make an amphibious assault on Mogadishu to establish a "toe hold" to allow port and airfield operations. A MPF ship was also sent into the port. Once the port was ready humanitarian relief began to flow into country. To ensure the proper distribution, Special Forces Teams were placed at each province capital to make sure the supplies got to the people and not the war lords. This was a join operation with the Marines in the lead.
"The MEU's ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) along with Delta Battery 2nd Battalion 12th Marines, performed simultaneous ship to objective amphibious assaults on the Port of Mogadishu and Mogadishu International Airport, establishing a foothold for additional incoming troops.[28] Echo and Golf Company assaulted the airport by helicopter and Amphibious Assault Vehicles, while Fox Company secured the port with an economy of force rubber boat assault. The 1st Marine Division's Air Contingency Battalion (ACB), 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, as well as 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (3/11 is an artillery battalion but operated as a provisional infantry battalion while in Somalia), arrived soon after the airport was secured. Elements of BLT 2/9's India Co, and 1/7 went on to secure the airport in Baidoa and the city of Bardera, while BLT 2/9's Golf Company, and elements of the Belgian Special Forces, conducted an amphibious landing at the port city of Kismayo. Air support was provided by the combined helicopter units of HMLA-267, HMH-363, HMH-466, HMM-164, and HC-11's DET 10.
Concurrently, various Somali factions returned to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the civil war. This effort was known as the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia and it resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement signed on 27 March 1993.[29] The conference, however, had little result as the civil war continued afterwards."
I remember as we were brought on board the USN ships (I arrived on the USS Vancouver) the Marines were collecting everybody’s weapons regardless of citizenship or official status - in part because they didn’t know any of the Embassy Saigon staff and we were jumbled together with all kinds of people. I had already passed my unauthorized M2 carbine off to someone still on shore so it wasn’t a problem for me. I do believe that many collectors today might weep if they saw an inventory of what was tossed over the side. We also watched as the non Amcits were sent down to the well deck to be moved by the small boats to the Contendor. Last year I offered the Quantico Museum some of the pictures I took especially of identifiable Marines from Vancouver contingent but have yet to hear a final word from them.
Phil - how do. you put a JLOTS over the shore without putting boots on the ground? (answer....you don't). Everyone has more Amphibs than the USMC....we don't have Amphibs...we have a vested interest and primary usage. It is not unheard of for Marines to hitch a ride from Army mariners, or assist and support Joint Maritime Ops.
"Seeking to neither replace nor displace the traditional roles of the US Navy and US Marine Corps, America’s primary landpower institution could rather invest in twenty-first-century coastal fort complexes in forward areas that mitigate vulnerabilities and amplify strengths in order to enable joint protection and maneuver in increasingly lethal maritime environments."
Not directly related to the JLOTS topic- however, the Army is making significant strides toward enabling the joint capability to influence the littoral area. Their approach seeks to "enable decisive naval maneuver within range of adversary systems... [creating] 'windows of opportunity' for potentially vulnerable warships to aggressively move into contested seascapes and deliver devastating strike packages."
In short, the Army strategists are recognizing the serious challenge the joint force is faced with to achieve conditions of local sea denial to enable missions ashore while increasingly linked to fleet actions. The Army has the ability to invest in this area and its taking these steps because the GCCs are asking for this ability. Their look in structure, however, is much bigger than what the USMC is doing in these area (think size of MDTF vs MLR). There are merits in both formations depending on the use case.
The take away here is the Army is planning in earnest to conduct maritime missions directly linked to Navy operations. Given the current resource constraints and demand signal from GCCs does the larger group of contributors here believe this is an area the USMC should also not prepare for?
THE ARMY AND THE FORTRESS FLEET: REIMAGINING LANDPOWER IN MARITIME WARFARE:
Hey Phil...what was the Operation a few years ago? Something like 'Operation Sea Angel'? In Bangladesh? Yeah, that's the one. Definitely not an amphibious assault either...but square in our lane.
Travis - I've been watching that. I think it's part prudence, and part marketing relevance in the current DOD environment. Long range ISR and Fires capability in the Pacific of course has relevance...and does so in most theatres. To your question "should the USMC also not prepare for?" For the sake of argument (and I think there are issues with the context of your question) I'll take it at face value and say 'yes'. But saying that doesn't mean compromising whole and relevant capability sets the way it has been done over the last 4 years. As an analogy, in the past, the USMC developed a ground based nuclear strike capability as part of an effort to prepare for missions that were deemed part of the demand signal at the time. The USMC did not give up other capabilities in order to provide this capability.
Phil - like a bad rash, I keep popping up. What was that Op in Indonesia a few years ago? Unified Assistance! That's the one...something to do with a devastating Tsunami. I don't remember the part where an amphibious assault was conducted as part of the Op. In fact, I don't remember where in the CMC handbook it says 'We can only conduct contested Amphibious Assaults with respect to maneuver from the sea regardless of type operation'.
In fairness, I am not rushing to see Jarheads running back to conduct "Gaza Style Green Beach Presence Ops". But the assertion that over the shore HA ops is out of scope for the USMC is just flat out nonsense. The problem is loss of capability, not mission. More so, since you can't get a JLOTS on shore without boots on the beach...are you saying it is good for the Army to have soldiers on shore (or the Navy) versus Marines?
This whole endeavor is fraught with peril! This would have been a very good fit for Navy Amphip CBs and Marine Landing Support (if they still have such an animal) along with some trigger pullers for security. This is what these units do while in harm's way. Not to take anything away from the Army 7th Trans Brigade who I am sure are fully capable but probably not so much in a semi hostile/chaotic environment. Not to be a Debbie downer but this could be disastrous if it proceeds as we are told. Too bad our former Commandant let our Amphib lift go to hell in hand basket along with innumerable other things. I will hope for the best and trust that those in charge are prepared for the worst!!!!
I concur with Major DiMarco, a retired Marine who spent many years and deployments in the embarkation field. As those of us who have experienced amphibious operations know, what is practiced on land is far more difficult once in the water. Just think of the last time you observed an efficient causeway operation from an LST. As for security at the beachfront, transportation soldiers are not selected for their combat capability. A QRF will be needed on stand by. Hopefully this entire boondoggle is nothing more than a political dream and the IDF will have operational control of Gaza before the first boat leaves Ft. Eustis.
Navy has something to do with amphib capability or lack thereof.
Alibi round...once again I find myself in the unusual position of agreeing with you. I'll see your 'Navy' and raise one 'time for the USMC to become more aggressive about Navy (mis)Management of Amphibious assets'. Yes, it's a glass house, but the time for passive acceptance and public support for reduced (31) capability is over.
Hence my question in an earlier posting. “Who guards the pier””?” MEU is heading home and the army would need to be land based
Where are the amphibs? Well, USS Kearsarge is in dry dock, USS Wasp was broken badly and finally got underway, USS Iwo Jima is having issues getting lit off, USS Boxer is also broken badly and USS Makin Island is in drydock.
Funny thing (not haha funny) is that Iwo Jima and Wasp and Boxer all just got out of extensive dry dock periods (2+/- yrs) and they are so broken they are having issues getting underway. Boxer was supposed to deploy last Nov, and Wasp was supposed to be deployed already.
What is going on in the yard periods? The Navy can say what they will about the old MSMO (Multi Ship Mulit Option) contracting style....ships came out of the yards fixed. They switched to a fixed price model and now........the results speak for themselves.
Where are the amphibs? Well, USS Kearsarge is in dry dock, USS Wasp was broken badly and finally got underway, USS Iwo Jima is having issues getting lit off, USS Boxer is also broken badly and USS Makin Island is in drydock.
Funny thing (not haha funny) is that Iwo Jima and Wasp and Boxer all just got out of extensive dry dock periods (2+/- yrs) and they are so broken they are having issues getting underway. Boxer was supposed to deploy last Nov, and Wasp was supposed to be deployed already.
What is going on in the yard periods? The Navy can say what they will about the old MSMO (Multi Ship Mulit Option) contracting style....ships came out of the yards fixed. They switched to a fixed price model and now........the results speak for themselves.
I don't think anyone is advancing the idea of an amphibious assault into Gaza. However, we are advocating here on Compass Points for a strategically mobile, rapid deployable, 911 force the US Marine Corps needs to be and is not today. In 1992 President Bush order USCENTCOM to conduct Operation Restore Hope to prevent a humanitarian disaster in Somalia. The waring factions were preventing the UN from executing their humanitarian operation. CENTCOM's JTF commander used a MEU to make an amphibious assault on Mogadishu to establish a "toe hold" to allow port and airfield operations. A MPF ship was also sent into the port. Once the port was ready humanitarian relief began to flow into country. To ensure the proper distribution, Special Forces Teams were placed at each province capital to make sure the supplies got to the people and not the war lords. This was a join operation with the Marines in the lead.
"The MEU's ground combat element, Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines (2/9) along with Delta Battery 2nd Battalion 12th Marines, performed simultaneous ship to objective amphibious assaults on the Port of Mogadishu and Mogadishu International Airport, establishing a foothold for additional incoming troops.[28] Echo and Golf Company assaulted the airport by helicopter and Amphibious Assault Vehicles, while Fox Company secured the port with an economy of force rubber boat assault. The 1st Marine Division's Air Contingency Battalion (ACB), 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, as well as 3rd Battalion, 11th Marines (3/11 is an artillery battalion but operated as a provisional infantry battalion while in Somalia), arrived soon after the airport was secured. Elements of BLT 2/9's India Co, and 1/7 went on to secure the airport in Baidoa and the city of Bardera, while BLT 2/9's Golf Company, and elements of the Belgian Special Forces, conducted an amphibious landing at the port city of Kismayo. Air support was provided by the combined helicopter units of HMLA-267, HMH-363, HMH-466, HMM-164, and HC-11's DET 10.
Concurrently, various Somali factions returned to the negotiating table in an attempt to end the civil war. This effort was known as the Conference on National Reconciliation in Somalia and it resulted in the Addis Ababa Agreement signed on 27 March 1993.[29] The conference, however, had little result as the civil war continued afterwards."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Task_Force#Background
I remember as we were brought on board the USN ships (I arrived on the USS Vancouver) the Marines were collecting everybody’s weapons regardless of citizenship or official status - in part because they didn’t know any of the Embassy Saigon staff and we were jumbled together with all kinds of people. I had already passed my unauthorized M2 carbine off to someone still on shore so it wasn’t a problem for me. I do believe that many collectors today might weep if they saw an inventory of what was tossed over the side. We also watched as the non Amcits were sent down to the well deck to be moved by the small boats to the Contendor. Last year I offered the Quantico Museum some of the pictures I took especially of identifiable Marines from Vancouver contingent but have yet to hear a final word from them.
Clearly an Army mission. This is not an amphibious assault. Not a USMC mission/task.
Army has more amphib/landing capability than USMC, always did.
US clearly does not want the black boots, assault troops on shore in Gaza. Smart. Marines who think we should be, not so much.
Phil - how do. you put a JLOTS over the shore without putting boots on the ground? (answer....you don't). Everyone has more Amphibs than the USMC....we don't have Amphibs...we have a vested interest and primary usage. It is not unheard of for Marines to hitch a ride from Army mariners, or assist and support Joint Maritime Ops.
"Seeking to neither replace nor displace the traditional roles of the US Navy and US Marine Corps, America’s primary landpower institution could rather invest in twenty-first-century coastal fort complexes in forward areas that mitigate vulnerabilities and amplify strengths in order to enable joint protection and maneuver in increasingly lethal maritime environments."
Not directly related to the JLOTS topic- however, the Army is making significant strides toward enabling the joint capability to influence the littoral area. Their approach seeks to "enable decisive naval maneuver within range of adversary systems... [creating] 'windows of opportunity' for potentially vulnerable warships to aggressively move into contested seascapes and deliver devastating strike packages."
In short, the Army strategists are recognizing the serious challenge the joint force is faced with to achieve conditions of local sea denial to enable missions ashore while increasingly linked to fleet actions. The Army has the ability to invest in this area and its taking these steps because the GCCs are asking for this ability. Their look in structure, however, is much bigger than what the USMC is doing in these area (think size of MDTF vs MLR). There are merits in both formations depending on the use case.
The take away here is the Army is planning in earnest to conduct maritime missions directly linked to Navy operations. Given the current resource constraints and demand signal from GCCs does the larger group of contributors here believe this is an area the USMC should also not prepare for?
THE ARMY AND THE FORTRESS FLEET: REIMAGINING LANDPOWER IN MARITIME WARFARE:
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-army-and-the-fortress-fleet-reimagining-landpower-in-maritime-warfare/
No. This is not an amphibious assault. Out of our lane. Perfect army mission.
Hey Phil...what was the Operation a few years ago? Something like 'Operation Sea Angel'? In Bangladesh? Yeah, that's the one. Definitely not an amphibious assault either...but square in our lane.
Travis - I've been watching that. I think it's part prudence, and part marketing relevance in the current DOD environment. Long range ISR and Fires capability in the Pacific of course has relevance...and does so in most theatres. To your question "should the USMC also not prepare for?" For the sake of argument (and I think there are issues with the context of your question) I'll take it at face value and say 'yes'. But saying that doesn't mean compromising whole and relevant capability sets the way it has been done over the last 4 years. As an analogy, in the past, the USMC developed a ground based nuclear strike capability as part of an effort to prepare for missions that were deemed part of the demand signal at the time. The USMC did not give up other capabilities in order to provide this capability.
Marines DO NOT belong here! It is not an amphibious assault. Its an Army mission.
Phil - like a bad rash, I keep popping up. What was that Op in Indonesia a few years ago? Unified Assistance! That's the one...something to do with a devastating Tsunami. I don't remember the part where an amphibious assault was conducted as part of the Op. In fact, I don't remember where in the CMC handbook it says 'We can only conduct contested Amphibious Assaults with respect to maneuver from the sea regardless of type operation'.
In fairness, I am not rushing to see Jarheads running back to conduct "Gaza Style Green Beach Presence Ops". But the assertion that over the shore HA ops is out of scope for the USMC is just flat out nonsense. The problem is loss of capability, not mission. More so, since you can't get a JLOTS on shore without boots on the beach...are you saying it is good for the Army to have soldiers on shore (or the Navy) versus Marines?