The “original sin” of Force Design 2030 was not the divestment of one infantry regimental headquarters and three infantry battalions; rather, it was the emasculation of Marine Corps combined arms capabilities. Without robust and resilient supporting arms, Marine infantry is unable to fight, win, and survive battles across the range of military operations. Robbing Marine infantry of all tanks, all assault bridging, all in stride breaching, all school trained snipers, most direct support cannon artillery, and resiliency in tactical aviation is not only professional malpractice, it is also morally wrong. Committing Marine infantry without proper support against a determined enemy is not much different than deploying Marines and Sailors inside active contested areas aboard slow, relatively unarmed LSMs built to commercial survivability standards.
In case you think I’m wrong about Marine infantry, consider the following personal reflections from Major General James Livingston and Colonel Jay Vargas about their experiences during the Battle of Dai Do in Vietnam, during which both earned the Medal of Honor:
“None of us would have survived the fighting in and around Dai Do without the unshakable leadership of the officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers; or more importantly, without the magnificent courage, performance, and tenacity of the individual Marines, who were fighting against great odds; and finally, without the close, continuous, and accurate support provided by artillery, helicopter gunships, fixed wing aviation, and naval gunfire. Marine tanks, though limited in number, were also important. Additional tanks would have helped immensely.”
“Close combat is no less important to winning future battles than past battles. But Marine infantry cannot be expected to fight and win with one hand tied behind its back. The jettisoning of all tanks, the deactivation of three infantry battalions, the gutting of direct support cannon artillery, and the loss of two attack helicopter squadrons [note: one has been belatedly reactivated], all to self-fund new experimental capabilities, is unwise and dangerous. FD 2030 and the FD 2030 Annual Update are leaving Marine infantry vulnerable and dangerously isolated, stripped of the support needed to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Battles won in the past, such as Dai Do, will likely be lost in the future. Simply stated, we do not believe the Magnificent Bastards [2nd Battalion, 4th Marines] could win the Battle of Dai Do today, given the significant cuts in essential force structure and supporting arms. Even more damaging is the fact that we are unnecessarily and foolishly risking the lives and limbs of our most precious asset, the individual Marine.”
While Force Design fools are “sensing” in preparation for a WEZ we have this headline. “China is now operating the former United States military facility at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, The Telegraph reports citing anonymous officials and satellite imagery analyses.”! Are you trembling w rage or nauseated or switching back and forth between these “senses” as reality sinks into your mind?
Obligatory: you’re right—Congress, the combatant commanders, the Commandant, and everyone actually making decisions are all wrong, and this small group is the lone voice of truth. So right that after 6 years of lobbying the Hill, attempting to counter two Commandants, meeting senior administration officials, raising a whopping $11,000 over 6 years (“for $5 a day you too can feed the egos of retired GOs”) publishing 200+ articles (so people have heard you, right?)—you still have nothing to show for it.
I watched a documentary on a Marine armored recon company in Fallujah mounted in LAV's. Watching the tales of several weeks of urban combat against an enemy who was something less than a peer level adversary, but willing to die. The Marines came through, but watching I wondered if the new Marines could even perform that mission today.
Also reading "the last stand of Fox Company" about Marines fighting in Korea. I wonder if the new Marine doctrine would allow the Marines to be part of that operation.
How many times will the Marines be called on only to respond that their forces are not appropriate for that sort of operation - call the Army to perform it.
When will DOD conclude: "why do we even need the Marines any longer" ?
A former Combatant Commander during the 38th Commandant's time in office told me that the Commandant never talked with him about FD 2030 and he knew he had not talked with the Commanders of EUCOM, AFRICOM or SOUTHCOM. Those who claim otherwise simply don't know what they claim to know.
So we’re still stuck on “who didn’t talk to whom” six years ago? And now the argument is that former Commandants were heard but not obeyed? That’s the hill you’re on? Meanwhile, Congress, the SECDEF, and two sitting Commandants have all backed FD—and it’s already reshaping the force.
What matters is what Combatant Commanders are saying today—and they’ve consistently supported the capabilities FD delivers: stand‑in forces, long‑range precision fires, sensing networks, and a Corps tailored to actual pacing threats. And MEUs they all want MEUs.
Chowder II could have been value‑added, but instead of playing the ball where it lay, they chased “what should have been” and lost all traction. If you actually care about Amphibs, hold the Navy accountable and support CMC 39 as he balances crisis response with FD realities. Otherwise, you’re just background noise.
What requests by the Combatant Commanders? Have you read Adm. Paparo’s comments of last year? He DIDN’T EVEN MENTION SIFs/MLRs/NMESIS.
Face it Cpl. FD has already lost it “shiny new glimmer. Congress funds it because they’re stupid and don’t dig deeper into what they’re funding. With a glitzy Power Point presentation I could get them to fund bolt action .22s as a replacement for the M4.
Speaking of argumentum ad hominem. . . Here are some recent CP comments. . .
“No reasonably intelligent Marine with our Country, our Corps and our Marines in mind can believe FD 2030 makes any sense. Time to unceremoniously dump it without regard for establishing accountability which seems to be the main impediment to moving on NOW!”
- Tom Eagan 1 July 2025
“We need to find some way for those responsible for FD to “save face”. But first, their heads have to be withdrawn from that dark, remote location that they have been in for the past ten years. Semper Fi”
- Raymond Lee Maloy 1 July 2025
“I lived this. It was unbelievably heinous dealing with that man. To be honest, wouldn't piXX on him if he were on fire to this day....24 years later!”
- Coffeejoejava 25 June 2025
“I suspect my friend that you are not really a Marine because real Marines don't think and write like this. They didn't sign on to this gun club to "sense and target;" they came aboard to close with and destroy the enemy. Perhaps you area sailor or airman who wants to do this stuff and is good at it; at least that would be my theory if I didn't see your words in other venues arguing against the realities of ground combat.”
- Paul Van Riper 24 June 2025
“I doubt this President has any indication of what the Marines have lost in the quest toward irrelevance know as FD. He knows they look good opening the doors for him at the white house and standing beside Marine One when he flies to Andrews. Pretty much what I would consider his knowledge of the Marine Corps, other than the propaganda he has been fed by the Commandants sycophants.”
- Coffeejoejava 21 June 2025
“President of MCU did not look like, speak like, or have the demeanor of a Marine let alone a general officer. Makes me question the judgment of the board that selected him for brigadier general.
- Paul Van Riper 11 Feb 2025
We were fortunate, in the past, for an incompetent Commandant to be replaced by a savior. Unfortunately, this hasn’t happened today…This guy is not even an accomplished liar, and the sooner he is exposed to those who can effect change, the better. Semper Fi is still used, but “faithful” to what or whom?
“But we have switched to drones, and I can say about my unit that we ensured approximately 80% of all targets engaged, from our brigade, are by unmanned systems. I think that this percentage is a bit lower, but still, most of the targets struck by our fires are struck by drones.”
Summary: The war in Ukraine demonstrates the battlefield is now defined by low-cost drones and electronic warfare – not large platforms. Ukrainian commanders report drones have surpassed artillery as the dominant weapon, dictating battlefield control through 24/7 reconnaissance, precision strikes (FPV drones), and constant EW battles.
This isn't a future threat; it's today's fight. Ukraine's experience validates the USMC's focus on Force Design. Dismissing these changes as premature ignores the clear lessons from the frontlines: massed firepower and traditional platforms are increasingly vulnerable and less decisive in a drone-saturated environment.
The debate isn't if the battlefield is changing, but whether we adapt fast enough.
A little more context for the greater audience: "Tactical UAVs have significant limitations. Between 60 and 80% of Ukrainian FPVs fail to reach their target, depending on the part of the front and the skill of the operators. Of those that do strike their targets, a majority fail to destroy the target system when striking armoured vehicles."..."The success rate in wounding infantry is high. Furthermore, there are long periods where either EW or the weather significantly degrades UAV operations."..."... tactical UAVs currently account for 60–70% of damaged and destroyed Russian systems."..."One of the main reasons for such a high proportion of kills being caused by FPVs is the relative lack of artillery in Ukrainian units.". And finally "Tank-on-tank engagements have increased in regularity because of these tactics. It is noteworthy that every Ukrainian brigade aims to field a company or battalion of tanks, with availability varying considerably between formations.". These comments are from a report with the following context: "The observations contained in this report are based on interviews by the authors with staff and personnel from air assault brigades, a marine brigade, a jaeger brigade, a mechanized brigade, an artillery brigade and assault units holding key sectors on the Donetsk and Sumy fronts. The authors also spoke to air defence troops and observed Ukrainian mobile air defence groups, as well as being briefed by personnel of the Donetsk and Sumy Operational Commands, the Joint Strategic–Operational Command, officers of the Ukrainian General Staff, representatives of the Ukrainian Special Services and members of Stavka. Finally, the authors compared these observations with officers responsible for the provision of military technical assistance from Ukraine's international partners.".
What are you talking about? That does not make any sense in the context of this discussion. If you read the report, you would not have made that statement. Drones are an important component of the fight, but not the only component. More so, the factors that lead to 60-80% of failure to reach target are many, varied, and include aspects of combined arms+ management for the team deploying the sUAS. And what if the other guy has a million little tries and a 100 heavy glide bombs and the secure air space to deploy them? What you said makes as much sense talking about this subject as it would if we were talking about a tennis match..."You cannot be serious!" - J. McEnroe
Obligatory: "read more, talk less. You don't know what you are talking about. Drones are an important add, but you are straight out of the Simpson's monorail episode".
My man, the Ukrainian I’m quoting is living the reality you keep theorizing about. He’s surviving drone-saturated battlefields—not pretending it’s still 1991. Compass Points and Desert Storm nostalgia won’t stop Lancets and FPVs. Adaptation will.
That’s why Force Design moves forward while CP spins its wheels.
Not theorizing. I am quoting direct from UKR reporting and analysis. You're quoting TWZ articles which are right up there with the Marine Enquirer. I bet you watch youtube shorts and come away convinced that FPVs have a 100% mission kill rate in the Ukraine conflict also. 1991? Desert Storm? Time for you to put the Whiteclaw down and go home.
The corporal is not correct about the effectiveness of drones to the extent that they control the battle space. The terms and pace of the fighting are on the Russians side and while they move slowly they move inextricably forward. Doesn’t mean drones are not a threat but it is just hogwash to think that EW/ECW etc. etc plus battlefield moxie like sewing the wire guided drones down canalized routes and literally cut the fiber optic line is being devolved every day. In the main the preponderance of WIA and KIA are coming from field artillery, massed field artillery of every sort. There are many non traditional sources reporting on the conflict and they all mostly come to its is an awful dirty fight and drones just a small part of it.
Everything written, even some of your own references, say drones are important, but they are not a replacement for artillery. So far I do not see other nations dumping their artillery for drones.
First of all, I see the hype over drones similar to the hype of the end of the tank, after so many Israeli tanks were destroyed by Egyptian soldiers with ATGMs. Pundits made the wrong conclusions. The tank is not dead. Nations have not gotten rid of their tanks. However, many drone advocates, especially in the FD Marine Corps, have fallen for this fallacy.
Secondly, do you really think the current MEU without tanks and tubed artillery is as potent as the MEU prior to FD? There is one thing the Marine Corps does that no other service does: combined-arms naval expeditionary warfare. Is the current MEU still capable? Can the current Marine Corps assist the Army as it has in the past: Korea, Vietnam, Gulf Wars etc? In my opinion it cannot.
Thanks for the questions, and please keep them coming.
I’m not sure where your information came from, but MEUs still deploy with tubed artillery, and in some cases even take HIMARS.
And you are correct—MEUs no longer deploy with four tanks and a single wrecker, each requiring its own connector to get ashore and adding a significant logistical footprint that was increasingly hard to justify.
There’s still plenty of firepower left: LAV-25s, LAV-ATs, ACVs, Javelins, Skids, HIMARS, F-35s, and more. Throw in Group 3 UAS (there now) for sensing and FPVs for strike (soon).
Frankly, I’d take a 2025 MEU over a 2015 MEU any day. That’s not tied to Force Design—it’s simply the result of technology advancements.
Imagine a MEU without the divestment and the addition of drones. The MEU of today does not have a strong mobile firepower system. You don't get power projection from an LAV. Technological advancements are not everything.
No it’s not, it’s a result of going from a 4 ship ARG/MEU to a 3 ship ARG/MEU. And my guess is that most MEUs are deploying with only a platoon of tubed artillery and a single section of HIMARS.
Hogwash Cpl. the Ukrainians are relying on drones due to the fact that they’re critically short of artillery shells. Besides that, numerous sources reliably claim that drones can’t replace the effectiveness of artillery.
Here are a few quotes from articles published in the last 2 years on the subject of drones and their ability to replace conventional artillery.
“As many reports open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts, and other respected military analysts indicate, the proliferation of FPV drones largely compensates for critical shortages of artillery shells, particularly on the Ukrainian side, filling a gap rather than offering a fundamentally better solution.”
“While FPV drones have proven effective against armored vehicles and in close-quarters combat, at best, they deliver tactical-level precision comparable to battalion mortars, a far cry from the comprehensive impact of artillery fire.”
“UAVs are significantly hampered by adverse weather conditions; rain degrades sensor performance and can cause electrical malfunctions, while strong winds can destabilize the aircraft, impacting its ability to maintain flight or accurately deliver payloads. These limitations mean UAV effectiveness is often dramatically reduced, or even negated, during inclement weather, making them unreliable.”
“UAVs’ payloads also restrict their destructive potential, limiting their ability to inflict significant damage on hardened targets or to suppress enemy fire effectively. Their reliance on radio frequency links makes them vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, cyberattacks, and other forms of electronic warfare—a weakness artillery, particularly when combined with robust communications security measures, doesn’t share. Artillery, in contrast, delivers massed fires in all weather conditions, over extended ranges, and with significantly greater explosive effect. Even the most advanced FPV drones, as Euromaidan Press and other sources have highlighted, cannot replicate the broad-area suppression, neutralization, and destruction that a battery of 155mm howitzers can achieve in a matter of minutes. Nor can drones match the psychological impact of sustained artillery bombardment, a long-recognized element of attritional warfare.”
“Drones are a temporary fix, a stopgap measure, not a replacement. Recognizing this distinction is crucial for American military planners.”
“Precision is valuable, but the ability to deliver massed fires at scale remains essential in major combat operations. Drones will never replicate the overwhelming suppression and deep interdiction effects of artillery. The ability to saturate an enemy position with high-explosive rounds remains a critical capability for breaking enemy defenses and achieving decisive breakthroughs.”
“Enthusiasm for new technologies must be tempered with a realistic understanding of their limitations, a respect for the enduring principles of warfare, and a commitment to maintaining a balanced and comprehensive fires capability. Otherwise, we risk developing a fires force optimized for niche threats, but woefully unprepared for the massed, high-intensity combat that future conflicts with peer adversaries will inevitably demand.”
“Ukraine is ramping up the production of one-way attack suicide” drones to compensate for the lack of artillery shells at the front, the Ukrainian Deputy Defense Ministry said.”
“Berezutskyi highlights that FPV drones are nearing the range and capabilities of battalion mortars, though this comparison is conditional. While FPV drones with up to a 30-kilometer range exist, it’s premature to claim they can entirely substitute conventional artillery.”
“The expert says the utilization of FPV drones does not currently allow for barrage fire or suppression of a stronghold, but their massive use could disrupt the advance of an enemy column or destroy the firing points of a Russian platoon stronghold before a Ukrainian assault begins.”
“For now, they cannot replace missile forces and artillery, except partially, for specific tasks," believes Havryliuk.”
“The effectiveness of combat operations depends on the comprehensive use of the entire spectrum of weapons: artillery, drones, armored vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, electronic warfare, and the professionalism of the personnel," emphasized the Deputy Minister of Defense.”
“Despite their technological allure and affordability, drones perform under specific operational contexts for specific mission objectives and are unlikely to shift the offense-defense balance.”
“Leaning heavily on stand-off centric platforms, including UAVs to provide ‘affordable mass’ compromises ‘effective mass’, and cedes strategic initiative to the adversaries.”
The quote I find most applicable to the question of the Corps’s NMESIS weapons system is:
“Enthusiasm for new technologies must be tempered with a realistic understanding of their limitations, a respect for the enduring principles of warfare, and a commitment to maintaining a balanced and comprehensive fires capability. Otherwise, we risk developing a fires force optimized for NICHE THREATS, but woefully unprepared for the massed, high-intensity combat that future conflicts with peer adversaries will inevitably demand.”
In summary many of the same arguments that are leveled at drones are applicable to the NMESIS weapons system, plus there is still no solution to the LOGISTICS PROBLEM!
The “original sin” of Force Design 2030 was not the divestment of one infantry regimental headquarters and three infantry battalions; rather, it was the emasculation of Marine Corps combined arms capabilities. Without robust and resilient supporting arms, Marine infantry is unable to fight, win, and survive battles across the range of military operations. Robbing Marine infantry of all tanks, all assault bridging, all in stride breaching, all school trained snipers, most direct support cannon artillery, and resiliency in tactical aviation is not only professional malpractice, it is also morally wrong. Committing Marine infantry without proper support against a determined enemy is not much different than deploying Marines and Sailors inside active contested areas aboard slow, relatively unarmed LSMs built to commercial survivability standards.
In case you think I’m wrong about Marine infantry, consider the following personal reflections from Major General James Livingston and Colonel Jay Vargas about their experiences during the Battle of Dai Do in Vietnam, during which both earned the Medal of Honor:
“None of us would have survived the fighting in and around Dai Do without the unshakable leadership of the officers, staff noncommissioned officers, and noncommissioned officers; or more importantly, without the magnificent courage, performance, and tenacity of the individual Marines, who were fighting against great odds; and finally, without the close, continuous, and accurate support provided by artillery, helicopter gunships, fixed wing aviation, and naval gunfire. Marine tanks, though limited in number, were also important. Additional tanks would have helped immensely.”
“Close combat is no less important to winning future battles than past battles. But Marine infantry cannot be expected to fight and win with one hand tied behind its back. The jettisoning of all tanks, the deactivation of three infantry battalions, the gutting of direct support cannon artillery, and the loss of two attack helicopter squadrons [note: one has been belatedly reactivated], all to self-fund new experimental capabilities, is unwise and dangerous. FD 2030 and the FD 2030 Annual Update are leaving Marine infantry vulnerable and dangerously isolated, stripped of the support needed to locate, close with, and destroy the enemy. Battles won in the past, such as Dai Do, will likely be lost in the future. Simply stated, we do not believe the Magnificent Bastards [2nd Battalion, 4th Marines] could win the Battle of Dai Do today, given the significant cuts in essential force structure and supporting arms. Even more damaging is the fact that we are unnecessarily and foolishly risking the lives and limbs of our most precious asset, the individual Marine.”
You can read the full article at: https://www.mca-marines.org/wp-content/uploads/Livingston-Vargas-Aug22-WEB-REVISED-for-posting.pdf
While Force Design fools are “sensing” in preparation for a WEZ we have this headline. “China is now operating the former United States military facility at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, The Telegraph reports citing anonymous officials and satellite imagery analyses.”! Are you trembling w rage or nauseated or switching back and forth between these “senses” as reality sinks into your mind?
Yup, the SIF is going to be real beneficial in the desert.
Obligatory: you’re right—Congress, the combatant commanders, the Commandant, and everyone actually making decisions are all wrong, and this small group is the lone voice of truth. So right that after 6 years of lobbying the Hill, attempting to counter two Commandants, meeting senior administration officials, raising a whopping $11,000 over 6 years (“for $5 a day you too can feed the egos of retired GOs”) publishing 200+ articles (so people have heard you, right?)—you still have nothing to show for it.
I watched a documentary on a Marine armored recon company in Fallujah mounted in LAV's. Watching the tales of several weeks of urban combat against an enemy who was something less than a peer level adversary, but willing to die. The Marines came through, but watching I wondered if the new Marines could even perform that mission today.
Also reading "the last stand of Fox Company" about Marines fighting in Korea. I wonder if the new Marine doctrine would allow the Marines to be part of that operation.
How many times will the Marines be called on only to respond that their forces are not appropriate for that sort of operation - call the Army to perform it.
When will DOD conclude: "why do we even need the Marines any longer" ?
A former Combatant Commander during the 38th Commandant's time in office told me that the Commandant never talked with him about FD 2030 and he knew he had not talked with the Commanders of EUCOM, AFRICOM or SOUTHCOM. Those who claim otherwise simply don't know what they claim to know.
So we’re still stuck on “who didn’t talk to whom” six years ago? And now the argument is that former Commandants were heard but not obeyed? That’s the hill you’re on? Meanwhile, Congress, the SECDEF, and two sitting Commandants have all backed FD—and it’s already reshaping the force.
What matters is what Combatant Commanders are saying today—and they’ve consistently supported the capabilities FD delivers: stand‑in forces, long‑range precision fires, sensing networks, and a Corps tailored to actual pacing threats. And MEUs they all want MEUs.
Chowder II could have been value‑added, but instead of playing the ball where it lay, they chased “what should have been” and lost all traction. If you actually care about Amphibs, hold the Navy accountable and support CMC 39 as he balances crisis response with FD realities. Otherwise, you’re just background noise.
What requests by the Combatant Commanders? Have you read Adm. Paparo’s comments of last year? He DIDN’T EVEN MENTION SIFs/MLRs/NMESIS.
Face it Cpl. FD has already lost it “shiny new glimmer. Congress funds it because they’re stupid and don’t dig deeper into what they’re funding. With a glitzy Power Point presentation I could get them to fund bolt action .22s as a replacement for the M4.
argumentum ad hominem,
Speaking of argumentum ad hominem. . . Here are some recent CP comments. . .
“No reasonably intelligent Marine with our Country, our Corps and our Marines in mind can believe FD 2030 makes any sense. Time to unceremoniously dump it without regard for establishing accountability which seems to be the main impediment to moving on NOW!”
- Tom Eagan 1 July 2025
“We need to find some way for those responsible for FD to “save face”. But first, their heads have to be withdrawn from that dark, remote location that they have been in for the past ten years. Semper Fi”
- Raymond Lee Maloy 1 July 2025
“I lived this. It was unbelievably heinous dealing with that man. To be honest, wouldn't piXX on him if he were on fire to this day....24 years later!”
- Coffeejoejava 25 June 2025
“I suspect my friend that you are not really a Marine because real Marines don't think and write like this. They didn't sign on to this gun club to "sense and target;" they came aboard to close with and destroy the enemy. Perhaps you area sailor or airman who wants to do this stuff and is good at it; at least that would be my theory if I didn't see your words in other venues arguing against the realities of ground combat.”
- Paul Van Riper 24 June 2025
“I doubt this President has any indication of what the Marines have lost in the quest toward irrelevance know as FD. He knows they look good opening the doors for him at the white house and standing beside Marine One when he flies to Andrews. Pretty much what I would consider his knowledge of the Marine Corps, other than the propaganda he has been fed by the Commandants sycophants.”
- Coffeejoejava 21 June 2025
“President of MCU did not look like, speak like, or have the demeanor of a Marine let alone a general officer. Makes me question the judgment of the board that selected him for brigadier general.
- Paul Van Riper 11 Feb 2025
We were fortunate, in the past, for an incompetent Commandant to be replaced by a savior. Unfortunately, this hasn’t happened today…This guy is not even an accomplished liar, and the sooner he is exposed to those who can effect change, the better. Semper Fi is still used, but “faithful” to what or whom?
- Raymond Lee Maloy 24 Mar 2025
“But we have switched to drones, and I can say about my unit that we ensured approximately 80% of all targets engaged, from our brigade, are by unmanned systems. I think that this percentage is a bit lower, but still, most of the targets struck by our fires are struck by drones.”
https://www.twz.com/news-features/ukrainian-commanders-exclusive-insights-on-brutal-drone-warfare-on-the-frontline?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mil-ebb
Summary: The war in Ukraine demonstrates the battlefield is now defined by low-cost drones and electronic warfare – not large platforms. Ukrainian commanders report drones have surpassed artillery as the dominant weapon, dictating battlefield control through 24/7 reconnaissance, precision strikes (FPV drones), and constant EW battles.
This isn't a future threat; it's today's fight. Ukraine's experience validates the USMC's focus on Force Design. Dismissing these changes as premature ignores the clear lessons from the frontlines: massed firepower and traditional platforms are increasingly vulnerable and less decisive in a drone-saturated environment.
The debate isn't if the battlefield is changing, but whether we adapt fast enough.
A little more context for the greater audience: "Tactical UAVs have significant limitations. Between 60 and 80% of Ukrainian FPVs fail to reach their target, depending on the part of the front and the skill of the operators. Of those that do strike their targets, a majority fail to destroy the target system when striking armoured vehicles."..."The success rate in wounding infantry is high. Furthermore, there are long periods where either EW or the weather significantly degrades UAV operations."..."... tactical UAVs currently account for 60–70% of damaged and destroyed Russian systems."..."One of the main reasons for such a high proportion of kills being caused by FPVs is the relative lack of artillery in Ukrainian units.". And finally "Tank-on-tank engagements have increased in regularity because of these tactics. It is noteworthy that every Ukrainian brigade aims to field a company or battalion of tanks, with availability varying considerably between formations.". These comments are from a report with the following context: "The observations contained in this report are based on interviews by the authors with staff and personnel from air assault brigades, a marine brigade, a jaeger brigade, a mechanized brigade, an artillery brigade and assault units holding key sectors on the Donetsk and Sumy fronts. The authors also spoke to air defence troops and observed Ukrainian mobile air defence groups, as well as being briefed by personnel of the Donetsk and Sumy Operational Commands, the Joint Strategic–Operational Command, officers of the Ukrainian General Staff, representatives of the Ukrainian Special Services and members of Stavka. Finally, the authors compared these observations with officers responsible for the provision of military technical assistance from Ukraine's international partners.".
I'll take missing 60--80 of the time if I have a million tries and the other guy only gets 100.
What are you talking about? That does not make any sense in the context of this discussion. If you read the report, you would not have made that statement. Drones are an important component of the fight, but not the only component. More so, the factors that lead to 60-80% of failure to reach target are many, varied, and include aspects of combined arms+ management for the team deploying the sUAS. And what if the other guy has a million little tries and a 100 heavy glide bombs and the secure air space to deploy them? What you said makes as much sense talking about this subject as it would if we were talking about a tennis match..."You cannot be serious!" - J. McEnroe
Spot on!
Obligatory: "read more, talk less. You don't know what you are talking about. Drones are an important add, but you are straight out of the Simpson's monorail episode".
My man, the Ukrainian I’m quoting is living the reality you keep theorizing about. He’s surviving drone-saturated battlefields—not pretending it’s still 1991. Compass Points and Desert Storm nostalgia won’t stop Lancets and FPVs. Adaptation will.
That’s why Force Design moves forward while CP spins its wheels.
And the scoreboard shows it.
Not theorizing. I am quoting direct from UKR reporting and analysis. You're quoting TWZ articles which are right up there with the Marine Enquirer. I bet you watch youtube shorts and come away convinced that FPVs have a 100% mission kill rate in the Ukraine conflict also. 1991? Desert Storm? Time for you to put the Whiteclaw down and go home.
The corporal is not correct about the effectiveness of drones to the extent that they control the battle space. The terms and pace of the fighting are on the Russians side and while they move slowly they move inextricably forward. Doesn’t mean drones are not a threat but it is just hogwash to think that EW/ECW etc. etc plus battlefield moxie like sewing the wire guided drones down canalized routes and literally cut the fiber optic line is being devolved every day. In the main the preponderance of WIA and KIA are coming from field artillery, massed field artillery of every sort. There are many non traditional sources reporting on the conflict and they all mostly come to its is an awful dirty fight and drones just a small part of it.
Everything written, even some of your own references, say drones are important, but they are not a replacement for artillery. So far I do not see other nations dumping their artillery for drones.
Aren’t you glad we have both!? That’s my point.
First of all, I see the hype over drones similar to the hype of the end of the tank, after so many Israeli tanks were destroyed by Egyptian soldiers with ATGMs. Pundits made the wrong conclusions. The tank is not dead. Nations have not gotten rid of their tanks. However, many drone advocates, especially in the FD Marine Corps, have fallen for this fallacy.
Secondly, do you really think the current MEU without tanks and tubed artillery is as potent as the MEU prior to FD? There is one thing the Marine Corps does that no other service does: combined-arms naval expeditionary warfare. Is the current MEU still capable? Can the current Marine Corps assist the Army as it has in the past: Korea, Vietnam, Gulf Wars etc? In my opinion it cannot.
Thanks for the questions, and please keep them coming.
I’m not sure where your information came from, but MEUs still deploy with tubed artillery, and in some cases even take HIMARS.
And you are correct—MEUs no longer deploy with four tanks and a single wrecker, each requiring its own connector to get ashore and adding a significant logistical footprint that was increasingly hard to justify.
There’s still plenty of firepower left: LAV-25s, LAV-ATs, ACVs, Javelins, Skids, HIMARS, F-35s, and more. Throw in Group 3 UAS (there now) for sensing and FPVs for strike (soon).
Frankly, I’d take a 2025 MEU over a 2015 MEU any day. That’s not tied to Force Design—it’s simply the result of technology advancements.
Imagine a MEU without the divestment and the addition of drones. The MEU of today does not have a strong mobile firepower system. You don't get power projection from an LAV. Technological advancements are not everything.
No it’s not, it’s a result of going from a 4 ship ARG/MEU to a 3 ship ARG/MEU. And my guess is that most MEUs are deploying with only a platoon of tubed artillery and a single section of HIMARS.
Hogwash Cpl. the Ukrainians are relying on drones due to the fact that they’re critically short of artillery shells. Besides that, numerous sources reliably claim that drones can’t replace the effectiveness of artillery.
Here are a few quotes from articles published in the last 2 years on the subject of drones and their ability to replace conventional artillery.
“As many reports open-source intelligence (OSINT) analysts, and other respected military analysts indicate, the proliferation of FPV drones largely compensates for critical shortages of artillery shells, particularly on the Ukrainian side, filling a gap rather than offering a fundamentally better solution.”
“While FPV drones have proven effective against armored vehicles and in close-quarters combat, at best, they deliver tactical-level precision comparable to battalion mortars, a far cry from the comprehensive impact of artillery fire.”
“UAVs are significantly hampered by adverse weather conditions; rain degrades sensor performance and can cause electrical malfunctions, while strong winds can destabilize the aircraft, impacting its ability to maintain flight or accurately deliver payloads. These limitations mean UAV effectiveness is often dramatically reduced, or even negated, during inclement weather, making them unreliable.”
“UAVs’ payloads also restrict their destructive potential, limiting their ability to inflict significant damage on hardened targets or to suppress enemy fire effectively. Their reliance on radio frequency links makes them vulnerable to jamming, spoofing, cyberattacks, and other forms of electronic warfare—a weakness artillery, particularly when combined with robust communications security measures, doesn’t share. Artillery, in contrast, delivers massed fires in all weather conditions, over extended ranges, and with significantly greater explosive effect. Even the most advanced FPV drones, as Euromaidan Press and other sources have highlighted, cannot replicate the broad-area suppression, neutralization, and destruction that a battery of 155mm howitzers can achieve in a matter of minutes. Nor can drones match the psychological impact of sustained artillery bombardment, a long-recognized element of attritional warfare.”
“Drones are a temporary fix, a stopgap measure, not a replacement. Recognizing this distinction is crucial for American military planners.”
“Precision is valuable, but the ability to deliver massed fires at scale remains essential in major combat operations. Drones will never replicate the overwhelming suppression and deep interdiction effects of artillery. The ability to saturate an enemy position with high-explosive rounds remains a critical capability for breaking enemy defenses and achieving decisive breakthroughs.”
“Enthusiasm for new technologies must be tempered with a realistic understanding of their limitations, a respect for the enduring principles of warfare, and a commitment to maintaining a balanced and comprehensive fires capability. Otherwise, we risk developing a fires force optimized for niche threats, but woefully unprepared for the massed, high-intensity combat that future conflicts with peer adversaries will inevitably demand.”
“Ukraine is ramping up the production of one-way attack suicide” drones to compensate for the lack of artillery shells at the front, the Ukrainian Deputy Defense Ministry said.”
“Berezutskyi highlights that FPV drones are nearing the range and capabilities of battalion mortars, though this comparison is conditional. While FPV drones with up to a 30-kilometer range exist, it’s premature to claim they can entirely substitute conventional artillery.”
“The expert says the utilization of FPV drones does not currently allow for barrage fire or suppression of a stronghold, but their massive use could disrupt the advance of an enemy column or destroy the firing points of a Russian platoon stronghold before a Ukrainian assault begins.”
“For now, they cannot replace missile forces and artillery, except partially, for specific tasks," believes Havryliuk.”
“The effectiveness of combat operations depends on the comprehensive use of the entire spectrum of weapons: artillery, drones, armored vehicles, multiple rocket launchers, electronic warfare, and the professionalism of the personnel," emphasized the Deputy Minister of Defense.”
“Despite their technological allure and affordability, drones perform under specific operational contexts for specific mission objectives and are unlikely to shift the offense-defense balance.”
“Leaning heavily on stand-off centric platforms, including UAVs to provide ‘affordable mass’ compromises ‘effective mass’, and cedes strategic initiative to the adversaries.”
The quote I find most applicable to the question of the Corps’s NMESIS weapons system is:
“Enthusiasm for new technologies must be tempered with a realistic understanding of their limitations, a respect for the enduring principles of warfare, and a commitment to maintaining a balanced and comprehensive fires capability. Otherwise, we risk developing a fires force optimized for NICHE THREATS, but woefully unprepared for the massed, high-intensity combat that future conflicts with peer adversaries will inevitably demand.”
Here are the links to the quoted articles:
https://smallwarsjournal.com/2025/05/05/beyond-the-hype-why-drones-cannot-replace-artillery/
https://www.rfi.fr/en/international-news/20240318-cheap-drones-cannot-match-artillery-power-in-ukraine-experts
https://euromaidanpress.com/2024/01/19/expert-fpv-drones-can-not-replace-artillery-but-are-comparable-with-battalion-mortar-systems/
https://newsukraine.rbc.ua/news/drones-on-front-lines-cannot-yet-replace-1729699596.html
And while not directly related to the discussion here one final article on the replacement of manned aircraft with UAVs:
https://www.isdp.eu/limitations-of-drones-and-the-future-of-american-air-superiority/
In summary many of the same arguments that are leveled at drones are applicable to the NMESIS weapons system, plus there is still no solution to the LOGISTICS PROBLEM!