Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.
It's very hard to defend EABO, FD, MLR, and SIF on their merits. Most proponents don't really try. Instead, they resort to personal attacks on those offering a better way forward for the Marine Corps. Distinguished officers such as Walt Boomer, Tony Zinni, Chuck Krulak, Jim Conway, Jack Sheehan, Charley Wilhelm, Bill Keys, Paul Van Riper and others are characterized as out of touch old men, who are simply yearning for the "good ole days." One recent attack took an even lower road, labeling those opposed to FD as "ex-officers."
Chowder II welcomes an open debate on FD, specifically has it made the Marine Corps more relevant in an increasingly dangerous world or not. MCU would be the perfect venue to get the students involved. I offer the following as the first topic in this debate: How does the Marine Corps intend to position, reposition, and logistically resupply widely dispersed SIFs inside contested areas?
I'm not holding my breath because HQMC does not want Chowder II to debate FD inside the schoolhouses at Quantico. If I'm wrong, I hope the President of the MCU will correct me.
Unfortunately I don’t think you’re mistaken. CP would be a perfect forum for the debate. Through CP, Chowder Society II members and proponents and any FD proponents could observe and if so inclined enter the debate.
But I’m extremely disappointed to observe that for the most part, although there have been one or two exceptions, most FD proponents that have used this forum have been unprofessional and in some cases disrespectful. If these commenters are former or active duty Marines they have done themselves and the Corps are huge disservice.
FD 2030 proponents have been largely silent on this forum. Some of these comments pick at the edges of the “debate” but do not wade in so a rational discussion can emerge. If the current conflicts prove anything, it is that a balanced, flexible force with thoughtful integration of new technology can exist on the modern battlefield. WE used to provide that (in spades) to any CINC!
An excellent reduction of an amateurish assault on those of us who can see "stupid" with no great effort. Use of the term"graybeards" added to the silly level of the "Point(er). No doubt if She Who Must Be Obeyed" permitted me to be bearded it would be gray, but as in the discourse re FD, survival let alone sucess requires knowing reality!
Sounds like General Van Ryper. The Corps is destined to become a ceremonial unit for POTUS. The decision makers are neutering the Marine Corps and these decisions will mean Marines do burials and the President's Own. Dumping small missile units on islands in WestPac is asinine.
I am so glad that Compass Point has calmer heads than I. Some of those comments by FD disciples raised my pressure level to near explosion…CP approach in answering all and especially the ignorant comments, kept me calm. Well done, gentlemen!
I will echo Douglas C Rape’ comments, short and precise!
“Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.”
Of the services, the Marine Corps deserves the most credit for embracing the 2018 NDS’s direction to refocus on great power competition and the nature of future warfighting. Despite the
controversy, the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 offers a coherent way for the Marine Corps
to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as
the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.16 The service deserves high marks
for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves. As the United States
confronts an increasingly tumultuous and unpredictable world, the Marine Corps’ role remains
as important as ever, and the service needs to preserve its ability to respond quickly outside the
Indo-Pacific as the need arises"
The above is taken from "Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy", which was released by the RAND Corporation on 29 July 24.
The issue I have with it, along with most of you, is that despite what the Corps has done, they are not ready to "Fight Tonight" with this MLR thing. There are no missiles, there are no "LSM", there is no logistics (How in gods name do you fairy dust logistics??). All we have are pretty PowerPoints and briefing papers of what it will look like "in the future".
PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain the immense fuel and logistical trains necessary to sustain tanks and the trivial number of artillery pieces brought by a MEU/MEB/MEF.
COUNTERPOINT - Most of these limitations are the result of the Navy’ inability (unwillingness) to provide the five amphibious ships MEUs used to deploy with. Even with five ships, there was always competition for cube, square, and weight, but not like there is today with three, granted more modern and capable, ships.
Why doesn't the Corps push for a ship similar to the old LKA's? They were like floating warehouses. Add these to the 3 ship ARG and most of your issues are solved.
Now having read added comments and adjusting my old gray head, a series of questions occurs to me. Tanks are vulnerable to many modern weapons and don't provide a stand alone solution to land warfare and so CMC was alert to this and eliminated tanks from our Corps. Helicopters are vulnerable to many weapons on modern battlefields so reducing their numbers saves millions of dollars. Tube Artillery is big, awkward to load/ unload, requires big and continuous logistical support (ammo) and doesn't ensure victory so again reduce the number of tubes. And Marine infantry are very vulnerable on the modern battlefields, constantly getting killed and wounded, jamming up logistics with medivacs and Navy personnel. The obvious solution is drastically reduce or eliminate grunts except for those needed for the brainiac solution of FD: a brand new concept of small teams scattered about like recon teams (Stingray aka 1967-68) but carrying their own rockets/ missiles rather than calling for arty and air. Now if the FD planners want to talk more about this analysis lots of graybeards recall those days. This guy has a couple of questions however: 1. How are you going to get the Chinese to ground their air force so that we again have no hostile air threat in the area? 2. How do we bullet proof or otherwise ensure team members cannot be wounded or killed so medevacs are not needed? 3. How do we "build" Marines who can hump and hide anti-ship missiles along with all their food and gear since they won't be resulplied? I suggest a dramatic build up of our diplomatic service so that we can persuade/ frighten/ subvert Chinese leadership and shift to all parties trashing the assumption that war is inevitable and instead assume Peace in Our Time. (Sorry about my attitude but my forest run this morning was not 14 miles at 7:20 per mile as I do so fondly recall.)
Sir, I will give you the argument on the debarkation of tanks, connectors, and the Whidbey Island LSD. One tank and one LCAC is a piecemeal landing. The fact that the Whidbey Island Class is the only class which can carry four LACACs is something which should have been rectified a long time ago. Why was this not addressed when the San Antonio's were built? Regarding tanks, everything I have read suggests the Russians have not been using proper tactics. It is true that the battlefield has changed with the advent of the ATGM and with drones. We all know that tanks should not operate on the battlefield by themselves. Every weapon on the battlefield operating separately can be defeated. This was highly evident after studies of the Yom Kippur War revealed that Israeli tanks operated unsupported against the first attacks by Egyptian infantry armed with ATGMs. The synchronization of infantry, armor, and artillery is the key to ground combat. I like to call it the ground combat triad. To say or imply that tanks are dead, as many do, is like saying we should not have helicopters because an infantryman can knock out a helicopter with a shoulder launched missile. Similarly, aircraft carriers do not operate by themselves either. They are part of a team of ships, just like the combined arms team on land. The infantryman armed with an ATGM does not possess the mobility, protection, firepower, and shock-action which a tank delivers. What weapon will support the infantryman to gain ground on the battlefield, if it is not the tank or mobile protected firepower? Finally, since the Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary force, what do you propose to remake the Marine Corps into a robust expeditionary force?
Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.
It's very hard to defend EABO, FD, MLR, and SIF on their merits. Most proponents don't really try. Instead, they resort to personal attacks on those offering a better way forward for the Marine Corps. Distinguished officers such as Walt Boomer, Tony Zinni, Chuck Krulak, Jim Conway, Jack Sheehan, Charley Wilhelm, Bill Keys, Paul Van Riper and others are characterized as out of touch old men, who are simply yearning for the "good ole days." One recent attack took an even lower road, labeling those opposed to FD as "ex-officers."
Chowder II welcomes an open debate on FD, specifically has it made the Marine Corps more relevant in an increasingly dangerous world or not. MCU would be the perfect venue to get the students involved. I offer the following as the first topic in this debate: How does the Marine Corps intend to position, reposition, and logistically resupply widely dispersed SIFs inside contested areas?
I'm not holding my breath because HQMC does not want Chowder II to debate FD inside the schoolhouses at Quantico. If I'm wrong, I hope the President of the MCU will correct me.
Gen.:
Unfortunately I don’t think you’re mistaken. CP would be a perfect forum for the debate. Through CP, Chowder Society II members and proponents and any FD proponents could observe and if so inclined enter the debate.
But I’m extremely disappointed to observe that for the most part, although there have been one or two exceptions, most FD proponents that have used this forum have been unprofessional and in some cases disrespectful. If these commenters are former or active duty Marines they have done themselves and the Corps are huge disservice.
FD 2030 proponents have been largely silent on this forum. Some of these comments pick at the edges of the “debate” but do not wade in so a rational discussion can emerge. If the current conflicts prove anything, it is that a balanced, flexible force with thoughtful integration of new technology can exist on the modern battlefield. WE used to provide that (in spades) to any CINC!
An excellent reduction of an amateurish assault on those of us who can see "stupid" with no great effort. Use of the term"graybeards" added to the silly level of the "Point(er). No doubt if She Who Must Be Obeyed" permitted me to be bearded it would be gray, but as in the discourse re FD, survival let alone sucess requires knowing reality!
Who is answering these questions?
Sounds like General Van Ryper. The Corps is destined to become a ceremonial unit for POTUS. The decision makers are neutering the Marine Corps and these decisions will mean Marines do burials and the President's Own. Dumping small missile units on islands in WestPac is asinine.
I am so glad that Compass Point has calmer heads than I. Some of those comments by FD disciples raised my pressure level to near explosion…CP approach in answering all and especially the ignorant comments, kept me calm. Well done, gentlemen!
I will echo Douglas C Rape’ comments, short and precise!
“Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.”
"U.S. Marine Corps
Of the services, the Marine Corps deserves the most credit for embracing the 2018 NDS’s direction to refocus on great power competition and the nature of future warfighting. Despite the
controversy, the Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 offers a coherent way for the Marine Corps
to operate in the Indo-Pacific against the pacing threat while retaining the ability to serve as
the nation’s emergency response for crises as they materialize.16 The service deserves high marks
for displaying the agility that DoD often yearns for but rarely achieves. As the United States
confronts an increasingly tumultuous and unpredictable world, the Marine Corps’ role remains
as important as ever, and the service needs to preserve its ability to respond quickly outside the
Indo-Pacific as the need arises"
The above is taken from "Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy", which was released by the RAND Corporation on 29 July 24.
https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html
The issue I have with it, along with most of you, is that despite what the Corps has done, they are not ready to "Fight Tonight" with this MLR thing. There are no missiles, there are no "LSM", there is no logistics (How in gods name do you fairy dust logistics??). All we have are pretty PowerPoints and briefing papers of what it will look like "in the future".
Gentlemen, the future is now.
PRO FORCE DESIGN POINT - Explain the immense fuel and logistical trains necessary to sustain tanks and the trivial number of artillery pieces brought by a MEU/MEB/MEF.
COUNTERPOINT - Most of these limitations are the result of the Navy’ inability (unwillingness) to provide the five amphibious ships MEUs used to deploy with. Even with five ships, there was always competition for cube, square, and weight, but not like there is today with three, granted more modern and capable, ships.
Why doesn't the Corps push for a ship similar to the old LKA's? They were like floating warehouses. Add these to the 3 ship ARG and most of your issues are solved.
Now having read added comments and adjusting my old gray head, a series of questions occurs to me. Tanks are vulnerable to many modern weapons and don't provide a stand alone solution to land warfare and so CMC was alert to this and eliminated tanks from our Corps. Helicopters are vulnerable to many weapons on modern battlefields so reducing their numbers saves millions of dollars. Tube Artillery is big, awkward to load/ unload, requires big and continuous logistical support (ammo) and doesn't ensure victory so again reduce the number of tubes. And Marine infantry are very vulnerable on the modern battlefields, constantly getting killed and wounded, jamming up logistics with medivacs and Navy personnel. The obvious solution is drastically reduce or eliminate grunts except for those needed for the brainiac solution of FD: a brand new concept of small teams scattered about like recon teams (Stingray aka 1967-68) but carrying their own rockets/ missiles rather than calling for arty and air. Now if the FD planners want to talk more about this analysis lots of graybeards recall those days. This guy has a couple of questions however: 1. How are you going to get the Chinese to ground their air force so that we again have no hostile air threat in the area? 2. How do we bullet proof or otherwise ensure team members cannot be wounded or killed so medevacs are not needed? 3. How do we "build" Marines who can hump and hide anti-ship missiles along with all their food and gear since they won't be resulplied? I suggest a dramatic build up of our diplomatic service so that we can persuade/ frighten/ subvert Chinese leadership and shift to all parties trashing the assumption that war is inevitable and instead assume Peace in Our Time. (Sorry about my attitude but my forest run this morning was not 14 miles at 7:20 per mile as I do so fondly recall.)
Sir, I will give you the argument on the debarkation of tanks, connectors, and the Whidbey Island LSD. One tank and one LCAC is a piecemeal landing. The fact that the Whidbey Island Class is the only class which can carry four LACACs is something which should have been rectified a long time ago. Why was this not addressed when the San Antonio's were built? Regarding tanks, everything I have read suggests the Russians have not been using proper tactics. It is true that the battlefield has changed with the advent of the ATGM and with drones. We all know that tanks should not operate on the battlefield by themselves. Every weapon on the battlefield operating separately can be defeated. This was highly evident after studies of the Yom Kippur War revealed that Israeli tanks operated unsupported against the first attacks by Egyptian infantry armed with ATGMs. The synchronization of infantry, armor, and artillery is the key to ground combat. I like to call it the ground combat triad. To say or imply that tanks are dead, as many do, is like saying we should not have helicopters because an infantryman can knock out a helicopter with a shoulder launched missile. Similarly, aircraft carriers do not operate by themselves either. They are part of a team of ships, just like the combined arms team on land. The infantryman armed with an ATGM does not possess the mobility, protection, firepower, and shock-action which a tank delivers. What weapon will support the infantryman to gain ground on the battlefield, if it is not the tank or mobile protected firepower? Finally, since the Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary force, what do you propose to remake the Marine Corps into a robust expeditionary force?