Compass Points - Rebuild Now
Rebuild America’s crisis response force
Compass Points - Rebuild Now
Rebuild America’s crisis response force
January 16. 2024
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When an earthquake hits, it can leave wide destruction. The USGS website shows three earthquakes in the continental US in 2024.
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-- M 2.8 - 53 km S of Whites City, New Mexico
-- M 2.5 - 30 km ENE of Barstow, CA
-- M 2.9 - 29 km SSW of Mina, Nevada
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The USGS website does not show where the damage has been most severe: the US Marine Corps.
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As Compass Points readers are well aware, the Marine Corps has been hit by the Force Design 2030 earthquake that has badly damaged the Marine Corps' combined arms capabilities.
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After even the worst earthquakes there is only one course of action: rebuild.
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In their article in The Hill, four senior Marine Corps General Officers, provide a blueprint for rebuilding the Marine Corps' combined arms, crisis response capabilities.
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Four retired Marine generals on how to rebuild America’s crisis response force
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. . . If asked to design the ideal “911” force for our nation, we would build it with six distinct capabilities.
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First, it would be an expeditionary force-in-readiness, capable of rapidly deploying to a crisis area by sea and air . . .
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Second, it would be a force of balanced combined arms, optimized to operate in austere environments . . .
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Third, this expeditionary force would be capable of task-organizing for any mission, consisting of flexible forces that could easily converge and composite into larger combat formation . . .
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Fourth, the force would have a global focus and be capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict . . .
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Fifth, this 911 force would be oriented to meet the requirements of all combatant commands, not a narrow few . . .
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And sixth, this premier emergency response force would have a training, education and concepts base for its doctrine, organization and equipping that emphasized maneuver, close combat, adaptability and flexibility. Its ethos would be built around a strong sense of these attributes, plus individual leadership traits such as trust, honor, discipline and initiative . . .
-- Charles Krulak, Charles Wilhelm, Anthony Zinni, & James Conway
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The General's go on to ask, "But wait, you may be thinking — the nation previously had such a force!" That is the problem. Most Americans and even many in Congress are not aware that over the last few years, the Marine Corps has been hit with an earthquake of radical restructuring. It is time to get the word out so the Marine Corps can cleanup, buildup, and regain its place as the world's premier, global, crisis response force.
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Compass Points salutes Generals Charles Krulak, Charles Wilhelm, Anthony Zinni, & James Conway for their timely blueprint for reconstruction and salutes all those throughout the Marine Corps community and in Congress helping to rebuild the Marine Corps.
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The Hill (thehill.com) 01/15/2024
Four retired Marine generals on how to rebuild America’s crisis response force
by Charles Krulak, Charles Wilhelm, Anthony Zinni, & James Conway
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-- Gen. Charles Krulak USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commandant of the Marine Corps.
-- Gen. Charles Wilhelm USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commander, United States Southern Command.
-- Gen. Anthony Zinni USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commander, United States Central Command.
-- Gen. James Conway USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commandant of the Marine Corps.
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USGS – US Geological Survey
https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/map/?extent=11.26461,-148.44727&extent=58.1707,-41.57227
So...the question I keep asking myself is "what does the hasty plan for reposturing the USMC look like?". Basically, what could we actually do with what is in hand / close to hand to be a more effective force in 3-6 months (I know my pro FD2030 friends will say "FD2030", so we'll acknowledge that as the 'throw away' COA 3). We know we can't 'magic' more ships, insta-aquire systems, and flash rebuild wholly lost capabilities. We also are stuck with some systems that may not be optimal. However we could affect people, planning, priorities, policies, and coordination. We also want to avoid starting a series of oscillations that needlessly result in lurching about like drunken LCpl Cfrog trying to stumble back to the barracks, which means attempting to build our hasty plan with an eye to the future deliberate design plan (Vision 2035, FD 2030 2.0...Marine Corps after next, etc). So given the host of constraints and restraints, what do COAs 1 and 2 look like?
If I were Commandant for a day…develop an interim plan
Wolf’s comments about the current Commandant “CMC plans to continue with FD2030; reportedly he put out the word that further discussion is futile” is concerning. If true, we now know a little something about the current Commandant…he possesses the “bonehead’ gene. BTW if the CMC “plans to continue” the 2030 Design, it is probably a good bet that SECNAV strongly agrees.
I once heard a former Commandant, when discussing contingence planning, state “if you need help don’t be afraid to ask for help”. Where I would first go for help is to the Joint side of DOD and sit down with US Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM has four component commands: Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the Joint Enabling and Capabilities Command (this new component should tickle every Marine planner’s invocation button).
AMC not only possess all the C-130s but also all C-17 Globemasters, a wonderfully capable air transporter. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_C-17_Globemaster_III ) This bird can perform both tactical and strategic airlift. When they say tactical, they mean it can land and take off from expeditionary airfields. In the late 90s during a MEU exercise a Marine Harrier landed on a Turkey expeditionary airfield damaging the front landing gear and aircraft to the point it was not flyable. The II MEF Commander ordered the Harrier replaced and the implied mission of getting the broken Harrier back to North Carolina. Flying in a replacement Harrier was not a big deal. The real problem was the broken Harrier on an expeditionary airfield in Turkey. II MEF reached out to AMC via USTRANSCOM and got a brand new C17 tasked to help get the broken Harrier off the expedition airfield. The Harrier was disassembled into three components: frame, engine, and wing. The C17 first flew in the component stands/carriers (after FAA approving the stands for flight) and returned the Harrier to good old NC.
Military Sea Command, in addition to the Ready Reserve Force ships (42 roll-on/roll off (RO/RO) vessels, including 8 Fast Sealift Support (FSS) vessels, 7 LMSR’s (Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off), 4 auxiliary crane ships, and 2 aviation repair vessels) and a host of Special Mission and Service Support ships. BTW the Service Support Group has the USS Mount Whitney originally an amphibious operations command and control ship. https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/ships/ship-inventory/
The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command is responsible for all stateside military and contracted ports and the military movement to those ports. They can also provide access to the US Army’s growing fleet of small amphibs. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/11/14/armys-little-known-boat-fleet-getting-big-upgrade.html Interesting the US Army can manage to build a small amphib fleet and the US Navy can’t seem to even get them planned and scheduled.
Then we have USTRANSCOM newest component: the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. Its mission is “aims to provide mission-tailored, ready joint capability packages to combatant commanders. Its two elements are the Joint Planning Support Element and the Joint Communications Support Element. Seems like there might be some help here.
Finally, there is USTRANSCOM JLOTS program (Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore). https://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/conferences/2001SummerPorts/Session5Adams.pdf Again, seems there might be some help here.
The interesting idea here is, with a little cooperation, an interim plan could be developed without the SECNAV but working with Combatant Commanders and the Joint Planning process while the US Marine Corps re-assembles its combat capabilities. Semper Fi