Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s pragmatic definition of military strategy is as current today as it was when his article led the May 1989 issue of Military Review. Lykke’s model remains the basis for military strategy instruction at the US Army War College. Interestingly, our records show that Military Review rejected this same article in March 1981. According to Lykke, the editors felt an article on strategy would be inappropriate for students at the Army’s
Wsenior tactical school.
HAT IS MILITARY STRATEGY? In
ancient Greece, it was the “art of the gen- eral.” In its glossary of military terms, the US Army War College lists eight definitions of military strategy. This highlights the first of many problems in the study of this important but complex subject. There is no universal definition or even the approximation of a consensus. Today the term “strategy” is used altogether too loosely. Some call a line drawn on a map a strategy. Others believe a laundry list of national objectives represents a strategy. The problem is not just semantics; it is one of effectively and competently using one of the most essential tools of the military profession. In trying to decide between alternative strategies, we are often faced with a comparison of apples and oranges, because the choices do not address the same factors. Only with a mutual understanding of what comprises military strategy can we hope to improve our strategic dialogue. There needs to be general agreement on a conceptual approach to military strategy: a definition, a description of the basic elements that make up military strategy and an analysis of how they are related. For the purpose of this discussion, we will use the definition approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: “The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.”1
During a visit to the US Army War College in 1981, General Maxwell D. Taylor characterized strategy as consisting of objectives, ways and means. We can
MILITARYREVIEW • January-February1997
183
express this concept as an equation: Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved). This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strate- gy-military, political, economic and so forth, depending upon the element of national power employed.
We should not confuse military strategy with national (grand) strategy, which may be defined as: “The art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.”2
Military strategy is [only] one part of this all-encom- passing national strategy. The military component of our national strategy is sometimes referred to as national military strategy-military strategy at its higher level and differentiated from operational strategies used as the basis for military planning and operations. Military strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which is defined as “a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.”3 In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.
With our general concept of strategy as a guide-strat- egy equals ends plus ways plus means-we can develop an approach to military strategy. Ends can be expressed as military objectives. Ways are concerned with the var- ious methods of applying military force. In essence, this
becomes an examination of courses of action designed to achieve the military objective. These courses of action are termed “military strategic concepts.” Means refers to the military resources (manpower, materiel, money, forces, logistics and so forth) required to accomplish the mission. This leads us to the conclusion that military strategy equals military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources. This conceptual approach is applicable to all three
National (grand) strategy, ... may be defined as: “The art and science of devel- oping and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.” ... Mili- tary strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which
is defined as “a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.” In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.
levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. It also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy, operational art and tactics. Strategists, planners, corps commanders and squad leaders are all concerned with ways to employ means to achieve ends.
Some readers may question this idea, thinking that while military resources are necessary to support a strategy, they are not a component of that strategy. They would limit military strategy to a consideration of military objectives and military strategic concepts. However, in discussing the importance of superiority of numbers, Carl von Clausewitz stated that the deci- sion on the size of military forces “is indeed a vital part of strategy.”4 And Bernard Brodie points out that “Strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons systems...”5 By considering military resources as a basic element of military strategy, we may also alleviate the problem of disregarding the importance of military objectives and strategic concepts while concentrating mainly on force structure issues.
There are two levels of military strategy: operational and force development. Strategies based on existing military capabilities are operational strategies-those that are used as a foundation for the formulation of specific plans for action in the short-range time period. This level of strategy has also been referred to as higher, or grand, tactics and operational art. Longer-range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives and
requirements and are therefore not as constrained by current force posture. These longer-range strategies are more often global in nature and may require improve- ments in military capabilities. Military strategies can be regional as well as global, concerning themselves with specific threat scenarios.
Military objectives and military strategic concepts of a military strategy establish requirements for resources and are, in turn, influenced by the availability of resources. If we fail to consider military resources as an element of military strategy, we may be faced with what has come to …..Drones are means….etc etc Cheers
OK, let's have this discussion. Say that Col Lykke's paper is correct. Question: Is the "Island Chain" Strategy a military strategy or a political strategy?
In my opinion it is neither, lately the “designers” dropped 2030. It’s a “design”. Not my word but the “designers”! It is Force Design and it needs to be put in the “shit can” . We have wars “Marines to Make and Battles to Win”. Designs do not do either. A Famous Marine Once Said “The Only thing the Commandant Commands is the Silent Drill Team, the Drum and Bugle Corps, the Marine Band”. Some Admiral would be the Combatant Commander of FD Units . How would Commander Of Central utilize a Marine Littoral Regiment from MarForPac as part of Mar Cent to fight the Iranians?
Colonel Art Lykke was leader of my seminar at the Army War College in 1981/82. He was as fine an officer as I ever knew and an exceptionally talented instructor. I still have several of his articles and papers in my possession.
Battle of Rabaul New Guinea …a “Neutralization” Campaign (1943 – 1945) – a rewrite from CP Managing Marines? Because I am not sure it is getting the attention it deserves, hoping the 1066 Report gets the attention it deserves.
(BTW get your camp stools and break out your maps)
Any Pacific Ocean military strategy should have started with a study of the WW2 Pacific Campaigns. The Rabaul campaign needs attention and study, because it set the strategy of isolation for most of the Pacific War.
In January 1942 the Japanese captured Rabaul and immediately started turning it into a fortress. The Japanese established Rabaul as their Southern Pacific supply, communications and air dome hub. “The Rabaul port facilities were excellent, and the harbor big enough to hold the entire Imperial Japanese Navy, its fleet train, and enough transports and supply ships to carry and maintain an army corps.” Rabaul could support not only the Japanese efforts in New Guinea and the Southern Solomon Islands but also the Central Pacific Gilbert and Marshall Island Chains.
Working the Rabaul problem required looking at the current tactical situation in air distances. The first air leg started at Port Moresby on the southern tip of New Guinea held by the allies and ended at the Japanese held base at Wewak on the North side of New Guinea (550 miles). This leg also included the strategically important Vitiaz Strait between New Guinea and New Britain. The second leg was Port Moresby to Rabaul (550 miles). The last leg was the north side of the triangle from Wewak to Rabaul (600 miles).
The Joint Staff Directive established three tasks for the capture of Rabaul. “Task One directed the seizure of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Santa Cruz Islands. Task Two called for the recapturing the remaining Soloman Islands and northeastern coast of New Guinea. This included Japanese held New Guinea ports of Lae, Salamaua, and points north. Task Three called for the occupation of New Britain, including Rabaul.” These tasks were issued to the two regional commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.
In March 1943, reacting to the Allies pressure in New Guinea, the Japanese attempt to reinforce Lae, New Guinea from Rabaul. A Japanese convoy of eight destroyers and eight troop transport carrying 6900 troops was detected and as it sailed into the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The combined US Army 15th Air Force and allied Royal Australian Air Force jumped the convoy east of Lae and sunk all eight transports and four of the destroyers with only 1200 of the Jap soldiers making it to Lae. The Allied Air Groups were also engaged by enemy aircraft losing 102 of the 150 Japanese planes. A great 2 days for the allies and a complete disaster for the Japanese.
I should note that the 15th Air Force developed new tactics for the bombing of shipping before the battle. The two techniques of “skip” bombing and “mast-high” bombing were developed and rehearsed. The neat thing here is a single bomber could apply both techniques on a single run (at very low altitude), on a single target with two bombs. A worthwhile read is the Battle of the Bismarck Sea Section of General Kenney Reports (15th Air Force Commander) found here: https://media.defense.gov/2010/May/26/2001330291/-1/-1/0/AFD-100526-032.pdf
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea raised the question: Can Rabaul be neutralized and by-passed using air power? The Commander of the US 5th Air Force, General George Kenny, credited with the Bismarck Sea victory, reporting to General MacArthur, said yes, but I am going to need some more airfields either captured or built.
MacArthur was the Southwest Pacific Area commander responsible for Australia, New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, New Britain (Rabaul), New Ireland and the water around them. Admiral Halsey, assigned by Admiral Nimitz, was the Southern Pacific Area Commander. The boundary between the two areas split the Solomon Island Chain, however, both MacArthur and Halsey, could penetrate into the others area with permission. This command arrangement set up Rabaul for a classic double envelopment.
MacArthur would start with his wing of the double envelopment taking the Islands of Kiriwina and Woodlark south of New Britain securing the SLOCs to the Solomon’s and Australia. Next Lae, on the north side of New Guinea, would be taken by Australian troops attacking from Salamaua. The first air born assault in the pacific war was execute by a US Army parachute drop cutting off the Japanese retreat from Lae. The drop was uniquely covered by a smoke screen provided by US Bombers. Trapped between two forces, the Japanese commander retreated his forces through the Saruwaged Mountain range.
Next MacArthur secured the Huon Peninsula and the Vitiaz Strait in order to make his amphibious assaults on New Britain. The Australian 9th Infantry Division conducted an amphibious assault to capture and secure the port town of Finschhafen to complete his Huon Peninsula Campaign. Finschhafen would be turned into a major base and port with three airfields.
New Britain was next. In Dec 1943 the 1st Marine Division conducted amphibious assaults at Cape Gloucester and Arawe to seize, improve and build airfields. The airfields at Gatsama and Talasea were captured in January. MacArthur would later close one of the back doors to Rabaul with the seizure of the Admiralty Islands (and the stationing of bombers) located 620 miles north of Cape Gloucester, New Britain.
The same tactics would be applied to the Solomon Island side of the double envelopment. From Guadalcanal the amphibious assaults would continue north to the Russel Islands, Vella Lavella Island, New George and the Battle of Munda Point, the deception amphibious raid on Choiseul by the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion, in preparation for the Bougainville amphibious assaults and the construction of three airfields. At the end of the Solomon drive was the Green Islands. Again airfields were seized, improved and/or built at each one of these objectives. The final nail to close the back door on Rabaul was delivered by the 4th Marine Regiment with the capture of Emirau Island just north of the northern tip of New Ireland. (TADA! A double envelopment and a modern day Cannae. US Military War Colleges need to add this campaign to their curriculum.)
While this march of amphibious assaults, airfield seizures and construction was occurring, the USA 5th Air Force, Admiral Halsey’s carrier raids and ComAirSols made continuous (daily) air raids and “sweeps” on Rabaul. ComAirSols was all ground based aircraft in the Solomon Area of Operations and a Joint Organization make up of US Navy (19 Squadrons: 274 planes), and US Marine (14 Squadrons; 181 planes), Royal New Zealand Air Force (2 Squadrons; 57 planes), and the US Army 13th Air Force (16 Squadrons; 216 planes).
The Japanese Rabaul “Fortress” consisted of five air fields with over 300 aircrafts, and these were later reinforced after heavy losses with another 100 planes. When the Japanese withdrew their planes there was less than a dozen planes that could fly out. In addition to 500+ small boats and barges, 20 destroyers, 10 submarines, 30 naval vessels, 154 large cargo vessels, and 70 small cargo ships were sunk. All dock facilities were destroyed. Of the over 110,000 military personal, approximately 60,000 surrendered to Australian Forces two weeks after Japan’s surrender. The Australians found over 100 Japanese operational medium and light tanks and over 350 miles of tunnels. The neutralization of Rabaul was accomplished by 29,354 Allied sorties and 20,584 tons of bombs.
The Rabaul Campaign’s “focus of effort” was clearly the 15th US Air Force and ComAirSols. The amphibious operations were actually a supporting effort to seize and build airfields. The Japanese center of gravity attacked was their SLOCs. Also of note, many of the amphibious landings were accomplished with regiment or smaller size units. (The Bougainville amphibious assault was accomplished by the 3rd Marine Division and the US Army 37th Infantry Division.) The small amphibian ships, LCIs and LSTs, also played a significant role in this campaign. Using a contemporary military term, this campaign was about as “JOINT” as you can get.
After looking at this campaign I am concern about the needed re-constitution of the Marine Air Wings. Acquisition and MOS training time lines are much longer for Marine aviation than for an infantry battalion or even a tank battalion or two. Something to think about.
Semper Fi.
References: History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II by Robert Sherrod and Rabaul 1943-1945: Reducing Japan’s Great Island Fortress by Mark Lardas
I sure agree with a Pacific strategy study of the WW ll island campaigns as a starting point. I will add that a study of the Korean War and China's participation and strategy is worth a look. Also part of the package study effort should be using Geoprepositioning as a complement to Maritime Prepositioning.
The Corps I knew and served was capable of handling any threat, anywhere, and any time! To further enhance and accelerate our war fighting capabilities the Corps created the Maritime Preposition Shipping program. I have to bluntly ask, what the hell is happening? Where is has the leadership taken us? And, what about taking care of the troops? It is apparent that there has been a major breech in leadership when we ignore the basic tenets of leadership by ignoring these basics. Need I say allowing barracks neglect!
I understand that technology has had a major impact on our war fighting capabilities. I am well aware of the need to be capable to improvise, adapt, and overcome as situation requires. Unfortunately, I just don't see the Force Design 30 as putting the Corps at the forefront of the "First to Fight" threat to our would be opponents.
As a sidebar, Colonel Gerald Turley's USMC (Ret) and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness and Training) recent comments in the Marine Corps Gazette insightful. Worth a read!
No doubt MCCP will monitor the CMC’s response and Question, Verify and provide Feedback! The days of Trust and Verify are dust! The One Trick Pony must be shot and The Scaleable, Fully Capable multiple MEU thru multiple MEFs must rise like a Phoenix! It must have a full complement of Modern Tanks, artillery, engineers. C4I etc etc…..Further it must have 38 Amphibious Ships and MPF….today’s WSJ has an opinion piece by former CentCom Commander General McKensie Retired re why abandoning this AOR was insanity. God Save America and Victory to the Corps!
While I wish General Smith a speedy recovery from his medical issues, I also wish to read the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Will we continue in a direction many of us believe is wrong, or will we adjust our sails and get back on course?
I have searched the Internet for an official message from Our Beloved Corps Commemorating the 79th Anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Iwo Jima. I found nothing on the Official Website, the was once a Marines App, it no longer functions. I finally found a contact email for the USMC History Division and sent them an inquiry as to if it was common practice to highlight this USMC Victory ? I did find Ranker vote on everything….they have a collection of lists, one of them is “The Most Important Battles in US History”. Iwo Jima number 14.
One can only hope that this wedge of congressional inquiry will lead to some answers, which heretofore have not been even remotely forth coming. This ought to help when querying our local congressional reps and senators in regard to their knowledge of FD2030. Whoops excuse me General Smith just plain ole Force Design….silly ole thinker, have to get it right….
Military Strategy
Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr., US Army, Retired
Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr.’s pragmatic definition of military strategy is as current today as it was when his article led the May 1989 issue of Military Review. Lykke’s model remains the basis for military strategy instruction at the US Army War College. Interestingly, our records show that Military Review rejected this same article in March 1981. According to Lykke, the editors felt an article on strategy would be inappropriate for students at the Army’s
Wsenior tactical school.
HAT IS MILITARY STRATEGY? In
ancient Greece, it was the “art of the gen- eral.” In its glossary of military terms, the US Army War College lists eight definitions of military strategy. This highlights the first of many problems in the study of this important but complex subject. There is no universal definition or even the approximation of a consensus. Today the term “strategy” is used altogether too loosely. Some call a line drawn on a map a strategy. Others believe a laundry list of national objectives represents a strategy. The problem is not just semantics; it is one of effectively and competently using one of the most essential tools of the military profession. In trying to decide between alternative strategies, we are often faced with a comparison of apples and oranges, because the choices do not address the same factors. Only with a mutual understanding of what comprises military strategy can we hope to improve our strategic dialogue. There needs to be general agreement on a conceptual approach to military strategy: a definition, a description of the basic elements that make up military strategy and an analysis of how they are related. For the purpose of this discussion, we will use the definition approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff: “The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.”1
During a visit to the US Army War College in 1981, General Maxwell D. Taylor characterized strategy as consisting of objectives, ways and means. We can
MILITARYREVIEW • January-February1997
183
express this concept as an equation: Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can be achieved). This general concept can be used as a basis for the formulation of any type strate- gy-military, political, economic and so forth, depending upon the element of national power employed.
We should not confuse military strategy with national (grand) strategy, which may be defined as: “The art and science of developing and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.”2
Military strategy is [only] one part of this all-encom- passing national strategy. The military component of our national strategy is sometimes referred to as national military strategy-military strategy at its higher level and differentiated from operational strategies used as the basis for military planning and operations. Military strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which is defined as “a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.”3 In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.
With our general concept of strategy as a guide-strat- egy equals ends plus ways plus means-we can develop an approach to military strategy. Ends can be expressed as military objectives. Ways are concerned with the var- ious methods of applying military force. In essence, this
becomes an examination of courses of action designed to achieve the military objective. These courses of action are termed “military strategic concepts.” Means refers to the military resources (manpower, materiel, money, forces, logistics and so forth) required to accomplish the mission. This leads us to the conclusion that military strategy equals military objectives plus military strategic concepts plus military resources. This conceptual approach is applicable to all three
National (grand) strategy, ... may be defined as: “The art and science of devel- oping and using the political, economic and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.” ... Mili- tary strategy must support national strategy and comply with national policy, which
is defined as “a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.” In turn, national policy is influenced by the capabilities and limitations of military strategy.
levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. It also reveals the fundamental similarities among national military strategy, operational art and tactics. Strategists, planners, corps commanders and squad leaders are all concerned with ways to employ means to achieve ends.
Some readers may question this idea, thinking that while military resources are necessary to support a strategy, they are not a component of that strategy. They would limit military strategy to a consideration of military objectives and military strategic concepts. However, in discussing the importance of superiority of numbers, Carl von Clausewitz stated that the deci- sion on the size of military forces “is indeed a vital part of strategy.”4 And Bernard Brodie points out that “Strategy in peacetime is expressed largely in choices among weapons systems...”5 By considering military resources as a basic element of military strategy, we may also alleviate the problem of disregarding the importance of military objectives and strategic concepts while concentrating mainly on force structure issues.
There are two levels of military strategy: operational and force development. Strategies based on existing military capabilities are operational strategies-those that are used as a foundation for the formulation of specific plans for action in the short-range time period. This level of strategy has also been referred to as higher, or grand, tactics and operational art. Longer-range strategies may be based on estimates of future threats, objectives and
requirements and are therefore not as constrained by current force posture. These longer-range strategies are more often global in nature and may require improve- ments in military capabilities. Military strategies can be regional as well as global, concerning themselves with specific threat scenarios.
Military objectives and military strategic concepts of a military strategy establish requirements for resources and are, in turn, influenced by the availability of resources. If we fail to consider military resources as an element of military strategy, we may be faced with what has come to …..Drones are means….etc etc Cheers
OK, let's have this discussion. Say that Col Lykke's paper is correct. Question: Is the "Island Chain" Strategy a military strategy or a political strategy?
In my opinion it is neither, lately the “designers” dropped 2030. It’s a “design”. Not my word but the “designers”! It is Force Design and it needs to be put in the “shit can” . We have wars “Marines to Make and Battles to Win”. Designs do not do either. A Famous Marine Once Said “The Only thing the Commandant Commands is the Silent Drill Team, the Drum and Bugle Corps, the Marine Band”. Some Admiral would be the Combatant Commander of FD Units . How would Commander Of Central utilize a Marine Littoral Regiment from MarForPac as part of Mar Cent to fight the Iranians?
Colonel Art Lykke was leader of my seminar at the Army War College in 1981/82. He was as fine an officer as I ever knew and an exceptionally talented instructor. I still have several of his articles and papers in my possession.
US Army War College Corresponding Studies Course Class 7/12/1994 Semper Fidelis
Battle of Rabaul New Guinea …a “Neutralization” Campaign (1943 – 1945) – a rewrite from CP Managing Marines? Because I am not sure it is getting the attention it deserves, hoping the 1066 Report gets the attention it deserves.
(BTW get your camp stools and break out your maps)
Any Pacific Ocean military strategy should have started with a study of the WW2 Pacific Campaigns. The Rabaul campaign needs attention and study, because it set the strategy of isolation for most of the Pacific War.
In January 1942 the Japanese captured Rabaul and immediately started turning it into a fortress. The Japanese established Rabaul as their Southern Pacific supply, communications and air dome hub. “The Rabaul port facilities were excellent, and the harbor big enough to hold the entire Imperial Japanese Navy, its fleet train, and enough transports and supply ships to carry and maintain an army corps.” Rabaul could support not only the Japanese efforts in New Guinea and the Southern Solomon Islands but also the Central Pacific Gilbert and Marshall Island Chains.
Working the Rabaul problem required looking at the current tactical situation in air distances. The first air leg started at Port Moresby on the southern tip of New Guinea held by the allies and ended at the Japanese held base at Wewak on the North side of New Guinea (550 miles). This leg also included the strategically important Vitiaz Strait between New Guinea and New Britain. The second leg was Port Moresby to Rabaul (550 miles). The last leg was the north side of the triangle from Wewak to Rabaul (600 miles).
The Joint Staff Directive established three tasks for the capture of Rabaul. “Task One directed the seizure of Guadalcanal, Tulagi, and the Santa Cruz Islands. Task Two called for the recapturing the remaining Soloman Islands and northeastern coast of New Guinea. This included Japanese held New Guinea ports of Lae, Salamaua, and points north. Task Three called for the occupation of New Britain, including Rabaul.” These tasks were issued to the two regional commanders, General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz.
In March 1943, reacting to the Allies pressure in New Guinea, the Japanese attempt to reinforce Lae, New Guinea from Rabaul. A Japanese convoy of eight destroyers and eight troop transport carrying 6900 troops was detected and as it sailed into the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The combined US Army 15th Air Force and allied Royal Australian Air Force jumped the convoy east of Lae and sunk all eight transports and four of the destroyers with only 1200 of the Jap soldiers making it to Lae. The Allied Air Groups were also engaged by enemy aircraft losing 102 of the 150 Japanese planes. A great 2 days for the allies and a complete disaster for the Japanese.
I should note that the 15th Air Force developed new tactics for the bombing of shipping before the battle. The two techniques of “skip” bombing and “mast-high” bombing were developed and rehearsed. The neat thing here is a single bomber could apply both techniques on a single run (at very low altitude), on a single target with two bombs. A worthwhile read is the Battle of the Bismarck Sea Section of General Kenney Reports (15th Air Force Commander) found here: https://media.defense.gov/2010/May/26/2001330291/-1/-1/0/AFD-100526-032.pdf
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea raised the question: Can Rabaul be neutralized and by-passed using air power? The Commander of the US 5th Air Force, General George Kenny, credited with the Bismarck Sea victory, reporting to General MacArthur, said yes, but I am going to need some more airfields either captured or built.
MacArthur was the Southwest Pacific Area commander responsible for Australia, New Guinea, Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, New Britain (Rabaul), New Ireland and the water around them. Admiral Halsey, assigned by Admiral Nimitz, was the Southern Pacific Area Commander. The boundary between the two areas split the Solomon Island Chain, however, both MacArthur and Halsey, could penetrate into the others area with permission. This command arrangement set up Rabaul for a classic double envelopment.
MacArthur would start with his wing of the double envelopment taking the Islands of Kiriwina and Woodlark south of New Britain securing the SLOCs to the Solomon’s and Australia. Next Lae, on the north side of New Guinea, would be taken by Australian troops attacking from Salamaua. The first air born assault in the pacific war was execute by a US Army parachute drop cutting off the Japanese retreat from Lae. The drop was uniquely covered by a smoke screen provided by US Bombers. Trapped between two forces, the Japanese commander retreated his forces through the Saruwaged Mountain range.
Next MacArthur secured the Huon Peninsula and the Vitiaz Strait in order to make his amphibious assaults on New Britain. The Australian 9th Infantry Division conducted an amphibious assault to capture and secure the port town of Finschhafen to complete his Huon Peninsula Campaign. Finschhafen would be turned into a major base and port with three airfields.
New Britain was next. In Dec 1943 the 1st Marine Division conducted amphibious assaults at Cape Gloucester and Arawe to seize, improve and build airfields. The airfields at Gatsama and Talasea were captured in January. MacArthur would later close one of the back doors to Rabaul with the seizure of the Admiralty Islands (and the stationing of bombers) located 620 miles north of Cape Gloucester, New Britain.
The same tactics would be applied to the Solomon Island side of the double envelopment. From Guadalcanal the amphibious assaults would continue north to the Russel Islands, Vella Lavella Island, New George and the Battle of Munda Point, the deception amphibious raid on Choiseul by the 2nd Marine Parachute Battalion, in preparation for the Bougainville amphibious assaults and the construction of three airfields. At the end of the Solomon drive was the Green Islands. Again airfields were seized, improved and/or built at each one of these objectives. The final nail to close the back door on Rabaul was delivered by the 4th Marine Regiment with the capture of Emirau Island just north of the northern tip of New Ireland. (TADA! A double envelopment and a modern day Cannae. US Military War Colleges need to add this campaign to their curriculum.)
While this march of amphibious assaults, airfield seizures and construction was occurring, the USA 5th Air Force, Admiral Halsey’s carrier raids and ComAirSols made continuous (daily) air raids and “sweeps” on Rabaul. ComAirSols was all ground based aircraft in the Solomon Area of Operations and a Joint Organization make up of US Navy (19 Squadrons: 274 planes), and US Marine (14 Squadrons; 181 planes), Royal New Zealand Air Force (2 Squadrons; 57 planes), and the US Army 13th Air Force (16 Squadrons; 216 planes).
The Japanese Rabaul “Fortress” consisted of five air fields with over 300 aircrafts, and these were later reinforced after heavy losses with another 100 planes. When the Japanese withdrew their planes there was less than a dozen planes that could fly out. In addition to 500+ small boats and barges, 20 destroyers, 10 submarines, 30 naval vessels, 154 large cargo vessels, and 70 small cargo ships were sunk. All dock facilities were destroyed. Of the over 110,000 military personal, approximately 60,000 surrendered to Australian Forces two weeks after Japan’s surrender. The Australians found over 100 Japanese operational medium and light tanks and over 350 miles of tunnels. The neutralization of Rabaul was accomplished by 29,354 Allied sorties and 20,584 tons of bombs.
The Rabaul Campaign’s “focus of effort” was clearly the 15th US Air Force and ComAirSols. The amphibious operations were actually a supporting effort to seize and build airfields. The Japanese center of gravity attacked was their SLOCs. Also of note, many of the amphibious landings were accomplished with regiment or smaller size units. (The Bougainville amphibious assault was accomplished by the 3rd Marine Division and the US Army 37th Infantry Division.) The small amphibian ships, LCIs and LSTs, also played a significant role in this campaign. Using a contemporary military term, this campaign was about as “JOINT” as you can get.
After looking at this campaign I am concern about the needed re-constitution of the Marine Air Wings. Acquisition and MOS training time lines are much longer for Marine aviation than for an infantry battalion or even a tank battalion or two. Something to think about.
Semper Fi.
References: History of Marine Corps Aviation in World War II by Robert Sherrod and Rabaul 1943-1945: Reducing Japan’s Great Island Fortress by Mark Lardas
I sure agree with a Pacific strategy study of the WW ll island campaigns as a starting point. I will add that a study of the Korean War and China's participation and strategy is worth a look. Also part of the package study effort should be using Geoprepositioning as a complement to Maritime Prepositioning.
Ian Toll's trilogy on war in the Pacific is a must read.
The Corps I knew and served was capable of handling any threat, anywhere, and any time! To further enhance and accelerate our war fighting capabilities the Corps created the Maritime Preposition Shipping program. I have to bluntly ask, what the hell is happening? Where is has the leadership taken us? And, what about taking care of the troops? It is apparent that there has been a major breech in leadership when we ignore the basic tenets of leadership by ignoring these basics. Need I say allowing barracks neglect!
I understand that technology has had a major impact on our war fighting capabilities. I am well aware of the need to be capable to improvise, adapt, and overcome as situation requires. Unfortunately, I just don't see the Force Design 30 as putting the Corps at the forefront of the "First to Fight" threat to our would be opponents.
As a sidebar, Colonel Gerald Turley's USMC (Ret) and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Readiness and Training) recent comments in the Marine Corps Gazette insightful. Worth a read!
Col. Gerald H. Turley USMCR (Ret.)
The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors, Vietnam, 1972 (Leatherneck Classics)
4.9 4.9 out of 5 stars 26 Reviews
4.0 on Goodreads (50)
For the benefit of those who are unfamiliar w Colonel Turley he is a Legendary Marine. Do a search for his books and films.
The wizard behind this curtain, writing such erudite questions, would be??? Gung-ho matters not, they are asked!
No doubt MCCP will monitor the CMC’s response and Question, Verify and provide Feedback! The days of Trust and Verify are dust! The One Trick Pony must be shot and The Scaleable, Fully Capable multiple MEU thru multiple MEFs must rise like a Phoenix! It must have a full complement of Modern Tanks, artillery, engineers. C4I etc etc…..Further it must have 38 Amphibious Ships and MPF….today’s WSJ has an opinion piece by former CentCom Commander General McKensie Retired re why abandoning this AOR was insanity. God Save America and Victory to the Corps!
While I wish General Smith a speedy recovery from his medical issues, I also wish to read the 39th Commandant’s Planning Guidance. Will we continue in a direction many of us believe is wrong, or will we adjust our sails and get back on course?
I just cked the Official Marines X post for Today…….sadly it was my duty to remind them about Iwo Jima!
I have searched the Internet for an official message from Our Beloved Corps Commemorating the 79th Anniversary of the beginning of the Battle of Iwo Jima. I found nothing on the Official Website, the was once a Marines App, it no longer functions. I finally found a contact email for the USMC History Division and sent them an inquiry as to if it was common practice to highlight this USMC Victory ? I did find Ranker vote on everything….they have a collection of lists, one of them is “The Most Important Battles in US History”. Iwo Jima number 14.
D-Day FEB 19, 1945 The Enemy had 22,000 Fighters Underground……
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Battle of Iwo Jima
19 February–26 March 1945
Flag Raising on Mount Suribachi, Iwo Jima, Japan
I think Compass Points generated the questions for Congress.
I sure do not want to be the one putting this all together.
When is it due Nov 10th 2075.
One can only hope that this wedge of congressional inquiry will lead to some answers, which heretofore have not been even remotely forth coming. This ought to help when querying our local congressional reps and senators in regard to their knowledge of FD2030. Whoops excuse me General Smith just plain ole Force Design….silly ole thinker, have to get it right….
Those questions are a good start. Hopefully, the answers don't mark the end of our Marine Corps.
Is there an email address for compass points that a hard charger could submit ideas to?