Compass Points - Sagacious Comments

Readers expand the discussion

Compass Points - Sagacious Comments

Readers expand the discussion

July 18, 2024

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"Provide an independent source of broader thinking, deeper understanding, and better decisions, for a stronger Marine Corps."

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That is the mission of Compass Points.

Years ago, in the summer of 2019, before Compass Points began, the Marine Corps took a misguided detour called Force Design 2030. The Commandant's Planning Guidance was the beginning of the new Marine Corps focus, a focus on defense instead of offense; a focus on Marines isolated on islands, instead of Marines unified on amphibious ships; and a focus on only one geographic region, instead of a focus on global, combined arms, crisis response. At first, the new focus of the Marine Corps was praised by some as innovative and bold.

Soon, however, those with more experience began to ask questions. How can Marines isolated on islands provide worldwide crisis response? How can Marines accept fewer amphibious ships, when more ships are needed? How can a small Marine Expeditionary Unit, struggling to help some foreign country in crisis, be rapidly reinforced without sufficient maritime pre-positioned ships? How can the Marine Corps fight a peer or near peer adversary without enough infantry, artillery, air, armor, and engineering assets? And why were specialized Marines missile units created, instead of being simply added to the proven and powerful Marine Air Ground Logistics Task Force?

As soon as the discussion, the discourse, and the debate began, it began to grow. Week by week it has continued to grow.

Recently, some in Congress have begun asking their own questions. The questions from Congress have grown into an official investigation of the Marine Corps by a federally funded research and development center.

Some have asked why does Compass Points continue to question -- not the Marine Corps -- but the Marine Corps' misguided detour? Some say there is no need to continue the discussion because we all know the Marine Corps is on the wrong path. Let's just be quiet and move on. Unfortunately, not everyone understands that the Marine Corps is on the wrong path. New Marine leaders join Compass Points every day who do not understand the issues. There are friends of the Corps in think tanks, academia, and business, who still do not understand. And there are still some in Congress who do not yet understand. Everyone needs to understand that the Marine Corps is in a serious situation. The Marine Corps needs to correct its misguided detour and take a better path forward. 

It is so urgent to help the Marine Corps find a better path forward because there is still so much good in the Marine Corps. There are still fine young Marines graduating from the Marine Corps Recruit Depots who are ready to fight and win. There are courageous Marines and Marine leaders of every rank and MOS who accomplish amazing things every day. Yet if the Marine Corps is to be true to its tremendous past and prepare for its tremendous future, changes must be made.

There are no enemies here. No sides. All Marines and friends of the Corps want what is best for the Nation and best for the Marine Corps. Only a few of the current very senior leadership of the Marine Corps helped create the Force Design detour. Instead, most senior Marine leaders today have been handed a detour that took place starting back in 2019 and now they are trying to figure out how to make the best of it.

The answer for all those who love the Marine Corps is to continue to build the discussion, discourse, and debate into broader thinking, deeper understanding, and better decisions, for a stronger Marine Corps.

Just as the discussion will continue, challenges facing the US will continue. What global challenges will the US face next? No one knows. No matter what happens, however, there is no doubt Compass Points readers, online and off, will continue their insightful analysis and comment.

Over the last weeks, Compass Points readers have responded online and off with a treasure load of comments, insights, and analysis. Only a few of the comments are re-posted below. Most of the full comments are available for reading on the Compass Points site. As always, comments have been edited for length and content. Several long, thoughtful comments have been reduced to just a sentence or two. Often the real enjoyment comes, not as much from the excerpt included below, but from reading the comment in full. Compass Points appreciates the full, insightful, and professional comments of all readers. Many thanks!

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cfrog

Thanks for the poems and inspiration! Semper Fi!

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Douglas C Rapé

Yes, short range reconnaissance drones at the squad level make perfectly good sense. Hence the need for the 15 man squad. Drones for the S-2 and drones as FAC’s for artillery. Could be fielded by Thanksgiving.

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Ray “Skip” Polak

What is the definition of a “swarm”? 50-250-1000 drones? With what payload? And what is targeted? If a determined enemy sent over several “swarms” like the drone displays over ballfields at half time, would not many of the first of them be “dumb” ( no payload) to make a defender use precious assets against them? How long can they stay aloft if not a piloted version of what we use for long distance intelligence and attack? Obviously, there are some members who qualify as experts in this field, but there are many here who drag knuckles in these discussions. (admit to having no hair left on my knuckles)

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Bob Whitener

There is article after article stating that FD 2030 is a terribly flawed concept. There is very little written on "What to do in lieu of FD 2030?" As Charles states below in his comments, the Commandant is sticking by his guns based on the recent 1 hour interview. What, may I ask, would you expect this distinguished warrior to do? It could be that some original thinking from the Graybeard side could help move the needle toward resolution more than does article after article of dart throwing.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

Having just spent an hour plus listening to the 39th CMC conducting a love fest interview with some nice beltway warrior from the Brookings Institute has left this old thinker’s head absolutely spinning. It is not until one hears General Smith discuss MLR’s, SIF (sorta) and this concept of peer-to-peer foe, fight that the gravity of the poor thinking of FD2030 planners and proponents becomes somewhat clear. Throw in a heavy dollop of political correctness and beltway buzz words and there you have it.

That said, there is inherent misalignment with current leadership/managers regarding what is going on in reality in the world and the war that they seem to think is happening tomorrow with Mainland China and the CCP/PLA.

And cfrog, please keep the very clever gallows humor coming, its merits are almost unlimited!

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Randy Shetter

Once again General Smith wants to have his cake and eat it too. The 39th Commandant wants to shut down sea lines of communication in the Pacific with light Littoral Combat Regiments and still maintain enough combat power to have a Marine Expeditionary Force to back them up. He also wants these Littoral Combat Regiments to be lighter and more mobile. I don't think you can have both. Additionally, due to the lighter LCRs they can be destroyed in detail more easily than a traditional Marine regiment. He said he agrees with CNO Admiral Franchetti that 31 L Class ships is sufficient. We all know that is not enough ships. Commandant Smith is still pursuing the Landing Ship Medium program instead of procuring more of the larger L Class ships for a truly expeditionary capability. Why not let the Navy and the Army with their Multi-Domain Task Force, handle Chinese ships, and let the Marine Corps do what it does best and what it is supposed to do: being a combined arms naval expeditionary force.

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Greg Falzetta

“The littoral combat regiment also is capable of attacking and destroying a naval base.”

I’m not sure this is a completely accurate statement. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a final TO/TE for the MLR. What is the makeup of the MLR’s supporting arms? What, at best 2 batteries of M777s, a HIMARS unit, a few 5”/54s, a few more 76mm naval guns? What type of air support will they have? And, most importantly, what type of logistics will provide for the force ashore?

I’m sorry, I for one don’t remotely believe that an MLR by itself is capable of attacking and destroying an enemy advance naval base.

We’re being sold a bill of goods by the current Corps leadership. Congress needs to start asking the HARD questions, and if they’re not adequately answered then the Corps needs to be dictated to by Congress as to what’s expected of them under Title 10.

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Bob Whitener

A superior proposal Compass Points! Your proposal of *at least two other smaller MAGTFs built around Expeditionary Fast Transports constantly patrolling* is superior Marine thinking by adapting to the situation. It is a classic style of Marine thinking. The powers that be might also decide the Expeditionary Fast Transport is a suitable alternative to the LSM.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

No way do we want to disparage our CMC. He did a very good job of speaking well in the Brookings interview, but nowhere in the conversation did he really address what CP just presented in a couple of short paragraphs. Yes, we are in a “grey war” with China, what’s new? Bad actors are with us always like bad weather at sea. Being able to be the fastest most lethal force on the scene when called upon, has been a trademark of the Marine Corps almost from its inception. It has evolved and needs to clearly evolve further. But the base of it, the MAGTF which can be beautifully task organized to meet the circumstances is something to behold and no doubt a critical key in the evolution of the Corps fighting capability going forward.

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Paul Van Riper

Note that CMC in a "conversation" at Brookings last week described in some detail the organization and purpose of the three Marine Littoral Regiments created from the 3rd, 4th, and 12th Marine Regiments. He followed these remarks with words to the effect that there will still be III MEF with the 3rd Marine Division as if creation of the MLRs had not destroyed the Division's Infantry and Artillery Regiments. No way to take this except as double counting. Purposeful or unintentional his words were deceitful.

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Polarbear

To say the CMC Brookings interview was disappointing is an understatement for a number of reasons.

The Marine Corps needs to establish a better way to train, select and promote general officers in order to prevent strategic narrow-minded thinking that trades combat power for experimenting and lethality.

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Jack Cate

I would never recommend someone join the USMC as long as this type of thinking by the CMC continues.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

This CP Substack post is critical to the conversation. We have a subset of officers and or politicians and civilians that thought and or think today’s FD-EXYZ is a good idea and or can be shoe horned into something workable. It cannot be made “better”, it’s an Edsel, it’s “New Coke” and any other hopeless commercial product that is suitable as an analogy to this failed and to a large degree improperly vetted concept.

Two final thoughts:

1. Thanks to CP and Chowder Society II for breaking it down here, though again it is worth viewing the “conversation” for one’s self.

2. The lurking issue in all of the shenanigans around FD2030 are a clear and present example of duplicity in our leadership. It points to loss of trust and confidence in the senior leaders, and this is an attack not only on our readiness, but our Marine Corps and everything it stands for, Our Ethos, our way of “being” is absolutely under attack. It is tragedy in the making before our eyes. Hopefully this Brookings attention and the FFRDC will add further weight to the ongoing efforts to reset the planning and rebuilding the Corps capabilities.

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Douglas C Rapé

Re ploughing old ground here. Almost five years ago the suggestion was made to expand each of the four Artillery Regiments with a Bn of anti-ship missile capability. With task organization four Bn’s could be brought to bear without the divesting that occurred in the dark of the night. Certainly, would have provided time to develop the entire concept. This entire castration of the Corps was based on the alleged range, accuracy and lethality of a Chinese weapon that had never hit, let alone sunk a moving trash barge.

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Martin Belcher

This CP article addresses every tactical concern I have about FD. The logistical issues are foremost. The article eloquently spells out the end result of this forced change. To me, in simple terms, it describes a "Die in place" scenario.

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Bud Meador

In a world seemingly teetering on the brink of significant conflicts(s), we need a Corps of Marines capable of operations that range from MEU to MEF level - and, if need be, multiple MEF’s. World affairs are sending us just that message. We need to listen and be prepared to respond accordingly. America needs its Corps of Marines.

On another subject, “Skip” Polak hits directly upon our grand strategic nightmare: our lack of industrial capacity to outfit ourselves properly for a naval and military conflict with a peer competitor. China, perhaps Japan & the ROK, can out produce us from a standing still start, particularly in steel & heavy industry production of ships, armor, & perhaps, aircraft. I am much influenced in this matter by Dr. Thomas Huber of DMH, CGSC, Ft. Leavenworth (ret), who argues for massively re-thinking how our society organizes for war from an industrial perspective.

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Frank P DiMarco

CP's idea of a quarantine of Iranian ports sounds great in theory! But in reality, the Navy does not have the amphibs that are currently needed. Not only are the number of amphib ships lacking but the maintenance on the current amphibs is beyond horrible! Before we start talking about here an ARG, there an ARG, everywhere an ARG we need a realistically better maintenance cycle than we have now. You need not look any further than the USS Boxer..........200 million dollars spent and how many years in maintenance? It is the equivalent of a hanger queen! To add insult to injury the USS Bon Homme Richard burned at the pier for 3 days and ultimately had to be scrapped! We must do better.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

General Van Riper’s article in Real Clear Defense is beyond troubling, further besides calling into the question the very validity of the War Gaming to support FD2030, it calls into question the very integrity of the officers associated with the heavy thumb, demand for a predetermined outcome and currently an apparent “gag order” that restricts the very officers facilitating their education in preparation for higher command, from even discussing the FD concept in a critical thinking fashion.

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Jerry McAbee

 The truth is the Marines have no concept for logistically supporting the MLRs/SIFs today or in the future. Without a proven concept, it’s impossible to develop the capabilities and requirements needed. The current Commandant would do well to heed the words of a previous Commandant, General Robert Barrow who knew: “amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics.” All those who continue to advocate the full and quick implementation of Force Design need to tell us exactly how the Marines are going to logistically (which includes lifesaving emergency medical care and evacuation) support Marines who are isolated, vulnerable, and inside China’s kill zone. But they won’t because they can’t.

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Randy Shetter

With regards to logistics, there is an enlightening rebuttal in the June Naval Institute Proceedings article "Force Design is Still to Heavy" by Gunnery Sergeant Davis. The rebuttal by Colonel McFetridge, US Army, points out that FD and its "austere logistical support" would force Marines to live at subsistence levels. The Colonel argues that light forces such as Wingate's Chindit's and Merrill's Marauders, while operating deep behind Japanese lines and "creating some difficulties for Japanese troops, achieved no strategic operational effect...." At the same time, these operations left these units combat ineffective for the remainder of the war. He also maintains that Marine Raiders were mostly used as line infantry at Guadalcanal. And from our own history, we must recall that Guadalcanal was called "Starvation Island" due to a lack of logistical support from the fleet.

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Coffeejoejava

I said it before and I will say it again. These "war games" that "proved" the concepts of FD2030 put a serious strain on the Pentagons supply of "fairy dust". And from the sounds of it, it was used exclusively on the logistics piece of this. 863 tons of supplies daily. And the Corps is experimenting with a drone that can carry a case of MRE's?

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John Folchetti

The issue of logistics support for the MLRs/SIFs has been getting lip service from the top for years. Back in 2021 there was a Marine Times article on "expeditionary foraging." It was laughable then; the lack of progress since then is deplorable.

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

The T/O of the SIF rifle company is so top heavy it defies credulity. What it for sure ignores is real war fighting reality in terms of WIA and KIA. Suddenly this overweighted rifle company T/O gets into a fight and suffers 40% casualties. The unit is likely more diminished because of time and grade of the KIA and WIA. Further since when does the Marine Corps look at US Army T/O and say that ought to work for us. When we look at these young E4/E5/E6 Infantry and other MOS’ today, my money as a platoon or company commander is on the young NCO’s and their abilities right now, not five years from now.

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Paul Van Riper

Would it have been a better idea to add missiles to artillery regiments? The answer is yes. Best course of actions would have been to place missile batteries inside 12th Marines and task organize for anti-ship mission. Task organizing is the way the Corps operated for decades and it was the "magic" of the MAGTF. Whether the other artillery regiments needed missiles is in my mind an open question.

Adding missile capability was the way to go without a doubt. Former CMC destroyed III MEF for a narrow mission Marines could not perform near as well as US Army's multi-domain task forces, of which there are two in the Pacific theater today

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Greg Falzetta

Hopefully the FFRDC study will convince Congress to right the ship while there is still time. I have no confidence that the Corps’ leadership will listen to “the old guys” or the recommendations of the study and do it themselves.

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Lynn Stuart

I find it incredible we are debating the merits of sinking a ship when perhaps it's more appropriate to argue for returning our Corps to its original combined arms strength and capabilities -- if even possible now!

 The real tragedy is transforming the Marine Corps into a non-combined arms force chasing ships with questionable Marine Island teams that don't appear to have the requisite equipment to do so, or even to do so as well as other existing services. The Corps is in big trouble -- we need to get back to our Title X mission and reconstitute our combined arms capabilities.

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medevicerep

It appears that the US Army is already ahead of the Marines in developing an island-based ship killer capability. Let them go down that rabbit hole. Let the Marines focus on what we do best, task organized units trained to respond rapidly to a variety of crises.

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Alfred Karam

I’ve said this before, relying on technology alone will not win us the fight to come. I agree that we need mass and technology, especially when and not if we slog it out with the Chinese.

Yes, and yes, and yes, 3rdMarDiv needs to be rebalanced with artillery, air power, engineering equipment and logistics and with required Amphibs necessary for maneuver and sustainment.

If Missile Defense is needed, the missile defense should be an add on to the MAGTF, not a replacement!

No doubt Marines will fight and will fight ferociously, let’s make sure they have EVERYTHING to fight and win!

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Compass Points salutes all readers who in their own ways are continuing to build the discussion about a stronger Marine Corps.