Compass Points - SASC Postpones
Congress wants to hear more.
April 25, 2024
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The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) had scheduled the Department of the Navy budget hearings for 30 April. Scheduled to testify were the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The hearings set for 30 April have been postponed.
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Compass Points does not know why the hearings have been postponed, but it may be that the Senators are busy reading the report submitted by the Marine Corps on Force Design.
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The latest National Defense Authorization Act had three requirements related to investigating Force Design. First, the Marine Corps was required to submit a comprehensive report on Force Design and its effects on the combat power of the Marine Corps. Then, the Marine Corps was required to brief the report on Force Design in person to the Congress. Finally, Congress imposed a requirement on the Department of Defense to select an FFRDC -- federally funded research and development center -- to conduct a yearlong review of Force Design. FFRDCs are public-private partnerships that conduct research and development for the United States.
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Apparently, the Marine Corps' overdue report on Force Design has been submitted to Congress. But it is not clear if the briefing of the report has been scheduled, or if the Department of Defense has selected the FFRDC to investigate Force Design.
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It is also possible that Senators are busy reading the latest articles by author and Marine Gary Anderson. Writing in The American Spectator, Gary Anderson forcefully argues that Force Design, instead of modernizing the Marine Corps and making it stronger has, instead, weakened the Marine Corps' combined arms fighting force.
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. . . The Corps’ situation is largely self-inflicted, as an intellectual civil war within the Marine Corps has entered its fourth year. At issue is the current leadership’s effort to reduce Marine Corps amphibious attack capabilities in return for anti-ship missiles to fight the Chinese Navy. This has upset many inside the Corps and a cadre of former Marine Corps general officers.
In order to placate its critics, the current leadership of the Corps has changed the name of its controversial “Force Design 2030” strategy to simply “Force Design” (FD). Under pressure from critics who believe that the Navy-Marine Corps team had reduced amphibious forward presence to dangerously low levels, the current commandant — General Eric Smith — has thrown a bone to the insurgents, affirming the importance of having forward deployed Marine Expeditionary Units in the world’s most likely trouble spots. He has also agreed with the Chief of Naval Operations to “fix” the availability of amphibious shipping. How they will do this in the short term is yet to be explained.
. . . Many of the retired Marines who have serious questions regarding FD spent their careers building worldwide force readiness capable of handling contingencies ranging from humanitarian disasters to major theater conflict. Seeing it reduced to a region-centric blend of coastal artillery and light naval infantry is distressing indeed.
-- Gary Anderson, The American Spectator
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Surprisingly, an Army officer, Ian Whitfield, decided to wade into the middle of the discussion about Force Design with his article in Real Clear Defense, "Public Disputes Undercut Officer Class."
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. . . Finally, the outspoken opposition from the group further exacerbates recruitment challenges for the Marine Corps. Military services are increasingly struggling to recruit and retain service members. A significant factor contributing to this decline is the eroding public trust in the military, which is only worsened by public disputes like those involving Chowder II. Such conflicts, aired openly on the internet, portray the perception of the Marine Corps as disjointed and unstable. These actions potentially deter prospective recruits from joining an organization seemingly mired in internal discord.
-- Ian Whitfield, Real Clear Defense
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Gary Anderson was quick to reply to the Army officer.
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Ian Whitfield is a part time U.S. Army military police officer and a graduate student at Georgetown University. As a cop, he should know how dangerous it is to blunder into a family domestic dispute without knowing the culture he is encountering. Mr. Whitfield decided to weigh in on an internal Marine Corps dispute in a recent piece in this publication. He accuses a group of retired Marine Corps general officers calling themselves "Chowder II" of undermining the current Marine Corps' leadership and damaging the future recruiting efforts of the organization. I disagree with his analysis and would like to explain why.
. . . Chowder II is trying to have the kind of open and honest debate that should have been conducted before Force Design was implemented. This is not a case of a group of disgruntled retirees resisting change. The Marine Corps is a family, and families occasionally feud. Cops like Mr. Whitfield are best advised to stay out of the line of fire.
-- Gary Anderson, Real Clear Defense
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It is worth noting that in his Real Clear Defense article, Gary Anderson emphasizes, “First, let me state clearly that I am not a part of Chowder II. I agree with their goals, but we sometimes disagree on methods to attain the goals.” In a similar way, Compass Points is independent of Chowder II or any other organization. Compass Points exists to support and encourage robust discussion among all those active-duty Marines, Marine veterans, and friends of the Corps who are working to upgrade and enhance the Marine Corps.
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Compass Points looks forward to the SASC budget hearings being re-scheduled and salutes both the Senate Armed Services Committee and Gary Anderson for all they are doing to keep the Marine Corps strong today and stronger tomorrow.
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The American Spectator - 04/23/2024
Biden Has Allowed the Marine Corps to Become Irrelevant
Gary Anderson, The American Spectator, April 23, 2024
Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and is the author of the Naval War College Newport Paper “BEYOND MAHAN.” He was the Director of Wargaming for the Marine Corps and Chief of Staff of its Warfighting Lab.
https://spectator.org/biden-has-allowed-the-marine-corps-to-become-irrelevant/
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Real Clear Defense - 04/20/2024
Public Disputes Undercut Officer Class
By Ian Whitfield
Ian Whitfield is an Army Officer and a graduate student in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program.
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Real Clear Defense - 04/25/2024
Marine Corps Force Design: In Defense of Chowder II
By Gary Anderson
Gary Anderson lectures on Alternative Analysis at George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs. He served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense
Major Whitfield's comments about recruiting are weak conflation, at best. "Recruiting challenges" is a new addition to the buzz word lexicon, so it's a key part of his essay. He writes: "Finally, the outspoken opposition from the group further exacerbates recruitment challenges for the Marine Corps.....These actions potentially deter prospective recruits from joining an organization seemingly mired in internal discord.". The debate over Force Design doesn't prevent active and passive prospecting nor the benefits used to identify why a potential applicant may consider joining the USMC. Further, he assumes without proving (or identifying it as a hypothesis) that the debate over Force Design affects propensity. He's conflating issues. Neither does he acknowledge the possibility that the issue at the core of the FD (2030) discussion could be a problem affecting FD (2030). To me, it's analogous to me blaming the Doctor who pointed out that I broke my arm, when I broke my arm. The doctor's discussion of my broken arm was not the cause of my pain and reduced mobility, it was the broken arm. However, I think the Force Design debate is likely to have minimal effect on recruiting, especially after all other factors that affect propensity are considered. I'll admit that is a hypothesis and unproven. What I know is that there is always 'something', some type of broad narrative, that makes recruiting problematic ('the war', 'the economy', 'the president', 'the corruption', etc) at least in the eyes of someone looking for an easy excuse and not a cause.
As for the rest of the article, it's a fairly shallow opinion piece, high on conflation and supposition. Below are few more draft comments if you're inclined to read.
-"The Marine Corps restructuring required a divestment-to-reinvestment strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations.".
That this concept continues to be allowed to pass unchallenged is a significant part of the (DoD) problem. Is there any real example of where practical capability has been preserved while employing a 'divesting to reinvest strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations. This is not to say that working within budgetary constraints is not reality; that is not the issue. The issue is funding, relevant capability, and innovation in the very specific context of how the changes were made and sold as part of FD (2030) [and any other public or private venture].
-"_Force Design_ prescribes a shift away from traditional heavy equipment like armor and artillery to develop a more agile and flexible force tailored to meet contemporary security challenges."
This concept gets pushed as if we are comparing the Rangers circa 1989 dropping onto a Panamanian airfield and the 1986 1st Armored Division. I am very well versed on the logistics for heavy combat equipment. That said, I've also seen that dropping the heavier equipment usually results in more rolling stock and still a large motorized footprint. Just look at 3d MLR's load outs....rockets, radar's, and log support aren't exactly 'nuttin but my Alice pack, M16, and boots'.
May I suggest that all of us lobby US Senators on this committee who will listen to ask the right questions at this hearing and demand real answers.