Compass Points - Sad Santa

Too many still on naughty list

Compass Points - Sad Santa

Too many still on naughty list

December 21, 2024

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As Christmas approaches, Santa must be sad at those still trying to put a shine on the Marine Corps' aging and long tarnished plan to place small missile units on islands in the Pacific. An article in 19fortyfive is the most recent example.

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The US Marine Corps is dramatically increasing its relevance to the United States’ war fighting capability. As the world lurches into an age of renewed strategic competition, the Marine Corps understands that it must be at the forefront of innovation in high-intensity warfare.

-- Andrew Rolander, 19fortyfive

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Relevance!

Strategic competition!

Forefront of innovation!

This is the routine kind of excited Power-Point language that strives to be both vague and impressive, but serves only to reveal the author's low understanding of the subject, his low regard for his readers, or both. The author goes on to describe the supposedly wondrous capabilities of these theoretical missile units.

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A central concept in the reorganisation is moving small, hard-to-detect units rapidly by sea to islands—or small parts of islands—that are close to the enemy. Those highly mobile units, requiring little support, would use advanced weapons to challenge the enemy’s use of nearby sea and air space.

-- Andrew Rolander, 19fortyfive

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The author seems unaware that the Marine Corps plan for island missile units is no longer new. Years have gone by now. Despite the passing years, there are no Marine missile units deployed and ready on islands near China's coast. Even after years, there is not even an established T/O or T/E. The ability to deploy a missile unit, fire a missile, displace, and fire again has never been accomplished as an exercise, not even once. If there were any deployed missile units -- and there are none -- they would not be "small" -- the missiles and support tonnage is not small. The units would not be "hard-to-detect" -- the active radars alone are a constant homing beacon for the enemy. They would not be "highly mobile" -- they would be stuck in place. They would not "require little support" -- but would need constant resupply of food, fuel, and munitions, as well as constant transportation, reinforcement, and evacuation.

Readers were quick to respond to the errant article.

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The Marines have transformed from the Nation’s premier expeditionary force in readiness to irrelevance. EABO is a house of cards. The MLR has no means to maneuver, no combined arms. It is not survivable against a determined enemy. The small unit Stand-in Forces cannot be repositioned or logistically supported inside contested areas. They are duplicative and ineffective to other Services’ capabilities. For example, the “long range missile” the author touts is the subsonic, short-range (115 NM) Naval Strike Missile. After 5+ years, not a single MLR has obtained initial operating capability. Until the Marines can solve the logistics issues (which they can’t), the MLR will continue to consume resources but nothing else. EABO is a prime target for DOGE

-- Cannoncocker92

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I am continually amazed at those who believe that any Service can divest itself of some 25% of its combat power, to include troops, armor, bridging equipment, mine-clearing equipment, cannon artillery, f/w and r/w aviation assets, and significant logistics capability and claim it is more capable than ever. How can those same people claim it continues as the Nation “premier crisis response force” when it agreed to cut its requirement for amphibious shipping from 38 to 31 ships knowing that the availability rate for amphibious ships today is slightly above 40%?

If this “new” Marine Corps is so flexible, why couldn’t it respond to the earthquake disaster in Turkey when it was asked for or conduct the Embassy evacuation in Africa? The value of the Marine Corps is as the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness…world-wide deployable, NOT sitting on islands off of China taking pot shots at PLAN ships as they sail by. Obviously any funds that are directed at better sensing, intelligence, and communications are welcome. The same for increased lethality. BUT, how is this Corps going to cross a river or a minefield? Will it “cyber its way”? The Character of War may be changing (as always) but the Nature of War remains…brutal, deadly, chaotic and unforgiving of mistakes.

-- Grunt64

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The Marines, not the Navy, cut the requirement for L class amphibious ships from 38 to 31. The Navy currently has 32 on the active rolls, 1 more than the Marines’ stated requirement. You can’t blame the Navy for meeting the Marine Corps’ requirement. The Marines have subsequently requested 35 Landing Ship Medium (a slow speed, essentially unarmed connector built to civilian survivability standards) to support the MLR/Stand-in Forces. None have been built. None will probably be built. Why? They are not survivable inside China’s WEZ, an area where the Navy’s Arleigh Burke destroyers will avoid.

-- Cannoncocker

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If the author had any credibility in the larger defense community, this vacuous piece destroyed it. A modicum of research would have revealed the near countless errors contained in the article. Force Design 2030 didn’t enhance the Marine Corps’ operational capabilities, it destroyed them. A Corps of what once was the world’s premier air-ground combined arms task forces able to deploy rapidly to emerging crises is becoming a hollow force of missile shooters on the defense in isolated island. Tragic is the only word that adequately describes the actions of the 38th and 39th Commandants.

-- The Wolf

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As Christmas approaches, what Santa should bring the Marine Corps and the Nation this year is not more vacuous touting of theoretical Marine missile units. Instead, Santa should bring the Marine Corps a renewed focus on rebuilding, enhancing, and restoring America's 9-1-1 force. It must continue to be true in the future, as it has been in the past, that with just one call, US policy makers get the global, combined arms, Marine, air, ground, logistics, task force, always patrolling the seas, ready to arrive offshore any crisis to deter, assist, and fight.