With the US entry into WWI in Europe we had an advantage in seeing how the British Army had adjusted from a Colonial Army that had not fought on the continent since Waterloo to a force able to fight with an advanced Army ( the French) against what was the best Army in the world in 1914. These adjustments do not come easy and cost lives at a horrific rate. The British let this knowledge slip away in the interwar period and they did not adapt to their next conflict on the continent which culminated with the defeat at Dunkirk.
Since Vietnam the Corps has not engaged in sustained, high intensity combat over a prolonged period with high casualty rates. This has created a mind set that makes Fd-2030 and EABO seem viable and even decisive. It is neither. It is playing badminton in prep for a football game. We seem to believe that a Cav Screening effort can win the battle. It cannot.
Over my career I encouraged my subordinates to focus on Viking Raids, our Civil War, the Pacific Campaign of WWII and the Soviet German war on the Eastern Front 1941-45. I was always particularly drawn to Charles Martel’s defeat on the highly experienced and mobile Muslim Army with his heavy infantry.
I might note that great basketball, football and other athletes can become reasonably proficient golfers. I have yet to see the reverse. Focus on the big fight. You can retool, organize and train for the lesser. This is further possible because of the Marine competence in task organization. Learn to hunt lions.
After Desert Shield/Storm, the big change to the Combatant Commander’s deployment plans was not only inclusion of the Patriot Batteries but also ensuring their early arrival in the AOR. Because the Combatant Commanders have recognized the importance of the Patriot (and now the MDTF) the Patriot upgrades have been continuing since 1990 (that is 35 years).
The US Army is now upgrading the MDTF Patriot Missile System with the MIM-104 System to enhance its anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-drone capability.
I have long stated that the US Marine Corps should not be in the anti-ship missile business. The anti-drone business? Yes, as long as it is at the tactical level. Let the Combatant Commanders drive the drone requirements for the Operational and Strategic Levels of War.
The center piece of the MLR was an anti-ship capability that was supposed to be filled by the HIMARS that replaced large numbers of tube artillery. The problem is an HIMARS artillery rocket does not have the range for an anti-ship missile. The insistence of building the MLR anti-ship mission (NMESIS) then leads the Marine Corps leadership into the timely development of an anti-ship capability.
The US now has a Joint Force Doctrine that emphasizes the strategic capabilities of each service. Land based defense against targets at sea has long been an US Army mission. In addition, the MDTS seems to be a considerable number of steps ahead of the Marine Corps. The question in my mind is when the Marines needed tanks, we were to request them from the US Army. If that was a good idea, instead of developing an anti-ship missile why not utilize the Combatant Commanders requested and deployed US Army MDTF?
Now the “rub” between the MDTF and the MLR deployment ideas. The MLR is to be deployed forward as the “Stand-in Force”. (BTW the SIF is a Marine Commandant’s idea, it is not Joint Doctrine.) The MLR was to be forward deployed to cover the maritime WEZ, that mission is normally, generally, most of the time, covered by the US Navy with high tech submarines, radars, SOSS units, P8 Patrol Aircraft, satellite surveillance, etc., etc.. Next question: What does the MLR add to the Navy’s capabilities to control the WEZ?
No way in hell will a smart Combatant Commander (or the US Army) going to risk their MDTF assets forward deployed hiding on a small “littoral” Pacific Island. Initially, I thought the MLR was a good idea as long as its mission was focused on surveillance and reconnaissance. Of course, the question then becomes what can a recon team (or Marine Raider Team) accomplish beyond the surveillance and reconnaissance assets at the disposal of the US Navy? S/F
Note the Strategic Fires Battalion, which consists of a HIMARS Battery, a Mid-Range Capability Battery, and a Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons Battery. Let’s take a close look at each battery:
1. HIMARS Battery: Features the new PrSM ballistic missile. Variant 2 will have a range of 300+ miles and anti-ship capability. Future variants are expected to increase the range to 600+ miles.
2. Mid-Range Battery: Features the Tomahawk (land and maritime attack versions) and SM-6 missiles. The SM-6 ballistic missile can engage ships at an estimated 290 miles. The subsonic Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) can hit moving targets at roughly 1000 miles.
3. Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons Battery. Features the Dark Eagle Hypersonic (Mach 5+) missile with a range of almost 1800 miles. The current version cannot hit a moving target, but recent information suggests that a future version is being developed with the capability to strike moving targets.
I encourage readers to compare the MDTF to the MLR and the missile capabilities of the PrSM, SM-6, MST, and Dark Eagle to the subsonic, 115-mile Naval Strike Missile and draw their own conclusions about effectiveness in the vast distances of the Pacific. Just my opinion, but the MLR/SIF is redundant and much less capable than the MDTF.
There is no question about it. The Marine Corps does not even belong in this debate! The Army is light years ahead. We can't even get a full functional battery of missiles after five years. This is not our race. It would be like the Air Force Chief of Staff saying he wants a beach landing force. If HQMC wants to do HIMARs raids to hit a PLAN Navy base or do a hit and run HIMARS strike, that, I believe would fit in with a MEUs capability. But to upend the whole Force for something not in our purview, is wrong.
Looking forward to the additional parts of " Preparing for War". These excellent comments cover different historical times and that is as it should be as all of us have different experiences and reading interests. WW1 was certainly a beginning for the Corps to begin developing into the force that fought in WWII. Viet Nam was again different than WWII and our leaders had to adjust again. This preparation for War continues to this day and knowing prior History definitely has a place in preparing for future conflicts. As the saying goes, those that ignore history are destined to repeat it.
Grok:Summary of the Battle of Megiddo (c. 1457 BCE)**
**Context**: During Pharaoh Thutmose III’s reign in Egypt’s 18th Dynasty, a coalition of Canaanite city-states, led by the king of Kadesh and backed by the Mitanni, rebelled against Egyptian control in the Levant. The fortified city of Megiddo, a key trade hub in the Jezreel Valley, became the focal point of the conflict.
**Prelude**: Thutmose III launched a campaign to crush the rebellion, marching a 10,000–20,000-strong army from Egypt to Megiddo. Facing three routes to the city, he boldly chose the risky Aruna Pass, a narrow mountain route, against his generals’ advice, to surprise the enemy.
**Battle**: Emerging from the Aruna Pass, Thutmose’s forces caught the coalition off guard. His chariots and archers overwhelmed the Canaanite army, which fled chaotically to Megiddo. Egyptian soldiers delayed pursuit by looting, allowing the enemy to retreat behind the city’s walls.
**Siege**: Thutmose besieged Megiddo for seven months, encircling it with a palisade. Starvation forced the city’s surrender, though the king of Kadesh escaped. Egypt captured significant loot, including 924 chariots, 2,238 horses, and vast resources.
**Significance**: The victory solidified Thutmose III’s reputation as a military genius, reasserted Egyptian dominance in the Levant, and weakened Mitanni influence. Detailed records in the Annals of Thutmose III at Karnak make it one of history’s first well-documented battles. Megiddo’s strategic importance earned it the name Armageddon in later biblical contexts.
**Sources**: The Annals, Gebel Barkal Stela, and archaeological finds at Megiddo (Tell el-Mutesellim) provide evidence, though Egyptian accounts are propagandistic and lack opposing perspectives” !
With the US entry into WWI in Europe we had an advantage in seeing how the British Army had adjusted from a Colonial Army that had not fought on the continent since Waterloo to a force able to fight with an advanced Army ( the French) against what was the best Army in the world in 1914. These adjustments do not come easy and cost lives at a horrific rate. The British let this knowledge slip away in the interwar period and they did not adapt to their next conflict on the continent which culminated with the defeat at Dunkirk.
Since Vietnam the Corps has not engaged in sustained, high intensity combat over a prolonged period with high casualty rates. This has created a mind set that makes Fd-2030 and EABO seem viable and even decisive. It is neither. It is playing badminton in prep for a football game. We seem to believe that a Cav Screening effort can win the battle. It cannot.
Over my career I encouraged my subordinates to focus on Viking Raids, our Civil War, the Pacific Campaign of WWII and the Soviet German war on the Eastern Front 1941-45. I was always particularly drawn to Charles Martel’s defeat on the highly experienced and mobile Muslim Army with his heavy infantry.
I might note that great basketball, football and other athletes can become reasonably proficient golfers. I have yet to see the reverse. Focus on the big fight. You can retool, organize and train for the lesser. This is further possible because of the Marine competence in task organization. Learn to hunt lions.
Here We Go Again
Here is another article I caught on RCP Defense about upgrading the US Army Patriot as an integrated system to the MDTF.
“US Army to Add Four New Patriot Missile Battalions, Including Guam Unit – The Defense Post”
https://thedefensepost.com/2025/07/25/us-army-adds-patriot-battalions/
After Desert Shield/Storm, the big change to the Combatant Commander’s deployment plans was not only inclusion of the Patriot Batteries but also ensuring their early arrival in the AOR. Because the Combatant Commanders have recognized the importance of the Patriot (and now the MDTF) the Patriot upgrades have been continuing since 1990 (that is 35 years).
The US Army is now upgrading the MDTF Patriot Missile System with the MIM-104 System to enhance its anti-aircraft, anti-missile and anti-drone capability.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIM-104_Patriot - Very impressive!
I also need to note that during Exercise Talisman Sabre 2025 in Australia, the 3rd MDTF successfully sank a maritime target using an SM-6 missile.
“Army Bullseyes Maritime Target with Portable Launcher - USNI News”
https://news.usni.org/2025/07/17/army-bullseyes-maritime-target-with-sm-6-fired-from-portable-launcher
I have long stated that the US Marine Corps should not be in the anti-ship missile business. The anti-drone business? Yes, as long as it is at the tactical level. Let the Combatant Commanders drive the drone requirements for the Operational and Strategic Levels of War.
The center piece of the MLR was an anti-ship capability that was supposed to be filled by the HIMARS that replaced large numbers of tube artillery. The problem is an HIMARS artillery rocket does not have the range for an anti-ship missile. The insistence of building the MLR anti-ship mission (NMESIS) then leads the Marine Corps leadership into the timely development of an anti-ship capability.
The US now has a Joint Force Doctrine that emphasizes the strategic capabilities of each service. Land based defense against targets at sea has long been an US Army mission. In addition, the MDTS seems to be a considerable number of steps ahead of the Marine Corps. The question in my mind is when the Marines needed tanks, we were to request them from the US Army. If that was a good idea, instead of developing an anti-ship missile why not utilize the Combatant Commanders requested and deployed US Army MDTF?
Now the “rub” between the MDTF and the MLR deployment ideas. The MLR is to be deployed forward as the “Stand-in Force”. (BTW the SIF is a Marine Commandant’s idea, it is not Joint Doctrine.) The MLR was to be forward deployed to cover the maritime WEZ, that mission is normally, generally, most of the time, covered by the US Navy with high tech submarines, radars, SOSS units, P8 Patrol Aircraft, satellite surveillance, etc., etc.. Next question: What does the MLR add to the Navy’s capabilities to control the WEZ?
No way in hell will a smart Combatant Commander (or the US Army) going to risk their MDTF assets forward deployed hiding on a small “littoral” Pacific Island. Initially, I thought the MLR was a good idea as long as its mission was focused on surveillance and reconnaissance. Of course, the question then becomes what can a recon team (or Marine Raider Team) accomplish beyond the surveillance and reconnaissance assets at the disposal of the US Navy? S/F
And we can't even get a full battery of a substandard missile system!
At the link is a notional generic organization chart for the Army’s Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF): https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11797.pdf
Note the Strategic Fires Battalion, which consists of a HIMARS Battery, a Mid-Range Capability Battery, and a Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons Battery. Let’s take a close look at each battery:
1. HIMARS Battery: Features the new PrSM ballistic missile. Variant 2 will have a range of 300+ miles and anti-ship capability. Future variants are expected to increase the range to 600+ miles.
2. Mid-Range Battery: Features the Tomahawk (land and maritime attack versions) and SM-6 missiles. The SM-6 ballistic missile can engage ships at an estimated 290 miles. The subsonic Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST) can hit moving targets at roughly 1000 miles.
3. Long-Range Hypersonic Weapons Battery. Features the Dark Eagle Hypersonic (Mach 5+) missile with a range of almost 1800 miles. The current version cannot hit a moving target, but recent information suggests that a future version is being developed with the capability to strike moving targets.
I encourage readers to compare the MDTF to the MLR and the missile capabilities of the PrSM, SM-6, MST, and Dark Eagle to the subsonic, 115-mile Naval Strike Missile and draw their own conclusions about effectiveness in the vast distances of the Pacific. Just my opinion, but the MLR/SIF is redundant and much less capable than the MDTF.
There is no question about it. The Marine Corps does not even belong in this debate! The Army is light years ahead. We can't even get a full functional battery of missiles after five years. This is not our race. It would be like the Air Force Chief of Staff saying he wants a beach landing force. If HQMC wants to do HIMARs raids to hit a PLAN Navy base or do a hit and run HIMARS strike, that, I believe would fit in with a MEUs capability. But to upend the whole Force for something not in our purview, is wrong.
Just think the addition of a NMESIS battery will make the PLA shudder in fear.
Randy, here is another unclassified data point. The Navy has 4 converted Ohio-class submarines, each capable of carrying 154 Tomahawk missiles.
Well, that's a better addition than we are making. That's a hefty payload.
In regard to vicarious lessons of war, let’s not overestimate the value of war gaming. Our last Commandant developed FD2030 from that fantasy game.
Looking forward to the additional parts of " Preparing for War". These excellent comments cover different historical times and that is as it should be as all of us have different experiences and reading interests. WW1 was certainly a beginning for the Corps to begin developing into the force that fought in WWII. Viet Nam was again different than WWII and our leaders had to adjust again. This preparation for War continues to this day and knowing prior History definitely has a place in preparing for future conflicts. As the saying goes, those that ignore history are destined to repeat it.
Grok:Summary of the Battle of Megiddo (c. 1457 BCE)**
**Context**: During Pharaoh Thutmose III’s reign in Egypt’s 18th Dynasty, a coalition of Canaanite city-states, led by the king of Kadesh and backed by the Mitanni, rebelled against Egyptian control in the Levant. The fortified city of Megiddo, a key trade hub in the Jezreel Valley, became the focal point of the conflict.
**Prelude**: Thutmose III launched a campaign to crush the rebellion, marching a 10,000–20,000-strong army from Egypt to Megiddo. Facing three routes to the city, he boldly chose the risky Aruna Pass, a narrow mountain route, against his generals’ advice, to surprise the enemy.
**Battle**: Emerging from the Aruna Pass, Thutmose’s forces caught the coalition off guard. His chariots and archers overwhelmed the Canaanite army, which fled chaotically to Megiddo. Egyptian soldiers delayed pursuit by looting, allowing the enemy to retreat behind the city’s walls.
**Siege**: Thutmose besieged Megiddo for seven months, encircling it with a palisade. Starvation forced the city’s surrender, though the king of Kadesh escaped. Egypt captured significant loot, including 924 chariots, 2,238 horses, and vast resources.
**Significance**: The victory solidified Thutmose III’s reputation as a military genius, reasserted Egyptian dominance in the Levant, and weakened Mitanni influence. Detailed records in the Annals of Thutmose III at Karnak make it one of history’s first well-documented battles. Megiddo’s strategic importance earned it the name Armageddon in later biblical contexts.
**Sources**: The Annals, Gebel Barkal Stela, and archaeological finds at Megiddo (Tell el-Mutesellim) provide evidence, though Egyptian accounts are propagandistic and lack opposing perspectives” !