Any advantage is short lived. Precision has its place. But, by the air war over Serbia the utility of precision and stealth were clearly no longer magic bullets and invisible cloaks. Snipers do not replace machine guns. Stealth is visible to the eye and other detection methods while fooling older radars. Precision weapons are dependent on intelligence which can fooled. All changes are on the margins and evolutionary. Collateral damage avoidance was one of many motivators for precision weapons. That comes with many unintended but totally predictable consequences.
In the end, forget the headlines and observations of amateurs. Focus on the balance required to be lethal and effective. One of the myths of modern war theory is that the masses are neutral and the selective destruction of the bad actors is key. The most current example is Gaza. The destruction of Hamas, as if the population of Gaza are neutral victims, just begs for precision weaponry. It has its place but is not the compete answer. It is part of the answer.
Doug, You need to write an article with this theme. Even the most uninitiated will understand your comparison of a sniper with a machine gun. Straight forward pointed words such as yours need wide distribution.
I’ve said this before, relying on technology alone will not win us the fight to come. I agree that we need mass and technology, especially when and not if we slog it out with the Chinese.
Yes, and yes, and yes, 3rdMarDiv needs to be rebalanced with artillery, air power, engineering equipment and logistics and with required Amphibs necessary for maneuver and sustainment.
If Missile Defense is needed, the missile defense should be an add on to the MAGTF, not a replacement!
No doubt Marines will fight and will fight ferociously, let’s make sure they have EVERYTHING to fight and win!
Note that CMC in a "conversation" at Brookings last week described in some detail the organization and purpose of the three Marine Littoral Regiments created from the 3rd, 4th, and 12th Marine Regiments. He followed these remarks with words to the effect that there will still be III MEF with the 3rd Marine Division as if creation of the MLRs had not destroyed the Division's Infantry and Artillery Regiments. No way to take this except as double counting. Purposeful or unintentional his words were deceitful.
General Van Riper, the whole Brookings Institute interview was a contradiction in terms. We could go item by item and just get to the same place, it’s a mess. Further we need plain Marine speak, not carefully couched word salads some consultants helps to craft that make “people” feel comfortable. What Marines do is generally not comfortable. That doesn’t mean confrontational, but rather clear concise language like Douglas Rape’s analogy, sniper verses a machine gun. People get that visual. We all served with Marines who said what was on their minds. When you hear this contradictory language from the CMC it leaves the impression that he doesn’t know how to get out of the box he and General Berger built. As polished and professional as the CMC looked and acted, it was a disappointment to view. It was everything that the Marine Corps I served in was not.
As we aim to reconstitute the Corps, I would like to harken back a few days to a piece submitted by Charles Wemyss, Jr., in which he reiterated a remark attributed to the late LtGen Victor Krulak, to wit: “America doesn’t need a Marine Corps, but it wants one.” I offer a view different from that of the original Chowder Society in this connection: the world has changed many times over since the days of the National Security Act time frame of 1947 - the necessity for a Marine Corps is manifestly apparent, particularly in light of our two most recent NEO OPS in which no Naval forces were to be had. Fortunately, available Special Operating Forces were thrown in to fill the gap, but, I would argue such employment is not prudent given their already over full “plates” of mission requirements. So, as Food For Thought, in a world seemingly teetering on the brink of significant conflicts(s), we need a Corps of Marines capable of operations that range from MEU to MEF level - and, if need be, multiple MEF’s. World affairs are sending us just that message. We need to listen, and be prepared to respond accordingly. America needs its Corps of Marines.
I anticipate that Compass Points will address the Brookings "conversation" and the obvious misinformation in coming days. Chowder Society II has already ensured that those in key positions know the facts versus CMC's false assertions. However, it never hurts to share this information widely and to encourage debate.
Tankers and artillery men have long known that mass is key at the the right time and circumstance. Precision has a quality unto itself
Our issue presently is not visible to many—-manufactured resupply and for the US it is the ability to generate resupply at the industrial level. We may have lost the ability to generate the amounts of war materiel necessary for a war on two fronts as we have lost many of the old standby munitions and warfare factories. Oh yeah, strategic oil reserves fit in there some place (what are all those “get-away” young men really here for?
This is "Project 2025..Mandate for Leadership, The Conservative Promise:" writted by the Heritage Foundation.
Of interest would be pages 115 (on the below page counter) where it discusses the United States Marine Corps.
"As a result, Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger developed and began to implement Force Design 2030,31 a plan that, if completed, would be the most radical transformation of the Marine Corps since World War II. The successful implementation of this force redesign, coupled with reforms in the Marine Corps’ personnel system and the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding plans, will be critical to ensuring the Corps’ future combat effectiveness.
Needed Reforms: Divest systems to implement the Force Design 2030 transformation. Divesting equipment that is less relevant to distributed, low-signature operations in a contested maritime environment will make funds available for modernization."
Seems they are all for it. I have even read where some of Trumps folks are talking about redeploying the ENTIRE Marine Corps to the Pacific to counter China.
“Skip” Polak hits directly upon our grand strategic nightmare: our lack of industrial capacity to outfit ourselves properly for a naval and military conflict with a peer competitor. China, perhaps Japan & the ROK, can out produce us from a standing still start, particularly in steel & heavy industry production of ships, armor, & perhaps, aircraft. I am much influenced in this matter by Dr. Thomas Huber of DMH, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth (ret), who argues for massively re-thinking how our society organizes for war from an industrial perspective. He suggests that by putting certain elements of our industrial base on a quasi-war footing in which industry could produce either products for peace or war, that we would see more people employed in production vice consumption, and, that should war come, simply switch to war goods rather than domestic use items. He references the War Production Board of WW II days, and asks “why can’t that construct be rebuilt?” Such a strategy would be confronted by some pushback, but, it could be done. So, how does Dr. Huber’s thinking square with current USN/USMC deficiencies? Just imagine if we had to go to war tomorrow, and saw unquestioned victory as our end state: How would we do it, and, with what war matériels at hand? I think the answer lies in how we envision our reconstitution, determine our new requirements of war matériels, and how we influence creation of a new structure supporting force projection from the sea.
Any advantage is short lived. Precision has its place. But, by the air war over Serbia the utility of precision and stealth were clearly no longer magic bullets and invisible cloaks. Snipers do not replace machine guns. Stealth is visible to the eye and other detection methods while fooling older radars. Precision weapons are dependent on intelligence which can fooled. All changes are on the margins and evolutionary. Collateral damage avoidance was one of many motivators for precision weapons. That comes with many unintended but totally predictable consequences.
In the end, forget the headlines and observations of amateurs. Focus on the balance required to be lethal and effective. One of the myths of modern war theory is that the masses are neutral and the selective destruction of the bad actors is key. The most current example is Gaza. The destruction of Hamas, as if the population of Gaza are neutral victims, just begs for precision weaponry. It has its place but is not the compete answer. It is part of the answer.
Doug, You need to write an article with this theme. Even the most uninitiated will understand your comparison of a sniper with a machine gun. Straight forward pointed words such as yours need wide distribution.
Exactly, General. You need both. The sniper for precision, and the MG for suppression.
I’ve said this before, relying on technology alone will not win us the fight to come. I agree that we need mass and technology, especially when and not if we slog it out with the Chinese.
Yes, and yes, and yes, 3rdMarDiv needs to be rebalanced with artillery, air power, engineering equipment and logistics and with required Amphibs necessary for maneuver and sustainment.
If Missile Defense is needed, the missile defense should be an add on to the MAGTF, not a replacement!
No doubt Marines will fight and will fight ferociously, let’s make sure they have EVERYTHING to fight and win!
Note that CMC in a "conversation" at Brookings last week described in some detail the organization and purpose of the three Marine Littoral Regiments created from the 3rd, 4th, and 12th Marine Regiments. He followed these remarks with words to the effect that there will still be III MEF with the 3rd Marine Division as if creation of the MLRs had not destroyed the Division's Infantry and Artillery Regiments. No way to take this except as double counting. Purposeful or unintentional his words were deceitful.
General Van Riper, the whole Brookings Institute interview was a contradiction in terms. We could go item by item and just get to the same place, it’s a mess. Further we need plain Marine speak, not carefully couched word salads some consultants helps to craft that make “people” feel comfortable. What Marines do is generally not comfortable. That doesn’t mean confrontational, but rather clear concise language like Douglas Rape’s analogy, sniper verses a machine gun. People get that visual. We all served with Marines who said what was on their minds. When you hear this contradictory language from the CMC it leaves the impression that he doesn’t know how to get out of the box he and General Berger built. As polished and professional as the CMC looked and acted, it was a disappointment to view. It was everything that the Marine Corps I served in was not.
As we aim to reconstitute the Corps, I would like to harken back a few days to a piece submitted by Charles Wemyss, Jr., in which he reiterated a remark attributed to the late LtGen Victor Krulak, to wit: “America doesn’t need a Marine Corps, but it wants one.” I offer a view different from that of the original Chowder Society in this connection: the world has changed many times over since the days of the National Security Act time frame of 1947 - the necessity for a Marine Corps is manifestly apparent, particularly in light of our two most recent NEO OPS in which no Naval forces were to be had. Fortunately, available Special Operating Forces were thrown in to fill the gap, but, I would argue such employment is not prudent given their already over full “plates” of mission requirements. So, as Food For Thought, in a world seemingly teetering on the brink of significant conflicts(s), we need a Corps of Marines capable of operations that range from MEU to MEF level - and, if need be, multiple MEF’s. World affairs are sending us just that message. We need to listen, and be prepared to respond accordingly. America needs its Corps of Marines.
I anticipate that Compass Points will address the Brookings "conversation" and the obvious misinformation in coming days. Chowder Society II has already ensured that those in key positions know the facts versus CMC's false assertions. However, it never hurts to share this information widely and to encourage debate.
Tankers and artillery men have long known that mass is key at the the right time and circumstance. Precision has a quality unto itself
Our issue presently is not visible to many—-manufactured resupply and for the US it is the ability to generate resupply at the industrial level. We may have lost the ability to generate the amounts of war materiel necessary for a war on two fronts as we have lost many of the old standby munitions and warfare factories. Oh yeah, strategic oil reserves fit in there some place (what are all those “get-away” young men really here for?
Good article, Mark .
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/24088042-project-2025s-mandate-for-leadership-the-conservative-promise
This is "Project 2025..Mandate for Leadership, The Conservative Promise:" writted by the Heritage Foundation.
Of interest would be pages 115 (on the below page counter) where it discusses the United States Marine Corps.
"As a result, Marine Corps Commandant General David H. Berger developed and began to implement Force Design 2030,31 a plan that, if completed, would be the most radical transformation of the Marine Corps since World War II. The successful implementation of this force redesign, coupled with reforms in the Marine Corps’ personnel system and the Navy’s amphibious shipbuilding plans, will be critical to ensuring the Corps’ future combat effectiveness.
Needed Reforms: Divest systems to implement the Force Design 2030 transformation. Divesting equipment that is less relevant to distributed, low-signature operations in a contested maritime environment will make funds available for modernization."
Seems they are all for it. I have even read where some of Trumps folks are talking about redeploying the ENTIRE Marine Corps to the Pacific to counter China.
“Skip” Polak hits directly upon our grand strategic nightmare: our lack of industrial capacity to outfit ourselves properly for a naval and military conflict with a peer competitor. China, perhaps Japan & the ROK, can out produce us from a standing still start, particularly in steel & heavy industry production of ships, armor, & perhaps, aircraft. I am much influenced in this matter by Dr. Thomas Huber of DMH, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth (ret), who argues for massively re-thinking how our society organizes for war from an industrial perspective. He suggests that by putting certain elements of our industrial base on a quasi-war footing in which industry could produce either products for peace or war, that we would see more people employed in production vice consumption, and, that should war come, simply switch to war goods rather than domestic use items. He references the War Production Board of WW II days, and asks “why can’t that construct be rebuilt?” Such a strategy would be confronted by some pushback, but, it could be done. So, how does Dr. Huber’s thinking square with current USN/USMC deficiencies? Just imagine if we had to go to war tomorrow, and saw unquestioned victory as our end state: How would we do it, and, with what war matériels at hand? I think the answer lies in how we envision our reconstitution, determine our new requirements of war matériels, and how we influence creation of a new structure supporting force projection from the sea.