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cfrog's avatar

Major Whitfield's comments about recruiting are weak conflation, at best. "Recruiting challenges" is a new addition to the buzz word lexicon, so it's a key part of his essay. He writes: "Finally, the outspoken opposition from the group further exacerbates recruitment challenges for the Marine Corps.....These actions potentially deter prospective recruits from joining an organization seemingly mired in internal discord.". The debate over Force Design doesn't prevent active and passive prospecting nor the benefits used to identify why a potential applicant may consider joining the USMC. Further, he assumes without proving (or identifying it as a hypothesis) that the debate over Force Design affects propensity. He's conflating issues. Neither does he acknowledge the possibility that the issue at the core of the FD (2030) discussion could be a problem affecting FD (2030). To me, it's analogous to me blaming the Doctor who pointed out that I broke my arm, when I broke my arm. The doctor's discussion of my broken arm was not the cause of my pain and reduced mobility, it was the broken arm. However, I think the Force Design debate is likely to have minimal effect on recruiting, especially after all other factors that affect propensity are considered. I'll admit that is a hypothesis and unproven. What I know is that there is always 'something', some type of broad narrative, that makes recruiting problematic ('the war', 'the economy', 'the president', 'the corruption', etc) at least in the eyes of someone looking for an easy excuse and not a cause.

As for the rest of the article, it's a fairly shallow opinion piece, high on conflation and supposition. Below are few more draft comments if you're inclined to read.

-"The Marine Corps restructuring required a divestment-to-reinvestment strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations.".

That this concept continues to be allowed to pass unchallenged is a significant part of the (DoD) problem. Is there any real example of where practical capability has been preserved while employing a 'divesting to reinvest strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations. This is not to say that working within budgetary constraints is not reality; that is not the issue. The issue is funding, relevant capability, and innovation in the very specific context of how the changes were made and sold as part of FD (2030) [and any other public or private venture].

-"_Force Design_ prescribes a shift away from traditional heavy equipment like armor and artillery to develop a more agile and flexible force tailored to meet contemporary security challenges."

This concept gets pushed as if we are comparing the Rangers circa 1989 dropping onto a Panamanian airfield and the 1986 1st Armored Division. I am very well versed on the logistics for heavy combat equipment. That said, I've also seen that dropping the heavier equipment usually results in more rolling stock and still a large motorized footprint. Just look at 3d MLR's load outs....rockets, radar's, and log support aren't exactly 'nuttin but my Alice pack, M16, and boots'.

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medevicerep's avatar

May I suggest that all of us lobby US Senators on this committee who will listen to ask the right questions at this hearing and demand real answers.

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