So...the question I keep asking myself is "what does the hasty plan for reposturing the USMC look like?". Basically, what could we actually do with what is in hand / close to hand to be a more effective force in 3-6 months (I know my pro FD2030 friends will say "FD2030", so we'll acknowledge that as the 'throw away' COA 3). We know we can't 'magic' more ships, insta-aquire systems, and flash rebuild wholly lost capabilities. We also are stuck with some systems that may not be optimal. However we could affect people, planning, priorities, policies, and coordination. We also want to avoid starting a series of oscillations that needlessly result in lurching about like drunken LCpl Cfrog trying to stumble back to the barracks, which means attempting to build our hasty plan with an eye to the future deliberate design plan (Vision 2035, FD 2030 2.0...Marine Corps after next, etc). So given the host of constraints and restraints, what do COAs 1 and 2 look like?
If I were Commandant for a day…develop an interim plan
Wolf’s comments about the current Commandant “CMC plans to continue with FD2030; reportedly he put out the word that further discussion is futile” is concerning. If true, we now know a little something about the current Commandant…he possesses the “bonehead’ gene. BTW if the CMC “plans to continue” the 2030 Design, it is probably a good bet that SECNAV strongly agrees.
I once heard a former Commandant, when discussing contingence planning, state “if you need help don’t be afraid to ask for help”. Where I would first go for help is to the Joint side of DOD and sit down with US Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM has four component commands: Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the Joint Enabling and Capabilities Command (this new component should tickle every Marine planner’s invocation button).
AMC not only possess all the C-130s but also all C-17 Globemasters, a wonderfully capable air transporter. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_C-17_Globemaster_III ) This bird can perform both tactical and strategic airlift. When they say tactical, they mean it can land and take off from expeditionary airfields. In the late 90s during a MEU exercise a Marine Harrier landed on a Turkey expeditionary airfield damaging the front landing gear and aircraft to the point it was not flyable. The II MEF Commander ordered the Harrier replaced and the implied mission of getting the broken Harrier back to North Carolina. Flying in a replacement Harrier was not a big deal. The real problem was the broken Harrier on an expeditionary airfield in Turkey. II MEF reached out to AMC via USTRANSCOM and got a brand new C17 tasked to help get the broken Harrier off the expedition airfield. The Harrier was disassembled into three components: frame, engine, and wing. The C17 first flew in the component stands/carriers (after FAA approving the stands for flight) and returned the Harrier to good old NC.
Military Sea Command, in addition to the Ready Reserve Force ships (42 roll-on/roll off (RO/RO) vessels, including 8 Fast Sealift Support (FSS) vessels, 7 LMSR’s (Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off), 4 auxiliary crane ships, and 2 aviation repair vessels) and a host of Special Mission and Service Support ships. BTW the Service Support Group has the USS Mount Whitney originally an amphibious operations command and control ship. https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/ships/ship-inventory/
The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command is responsible for all stateside military and contracted ports and the military movement to those ports. They can also provide access to the US Army’s growing fleet of small amphibs. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/11/14/armys-little-known-boat-fleet-getting-big-upgrade.html Interesting the US Army can manage to build a small amphib fleet and the US Navy can’t seem to even get them planned and scheduled.
Then we have USTRANSCOM newest component: the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. Its mission is “aims to provide mission-tailored, ready joint capability packages to combatant commanders. Its two elements are the Joint Planning Support Element and the Joint Communications Support Element. Seems like there might be some help here.
The interesting idea here is, with a little cooperation, an interim plan could be developed without the SECNAV but working with Combatant Commanders and the Joint Planning process while the US Marine Corps re-assembles its combat capabilities. Semper Fi
A couple of posts ago, the thought was put forward, if we had a blank sheet of paper to build or rebuild the “911” capabilities what would it look like. Ask and you shall receive. Short, pithy strokes on what it should look like, from four General Officers, that have been there and done that. They provided the template, six important keys to getting back on track. The big plan is in front of us, and now as cfrog suggests, what are we going to do about it, how best to make it happen.
On another Substack post today, “The Connecting File” they provided a podcast with Colonel Scott Cuomo, USMC where they discussed several subjects, and in the main it was quite entertaining, very useful dialog, until the conversation turned to how the Corps will operate under the mandates of FD2030. Then the game of dodge ball began. The logic of “Divest to Invest” and lighten the Marine Corps to meet the pacing threat of the Indo Pacific region, aka China, was glossily accepted, the tanks are old and where would/could 4 tanks be employed, and the Army has plenty of tanks. The 155mm guns are all old and in the Ukraine and besides they are a pain in the neck to “drag around behind 6 wheeled 7 ton trucks”. The point here is in addition to coming up with a revitalized Table of Equipment, and Table of Organization to support the 911 force, some house keeping in regard to whom is getting promoted and why, needs a serious look. If the ability to restructure and reconstitute the Marine Corps to its full capabilities, is to be undertaken, than those remnants of FD 2030, including those who think it is still a good idea, or have been supporting it, for purposes of promotion need to go down the road with the FD2030 concept. The harsh reality is that the damage done by the designers and early implementation of FD2030 appears deeper and wider than one would like to believe. Heavy doses of critical thinking need to return,and the OODA loop invigorated. But for sure, the word seems to be getting passed. We can only hope the brakes are on FD2030 and a new “old” course is being set.
Sure do appreciate Compass Points continuing to publish these articles from distinguished, lettered, career infantry officers with proven operational combat experience and Combatant Command/Service Command/Strategic leadership chops. I followed them nearly 40 years ago, learned much, and I continue to do so today. They don't have to do this. And despite what some currently serving leadership might think, they don't do it in self-interest or for twisted legacy-guarding, or because they're flippantly flouting an unwritten rule that we "keep Corps business private." They tried that in good faith for 2 years. While the old-man narrative and current fad of think-tank writing by "futurists" will not permit their voices in institutional publications like the Gazette or War on the Rocks, I'm glad they continue to get it on the record.
Cfrog...where do we go for quick fixes? I am currently serving in a functional combatant command that is exploring and developing those 911-response force options, but is doing so by, with, and through the GCC commander's requirements and priorities, not divergent from them. I would be interested in a Chowder II OPT that explored ways to go about this same approach. Does it require a SPMAGTF or ACM type construct sourced from I and II MEF? Tied to specific employment in a theater of competition? Might be light and lightweight at this point, not tied to amphib capability. I recall READY DIAMOND in 2021 which was a response force out of I MEF task organized for the AFG withdrawal. Something like that comes to mind.
Unfortunately, I wonder if the futurists in vogue would want to return to the OPLAN for guidance, since they've already done so much outside of it...but it would be interesting to develop COAs that build on the core principles contained in this article.
Learned several days ago that CMC plans to continue with FD2030; reportedly he put out the word that further discussion is futile. Sad, but perhaps not unexpected. This means--paraphrasing John Paul Jones--"We have not yet begun to fight." We certainly do not plan to fold our colors and go away. Stand by for some surprises in very near future.
If it so that the current Commandant (still not back at his post) intends to stifle discussion and a revisit of the concepts of FD2030, then it is time for a Boardroom fight. Having seen some video snippets of the current CMC, one is left with an impression of arrogance, comments such as "being a Marine is bonus enough" when discussing pay discrepancies with the outside world. Few, if any join the Marine Corps for Wall Street type pay, being part of our ethos and way of life is indeed high compensation. But reality is so, that Marines have to live, function and support family's etc., and while it is a high privilege to earn the Eagle, Globe and Anchor, baby needs new shoes is a understandable concern of our Marines. That snarky comment seemed at the time, something a salty second lieutenant about to pin on his silver bars would say, and not in jest. It would work for 30 seconds and then a Krulak or Zinni or Van Riper would quietly remind said Lieutenant to knock it off, because they had been out looking for low spots in rice paddies when he was still in short pants. Message sent.
One gets the notion that the CMC is now God like, and his FD2030 acolytes the purveyors of his epistles from his desk at 8th and I. Colonel Cuomo stated numerous times in the Connecting File podcast that he was all about his Marines and serving them. His enthusiasm was infectious, he would be one of those Company Commander's that the younger company grade officers would want to hang around at the O' Club bar on Friday afternoon after the smoking lamp was lit and Officers Call was finished. But, when it came to FD2030 and the soft shoe and defense of it, the switch got turned right off. "Okay you're one of them now." Career first, get the first star and keep going. Don't rock the boat, bring that enthusiasm to DC and blow smoke up the Congress' backside. Get promoted. News flash, the Marines always, and there is no exception, can smell insincerity a mile away.
To extend the Wall Street analogy, our current CEO is out on medical leave, we share holders do not know when he will be back, we anticipate with falling sales and revenues, and ergo falling ticker prices, a white paper will be issued from safe harbor saying prior results do not portend future outcomes, but stick with me and when I get my bonus and leave, all will be well. In the meantime, the company is performing just well enough to stay out of bankruptcy proceedings. An outside consultant has been called in by the Board of Directors and we can anticipate when completed and read, the CEO and his management team will do what every big boss does with bad news, stick the report in his top right drawer and not change course.
It is up to the board and share holders to take the fight to the "Street" and let the money guys decide the fate of the company. It is going to get very interesting.
I’ve always appreciated the Marine Corps’s risk taking and willingness to try new things. It puts itself as the most nimble and “ahead of the decision curve” branch among the joint force. The Army is so big and bureaucratic - it’s talking just now for example about counter C5ISRE that the Marine Corps was talking about 7-8 years ago.
The Marine Corps needs to be the thought leaders of conventional force. The Army needs to be prepared to scale by a factor of 10. Both branches are doing so, and therefore in my opinion, doing the right thing by making themselves distinguishably different force-providing service branches for our joint force Combatant Commanders to employ. That’s the job of the service chiefs and I’m thankful for it.
So...the question I keep asking myself is "what does the hasty plan for reposturing the USMC look like?". Basically, what could we actually do with what is in hand / close to hand to be a more effective force in 3-6 months (I know my pro FD2030 friends will say "FD2030", so we'll acknowledge that as the 'throw away' COA 3). We know we can't 'magic' more ships, insta-aquire systems, and flash rebuild wholly lost capabilities. We also are stuck with some systems that may not be optimal. However we could affect people, planning, priorities, policies, and coordination. We also want to avoid starting a series of oscillations that needlessly result in lurching about like drunken LCpl Cfrog trying to stumble back to the barracks, which means attempting to build our hasty plan with an eye to the future deliberate design plan (Vision 2035, FD 2030 2.0...Marine Corps after next, etc). So given the host of constraints and restraints, what do COAs 1 and 2 look like?
If I were Commandant for a day…develop an interim plan
Wolf’s comments about the current Commandant “CMC plans to continue with FD2030; reportedly he put out the word that further discussion is futile” is concerning. If true, we now know a little something about the current Commandant…he possesses the “bonehead’ gene. BTW if the CMC “plans to continue” the 2030 Design, it is probably a good bet that SECNAV strongly agrees.
I once heard a former Commandant, when discussing contingence planning, state “if you need help don’t be afraid to ask for help”. Where I would first go for help is to the Joint side of DOD and sit down with US Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM has four component commands: Air Mobility Command, Military Sealift Command, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command and the Joint Enabling and Capabilities Command (this new component should tickle every Marine planner’s invocation button).
AMC not only possess all the C-130s but also all C-17 Globemasters, a wonderfully capable air transporter. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boeing_C-17_Globemaster_III ) This bird can perform both tactical and strategic airlift. When they say tactical, they mean it can land and take off from expeditionary airfields. In the late 90s during a MEU exercise a Marine Harrier landed on a Turkey expeditionary airfield damaging the front landing gear and aircraft to the point it was not flyable. The II MEF Commander ordered the Harrier replaced and the implied mission of getting the broken Harrier back to North Carolina. Flying in a replacement Harrier was not a big deal. The real problem was the broken Harrier on an expeditionary airfield in Turkey. II MEF reached out to AMC via USTRANSCOM and got a brand new C17 tasked to help get the broken Harrier off the expedition airfield. The Harrier was disassembled into three components: frame, engine, and wing. The C17 first flew in the component stands/carriers (after FAA approving the stands for flight) and returned the Harrier to good old NC.
Military Sea Command, in addition to the Ready Reserve Force ships (42 roll-on/roll off (RO/RO) vessels, including 8 Fast Sealift Support (FSS) vessels, 7 LMSR’s (Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off), 4 auxiliary crane ships, and 2 aviation repair vessels) and a host of Special Mission and Service Support ships. BTW the Service Support Group has the USS Mount Whitney originally an amphibious operations command and control ship. https://www.msc.usff.navy.mil/ships/ship-inventory/
The Surface Deployment and Distribution Command is responsible for all stateside military and contracted ports and the military movement to those ports. They can also provide access to the US Army’s growing fleet of small amphibs. https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/11/14/armys-little-known-boat-fleet-getting-big-upgrade.html Interesting the US Army can manage to build a small amphib fleet and the US Navy can’t seem to even get them planned and scheduled.
Then we have USTRANSCOM newest component: the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command. Its mission is “aims to provide mission-tailored, ready joint capability packages to combatant commanders. Its two elements are the Joint Planning Support Element and the Joint Communications Support Element. Seems like there might be some help here.
Finally, there is USTRANSCOM JLOTS program (Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore). https://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/archive/conferences/2001SummerPorts/Session5Adams.pdf Again, seems there might be some help here.
The interesting idea here is, with a little cooperation, an interim plan could be developed without the SECNAV but working with Combatant Commanders and the Joint Planning process while the US Marine Corps re-assembles its combat capabilities. Semper Fi
A couple of posts ago, the thought was put forward, if we had a blank sheet of paper to build or rebuild the “911” capabilities what would it look like. Ask and you shall receive. Short, pithy strokes on what it should look like, from four General Officers, that have been there and done that. They provided the template, six important keys to getting back on track. The big plan is in front of us, and now as cfrog suggests, what are we going to do about it, how best to make it happen.
On another Substack post today, “The Connecting File” they provided a podcast with Colonel Scott Cuomo, USMC where they discussed several subjects, and in the main it was quite entertaining, very useful dialog, until the conversation turned to how the Corps will operate under the mandates of FD2030. Then the game of dodge ball began. The logic of “Divest to Invest” and lighten the Marine Corps to meet the pacing threat of the Indo Pacific region, aka China, was glossily accepted, the tanks are old and where would/could 4 tanks be employed, and the Army has plenty of tanks. The 155mm guns are all old and in the Ukraine and besides they are a pain in the neck to “drag around behind 6 wheeled 7 ton trucks”. The point here is in addition to coming up with a revitalized Table of Equipment, and Table of Organization to support the 911 force, some house keeping in regard to whom is getting promoted and why, needs a serious look. If the ability to restructure and reconstitute the Marine Corps to its full capabilities, is to be undertaken, than those remnants of FD 2030, including those who think it is still a good idea, or have been supporting it, for purposes of promotion need to go down the road with the FD2030 concept. The harsh reality is that the damage done by the designers and early implementation of FD2030 appears deeper and wider than one would like to believe. Heavy doses of critical thinking need to return,and the OODA loop invigorated. But for sure, the word seems to be getting passed. We can only hope the brakes are on FD2030 and a new “old” course is being set.
Sure do appreciate Compass Points continuing to publish these articles from distinguished, lettered, career infantry officers with proven operational combat experience and Combatant Command/Service Command/Strategic leadership chops. I followed them nearly 40 years ago, learned much, and I continue to do so today. They don't have to do this. And despite what some currently serving leadership might think, they don't do it in self-interest or for twisted legacy-guarding, or because they're flippantly flouting an unwritten rule that we "keep Corps business private." They tried that in good faith for 2 years. While the old-man narrative and current fad of think-tank writing by "futurists" will not permit their voices in institutional publications like the Gazette or War on the Rocks, I'm glad they continue to get it on the record.
Cfrog...where do we go for quick fixes? I am currently serving in a functional combatant command that is exploring and developing those 911-response force options, but is doing so by, with, and through the GCC commander's requirements and priorities, not divergent from them. I would be interested in a Chowder II OPT that explored ways to go about this same approach. Does it require a SPMAGTF or ACM type construct sourced from I and II MEF? Tied to specific employment in a theater of competition? Might be light and lightweight at this point, not tied to amphib capability. I recall READY DIAMOND in 2021 which was a response force out of I MEF task organized for the AFG withdrawal. Something like that comes to mind.
Unfortunately, I wonder if the futurists in vogue would want to return to the OPLAN for guidance, since they've already done so much outside of it...but it would be interesting to develop COAs that build on the core principles contained in this article.
Learned several days ago that CMC plans to continue with FD2030; reportedly he put out the word that further discussion is futile. Sad, but perhaps not unexpected. This means--paraphrasing John Paul Jones--"We have not yet begun to fight." We certainly do not plan to fold our colors and go away. Stand by for some surprises in very near future.
If it so that the current Commandant (still not back at his post) intends to stifle discussion and a revisit of the concepts of FD2030, then it is time for a Boardroom fight. Having seen some video snippets of the current CMC, one is left with an impression of arrogance, comments such as "being a Marine is bonus enough" when discussing pay discrepancies with the outside world. Few, if any join the Marine Corps for Wall Street type pay, being part of our ethos and way of life is indeed high compensation. But reality is so, that Marines have to live, function and support family's etc., and while it is a high privilege to earn the Eagle, Globe and Anchor, baby needs new shoes is a understandable concern of our Marines. That snarky comment seemed at the time, something a salty second lieutenant about to pin on his silver bars would say, and not in jest. It would work for 30 seconds and then a Krulak or Zinni or Van Riper would quietly remind said Lieutenant to knock it off, because they had been out looking for low spots in rice paddies when he was still in short pants. Message sent.
One gets the notion that the CMC is now God like, and his FD2030 acolytes the purveyors of his epistles from his desk at 8th and I. Colonel Cuomo stated numerous times in the Connecting File podcast that he was all about his Marines and serving them. His enthusiasm was infectious, he would be one of those Company Commander's that the younger company grade officers would want to hang around at the O' Club bar on Friday afternoon after the smoking lamp was lit and Officers Call was finished. But, when it came to FD2030 and the soft shoe and defense of it, the switch got turned right off. "Okay you're one of them now." Career first, get the first star and keep going. Don't rock the boat, bring that enthusiasm to DC and blow smoke up the Congress' backside. Get promoted. News flash, the Marines always, and there is no exception, can smell insincerity a mile away.
To extend the Wall Street analogy, our current CEO is out on medical leave, we share holders do not know when he will be back, we anticipate with falling sales and revenues, and ergo falling ticker prices, a white paper will be issued from safe harbor saying prior results do not portend future outcomes, but stick with me and when I get my bonus and leave, all will be well. In the meantime, the company is performing just well enough to stay out of bankruptcy proceedings. An outside consultant has been called in by the Board of Directors and we can anticipate when completed and read, the CEO and his management team will do what every big boss does with bad news, stick the report in his top right drawer and not change course.
It is up to the board and share holders to take the fight to the "Street" and let the money guys decide the fate of the company. It is going to get very interesting.
I’ve always appreciated the Marine Corps’s risk taking and willingness to try new things. It puts itself as the most nimble and “ahead of the decision curve” branch among the joint force. The Army is so big and bureaucratic - it’s talking just now for example about counter C5ISRE that the Marine Corps was talking about 7-8 years ago.
The Marine Corps needs to be the thought leaders of conventional force. The Army needs to be prepared to scale by a factor of 10. Both branches are doing so, and therefore in my opinion, doing the right thing by making themselves distinguishably different force-providing service branches for our joint force Combatant Commanders to employ. That’s the job of the service chiefs and I’m thankful for it.