I am still having an issue with the “Concept” of Stand in Forces. SIF 1.0 gives the definition as follows:
“Stand-in Forces Defined. SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary. Depending on the situation, stand-in forces are composed of elements from the Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, special operations forces, interagency, and allies and partners.”
Generally, the SF Teams called in B-52 airstrikes supporting the tribesmen attacks. Of course being a CIA Operation I assume it was executed under Title 50 vs Title 10 (Military) and I am not sure what was the coordination point between Title 50 and Title 10. The operation was very successful. When the Special Forces team captured an al Qaeda radio, they listen to what was believed bin Laden apologizing to the remainder of his fighters and issuing orders to take refuge in Pakistan. At that point the Combatant Commander took over the pursuit of the retreating al Qaeda fighters and bin Laden who did make it back to Pakistan.
For me the confusing part of SIF 1.0 comes with the Illustration of Stand-in Forces with the Battle of the Surigao Straits (24-25 Oct 1944) part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf MacArthur’s Leyte Landing started on 17 Oct with actual landings on 20 Oct. The Japanese decided to sortie to prevent and disturb the landings. They dangled the remainder of their carries as bait to draw off the US Carrier Force (Admiral Halsey). Their deception worked to ensure a surface night action.
The Navy initially tracked the Japanese TF with submarine reports and they had Admiral Odendorf’s TF of 6 battleships, 8 cruisers, 28 destroyers and 39 PT boats waiting at the North end of the Straits on full “Battle Station” alert. The PT boats were stationed along the south end of the straits. As the Jap TF entered and proceeded north through the strait, the PT boats attacked in three boat sections. This tactic forced the enemy ships to turn on search lights and fire salvos allowing the PT boats to report the location and ship types to the US Task Force. The Japanese TF took considerable losses in this defeat and retreated.
IMO this is a great example for a Naval TF Battle but I don’t see any of the definition elements of a SIF or how a Marine Littoral Unit could have helped.
I was originally thinking that the Marine Raider Regiment would be tasked with the SIF mission. The Raiders, however, are part of the Special Operations Command and that brings us back to the experimental Marine Littoral Regiment that has to somehow haul, hide and land (undetected) HIMARS on a Pacific Island. Let’s give the SIP mission to the SOCOM and get the Marine Corps back to training and equipping MAGTFs.
I think it is shameful that Congress requires an outside federal agency to investigate how the Marine Corps should prepare for future war. Marines should internally sort out our issues with Force Design 2030, Vision 2035, SIF 2.0, or other concepts and agree on a united way forward. It's time for the Marine Corps to reclaim its internal strength, consensus, and leadership prowess.
What boxer goes into a ring with the idea that they stand in one corner of the ring and wait to be pummeled with the counter idea that the pummeler will not find him, pummel himself to exhaustion or decide to pummel an empty corner of the ring. It seems almost dereliction of duty to allow the forces necessary to meet Title X not be made ready and prepared to meet the obligations thereof. That is just the start all of the virtuous arrows going from being closed to all open.
Thanks for this positive action go out to Senator Sullivan (Colonel in active Marine Corps Reserve) and in support, Representative Bergman (retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen.)
I am still having an issue with the “Concept” of Stand in Forces. SIF 1.0 gives the definition as follows:
“Stand-in Forces Defined. SIF are small but lethal, low signature, mobile, relatively simple to maintain and sustain forces designed to operate across the competition continuum within a contested area as the leading edge of a maritime defense-in-depth in order to intentionally disrupt the plans of a potential or actual adversary. Depending on the situation, stand-in forces are composed of elements from the Marine Corps, Navy, Coast Guard, special operations forces, interagency, and allies and partners.”
When I first read this definition, I thought of the CIA’s successful “Jawbreaker” Operation in Afghanistan to retaliate against bin Laden and al Qaeda. The CIA secretly moved Special Forces Teams into Afghanistan to support the Afghan tribes that were fighting against al Qaeda. These teams were equipped with satellite communications, GPS and laser equipped target designators and lots good old American dollars. https://www.militarytimes.com/off-duty/gearscout/irons/2019/10/15/this-is-what-the-cia-warriors-carried-into-afghanistan-in-the-days-after-911/
Generally, the SF Teams called in B-52 airstrikes supporting the tribesmen attacks. Of course being a CIA Operation I assume it was executed under Title 50 vs Title 10 (Military) and I am not sure what was the coordination point between Title 50 and Title 10. The operation was very successful. When the Special Forces team captured an al Qaeda radio, they listen to what was believed bin Laden apologizing to the remainder of his fighters and issuing orders to take refuge in Pakistan. At that point the Combatant Commander took over the pursuit of the retreating al Qaeda fighters and bin Laden who did make it back to Pakistan.
For me the confusing part of SIF 1.0 comes with the Illustration of Stand-in Forces with the Battle of the Surigao Straits (24-25 Oct 1944) part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf MacArthur’s Leyte Landing started on 17 Oct with actual landings on 20 Oct. The Japanese decided to sortie to prevent and disturb the landings. They dangled the remainder of their carries as bait to draw off the US Carrier Force (Admiral Halsey). Their deception worked to ensure a surface night action.
The Navy initially tracked the Japanese TF with submarine reports and they had Admiral Odendorf’s TF of 6 battleships, 8 cruisers, 28 destroyers and 39 PT boats waiting at the North end of the Straits on full “Battle Station” alert. The PT boats were stationed along the south end of the straits. As the Jap TF entered and proceeded north through the strait, the PT boats attacked in three boat sections. This tactic forced the enemy ships to turn on search lights and fire salvos allowing the PT boats to report the location and ship types to the US Task Force. The Japanese TF took considerable losses in this defeat and retreated.
IMO this is a great example for a Naval TF Battle but I don’t see any of the definition elements of a SIF or how a Marine Littoral Unit could have helped.
I was originally thinking that the Marine Raider Regiment would be tasked with the SIF mission. The Raiders, however, are part of the Special Operations Command and that brings us back to the experimental Marine Littoral Regiment that has to somehow haul, hide and land (undetected) HIMARS on a Pacific Island. Let’s give the SIP mission to the SOCOM and get the Marine Corps back to training and equipping MAGTFs.
I think it is shameful that Congress requires an outside federal agency to investigate how the Marine Corps should prepare for future war. Marines should internally sort out our issues with Force Design 2030, Vision 2035, SIF 2.0, or other concepts and agree on a united way forward. It's time for the Marine Corps to reclaim its internal strength, consensus, and leadership prowess.
What boxer goes into a ring with the idea that they stand in one corner of the ring and wait to be pummeled with the counter idea that the pummeler will not find him, pummel himself to exhaustion or decide to pummel an empty corner of the ring. It seems almost dereliction of duty to allow the forces necessary to meet Title X not be made ready and prepared to meet the obligations thereof. That is just the start all of the virtuous arrows going from being closed to all open.
Thanks for this positive action go out to Senator Sullivan (Colonel in active Marine Corps Reserve) and in support, Representative Bergman (retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen.)
One can bet any "study" by beltway experts will have a finding/recommendation for further study, research, and follow up.$$$$$$$$$$
Great roadmap to follow. Let’s hope those in power take these ideas seriously.