Compass Points - Report Due
List of 10 specific elements
Compass Points - Report Due
List of 10 specific elements
February 14, 2024
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Congress is more than busy with crises at home and abroad. Nevertheless, Congress is beginning to take time and attention to ask questions about the health of the Marine Corps. In the most recent National Defense Authorization Act, Congress imposed a requirement for a special report about the Marine Corps' Force Design decisions.
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Why should Congress feel the need to ask for a special report? Most likely because over the last few years, there have been too many questions about the Marine Corps and too few answers. In Section 1066 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 Congress requires, "the Commandant of the Marine Corps shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report detailing the programmatic choices made to implement Force Design 2030." Shortly after the report is submitted to Congress, the Marine Corps is required to brief the report to Congress. What does Congress want to know? Congress lays out a list of 10 specific elements.
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SEC. 1066. ANNUAL REPORT AND BRIEFING ON IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCE DESIGN 2030.
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. . . (c) Elements.--Each report required under subsection (a) and
briefing required under subsection (b) shall include the following
elements:
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(1) An assessment of changes in the national defense strategy,
Defense Planning Guidance, Joint Warfighting Concept (and
associated concept required capabilities), and other planning
processes that informed Force Design 2030.
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(2) An inventory and assessment of the exercises and
experimentation related to the Force Design, starting in fiscal
year 2020, including an identification of the capabilities that
were involved and the extent to which such exercises and
experimentation validated or militated against proposed capability
investments.
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(3) An inventory of divestments of capability or capacity,
whether force structure or equipment, starting in fiscal year 2020,
including--
(A) a timeline of the progress of each divestment;
(B) the type of force structure or equipment divested or
reduced;
(C) the percentage of force structure or equipment divested
or reduced, including any equipment entered into inventory
management or another form of storage;
(D) the rationale and context behind such divestment;
(E) an identification of whether such divestment affects
the ability of the Marine Corps to meet the requirements of the
Global Force Management process and operational plans,
including an explanation of how the Marine Corps plans to
mitigate the loss of such capability or capacity if the
divestment affects the ability of the Marine Corps to meet the
requirements of the Global Force Management process and
operational plans, including through new investments,
additional joint planning and training, or other methods; and
(F) an assessment of the actual and projected recruitment
and retention percentages for the Marine Corps, starting in
fiscal year 2020.
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(4) An inventory of extant or planned investments as a part of
Force Design 2030, disaggregated by integrated air and missile
defense, littoral mobility and maneuver, sea denial, and
reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance forces, including--
(A) capability name;
(B) capability purpose and context;
(C) capability being replaced (or not applicable);
(D) date of initial operational capability;
(E) date of full operational capability;
(F) deliveries of units by year; and
(G) approved acquisition objective or similar inventory
objective.
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(5) A description of the amphibious warfare ship and maritime
mobility requirements the Marine Corps submitted to the Department
of the Navy in support of the Marine Corps organization and
concepts under Force Design 2030 and its statutory requirements,
including--
(A) an explicit statement of the planning assumptions about
readiness of amphibious warfare ships and maritime mobility
platforms that were used in developing the requirements; and
(B) an assessment of whether the 30-year shipbuilding plan
of the Navy and the budget for the fiscal year covered by the
briefing meet the amphibious ship requirements of the Navy.
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(6) An assessment of how the capability investments described
in paragraph (4) contribute to joint force efficacy in new ways,
including through support of other Armed Forces.
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(7) An assessment of the ability of the Marine Corps to
generate required force elements for the Immediate Ready Force and
the Contingency Ready Force over the two fiscal years preceding the
fiscal year during which the report and briefing are provided and
the expected ability to generate forces for the subsequent two
fiscal years.
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(8) An assessment of Marine Corps force structure and the
readiness of Marine Expeditionary Units compared to availability of
amphibious ships comprising an Amphibious Ready Group over the two
fiscal years preceding the fiscal year during which the report and
briefing are provided and the expected availability for the
subsequent two fiscal years.
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(9) An assessment by the Marine Corps of the compliance of the
Marine Corps with the statutory organization prescribed in section
8063 of title 10, United States Code, that ``[t]he Marine Corps,
within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to
include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings,
and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be
organic therein''.
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(10) An assessment by the Marine Corps of the compliance of the
Marine Corps with the statutory functions prescribed in section
8063 of title 10, United States Code, that ``[t]he Marine Corps
shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine
forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components,
for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced
naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be
essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign''. . . .
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After all the questions have been asked, there is one more question worth asking. Why is Congress so concerned about the Marine Corps today that it requires a special report about the health and fitness of the Corps?
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It is worth keeping in mind that everyone involved with the Congressional report all want the same thing. Everyone is on the same side. Those in Congress requiring the report, those on active duty preparing the report, the broad Marine community, and every American, all want a Marine Corps that is strong today and stronger tomorrow. Because a strong Marine Corps helps keep the Nation strong.
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Congress has asked straight forward questions. Now the Marine Corps has the opportunity to provide straight forward answers. On this Valentine's Day, Compass Points salutes Congress for asking some crucial questions, and salutes the Marine Corps for preparing the answers. But the Marine Corps cannot take too much time preparing the answers. The report to Congress is due tomorrow.
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The 118th Congress (2023-2024)
H.R.2670 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024
SEC. 1066. ANNUAL REPORT AND BRIEFING ON IMPLEMENTATION OF FORCE DESIGN 2030.
https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text
Military Strategy
Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr., US Army, Retired
Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s pragmatic definition of military strategy is as current today as it was when his article led the May 1989 issue of Military Review. Lykke’s model remains the basis for military strategy instruction at the US Army War College. Interestingly, our records show that Military Review rejected this same article in March 1981. According to Lykke, the editors felt an article on strategy would be inappropriate for students at the Army’s
Wsenior tactical school.
HAT IS MILITARY STRATEGY? In
ancient Greece, it was the “art of the gen- eral.” In its glossary of military terms, the US Army War College lists eight definitions of military strategy. This highlights the first of many problems in the study of this important but complex subject. There is no universal definition or even the approximation of a consensus. Today the term “strategy” is used altogether too loosely. Some call a line drawn on a map a strategy. Others believe a laundry list of national objectives represents a strategy. The problem is not just semantics; it is one of effectively and competently using one of the most essential tools of the military profession. In trying to decide between alternative strategies, we are often faced with a comparison of apples and oranges, because the choices do not address the same factors. Only with a mutual understanding of what comprises military strategy can we hope to improve our strategic dialogue. There needs to be general agreement on a conceptual approach to military strategy: a definition, a description of the basic elements that make up military strategy and an analysis of how they are related. For the purpose of this discussion, we will use the definition approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: “The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.”1
During a visit to the US Army War College in 1981, General Maxwell D. Taylor characterized strategy as consisting of objectives, ways and means. We can
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express this concept as an equation: Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved). This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strate- gy-military, political, economic and so forth, depending upon the element of national power employed.
We should not confuse military strategy with national (grand) strategy, which may be defined as: “The art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.”2
Military strategy is [only] one part of this all-encom- passing national strategy. The military component of our national strategy is sometimes referred to as national military strategy-military strategy at its higher level and differentiated from operational strategies used as the basis for military planning and operations. Military strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which is defined as “a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.”3 In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.
With our general concept of strategy as a guide-strat- egy equals ends plus ways plus means-we can develop an approach to military strategy. Ends can be expressed as military objectives. Ways are concerned with the var- ious methods of applying military force. In essence, this
becomes an examination of courses of action designed to achieve the military objective. These courses of action are termed “military strategic concepts.” Means refers to the military resources (manpower, materiel, money, forces, logistics and so forth) required to accomplish the mission. This leads us to the conclusion that military strategy equals military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources. This conceptual approach is applicable to all three
National (grand) strategy, ... may be defined as: “The art and science of devel- oping and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.” ... Mili- tary strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which
is defined as “a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.” In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.
levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. It also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy, operational art and tactics. Strategists, planners, corps commanders and squad leaders are all concerned with ways to employ means to achieve ends.
Some readers may question this idea, thinking that while military resources are necessary to support a strategy, they are not a component of that strategy. They would limit military strategy to a consideration of military objectives and military strategic concepts. However, in discussing the importance of superiority of numbers, Carl von Clausewitz stated that the deci- sion on the size of military forces “is indeed a vital part of strategy.”4 And Bernard Brodie points out that “Strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons systems...”5 By considering military resources as a basic element of military strategy, we may also alleviate the problem of disregarding the importance of military objectives and strategic concepts while concentrating mainly on force structure issues.
There are two levels of military strategy: operational and force development. Strategies based on existing military capabilities are operational strategies-those that are used as a foundation for the formulation of specific plans for action in the short-range time period. This level of strategy has also been referred to as higher, or grand, tactics and operational art. Longer-range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives and
requirements and are therefore not as constrained by current force posture. These longer-range strategies are more often global in nature and may require improve- ments in military capabilities. Military strategies can be regional as well as global, concerning themselves with specific threat scenarios.
Military objectives and military strategic concepts of a military strategy establish requirements for resources and are, in turn, influenced by the availability of resources. If we fail to consider military resources as an element of military strategy, we may be faced with what has come to …..Drones are means….etc etc Cheers
Battle of Rabaul New Guinea …a “Neutralization” Campaign (1943 – 1945) – a rewrite from CP Managing Marines? Because I am not sure it is getting the attention it deserves, hoping the 1066 Report gets the attention it deserves.
(BTW get your camp stools and break out your maps)
Any Pacific Ocean military strategy should have started with a study of the WW2 Pacific Campaigns. The Rabaul campaign needs attention and study, because it set the strategy of isolation for most of the Pacific War.
In January 1942 the Japanese captured Rabaul and immediately started turning it into a fortress. The Japanese established Rabaul as their Southern Pacific supply, communications and air dome hub. “The Rabaul port facilities were excellent, and the harbor big enough to hold the entire Imperial Japanese Navy, its fleet train, and enough transports and supply ships to carry and maintain an army corps.” Rabaul could support not only the Japanese efforts in New Guinea and the Southern Solomon Islands but also the Central Pacific Gilbert and Marshall Island Chains.
Working the Rabaul problem required looking at the current tactical situation in air distances. The first air leg started at Port Moresby on the southern tip of New Guinea held by the allies and ended at the Japanese held base at Wewak on the North side of New Guinea (550 miles). This leg also included the strategically important Vitiaz Strait between New Guinea and New Britain. The second leg was Port Moresby to Rabaul (550 miles). The last leg was the north side of the triangle from Wewak to Rabaul (600 miles).
The Joint Staff Directive established three tasks for the capture of Rabaul. “Task One directed the seizure of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Santa Cruz Islands. Task Two called for the recapturing the remaining Soloman Islands and northeastern coast of New Guinea. This included Japanese held New Guinea ports of Lae, Salamaua, and points north. Task Three called for the occupation of New Britain, including Rabaul.” These tasks were issued to the two regional commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.
In March 1943, reacting to the Allies pressure in New Guinea, the Japanese attempt to reinforce Lae, New Guinea from Rabaul. A Japanese convoy of eight destroyers and eight troop transport carrying 6900 troops was detected and as it sailed into the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The combined US Army 15th Air Force and allied Royal Australian Air Force jumped the convoy east of Lae and sunk all eight transports and four of the destroyers with only 1200 of the Jap soldiers making it to Lae. The Allied Air Groups were also engaged by enemy aircraft losing 102 of the 150 Japanese planes. A great 2 days for the allies and a complete disaster for the Japanese.
I should note that the 15th Air Force developed new tactics for the bombing of shipping before the battle. The two techniques of “skip” bombing and “mast-high” bombing were developed and rehearsed. The neat thing here is a single bomber could apply both techniques on a single run (at very low altitude), on a single target with two bombs. A worthwhile read is the Battle of the Bismarck Sea Section of General Kenney Reports (15th Air Force Commander) found here: https://media.defense.gov/2010/May/26/2001330291/-1/-1/0/AFD-100526-032.pdf
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea raised the question: Can Rabaul be neutralized and by-passed using air power? The Commander of the US 5th Air Force, General George Kenny, credited with the Bismarck Sea victory, reporting to General MacArthur, said yes, but I am going to need some more airfields either captured or built.
MacArthur was the Southwest Pacific Area commander responsible for Australia, New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, New Britain (Rabaul), New Ireland and the water around them. Admiral Halsey, assigned by Admiral Nimitz, was the Southern Pacific Area Commander. The boundary between the two areas split the Solomon Island Chain, however, both MacArthur and Halsey, could penetrate into the others area with permission. This command arrangement set up Rabaul for a classic double envelopment.
MacArthur would start with his wing of the double envelopment taking the Islands of Kiriwina and Woodlark south of New Britain securing the SLOCs to the Solomon’s and Australia. Next Lae, on the north side of New Guinea, would be taken by Australian troops attacking from Salamaua. The first air born assault in the pacific war was execute by a US Army parachute drop cutting off the Japanese retreat from Lae. The drop was uniquely covered by a smoke screen provided by US Bombers. Trapped between two forces, the Japanese commander retreated his forces through the Saruwaged Mountain range.
Next MacArthur secured the Huon Peninsula and the Vitiaz Strait in order to make his amphibious assaults on New Britain. The Australian 9th Infantry Division conducted an amphibious assault to capture and secure the port town of Finschhafen to complete his Huon Peninsula Campaign. Finschhafen would be turned into a major base and port with three airfields.
New Britain was next. In Dec 1943 the 1st Marine Division conducted amphibious assaults at Cape Gloucester and Arawe to seize, improve and build airfields. The airfields at Gatsama and Talasea were captured in January. MacArthur would later close one of the back doors to Rabaul with the seizure of the Admiralty Islands (and the stationing of bombers) located 620 miles north of Cape Gloucester, New Britain.
The same tactics would be applied to the Solomon Island side of the double envelopment. From Guadalcanal the amphibious assaults would continue north to the Russel Islands, Vella Lavella Island, New George and the Battle of Munda Point, the deception amphibious raid on Choiseul by the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion, in preparation for the Bougainville amphibious assaults and the construction of three airfields. At the end of the Solomon drive was the Green Islands. Again airfields were seized, improved and/or built at each one of these objectives. The final nail to close the back door on Rabaul was delivered by the 4th Marine Regiment with the capture of Emirau Island just north of the northern tip of New Ireland. (TADA! A double envelopment and a modern day Cannae. US Military War Colleges need to add this campaign to their curriculum.)
While this march of amphibious assaults, airfield seizures and construction was occurring, the USA 5th Air Force, Admiral Halsey’s carrier raids and ComAirSols made continuous (daily) air raids and “sweeps” on Rabaul. ComAirSols was all ground based aircraft in the Solomon Area of Operations and a Joint Organization make up of US Navy (19 Squadrons: 274 planes), and US Marine (14 Squadrons; 181 planes), Royal New Zealand Air Force (2 Squadrons; 57 planes), and the US Army 13th Air Force (16 Squadrons; 216 planes).
The Japanese Rabaul “Fortress” consisted of five air fields with over 300 aircrafts, and these were later reinforced after heavy losses with another 100 planes. When the Japanese withdrew their planes there was less than a dozen planes that could fly out. In addition to 500+ small boats and barges, 20 destroyers, 10 submarines, 30 naval vessels, 154 large cargo vessels, and 70 small cargo ships were sunk. All dock facilities were destroyed. Of the over 110,000 military personal, approximately 60,000 surrendered to Australian Forces two weeks after Japan’s surrender. The Australians found over 100 Japanese operational medium and light tanks and over 350 miles of tunnels. The neutralization of Rabaul was accomplished by 29,354 Allied sorties and 20,584 tons of bombs.
The Rabaul Campaign’s “focus of effort” was clearly the 15th US Air Force and ComAirSols. The amphibious operations were actually a supporting effort to seize and build airfields. The Japanese center of gravity attacked was their SLOCs. Also of note, many of the amphibious landings were accomplished with regiment or smaller size units. (The Bougainville amphibious assault was accomplished by the 3rd Marine Division and the US Army 37th Infantry Division.) The small amphibian ships, LCIs and LSTs, also played a significant role in this campaign. Using a contemporary military term, this campaign was about as “JOINT” as you can get.
After looking at this campaign I am concern about the needed re-constitution of the Marine Air Wings. Acquisition and MOS training time lines are much longer for Marine aviation than for an infantry battalion or even a tank battalion or two. Something to think about.
Semper Fi.
References: History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II by Robert Sherrod and Rabaul 1943-1945: Reducing Japan’s Great Island Fortress by Mark Lardas