Major Whitfield's comments about recruiting are weak conflation, at best. "Recruiting challenges" is a new addition to the buzz word lexicon, so it's a key part of his essay. He writes: "Finally, the outspoken opposition from the group further exacerbates recruitment challenges for the Marine Corps.....These actions potentially deter prospective recruits from joining an organization seemingly mired in internal discord.". The debate over Force Design doesn't prevent active and passive prospecting nor the benefits used to identify why a potential applicant may consider joining the USMC. Further, he assumes without proving (or identifying it as a hypothesis) that the debate over Force Design affects propensity. He's conflating issues. Neither does he acknowledge the possibility that the issue at the core of the FD (2030) discussion could be a problem affecting FD (2030). To me, it's analogous to me blaming the Doctor who pointed out that I broke my arm, when I broke my arm. The doctor's discussion of my broken arm was not the cause of my pain and reduced mobility, it was the broken arm. However, I think the Force Design debate is likely to have minimal effect on recruiting, especially after all other factors that affect propensity are considered. I'll admit that is a hypothesis and unproven. What I know is that there is always 'something', some type of broad narrative, that makes recruiting problematic ('the war', 'the economy', 'the president', 'the corruption', etc) at least in the eyes of someone looking for an easy excuse and not a cause.
As for the rest of the article, it's a fairly shallow opinion piece, high on conflation and supposition. Below are few more draft comments if you're inclined to read.
-"The Marine Corps restructuring required a divestment-to-reinvestment strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations.".
That this concept continues to be allowed to pass unchallenged is a significant part of the (DoD) problem. Is there any real example of where practical capability has been preserved while employing a 'divesting to reinvest strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations. This is not to say that working within budgetary constraints is not reality; that is not the issue. The issue is funding, relevant capability, and innovation in the very specific context of how the changes were made and sold as part of FD (2030) [and any other public or private venture].
-"_Force Design_ prescribes a shift away from traditional heavy equipment like armor and artillery to develop a more agile and flexible force tailored to meet contemporary security challenges."
This concept gets pushed as if we are comparing the Rangers circa 1989 dropping onto a Panamanian airfield and the 1986 1st Armored Division. I am very well versed on the logistics for heavy combat equipment. That said, I've also seen that dropping the heavier equipment usually results in more rolling stock and still a large motorized footprint. Just look at 3d MLR's load outs....rockets, radar's, and log support aren't exactly 'nuttin but my Alice pack, M16, and boots'.
“submit a comprehensive report on Force Design and its effects on the combat power of the Marine Corps…Then, the Marine Corps was required to brief the report on Force Design in person to the Congress…imposed a requirement on the Department of Defense to select an FFRDC -- federally funded research and development center -- to conduct a yearlong review of Force Design. FFRDCs are public-private partnerships that conduct research and development for the United States.”
All this seems a long way from rebuilding the combat capability of the US Marine Corps. It will be interesting to see what the new Commandant attempts to keep and more importantly, hear his ideas on the priority of establishing the lost combat capabilities. A yearlong review sounds like another study before we start adding back squadrons, batteries, and battalions (artillery, infantry, tanks?).
The current Commandant (and SECDEF) are looking at a number of hard decisions in the next Joint Planning Cycle.
Do we establish the Marine tank battalions? With the M1 or the A10 Light Tank?
How about tube artillery? What is the trade-off between tube artillery and the HIMARS?
Does HIMARS go back to counter battery fire? Or continue the effort to arm it with short range anti-ship missiles?
How does the Marine Air Wing restore its attack and lift capabilities? The V-22 and the F-35 are new and innovative aircraft with new design and operational issues that need to be worked out. What decisions there? Does the F-35 need an anti-ship missile?
What do you do with the Marine Raider Regiment? The Marine Raider Regiment was the idea of a hectoring SECDEF looking for additional forces attempting to implement a successful COIN Strategy. I had the opportunity meet a number of the Raiders during the MARSOC3 Courts Martial of GySgt Danny Draher and GySgt Josh Nagron. Frankly, if I was a rifle company commander, I would cut my right arm off to have either of these Marines as my Company GySgt.
JOSHUA NEGRON - United American Patriots (uap.org)
The Raiders are highly trained and display exceptional leadership but why give these quality Marines to SOCCOM? During WW2 the US Marine Corps did away with the specialty battalions. The Para-Marines and Raider Battalions were used to fill out the assault waves of Iwo Jima. The Marine Defense Battalions were needed to fill out the III Marine Amphibious Corp for the invasion on Okinawa.
Let’s not forget the first MARSOC Raider Company that was kicked out of Afghanistan and the political Board of Inquires and embarrassments. IMHO this incident ended careers due to inter service rivalries. The company commander spent twelve years clearing his Raiders and getting to the truth of the Raiders returning fire in an enemy ambush. If I peeked your interest read the book; A Few Bad Men by Major Fred Galvin.
If what the new Commandant states is true that “The MEU remains our crown jewel.” Why not add a Marine Raider Company to the MEU? Maybe that is another justification to get the Navy off its butt when it comes to amphibious ship building and maintenance? Why would a Combatant Commander say no to MEU with a Raider Company?
Another issue is the MPF squadrons. I understand we are down to one. I think it would be a good idea for the new Commandant to ask for another one.
Yep, lots of decisions! If the Senate wants to narrow the new Commandant’s wiggle room, I think the next step is for the Senate to call in Chowder II, as the truth teller, AFTER the Commandant makes his report. OH! BTW SECNAV needs to be sitting next to the Commandant during that Senate hearing.
General John A. Lejeune, as we know Commanded the US Army’s 2 ID during WWI , among its units remains the 9th Infantry Regiment. The Manchu’s Motto is “KEEP UP THE FIRE”! Chowder II and the unrelated MCCP must “PRESS ON W GREAT VIGOR” AND “ KEEP UP THE FIRE”!
Mr. Whitfield displays his lack of knowledge about the Marine Corps.
Marines don’t hide their professional disagreements, whether in house or outside. That’s what makes our professional discussions fruitful and productive.
Major Whitfield's comments about recruiting are weak conflation, at best. "Recruiting challenges" is a new addition to the buzz word lexicon, so it's a key part of his essay. He writes: "Finally, the outspoken opposition from the group further exacerbates recruitment challenges for the Marine Corps.....These actions potentially deter prospective recruits from joining an organization seemingly mired in internal discord.". The debate over Force Design doesn't prevent active and passive prospecting nor the benefits used to identify why a potential applicant may consider joining the USMC. Further, he assumes without proving (or identifying it as a hypothesis) that the debate over Force Design affects propensity. He's conflating issues. Neither does he acknowledge the possibility that the issue at the core of the FD (2030) discussion could be a problem affecting FD (2030). To me, it's analogous to me blaming the Doctor who pointed out that I broke my arm, when I broke my arm. The doctor's discussion of my broken arm was not the cause of my pain and reduced mobility, it was the broken arm. However, I think the Force Design debate is likely to have minimal effect on recruiting, especially after all other factors that affect propensity are considered. I'll admit that is a hypothesis and unproven. What I know is that there is always 'something', some type of broad narrative, that makes recruiting problematic ('the war', 'the economy', 'the president', 'the corruption', etc) at least in the eyes of someone looking for an easy excuse and not a cause.
As for the rest of the article, it's a fairly shallow opinion piece, high on conflation and supposition. Below are few more draft comments if you're inclined to read.
-"The Marine Corps restructuring required a divestment-to-reinvestment strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations.".
That this concept continues to be allowed to pass unchallenged is a significant part of the (DoD) problem. Is there any real example of where practical capability has been preserved while employing a 'divesting to reinvest strategy to prioritize modernization without increased appropriations. This is not to say that working within budgetary constraints is not reality; that is not the issue. The issue is funding, relevant capability, and innovation in the very specific context of how the changes were made and sold as part of FD (2030) [and any other public or private venture].
-"_Force Design_ prescribes a shift away from traditional heavy equipment like armor and artillery to develop a more agile and flexible force tailored to meet contemporary security challenges."
This concept gets pushed as if we are comparing the Rangers circa 1989 dropping onto a Panamanian airfield and the 1986 1st Armored Division. I am very well versed on the logistics for heavy combat equipment. That said, I've also seen that dropping the heavier equipment usually results in more rolling stock and still a large motorized footprint. Just look at 3d MLR's load outs....rockets, radar's, and log support aren't exactly 'nuttin but my Alice pack, M16, and boots'.
May I suggest that all of us lobby US Senators on this committee who will listen to ask the right questions at this hearing and demand real answers.
FFRDC
“submit a comprehensive report on Force Design and its effects on the combat power of the Marine Corps…Then, the Marine Corps was required to brief the report on Force Design in person to the Congress…imposed a requirement on the Department of Defense to select an FFRDC -- federally funded research and development center -- to conduct a yearlong review of Force Design. FFRDCs are public-private partnerships that conduct research and development for the United States.”
All this seems a long way from rebuilding the combat capability of the US Marine Corps. It will be interesting to see what the new Commandant attempts to keep and more importantly, hear his ideas on the priority of establishing the lost combat capabilities. A yearlong review sounds like another study before we start adding back squadrons, batteries, and battalions (artillery, infantry, tanks?).
The current Commandant (and SECDEF) are looking at a number of hard decisions in the next Joint Planning Cycle.
Do we establish the Marine tank battalions? With the M1 or the A10 Light Tank?
How about tube artillery? What is the trade-off between tube artillery and the HIMARS?
Does HIMARS go back to counter battery fire? Or continue the effort to arm it with short range anti-ship missiles?
How does the Marine Air Wing restore its attack and lift capabilities? The V-22 and the F-35 are new and innovative aircraft with new design and operational issues that need to be worked out. What decisions there? Does the F-35 need an anti-ship missile?
What do you do with the Marine Raider Regiment? The Marine Raider Regiment was the idea of a hectoring SECDEF looking for additional forces attempting to implement a successful COIN Strategy. I had the opportunity meet a number of the Raiders during the MARSOC3 Courts Martial of GySgt Danny Draher and GySgt Josh Nagron. Frankly, if I was a rifle company commander, I would cut my right arm off to have either of these Marines as my Company GySgt.
https://www.uap.org/case/danny-draher/#gallery-8
JOSHUA NEGRON - United American Patriots (uap.org)
The Raiders are highly trained and display exceptional leadership but why give these quality Marines to SOCCOM? During WW2 the US Marine Corps did away with the specialty battalions. The Para-Marines and Raider Battalions were used to fill out the assault waves of Iwo Jima. The Marine Defense Battalions were needed to fill out the III Marine Amphibious Corp for the invasion on Okinawa.
Let’s not forget the first MARSOC Raider Company that was kicked out of Afghanistan and the political Board of Inquires and embarrassments. IMHO this incident ended careers due to inter service rivalries. The company commander spent twelve years clearing his Raiders and getting to the truth of the Raiders returning fire in an enemy ambush. If I peeked your interest read the book; A Few Bad Men by Major Fred Galvin.
If what the new Commandant states is true that “The MEU remains our crown jewel.” Why not add a Marine Raider Company to the MEU? Maybe that is another justification to get the Navy off its butt when it comes to amphibious ship building and maintenance? Why would a Combatant Commander say no to MEU with a Raider Company?
Another issue is the MPF squadrons. I understand we are down to one. I think it would be a good idea for the new Commandant to ask for another one.
Yep, lots of decisions! If the Senate wants to narrow the new Commandant’s wiggle room, I think the next step is for the Senate to call in Chowder II, as the truth teller, AFTER the Commandant makes his report. OH! BTW SECNAV needs to be sitting next to the Commandant during that Senate hearing.
General John A. Lejeune, as we know Commanded the US Army’s 2 ID during WWI , among its units remains the 9th Infantry Regiment. The Manchu’s Motto is “KEEP UP THE FIRE”! Chowder II and the unrelated MCCP must “PRESS ON W GREAT VIGOR” AND “ KEEP UP THE FIRE”!
Mr. Whitfield displays his lack of knowledge about the Marine Corps.
Marines don’t hide their professional disagreements, whether in house or outside. That’s what makes our professional discussions fruitful and productive.
Majority Members (13) Minority Members (12)
Reed, Jack (RI), Chairman
Shaheen, Jeanne (NH)
Gillibrand, Kirsten E. (NY)
Blumenthal, Richard (CT)
Hirono, Mazie K. (HI)
Kaine, Tim (VA)
King, Angus S. (ME)
Warren, Elizabeth (MA)
Peters, Gary C. (MI)
Manchin, Joe (WV)
Duckworth, Tammy (IL)
Rosen, Jacky (NV)
Kelly, Mark (AZ)
Wicker, Roger F. (MS), Ranking Member
Fischer, Deb (NE)
Cotton, Tom (AR)
Rounds, Mike (SD)
Ernst, Joni (IA)
Sullivan, Dan (AK)
Cramer, Kevin (ND)
Scott, Rick (FL)
Tuberville, Tommy (AL)
Mullin, Markwayne (OK)
Budd, Ted (NC)
Schmitt, Eric (MO)