Modern War against near peer or peer competitors will consume what we term “ logistics” at a mind numbing scale. For the Marine Corps that means ships. Amphibious assault shipping, MPS shipping and hospital ships. For the actual fight you must bring maneuver and massive firepower augmented by select high precision weaponry at the right place, at the right time. The maneuver portion at the operational level requires that you be a threat over long distances at sea striking at the time and place of your choice. If amphibious ships, MPS Shipping and Hospital ships are obsolete the entire surface force of the US Navy is obsolete. If tanks are obsolete infantry anti tank weaponry is obsolete. If tube artillery is obsolete anti ship missile batteries are too. FD-20XX seeks solutions to missions not assigned with unsuited weaponry to be supported by boats neither funded or built that are not survivable, to destroy ships that will not blindly sail into the little and very sparse kill zones. It is like a 1km by 1km minefield with 7-10 mines. Too little spread too wide and immovable.
Sadly, the reality is obvious and the supporters of FD-20XX have dug in and cannot back off. The supporters never even claimed to be decisive or victorious. Their mission sought to be disruptive. A military service cannot justify its size and budget by merely being disruptive. Two things come to mind. The Marine Raider Battalions in WWII, despite their skill, courage and huge talent could never be more than disruptive. Lord Mountbatten’s commandos who raided Nazi occupied Europe were disruptive not decisive. Both were far more versatile and effective than the visions for FD-20XX. It remains an unfunded and foggy vision five years after it was so poorly conceived.
Are we really confident that a single FFRDC and the people who are responsible for examining FD2030 are sufficiently knowledgeable, experienced and unbiased such that the outcome will be fair and impartial or should there be several independent studies undertaken simultaneously?
All this wishful thinking regarding logistics and resupply reminds me of the 1st MarDiv in 1965 as it received word to stand by for Vietnam.
I had just returned from the 3rd MarDiv after we had mounted out for Danang. We were damned lucky that we were fairly close to Okinawa and could use it as a resupply base for all the things that we should have taken with us it the first place.
I was just a buck Sergeant assigned as the Embarkation NCO for my Battalion (3rd AmTracs). At a division embarkation meeting at division, it became apparent that there was little experience with embarkation, and all that it entails, in the division. One colonel actually suggested living off the land… (sound familiar?) I started pointing out some of our problems and making suggestions and the discussions got more serious. I went back to the battalion, thinking that some people were in for a big awakening.
Due to a policy of not sending Marines back overseas with less than a year, I had received orders for recruiting duty. I didn’t know it, but The CG, MajGen Fields, had listened in on that embarkation meeting and had other plans for me. Upon reporting to him, I was informed that the orders were canceled and that I would be going Back to Vietnam with his division.
Before mounting out, we stripped Camp Pendleton of anything not nailed down and took it with us. I was responsible for the loading phase at Long Beach and departed with the command group aboard Talladega (APA-208).
Landing at Chu Lai, we found nothing but sand dunes and Viet Cong. As we cleared out the enemy , we set up our generators, dug wells for water supply and began erecting strong backed tents and constructing an expeditionary air field. We had combat loaded everything necessary for amphibious and inland operations. I would like to think that could be accomplished today, but I fear that a lot our young Marines will pay that price for leaders who use meaningless words to replace intelligent planning. Semper Fi
Modern War against near peer or peer competitors will consume what we term “ logistics” at a mind numbing scale. For the Marine Corps that means ships. Amphibious assault shipping, MPS shipping and hospital ships. For the actual fight you must bring maneuver and massive firepower augmented by select high precision weaponry at the right place, at the right time. The maneuver portion at the operational level requires that you be a threat over long distances at sea striking at the time and place of your choice. If amphibious ships, MPS Shipping and Hospital ships are obsolete the entire surface force of the US Navy is obsolete. If tanks are obsolete infantry anti tank weaponry is obsolete. If tube artillery is obsolete anti ship missile batteries are too. FD-20XX seeks solutions to missions not assigned with unsuited weaponry to be supported by boats neither funded or built that are not survivable, to destroy ships that will not blindly sail into the little and very sparse kill zones. It is like a 1km by 1km minefield with 7-10 mines. Too little spread too wide and immovable.
Sadly, the reality is obvious and the supporters of FD-20XX have dug in and cannot back off. The supporters never even claimed to be decisive or victorious. Their mission sought to be disruptive. A military service cannot justify its size and budget by merely being disruptive. Two things come to mind. The Marine Raider Battalions in WWII, despite their skill, courage and huge talent could never be more than disruptive. Lord Mountbatten’s commandos who raided Nazi occupied Europe were disruptive not decisive. Both were far more versatile and effective than the visions for FD-20XX. It remains an unfunded and foggy vision five years after it was so poorly conceived.
Are we really confident that a single FFRDC and the people who are responsible for examining FD2030 are sufficiently knowledgeable, experienced and unbiased such that the outcome will be fair and impartial or should there be several independent studies undertaken simultaneously?
I have no confidence that the results will be knowledgeable or unbiased. I hope I am wrong.
All this wishful thinking regarding logistics and resupply reminds me of the 1st MarDiv in 1965 as it received word to stand by for Vietnam.
I had just returned from the 3rd MarDiv after we had mounted out for Danang. We were damned lucky that we were fairly close to Okinawa and could use it as a resupply base for all the things that we should have taken with us it the first place.
I was just a buck Sergeant assigned as the Embarkation NCO for my Battalion (3rd AmTracs). At a division embarkation meeting at division, it became apparent that there was little experience with embarkation, and all that it entails, in the division. One colonel actually suggested living off the land… (sound familiar?) I started pointing out some of our problems and making suggestions and the discussions got more serious. I went back to the battalion, thinking that some people were in for a big awakening.
Due to a policy of not sending Marines back overseas with less than a year, I had received orders for recruiting duty. I didn’t know it, but The CG, MajGen Fields, had listened in on that embarkation meeting and had other plans for me. Upon reporting to him, I was informed that the orders were canceled and that I would be going Back to Vietnam with his division.
Before mounting out, we stripped Camp Pendleton of anything not nailed down and took it with us. I was responsible for the loading phase at Long Beach and departed with the command group aboard Talladega (APA-208).
Landing at Chu Lai, we found nothing but sand dunes and Viet Cong. As we cleared out the enemy , we set up our generators, dug wells for water supply and began erecting strong backed tents and constructing an expeditionary air field. We had combat loaded everything necessary for amphibious and inland operations. I would like to think that could be accomplished today, but I fear that a lot our young Marines will pay that price for leaders who use meaningless words to replace intelligent planning. Semper Fi