Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.
An excellent reduction of an amateurish assault on those of us who can see "stupid" with no great effort. Use of the term"graybeards" added to the silly level of the "Point(er). No doubt if She Who Must Be Obeyed" permitted me to be bearded it would be gray, but as in the discourse re FD, survival let alone sucess requires knowing reality!
It's very hard to defend EABO, FD, MLR, and SIF on their merits. Most proponents don't really try. Instead, they resort to personal attacks on those offering a better way forward for the Marine Corps. Distinguished officers such as Walt Boomer, Tony Zinni, Chuck Krulak, Jim Conway, Jack Sheehan, Charley Wilhelm, Bill Keys, Paul Van Riper and others are characterized as out of touch old men, who are simply yearning for the "good ole days." One recent attack took an even lower road, labeling those opposed to FD as "ex-officers."
Chowder II welcomes an open debate on FD, specifically has it made the Marine Corps more relevant in an increasingly dangerous world or not. MCU would be the perfect venue to get the students involved. I offer the following as the first topic in this debate: How does the Marine Corps intend to position, reposition, and logistically resupply widely dispersed SIFs inside contested areas?
I'm not holding my breath because HQMC does not want Chowder II to debate FD inside the schoolhouses at Quantico. If I'm wrong, I hope the President of the MCU will correct me.
FD 2030 proponents have been largely silent on this forum. Some of these comments pick at the edges of the “debate” but do not wade in so a rational discussion can emerge. If the current conflicts prove anything, it is that a balanced, flexible force with thoughtful integration of new technology can exist on the modern battlefield. WE used to provide that (in spades) to any CINC!
Sounds like General Van Ryper. The Corps is destined to become a ceremonial unit for POTUS. The decision makers are neutering the Marine Corps and these decisions will mean Marines do burials and the President's Own. Dumping small missile units on islands in WestPac is asinine.
I am so glad that Compass Point has calmer heads than I. Some of those comments by FD disciples raised my pressure level to near explosion…CP approach in answering all and especially the ignorant comments, kept me calm. Well done, gentlemen!
I will echo Douglas C Rape’ comments, short and precise!
“Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.”
I appreciate Compass Points recognizing that the FD-2030 debate is not merely a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision but also an examination of the 40-year status quo that prompted FD-2030. So far the comments here are merely golf claps for turning back the clock instead of owning the failure of tanks, the failure of the EFV, the never-achieved over-the-horizon dream, and 70+ year absence of opposed landings. Here is my takedown of the honorable Gen. Van Riper’s status quo burea-speak:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Listing conflicts in which the Marines were opposed only by rifles (Grenada), faced no beach opposition (Desert Storm), or just plain lost to the Taliban is hardly an endorsement of the past 40 years of status quo force design. Arguing that over-the-horizon (OTH) was changed to Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) is bureau-speak, since it meant long-distance amphibious asault was ditched and NO fundamental change to forces occurred.
Being “in the room” when the EFV’s faults were listed doesn’t magically cancel those faults, and its cancellation effectively nixed any dream of assault from an amphib fleet’s protected distance. The IED risk was already known before Iraq and Afghanistan because they were known for a century as “landmines,” yes? Hydraulic risk is merely a technical direct cause, not the root cause which was a jaded romance with 25-knot water speed obscuring any realistic assessment of its fundamental design. It called for a 19-year-old driver fresh off his Kawasaki to responsibly operate a 34-ton amtrac against the power of the sea with a never-before-tried retractable suspension, shifting armored plates and high-speed jets, gradually corroded by seawater, and all while risking infantry packed aboard. Worked fine when fresh out of the factory and with civilian techs nursing it daily, but months later its heavyweight moving parts and abuse from high-testosterone drivers on land were no match for those hydraulics. Not Marine-proof. CMC Amos: “The program is not affordable… The procurement and operations/maintenance costs of this vehicle are onerous.” But it was fast and cool, so another year and another billion dollars. Root cause: jaded vision.
The MV-22’s mishap rate being “near average” to other aircraft obscures the fact it’s the Marines’ primary troop carrier. Cobra crashes kill 2, Osprey crashes killl 20. The legacy CH-46 Sea Knight suffered no such record.
Tanks must be justified by their battlefield success and survivability, NOT because production plants build them on industry inertia and lobbyist donations. Both Russia and Ukraine are largely abandoning tank warfare because destroying nearly 10,000 tanks no longer requires opposing tanks. Tankers don’t scope individual soldiers, only high value targets, so they can’t distinguish between a civilian, a grandma, a rifleman or an ATGM-armed soldier until it’s too late. Gen Berger nailed it years before the Ukraine War.
Also, land armies buying tanks does not solve the amphibious debarkation equation. Those other tank-building nations don’t deploy MEU-sized units, nor float their tanks – and you knew this. The tanker’s dreamboat was a Whidbey Island LSD, the only amphib that could fit four LCACs, each with one tank aboard; so a tank platoon and no other vehicles. But that connector occupies over ten times the well deck footprint of the tank it’s hauling. A teenager looking down from the catwalk would shout “cool!,” but Gen. Berger immediately saw the problem: It’s $2.5 billion of combined ship and connectors delivering only four guns to shore, each with unguided rounds with an effective range less than two miles. Then the ship is mostly empty and spends weeks relocating for a new loadout.
Like slow LCU’s instead? Those LSDs (retiring next year) fit only three LCUs while LHDs and LPDs fit only ONE. Blaming the fleet is pointless, as even a doubling of tank debarkation gets you only eight tanks per ARG with all connectors burdened for 1 to 2 hours even if launched near shore. (And Berger was a 1stLt when those amphibs were designed during the reigns of “Giants” like CMCs Wilson, Barrow, Gray, Krulak and Conway.) That’s trivial armor, and all in the crosshairs of modern shoulder-fired ATGMs, and LCACs and LCUs can’t bring other forces ashore until the tanks are off. Expensive, trivial, vulnerable, archaic and total futility.
It’s so much easier to rally yesteryear’s generals to ankle-bite today’s new leaders, but to do so without effectively defending yesteryear’s failures? – well, that’s just plain unconvincing. The failure of the EFV, failure of tanks, collapse of OTH, defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, rarity of opposed landings, and today’s new federal budget/debt realities are all challenges that Gen. Berger and his successors must contend with. We get nowhere when legacy defenders ignore those failures and claim there was never a problem.
Sir, I will give you the argument on the debarkation of tanks, connectors, and the Whidbey Island LSD. One tank and one LCAC is a piecemeal landing. The fact that the Whidbey Island Class is the only class which can carry four LACACs is something which should have been rectified a long time ago. Why was this not addressed when the San Antonio's were built? Regarding tanks, everything I have read suggests the Russians have not been using proper tactics. It is true that the battlefield has changed with the advent of the ATGM and with drones. We all know that tanks should not operate on the battlefield by themselves. Every weapon on the battlefield operating separately can be defeated. This was highly evident after studies of the Yom Kippur War revealed that Israeli tanks operated unsupported against the first attacks by Egyptian infantry armed with ATGMs. The synchronization of infantry, armor, and artillery is the key to ground combat. I like to call it the ground combat triad. To say or imply that tanks are dead, as many do, is like saying we should not have helicopters because an infantryman can knock out a helicopter with a shoulder launched missile. Similarly, aircraft carriers do not operate by themselves either. They are part of a team of ships, just like the combined arms team on land. The infantryman armed with an ATGM does not possess the mobility, protection, firepower, and shock-action which a tank delivers. What weapon will support the infantryman to gain ground on the battlefield, if it is not the tank or mobile protected firepower? Finally, since the Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary force, what do you propose to remake the Marine Corps into a robust expeditionary force?
Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.
An excellent reduction of an amateurish assault on those of us who can see "stupid" with no great effort. Use of the term"graybeards" added to the silly level of the "Point(er). No doubt if She Who Must Be Obeyed" permitted me to be bearded it would be gray, but as in the discourse re FD, survival let alone sucess requires knowing reality!
It's very hard to defend EABO, FD, MLR, and SIF on their merits. Most proponents don't really try. Instead, they resort to personal attacks on those offering a better way forward for the Marine Corps. Distinguished officers such as Walt Boomer, Tony Zinni, Chuck Krulak, Jim Conway, Jack Sheehan, Charley Wilhelm, Bill Keys, Paul Van Riper and others are characterized as out of touch old men, who are simply yearning for the "good ole days." One recent attack took an even lower road, labeling those opposed to FD as "ex-officers."
Chowder II welcomes an open debate on FD, specifically has it made the Marine Corps more relevant in an increasingly dangerous world or not. MCU would be the perfect venue to get the students involved. I offer the following as the first topic in this debate: How does the Marine Corps intend to position, reposition, and logistically resupply widely dispersed SIFs inside contested areas?
I'm not holding my breath because HQMC does not want Chowder II to debate FD inside the schoolhouses at Quantico. If I'm wrong, I hope the President of the MCU will correct me.
FD 2030 proponents have been largely silent on this forum. Some of these comments pick at the edges of the “debate” but do not wade in so a rational discussion can emerge. If the current conflicts prove anything, it is that a balanced, flexible force with thoughtful integration of new technology can exist on the modern battlefield. WE used to provide that (in spades) to any CINC!
Who is answering these questions?
Sounds like General Van Ryper. The Corps is destined to become a ceremonial unit for POTUS. The decision makers are neutering the Marine Corps and these decisions will mean Marines do burials and the President's Own. Dumping small missile units on islands in WestPac is asinine.
I am so glad that Compass Point has calmer heads than I. Some of those comments by FD disciples raised my pressure level to near explosion…CP approach in answering all and especially the ignorant comments, kept me calm. Well done, gentlemen!
I will echo Douglas C Rape’ comments, short and precise!
“Very patient and precise answers to uninformed and often ignorant questions. It does not take long to see who has decades of experience with actual, deployed MAGTFs and who does not.”
I appreciate Compass Points recognizing that the FD-2030 debate is not merely a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision but also an examination of the 40-year status quo that prompted FD-2030. So far the comments here are merely golf claps for turning back the clock instead of owning the failure of tanks, the failure of the EFV, the never-achieved over-the-horizon dream, and 70+ year absence of opposed landings. Here is my takedown of the honorable Gen. Van Riper’s status quo burea-speak:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Listing conflicts in which the Marines were opposed only by rifles (Grenada), faced no beach opposition (Desert Storm), or just plain lost to the Taliban is hardly an endorsement of the past 40 years of status quo force design. Arguing that over-the-horizon (OTH) was changed to Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) is bureau-speak, since it meant long-distance amphibious asault was ditched and NO fundamental change to forces occurred.
Being “in the room” when the EFV’s faults were listed doesn’t magically cancel those faults, and its cancellation effectively nixed any dream of assault from an amphib fleet’s protected distance. The IED risk was already known before Iraq and Afghanistan because they were known for a century as “landmines,” yes? Hydraulic risk is merely a technical direct cause, not the root cause which was a jaded romance with 25-knot water speed obscuring any realistic assessment of its fundamental design. It called for a 19-year-old driver fresh off his Kawasaki to responsibly operate a 34-ton amtrac against the power of the sea with a never-before-tried retractable suspension, shifting armored plates and high-speed jets, gradually corroded by seawater, and all while risking infantry packed aboard. Worked fine when fresh out of the factory and with civilian techs nursing it daily, but months later its heavyweight moving parts and abuse from high-testosterone drivers on land were no match for those hydraulics. Not Marine-proof. CMC Amos: “The program is not affordable… The procurement and operations/maintenance costs of this vehicle are onerous.” But it was fast and cool, so another year and another billion dollars. Root cause: jaded vision.
The MV-22’s mishap rate being “near average” to other aircraft obscures the fact it’s the Marines’ primary troop carrier. Cobra crashes kill 2, Osprey crashes killl 20. The legacy CH-46 Sea Knight suffered no such record.
Tanks must be justified by their battlefield success and survivability, NOT because production plants build them on industry inertia and lobbyist donations. Both Russia and Ukraine are largely abandoning tank warfare because destroying nearly 10,000 tanks no longer requires opposing tanks. Tankers don’t scope individual soldiers, only high value targets, so they can’t distinguish between a civilian, a grandma, a rifleman or an ATGM-armed soldier until it’s too late. Gen Berger nailed it years before the Ukraine War.
Also, land armies buying tanks does not solve the amphibious debarkation equation. Those other tank-building nations don’t deploy MEU-sized units, nor float their tanks – and you knew this. The tanker’s dreamboat was a Whidbey Island LSD, the only amphib that could fit four LCACs, each with one tank aboard; so a tank platoon and no other vehicles. But that connector occupies over ten times the well deck footprint of the tank it’s hauling. A teenager looking down from the catwalk would shout “cool!,” but Gen. Berger immediately saw the problem: It’s $2.5 billion of combined ship and connectors delivering only four guns to shore, each with unguided rounds with an effective range less than two miles. Then the ship is mostly empty and spends weeks relocating for a new loadout.
Like slow LCU’s instead? Those LSDs (retiring next year) fit only three LCUs while LHDs and LPDs fit only ONE. Blaming the fleet is pointless, as even a doubling of tank debarkation gets you only eight tanks per ARG with all connectors burdened for 1 to 2 hours even if launched near shore. (And Berger was a 1stLt when those amphibs were designed during the reigns of “Giants” like CMCs Wilson, Barrow, Gray, Krulak and Conway.) That’s trivial armor, and all in the crosshairs of modern shoulder-fired ATGMs, and LCACs and LCUs can’t bring other forces ashore until the tanks are off. Expensive, trivial, vulnerable, archaic and total futility.
It’s so much easier to rally yesteryear’s generals to ankle-bite today’s new leaders, but to do so without effectively defending yesteryear’s failures? – well, that’s just plain unconvincing. The failure of the EFV, failure of tanks, collapse of OTH, defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan, rarity of opposed landings, and today’s new federal budget/debt realities are all challenges that Gen. Berger and his successors must contend with. We get nowhere when legacy defenders ignore those failures and claim there was never a problem.
Sir, I will give you the argument on the debarkation of tanks, connectors, and the Whidbey Island LSD. One tank and one LCAC is a piecemeal landing. The fact that the Whidbey Island Class is the only class which can carry four LACACs is something which should have been rectified a long time ago. Why was this not addressed when the San Antonio's were built? Regarding tanks, everything I have read suggests the Russians have not been using proper tactics. It is true that the battlefield has changed with the advent of the ATGM and with drones. We all know that tanks should not operate on the battlefield by themselves. Every weapon on the battlefield operating separately can be defeated. This was highly evident after studies of the Yom Kippur War revealed that Israeli tanks operated unsupported against the first attacks by Egyptian infantry armed with ATGMs. The synchronization of infantry, armor, and artillery is the key to ground combat. I like to call it the ground combat triad. To say or imply that tanks are dead, as many do, is like saying we should not have helicopters because an infantryman can knock out a helicopter with a shoulder launched missile. Similarly, aircraft carriers do not operate by themselves either. They are part of a team of ships, just like the combined arms team on land. The infantryman armed with an ATGM does not possess the mobility, protection, firepower, and shock-action which a tank delivers. What weapon will support the infantryman to gain ground on the battlefield, if it is not the tank or mobile protected firepower? Finally, since the Marine Corps is a naval expeditionary force, what do you propose to remake the Marine Corps into a robust expeditionary force?