Compass Points - Save our Ships
Keep the focus on amphibious ships.
March 19, 2024
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SOS in Morse code is signaled by three dots, three dashes, and three more dots. SOS is an international signal of emergency. The US Navy has a ship building and maintenance emergency and the Marine Corps is right there with them.
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To continue to serve as the nation's always ready 9-1-1 crisis response force, the Marine Corps must have amphibious ships so that Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) can be on constant global patrol as part of the Amphibious Ready Groups (ARG).
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The Marine Corps for decades has felt it did not have enough amphibious ships. How many amphibious ships does the Marine Corps need? Former CMC General Neller testified before Congress that to meet the worldwide requirements of the Combatant Commands, the Marine Corps needed "upwards of 50" amphibious ships. At the time there was an agreement with CMC and CNO that the baseline requirement was 43 ships, but -- solely due to fiscal constraints -- the Marine Corps would not press for 43 ships but would accept 38 amphib ships. So, 38 ships is the number agreed to between the Navy, the Marine Corps, and Congress.
Then the incoming CMC in the summer of 2019 made a strange and surprising announcement. He announced that the Marine Corps did not need 38 ships and could get by with less. The Navy and much of the Marine Corps was astounded by the new CMC. The Navy immediately went to 26 ships and CAPE went to 24. Congress had to step in and reset the number of amphibious ships to 31.
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Making the amphibious ship problem worse is maintenance backlog so severe it means even ships on the roster are not available for use. The readiness rate, the percentage of ships available for use has fallen to 40%. That means out of 31 amphibious ships, only 12 ships are available. This is one reason there is no ARG-MEU ready today to replace the 26th MEU in the Eastern Med.
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To continue to serve as the nation's always ready 9-1-1 crisis response force, the Marine Corps must have a full fleet of amphibious ships at an 80% availability rate.
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The Marine Corps also needs an upgraded Maritime Prepositioning Force. Prior to 2018, the MPF had three full Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPSRONs), operated by the Navy’s Military Sealift Command (MSC). Each MPSRON carried unit equipment and 30 days of supply for one brigade-sized MAGTF when combined with an echelon of personnel, light equipment, and combat aircraft. Each squadron can discharge its cargo pierside, ship-to-ship, ship-to-shore, or by air. MCPP-N consists of ground equipment, munitions, and aviation support equipment to supply a Marine Expeditionary Brigade for 30 days.
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The MPF is one of the most innovative programs of the last several decades. It was conceived by the Marines to rapidly deploy and sustain a combined arms brigade for 30 days of combat. No other service has the MPF. When it was created, the MPS was an addition to Marine capabilities – nothing was “divested.” Without MPS, the Marine Corps is unable to deploy a larger combined arms MEB or quickly composite to an even larger MEF.
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Unfortunately, the MPF program has been allowed to deteriorate over the years. There are currently no MPF ships in the Med to reinforce and augment the ARG-MEU -- if we had an ARG-MEU in the Med -- which we do not have!
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The amphibious ships and the prepositioning ships are both crucial. Neither type of ship competes against the other. The programs are separate and distinct. The Marine Corps has no ship needs more critical than amphibious ships and prepositioning ships.
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As Chris Owens has written previously in the Marine Times,
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. . . rebuilding the fleet will require a long-term, sustained effort, and a true partnership with the Navy, OSD and Congress to prioritize the resources toward this critical national requirement.
-- By Maj. Gen. Christopher Owens (ret), "Marines slam a shrinking amphibious fleet, but the Navy isn’t to blame" Marine Times
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There is a danger that as part of Navy budget planning, the Navy could pit amphibious ships against medium landing ships (LSM). The LSM is a ship the Marine Corps has said it needs as part of its Force Design program, to assist with Marines on missile units on Pacific islands. No LSM ship design has been finalized and no production funding has been allocated for the LSM. If the Navy is going to use the LSM to compete with funding and construction against the needed amphibious ships, it means the Marine Corps is competing against itself. The Marine Corps must not compete against itself. Shipyards are scarce and funding is scarce. The Marine Corps must be clear that its sole focus and priority is getting amphibious ships built. The LSM must not be allowed to distract from amphibious ships.
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There are amphibious ships and MPF ships. The Marine Corps needs more of both. Then there is the LSM. The LSM must not be allowed to compete against higher priority ships.
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In years gone by, the Marine Corps was careful about amphibious ships and made sure there were always ARG/MEUs in the Med and WestPac, 24/7/365. That is not true today. The 26th MEU left the Med recently. There is no ARG/MEU in the Eastern Med. There is no ARG/MEU deployed anywhere off the East Coast. There is no ARG/MEU deployed off the West Coast. The only ARG/MEU the Corps has now is the part-time 31st MEU.
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SOS in Morse code is signaled by three dots, three dashes, and three more dots. SOS is an international signal of emergency. The US Navy has a ship building and maintenance emergency and the Marine Corps is right there with them. In an emergency it is important to focus. What needs to be done first? What is most critical? The Marine Corps needs more amphibious ships now. The LSM must not be allowed to detract from or compete with the construction of amphibious ships.
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Stay focused and stay on course. What is the right number of amphibious ships? It might be 50, 46, or 38. The ship number should be determined by a new operational concept as part of the Marine combat development process. Right now, Congress has set the number at 31. So, for now, the Marine Corps needs at least 31 amphibious ships at an 80% readiness rate. If the readiness rate is going to stay at 40% then the Marine Corps needs to go back to the 50 amphibious ship number – or more. Navy and Marine Corps ARG/MEUs on constant worldwide patrol make the US stronger and the world safer.
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Marine Times - 05/05/2023
Marines slam a shrinking amphibious fleet, but the Navy isn’t to blame
By Maj. Gen. Christopher Owens (retired)
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CRS Reports
Navy LPD-17 Flight II and LHA Amphibious Ship Programs: Background and Issues for Congress
Updated February 6, 2024
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R43543
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CRS Reports
Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM)
(Previously Light Amphibious Warship
[LAW]) Program: Background and Issues for Congress
Updated December 20, 2023
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46374
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CRS Reports
Defense Primer: Department of Defense Pre-Positioned Materiel
Updated December 23, 2022
We've got the premier Navy in the world and I know that it doesn't come cheap. However, the status quo (and the background that created the status quo) is not producing enduring and sustained capability for our amphibious capability. If somebody doesn't take ownership and we keep pushing this issue like PFC cFrog walking his check-in sheet around Camp Schwab, the trend is clear by simply reviewing fleet size and readiness rates over the last 40 years. There are solutions to these problems, even with respect to bigger challenges. It may mean pushing some type of 10 year plan through in order to rebuild the base for our domestic capability. We do have domestic shortages in various trades that are currently vital across a range of industries (welders - vital to shipyards and vital to re-building the domestic semi conductor industry). Maybe along with the CHIPS Act, we need to push for a SHIPS Act; that's partly what "that peasant nation turned Peer Competitor" did. There are solutions...they are not short term, but there are solutions. The fact is we've been on a decline for decades....someone in charge needs to do something about our domestic ability to build, maintain, and repair our ships. Otherwise we should just suck it up and accept the Dunkirk Evacuation Fleet Plan as our new model. Foreign augmentation and sourcing are good secondary options, but we are a global maritime nation with two tremendous coastlines. This isn't our first go around at building up and reinvigorating the fleet, and the fact that it's 2024 and not 1804 doesn't matter; the principles are the same. In the near term, as a Nation, we need to formalize at the DoD level whatever Hi-Lo-No mix of various Surface Combatants, Logistics Support Vessels, Amphibs, MSC Shipping, and COTS we want in a sustained Amphibious Readiness Group afloat for Crisis Contingency so we have a consistent idea of what will be available for Crisis Response to the Cocoms. I am sure there is talk of this now, but in practical application, it is clearly a seat of the pants approach (for practical reasons, I understand).
We have lost the "bubble" on this issue. As a young Major at HQMC in 1976-1980 I well remember the briefings given to CMC regarding the impact of NTMPS/MPS will have on the Corps ability to quickly deploy anywhere in the world and the equipment would quickly marry up. Then, when President Regan got on board, there was talk of a 600 fleet Navy.
Looking back I'd say we somewhat terrified would be adversaries. Today, I have to question our Force-In-Readiness abilities to handle any major conflict that may arise in the future unless our leaders stop drinking the Kool-Aid. We need to count our friends on the Hill to correct this quagmire.