Compass Points – Point & Counterpoint

Stimulating discussion.

Compass Points – Point & Counterpoint

Stimulating discussion.

September 23, 2024

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The mission of Compass Points is to "Provide an independent source of broader thinking, deeper understanding, and better decisions for a stronger Marine Corps."

Compass Points welcomes the professional exchange among different points of view. Recently, there has been a good deal of comment and analysis of the Commandant's Planning Guidance.

One reader provided a list of points in support of the Commandant's Planning Guidance and in support of the Marine Corps' controversial plan to place small units of missile Marines on isolated Pacific islands. Now, another reader has replied.

This kind of robust discussion should be taking place regularly throughout the Marine Corps including at the most senior levels of HQMC, at the Combat Development Command, and at the Marine Corps University.

The discussion is presented below, organized into Point / Counterpoint format. As always, comments are edited for length and content. Compass Points thanks all readers for their comments, insights, and discussion.

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Discussion of

Force Design &

Commandant's Planning Guidance

Point / Counterpoint

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - I recommend that retired graybeards instead explain the past 40 years of utter failure before claiming clairvoyance over FD-2030.

COUNTERPOINT - I’m unsure of what you mean by the term “utter failure.” Surely you don’t mean Operation "Fury From the Sea,” the Marine’s landing in Grenada, “Operation Desert Storm,” or the two MEUs General Mattis led into Afghanistan, or I MEF’s performance under General Conway in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain the collapse of over-the-horizon warfare.

COUNTERPOINT - Over the Horizon operations did not “collapse.” OTH as it was known was followed by the Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) concept and the supporting concept, Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM), which were central to Marine Corps thinking until the 38th CMC walked away from them with EABO. (Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations).

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV), a multi-billion dollar boondoggle with excessive moving parts that was never “Marine-proof.”

COUNTERPOINT - You clearly know nothing of the history of the EFV. General P.X. Kelly halted an earlier program when it did not seem likely it would meet requirements. What followed was an extensive program involving separate land-based and a water-based systems. In short, vehicles were built that met the requirements for both environments and then the experience from those programs were merged into a new program, which won high praise from Congress and DOD for innovation and management. I was at the opening of the plant near Occoquan in 1996 where the first prototypes were built. The program ran into trouble for two reasons; it was not designed to protect against IEDs, which were unknown when MCCDC created requirement documents and challenges with the complex hydraulics. General Amos halted it for these reasons; I was in the room when he made the decision.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain the death toll of the MV-22.

COUNTERPOINT - Every one of the 62 deaths was a tragedy. Military aviation is challenged by the inherent risks of flight. The V-22’s mishap rate is 3.43 for 100,000 flight hours, near average for the other type/model/series aircraft Marine aviators fly.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain why nearly 10,000 tanks have been destroyed in Ukraine by non-armor assets and why Kiev has pulled back our donated M1 tanks.

COUNTERPOINT - Tanks have been severely tested in the war in Ukraine and often poorly employed. However, no modern military, other than the US Marine Corps, has abandoned them. Just the opposite; the US Army is developing a new tank with a requirement to be able to defend against the weapons seen in recent wars. The British Army is designing a new Leopard 3, and the Germans and French have formed a consortium to design and build a new modern tank with similar requirements. It is still true that tanks need infantry and infantry needs tanks.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain why you insist that literally every LCAC carry a single main battle tank (with nothing else) and thus only 4 tanks in a 3-ship MEU, and with each firing unguided rounds.

COUNTERPOINT - You surprise me with your lack of understanding of the role of tanks on the modern battlefield, that is, to provide the infantry with a mobile, protected, direct fire gun to fire on hard points and engage enemy armor. Unless absolutely needed early, my choice of landing craft would be LCUs.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain the immense fuel and logistical trains necessary to sustain tanks and the trivial number of artillery pieces brought by a MEU/MEB/MEF.

COUNTERPOINT - Most of these limitations are the result of the Navy’ inability (unwillingness) to provide the five amphibious ships MEUs used to deploy with. Even with five ships, there was always competition for cube, square, and weight, but not like there is today with three, granted more modern and capable, ships.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain why these assets were largely absent in Afghanistan. Over the past 40+ years the Marines insisted on hauling tiny elements of literally every capacity, as if expeditionary warfare was some kind of affirmative action program.

COUNTERPOINT - Marines embarked with what experience told them they needed for the expected missions, they did not “haul” anything.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Probably because they envisioned MEU forward deployments as officer familiarization regimes to feed white papers and enhance careers.

COUNTERPOINT - This is a gratuitous remark with no substance and thus unworthy of a reply.

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PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - General Berger saw through that charade, foresaw the demise of tanks by shoulder-fired systems, and recognized beach assaults were a fool’s errand.

COUNTERPOINT - In my view, General Berger’s understanding of modern war was extremely limited. He failed to think like a professionally schooled MAGTF officer. He thought more like a recon team leader. Thus, in four short years he destroyed what giants of the Corps—Generals Wilson, Barrow, Gray, Krulak, and Conway—built over 40 years. They built a Corps that was able to fight globally as a combined arms MAGTF from battalion-level to corps-level and able to close with and destroy an enemy. That Corps has been largely supplanted today by one focused on small teams and a reconnaissance and sensing mission. Talk about “small ball.” Most of those who have taken the Marine Corps down the Force Design detour have been either frightened or dazzled or both by new technology and they need a broader and better understanding of combat development, tactics, weapons employment, and operational art.

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Compass Points thanks all readers for their comments, insights, and discussion. In a discussion, when some point is raised without adequate support or understanding, the answer is not to narrow or restrict the discussion. The answer is more robust discussion, discourse, and debate.

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Compass Points – CMC CPG – Section 11

Marine Expeditionary Forces

September 19, 2024

https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-cmc-cpg-section-11