Compass Points - Readiness
Technology is powerful, so is infantry.
Compass Points - Readiness
Technology is powerful, so is infantry.
July 22, 2025
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Technology is powerful, but so is trained, equipped, combined arms Marine infantry. In his Compass Points interview yesterday, former Navy Secretary Jim Webb emphasized the continuing importance of Marine Corps readiness.
For the Marine Corps, readiness has always meant being most ready when the Nation is least ready, to be a global crisis response force, forward deployed at all times to deter, assist, and fight.
Marines have always been focused on being ready to, ""locate, close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver, or repel the enemy assault by fire and close combat."
Some senior Marine leaders in recent years, however, have seemed to step back from global Marine readiness and said that advances in technology have forced the Marines to adopt new ideas of readiness.
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We are the eyes and ears for the joint force, ideally positioned within the WEZ to conduct both reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, to act as a Joint Fires integrator for the combined force, and to strike the enemy from land and air to sea with organic sensors and precision fires, when necessary.
-- Frag Order 01-2024
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Strike the enemy with organic sensors? That is a long way from, "locate, close with and destroy." Authors and Marines John F. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Dinsmore warn that the Marine Corps has veered away from global readiness by asking the wrong questions.
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. . . we believe the Marine Corps, like the allies in 1914, is focusing on the wrong problem. Rather than a Marine Corps that contributes marginally to the positional-firepower fight, which we believe others can do better, the nation would be better served by a Marine Corps that can restore and maintain the ability to project power in an age of long-range precision weapons. This capability would be indispensable not only in a high-intensity conflict in the Pacific but in any mission around the globe.
-- John F. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Dinsmore
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Technology is always changing, always upgrading, and always bringing new challenges to the battlefield. Those who are called upon to be ready to fight our Nation’s battles, however, must never be swept away by the promises of new technology. New technology can never take the war out of warfighting. For example, in his study of the Karabakh Wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Vicken Cheterian, warned of the dangers of technology determinism.
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In 2020, the Azerbaijani army launched a massive attack on Armenian positions in Nagorno-Karabakh. After 44 days of fighting, Azerbaijan scored a major victory, forcing Armenian forces to retreat from the territories around Karabakh, followed by the deployment of Russian peacekeeping troops. While many analysts have focused on advanced technology to explain Azerbaijan’s victory, this article argues that a comparative study of the First Karabakh War (1991–1994) and the Second Karabakh War (2020) points to differences at the strategic level, including political transitions, diplomatic policies, and military forecasts, to propose a comprehensive and strategic discussion of the two wars, away from technological determinism.
-- Vicken Cheterian
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In an excerpt from his book, America and the Future of War, Williamson Murray warns that in any war with China or other near-peer adversary, US space based technology assets would be the first thing destroyed.
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The larger point is that the American military had better be prepared in future conflicts in which it finds itself to operate with a significant portion of its capabilities degraded. Any war between sophisticated powers will, to a considerable extent, take part in the dark. And that raises the worrisome question as to how effective US weapons will prove in the event an opponent is able to degrade severely their capabilities. Similarly, how effective will American fighting forces be when the communication links fail, when commanders on the sharp end have to make decisions on their own, and when GPS no longer provides accurate readings or any readings at all?
-- Williamson Murray
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Is the idea of a Marine Corps that is focused more on readiness to "locate, close with and destroy" and less on sensing and making sense "old and out of touch"? Which Marine Corps is best for the Nation? In the immediate future, will senior US policy makers need more of a "sensing and making sense" Marine Corps or a "locate, close with and destroy" Marine Corps?
The most futuristic fighting is ongoing now in Ukraine. While the conflict include some amazing new technology, nevertheless, the fighting is still very much force on force, violent, bloody, ground combat.
Has technology genuinely advanced to the point where the United States Marine Corps, the Nation's paramount crisis response force can safely discard or degrade its own infantry, armor, artillery, air, combat engineering, and more? The idea that Marines should isolate themselves on Pacific islands and focus on sensing, making sense, and passing on data is an idea that is beyond old and tired, it is poisonous and wrong.
Technology always advances, but technology never can erase the violent fighting between two irreconcilable wills. Before the next brutal battle erupts and Marines are sent in, with or without, the units, training, and equipment they need, it is time to upgrade, enhance, and rebalance the Marine Corps' global, expeditionary, combined arms, MAGTF. For the Marine Corps to be relevant today and tomorrow readiness must still mean global MAGTF readiness, i.e. flexible, global MEUs, backed up by larger and stronger, MEBs, and by even larger and stronger, MEFs.
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Real Clear Defense - 07/20/2024
Force Design: Where is the Evidence of Revolutionary Change?
By John F. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Dinsmore
John F. Schmitt is a former Marine infantry officer. Under the guidance of two commandants of the Marine Corps, General Al Gray and General Charles Krulak, he authored the Marine Corps keystone doctrinal manual, Warfighting. In the years since, he has continued to author documents for senior leaders in the Department of Defense.
Colonel Jeffrey S. Dinsmore is an active-duty Marine of 38 years. He enlisted in 1986, has served on nine operational deployments, including four deployments on Contingency and Special Purpose MAGTFs and Marine Expeditionary Units from 1987 to 2001, and five times on combat deployments during Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. He currently serves as a director of planning and training for task forces deploying to the Indo-Pacific.
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Technological determinism or strategic advantage?
Comparing the two Karabakh Wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan
By Vicken Cheterian
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402390.2022.2127093
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Technology And The Future Of War
In our time of unconventional conflict and rogue actors, the most advanced countries have the most to lose.
By Williamson Murray
https://www.hoover.org/research/technology-and-future-war
The “original sin” of Force Design 2030 was not the divestment of one infantry regimental headquarters and three infantry battalions; rather, it was the emasculation of Marine Corps combined arms capabilities. Without robust and resilient supporting arms, Marine infantry is unable to fight, win, and survive battles across the range of military operations. Robbing Marine infantry of all tanks, all assault bridging, all in stride breaching, all school trained snipers, most direct support cannon artillery, and resiliency in tactical aviation is not only professional malpractice, it is also morally wrong. Committing Marine infantry without proper support against a determined enemy is not much different than deploying Marines and Sailors inside active contested areas aboard slow, relatively unarmed LSMs built to commercial survivability standards.
In case you think I’m wrong about Marine infantry, consider the following personal reflections from Major General James Livingston and Colonel Jay Vargas about their experiences during the Battle of Dai Do in Vietnam, during which both earned the Medal of Honor:
“None of us would have survived the fighting in and around Dai Do without the unshakable leadership of the officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers; or more importantly, without the magnificent courage, performance, and tenacity of the individual Marines, who were fighting against great odds; and finally, without the close, continuous, and accurate support provided by artillery, helicopter gunships, fixed wing aviation, and naval gunfire. Marine tanks, though limited in number, were also important. Additional tanks would have helped immensely.”
“Close combat is no less important to winning future battles than past battles. But Marine infantry cannot be expected to fight and win with one hand tied behind its back. The jettisoning of all tanks, the deactivation of three infantry battalions, the gutting of direct support cannon artillery, and the loss of two attack helicopter squadrons [note: one has been belatedly reactivated], all to self-fund new experimental capabilities, is unwise and dangerous. FD 2030 and the FD 2030 Annual Update are leaving Marine infantry vulnerable and dangerously isolated, stripped of the support needed to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Battles won in the past, such as Dai Do, will likely be lost in the future. Simply stated, we do not believe the Magnificent Bastards [2nd Battalion, 4th Marines] could win the Battle of Dai Do today, given the significant cuts in essential force structure and supporting arms. Even more damaging is the fact that we are unnecessarily and foolishly risking the lives and limbs of our most precious asset, the individual Marine.”
You can read the full article at: https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Livingston-Vargas-Aug22-WEB-REVISED-for-posting.pdf
While Force Design fools are “sensing” in preparation for a WEZ we have this headline. “China is now operating the former United States military facility at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, The Telegraph reports citing anonymous officials and satellite imagery analyses.”! Are you trembling w rage or nauseated or switching back and forth between these “senses” as reality sinks into your mind?