We've got the premier Navy in the world and I know that it doesn't come cheap. However, the status quo (and the background that created the status quo) is not producing enduring and sustained capability for our amphibious capability. If somebody doesn't take ownership and we keep pushing this issue like PFC cFrog walking his check-in sheet around Camp Schwab, the trend is clear by simply reviewing fleet size and readiness rates over the last 40 years. There are solutions to these problems, even with respect to bigger challenges. It may mean pushing some type of 10 year plan through in order to rebuild the base for our domestic capability. We do have domestic shortages in various trades that are currently vital across a range of industries (welders - vital to shipyards and vital to re-building the domestic semi conductor industry). Maybe along with the CHIPS Act, we need to push for a SHIPS Act; that's partly what "that peasant nation turned Peer Competitor" did. There are solutions...they are not short term, but there are solutions. The fact is we've been on a decline for decades....someone in charge needs to do something about our domestic ability to build, maintain, and repair our ships. Otherwise we should just suck it up and accept the Dunkirk Evacuation Fleet Plan as our new model. Foreign augmentation and sourcing are good secondary options, but we are a global maritime nation with two tremendous coastlines. This isn't our first go around at building up and reinvigorating the fleet, and the fact that it's 2024 and not 1804 doesn't matter; the principles are the same. In the near term, as a Nation, we need to formalize at the DoD level whatever Hi-Lo-No mix of various Surface Combatants, Logistics Support Vessels, Amphibs, MSC Shipping, and COTS we want in a sustained Amphibious Readiness Group afloat for Crisis Contingency so we have a consistent idea of what will be available for Crisis Response to the Cocoms. I am sure there is talk of this now, but in practical application, it is clearly a seat of the pants approach (for practical reasons, I understand).
Not in disagreement with all you said. But i would add 3 move caveats.
1. We should not build a new yesterday's force. Build a new force with technologies need for today's battlefield Lighter Vehicles, SP Light Artillery, MLARs, Radars, UAV Capabilities.
2. Don't get stuck on 1 combat scenario - plan a force capable of rapid deployment and sustaining itself for 90 days in combat.
3. Budgets matter. We need to accept that a smaller modernized force is far better than a much bigger outdated force.
Maybe it's time for a 4 Marine Land/Air Brigade Force that can go anywhere and kill for 90 days.
We have lost the "bubble" on this issue. As a young Major at HQMC in 1976-1980 I well remember the briefings given to CMC regarding the impact of NTMPS/MPS will have on the Corps ability to quickly deploy anywhere in the world and the equipment would quickly marry up. Then, when President Regan got on board, there was talk of a 600 fleet Navy.
Looking back I'd say we somewhat terrified would be adversaries. Today, I have to question our Force-In-Readiness abilities to handle any major conflict that may arise in the future unless our leaders stop drinking the Kool-Aid. We need to count our friends on the Hill to correct this quagmire.
Agreed. Bigger can be be Better when it comes to deterrence. Lethality, Lethality, Lethality. Adversaries need to know we come quickly with enough sustainable force to change the situation. I don't think we have thought through the China focused mission concept.
Senator Shaheen sits on the senate armed services committee and the sub committee on sea power. My guess is she is as clueless as the rest of the senate with exceptions like Senator Sullivan. This is motivation enough to contact her local office and find out where she stands on the major issues identified. Will report back. That all said, it is not the number of times a MEU or larger force actually conducts a full on amphibious assault, the mere presence of a MEU with special operations capability tend to make people who are making trouble and bad decisions in a region to rethink their positions, maybe have a sincere chat with the local State Department officials and avoid having their throne turned over and left upside down with them in it, and a young Marine standing over them heavily armed, not in the mood to negotiate. We did these mission all through the early part of the last century, we learned a lot in the Banana Wars right in our own hemisphere. Some of those lessons learned were helpful when WWII began in earnest for the US, specifically the Pacific. You can not be a maritime power if you have no maritime power. We need to learn to roll our own steel again, fabricate and punch metals and do so on a scale that is accretive to the national defense. The capability is always there it is a matter of igniting the process and getting the priorities up to speed fast enough. As Cfrog says we can do this but we need to be stepping off on the left foot now.
As a former Phibron CCO I am beyond appalled at the current state of the amphibious fleet. There is no way to sugar coat it but the previous Commandant sold us out! And for what? The situation is well documented and smarter folks than I have articulated exceptionally well the foolishness and folly of FD2030! We have had ample discussions and dialog on this subject. It is time to declare General Quarters and set things straight. First and foremost a bright laser light needs to be shined on all these so called war games/simulations that required participants to sign NDAs! If sunshine is truly the best disinfected then let it shine......brightly. Next we need to weed out all these acolytes of FD2030. Lastly, we MUST have a full court press to undo what has been done. Sadly, this will take more years than I have left but I would be happy with a good start. Semper Fi.
This is what is happening to our amphib fleet. The LHD's, the last of the steam ships in the Navy, are maintenance nightmares. From leadership on down.
"Now, a pair of command investigations into engineering issues on the Boxer reveal that the Navy not only struggled to correctly repair the aging ship, but her engineering department was poorly led and suffering from issues that ranged from inexperience to outright allegations of assault that directly impacted the ship's ability to get out to sea and, in turn, her deployment schedule."
"The revelations come amid reports that the Boxer's sister ship, the USS Wasp, is also suffering from maintenance and engineering problems on the East Coast while Navy officials again refuse to elaborate or offer details."
Ships crews no longer know how to repair their ships, and from what the article states, there is severe doubt they know how to operate them either.
From a "boiler safety breakdown" (which if it fails instantly fills the engineering space with superheated steam) to running the Main Reduction Gears without lubrication.
The comments from Sen. Dan Sullivan come after a contentious year during which the Navy, Marine Corps and Congress publicly feuded over the state of the amphibious fleet.
By JUSTIN KATZ
on March 07, 2024 at 11:21 AM
Kearsarge Supports Large Scale Exercise (LSE) 2021
The Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), and Landing Craft, Air Cushions 86, 85 and 02 attached to Assault Craft Unit 4 (ACU 4) sail in formation Aug. 14, 2021. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jesse Schwab)
Updated 3/7/2024 at 5:46 pm ET with comment from Adm. Lisa Franchetti.
WASHINGTON — A US senator today said the chief of naval operations assured him the Navy’s next long-term shipbuilding plan will reach the 31 amphibious ship fleet mandated in law.
“I met with the CNO last week. I asked her what we’re going to see in the shipbuilding plan,” Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, said during an Amphibious Warship Industrial Base Coalition event on Capitol Hill. “And she assured me this year’s shipbuilding plan will have 31 amphibs at a minimum.”
The senator’s comments come just days before the White House is expected release its next annual budget request, which traditionally includes the publication of the Navy’s updated 30-year shipbuilding plan. That document outlines the numbers and types of ships the service projects it will seek to build over the next three decades.
It is also seen as an important tool for Congress to understand the Pentagon’s strategic plans, as well industry to gauge the military’s anticipated shipbuilding requirements so they invest and adjust their workforces accordingly.
Cmdr. Desiree Frame, a spokeswoman for CNO Adm. Lisa Franchetti, told Breaking Defense today that the admiral “previously confirmed her commitment” to reaching a 31 amphibious ship fleet and demonstrated that commitment earlier this week with a “combined Navy-Marine Corps trip” with Assistant Commandant Marine Corps Gen. Christopher Mahoney to several Gulf Coast shipyards.
“As I said in my confirmation hearing, I’m committed to working with the commandant of the Marine Corps and with the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that we meet the requirement of 31 amphibious ships,” Franchetti said in a statement to Breaking Defense.
Lawmakers’ increased sense of urgency to build up the amphibious ship fleet is at least in part driven by admissions last year from Marine Corps leadership that a lack of ready ships prevented the service from responding to events around the globe, such as the civil and humanitarian crises in Turkey and Sudan.
Last year’s shipbuilding plan did not project the Navy achieving a 31 amphibious ship fleet, contravening a law that was passed in the year prior mandating the Navy do so. The discrepancy drew the ire of defense hawks in Congress and led to Sullivan in particular to angrily question Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro during a hearing about why he wasn’t “following the law.”
In response to the senator’s questions and subsequent letters from lawmakers, Del Toro largely balked on the committee’s demands to immediately update the shipbuilding plan, instead writing he is “in constant consultation with the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Naval Operations” to provide the “right mix” of capabilities to the Navy’s fleet.
“The [Navy and Marine Corps] will continue to make investments to put us on course to achieve and maintain a ready and capable amphibious warship fleet that meets the needs of our joint force commanders,” he said in a June 19, 2023 letter, obtained by Breaking Defense.
Each of us have senators and Congress people. Most do not sit on committees directly associated with the shipping issue. They do have collegial relations with those that do. Write them! Urge them to contact friends on the appropriate committees, and ask them to ask the hard questions and respond to you. It is your right (duty) to ask any of your elected officials to put their foot in that door and add support to the larger naval commitment. They only have to look at the 11 embassies that this administration has closed to see why a global sea power is necessary—one was last week!
A US Navy vessel in shambles. Top to keel, a navy in shambles more concerned with extraneous cultural issues than mission readiness. A congress in shambles as it fails in its over sight duties. People in the military need to be held to a high standard of performance, members of the elected federal government are only held to the standard of re-election. How can under exposed low IQ politicians hold a sophisticated system like the DoD and downward Navy Department and Department of the Navy and Marine Corps to account for poor leadship, failure to take responsibility for their actions, etc etc. exactly they can’t and ergo the pickle we find ourselves in at the moment..
A follow up to my last comment.....Please not the findings of this compared to the finding from the Bon Homme Richard fire:
BOXER:
"In his letter, Peck said that "every level of senior engineering leadership failed to provide a safe, professional, and procedurally compliant work environment in engineering department" and he stressed that "these failures had direct, measurable impacts on USS Boxer's upcoming deployment and impeded the overall accomplishment of the strike group's mission."
BON HOMME RICHARD:
The training and readiness of Ship’s Force was marked by a pattern of failed drills, minimal crew participation, an absence of basic knowledge on firefighting in an industrial environment, and unfamiliarity on how to integrate supporting civilian firefighters. To illustrate this point, the crew had failed to meet the time standard for applying firefighting agent on the seat of the fire on 14
consecutive occasions leading up to 12 July 2020.
Is the loss of another vessel hinging on training?
Can someone tell me the number of times we have engaged in an Actual Amphibious Attack on a defended coastline since Inchon? I thinks its Zero but I could be wrong. If we haven't used a capability for over 70 years is it really a US Military Priority. That's not to say we don't need some number of LPHs and LPDs and RORO Ships but maybe we don't need as many as some here think. Maybe we need more Tankers More Cargo Ships and More Transport Aircraft.
Amphibious ships have enabled Marines to respond to a wide variety of crises around the world in the past 70 years. More recently they allowed then Brigadier General Mattis to take Marines into Afghanistan shortly after 911. They provided the ability to move a brigade to the Middle East in support of Operation Desert Storm. They enabled then Lieutenant General Zinni to conduct the amphibious withdrawal from Somalia in Operation United Shield and the late Lieutenant General Stackpole to provide humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh during Operation Sea Angle. And these are just few examples. As importantly, the Corps has no intention of conducting any sort of an amphibious operation that would mimic Inchon; until CMC got caught up in the FD 2030 nonsense Operational Maneuver From the Sea was the Crops' leading concept, which offered innovative ways to move from ship to shore..
Capt Harry Ellsworth of the Historical Division published a great monograph nearly 100 years ago, called "180 Landings of the Marine Corps: 1800-1934." Great reading, and in the late 90's, I got motivated to bring it up to date. I embarked on a similar research project to document the Corps' foreign expeditions since then. I have it in a binder somewhere in my steamer trunk, but I recall it resulted in similar numbers, increasing notably in the 80's and 90's. The tradition of global readiness at the point of friction has been our hallmark. It would be criminally negligent to discard it intentionally.
During Desert Storm, I seem to recall a MEB floating off the coast of Kuwait occupying the attention of numerous Iraqi divisions. Further, I recall General Schwarzkopf’s briefing to the press in which he praised highly that MEB’s impact on Iraqi forces … all without firing a shot. Not a bad exchange rate of combat power: MEB vs. Iraqi Divisions - all done through our amphibious capability.
In Spring 1972, then Major Walt Boomer landed with a battalion of VMC’s in North VietNam. Opposed? I’d have to say it was. Limited objectives and a very short time on the ground, but they did come from the sea!
All your comments are great! And thatk you for making good arguments.
I'm arguing as a contrarian position - how much Amphib Assault capability is needed and what kind?
- I'm not sold on LAW ship concept I think bigger and smaller ships are needed.
I think the Marines are best when they are/stay a multipurpose quick reaction assault force and that means Battalion and even Brigade MEU/MAB capabilities moved by air and sea anywhere in the world.
I am not sold on the China Anti Shipping Mission. I believe the Marines have not coordinated that idea enough with Navy, Air Force and Space Force.
We need a force structure that is highly Integrated with other Sub Sea, Sea, Air, Land and Space forces beyond the Marine Corps to rapidly respond anywhere in the World, plug in & most of all be SUSTAINED. Think Guadalcanal 1942-23.
I think it is imperative to modernize our forces with lessons learned from Ukraine, Yemen & Gaza. I think we have to accept a much smaller Army and Marine Corps Ground Force and a bigger reserve Naval, Air Ground & Logistics Forces force including cargo, oilers and RO/RO ships.
We've got the premier Navy in the world and I know that it doesn't come cheap. However, the status quo (and the background that created the status quo) is not producing enduring and sustained capability for our amphibious capability. If somebody doesn't take ownership and we keep pushing this issue like PFC cFrog walking his check-in sheet around Camp Schwab, the trend is clear by simply reviewing fleet size and readiness rates over the last 40 years. There are solutions to these problems, even with respect to bigger challenges. It may mean pushing some type of 10 year plan through in order to rebuild the base for our domestic capability. We do have domestic shortages in various trades that are currently vital across a range of industries (welders - vital to shipyards and vital to re-building the domestic semi conductor industry). Maybe along with the CHIPS Act, we need to push for a SHIPS Act; that's partly what "that peasant nation turned Peer Competitor" did. There are solutions...they are not short term, but there are solutions. The fact is we've been on a decline for decades....someone in charge needs to do something about our domestic ability to build, maintain, and repair our ships. Otherwise we should just suck it up and accept the Dunkirk Evacuation Fleet Plan as our new model. Foreign augmentation and sourcing are good secondary options, but we are a global maritime nation with two tremendous coastlines. This isn't our first go around at building up and reinvigorating the fleet, and the fact that it's 2024 and not 1804 doesn't matter; the principles are the same. In the near term, as a Nation, we need to formalize at the DoD level whatever Hi-Lo-No mix of various Surface Combatants, Logistics Support Vessels, Amphibs, MSC Shipping, and COTS we want in a sustained Amphibious Readiness Group afloat for Crisis Contingency so we have a consistent idea of what will be available for Crisis Response to the Cocoms. I am sure there is talk of this now, but in practical application, it is clearly a seat of the pants approach (for practical reasons, I understand).
Not in disagreement with all you said. But i would add 3 move caveats.
1. We should not build a new yesterday's force. Build a new force with technologies need for today's battlefield Lighter Vehicles, SP Light Artillery, MLARs, Radars, UAV Capabilities.
2. Don't get stuck on 1 combat scenario - plan a force capable of rapid deployment and sustaining itself for 90 days in combat.
3. Budgets matter. We need to accept that a smaller modernized force is far better than a much bigger outdated force.
Maybe it's time for a 4 Marine Land/Air Brigade Force that can go anywhere and kill for 90 days.
We have lost the "bubble" on this issue. As a young Major at HQMC in 1976-1980 I well remember the briefings given to CMC regarding the impact of NTMPS/MPS will have on the Corps ability to quickly deploy anywhere in the world and the equipment would quickly marry up. Then, when President Regan got on board, there was talk of a 600 fleet Navy.
Looking back I'd say we somewhat terrified would be adversaries. Today, I have to question our Force-In-Readiness abilities to handle any major conflict that may arise in the future unless our leaders stop drinking the Kool-Aid. We need to count our friends on the Hill to correct this quagmire.
Agreed. Bigger can be be Better when it comes to deterrence. Lethality, Lethality, Lethality. Adversaries need to know we come quickly with enough sustainable force to change the situation. I don't think we have thought through the China focused mission concept.
Senator Shaheen sits on the senate armed services committee and the sub committee on sea power. My guess is she is as clueless as the rest of the senate with exceptions like Senator Sullivan. This is motivation enough to contact her local office and find out where she stands on the major issues identified. Will report back. That all said, it is not the number of times a MEU or larger force actually conducts a full on amphibious assault, the mere presence of a MEU with special operations capability tend to make people who are making trouble and bad decisions in a region to rethink their positions, maybe have a sincere chat with the local State Department officials and avoid having their throne turned over and left upside down with them in it, and a young Marine standing over them heavily armed, not in the mood to negotiate. We did these mission all through the early part of the last century, we learned a lot in the Banana Wars right in our own hemisphere. Some of those lessons learned were helpful when WWII began in earnest for the US, specifically the Pacific. You can not be a maritime power if you have no maritime power. We need to learn to roll our own steel again, fabricate and punch metals and do so on a scale that is accretive to the national defense. The capability is always there it is a matter of igniting the process and getting the priorities up to speed fast enough. As Cfrog says we can do this but we need to be stepping off on the left foot now.
As a former Phibron CCO I am beyond appalled at the current state of the amphibious fleet. There is no way to sugar coat it but the previous Commandant sold us out! And for what? The situation is well documented and smarter folks than I have articulated exceptionally well the foolishness and folly of FD2030! We have had ample discussions and dialog on this subject. It is time to declare General Quarters and set things straight. First and foremost a bright laser light needs to be shined on all these so called war games/simulations that required participants to sign NDAs! If sunshine is truly the best disinfected then let it shine......brightly. Next we need to weed out all these acolytes of FD2030. Lastly, we MUST have a full court press to undo what has been done. Sadly, this will take more years than I have left but I would be happy with a good start. Semper Fi.
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2024/03/19/least-3-engineering-incidents-and-poor-leadership-kept-uss-boxer-deploying-investigations-reveal.html?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru&SToverlay=2002c2d9-c344-4bbb-8610-e5794efcfa7d
This is what is happening to our amphib fleet. The LHD's, the last of the steam ships in the Navy, are maintenance nightmares. From leadership on down.
"Now, a pair of command investigations into engineering issues on the Boxer reveal that the Navy not only struggled to correctly repair the aging ship, but her engineering department was poorly led and suffering from issues that ranged from inexperience to outright allegations of assault that directly impacted the ship's ability to get out to sea and, in turn, her deployment schedule."
"The revelations come amid reports that the Boxer's sister ship, the USS Wasp, is also suffering from maintenance and engineering problems on the East Coast while Navy officials again refuse to elaborate or offer details."
Ships crews no longer know how to repair their ships, and from what the article states, there is severe doubt they know how to operate them either.
From a "boiler safety breakdown" (which if it fails instantly fills the engineering space with superheated steam) to running the Main Reduction Gears without lubrication.
What is going on??
The comments from Sen. Dan Sullivan come after a contentious year during which the Navy, Marine Corps and Congress publicly feuded over the state of the amphibious fleet.
By JUSTIN KATZ
on March 07, 2024 at 11:21 AM
Kearsarge Supports Large Scale Exercise (LSE) 2021
The Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), the San Antonio-class amphibious transport dock ship USS Arlington (LPD 24), and Landing Craft, Air Cushions 86, 85 and 02 attached to Assault Craft Unit 4 (ACU 4) sail in formation Aug. 14, 2021. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Jesse Schwab)
Updated 3/7/2024 at 5:46 pm ET with comment from Adm. Lisa Franchetti.
WASHINGTON — A US senator today said the chief of naval operations assured him the Navy’s next long-term shipbuilding plan will reach the 31 amphibious ship fleet mandated in law.
“I met with the CNO last week. I asked her what we’re going to see in the shipbuilding plan,” Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, said during an Amphibious Warship Industrial Base Coalition event on Capitol Hill. “And she assured me this year’s shipbuilding plan will have 31 amphibs at a minimum.”
The senator’s comments come just days before the White House is expected release its next annual budget request, which traditionally includes the publication of the Navy’s updated 30-year shipbuilding plan. That document outlines the numbers and types of ships the service projects it will seek to build over the next three decades.
It is also seen as an important tool for Congress to understand the Pentagon’s strategic plans, as well industry to gauge the military’s anticipated shipbuilding requirements so they invest and adjust their workforces accordingly.
Cmdr. Desiree Frame, a spokeswoman for CNO Adm. Lisa Franchetti, told Breaking Defense today that the admiral “previously confirmed her commitment” to reaching a 31 amphibious ship fleet and demonstrated that commitment earlier this week with a “combined Navy-Marine Corps trip” with Assistant Commandant Marine Corps Gen. Christopher Mahoney to several Gulf Coast shipyards.
“As I said in my confirmation hearing, I’m committed to working with the commandant of the Marine Corps and with the Secretary of the Navy to ensure that we meet the requirement of 31 amphibious ships,” Franchetti said in a statement to Breaking Defense.
Lawmakers’ increased sense of urgency to build up the amphibious ship fleet is at least in part driven by admissions last year from Marine Corps leadership that a lack of ready ships prevented the service from responding to events around the globe, such as the civil and humanitarian crises in Turkey and Sudan.
Last year’s shipbuilding plan did not project the Navy achieving a 31 amphibious ship fleet, contravening a law that was passed in the year prior mandating the Navy do so. The discrepancy drew the ire of defense hawks in Congress and led to Sullivan in particular to angrily question Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro during a hearing about why he wasn’t “following the law.”
In response to the senator’s questions and subsequent letters from lawmakers, Del Toro largely balked on the committee’s demands to immediately update the shipbuilding plan, instead writing he is “in constant consultation with the Commandant of the Marine Corps and Chief of Naval Operations” to provide the “right mix” of capabilities to the Navy’s fleet.
“The [Navy and Marine Corps] will continue to make investments to put us on course to achieve and maintain a ready and capable amphibious warship fleet that meets the needs of our joint force commanders,” he said in a June 19, 2023 letter, obtained by Breaking Defense.
Each of us have senators and Congress people. Most do not sit on committees directly associated with the shipping issue. They do have collegial relations with those that do. Write them! Urge them to contact friends on the appropriate committees, and ask them to ask the hard questions and respond to you. It is your right (duty) to ask any of your elected officials to put their foot in that door and add support to the larger naval commitment. They only have to look at the 11 embassies that this administration has closed to see why a global sea power is necessary—one was last week!
A US Navy vessel in shambles. Top to keel, a navy in shambles more concerned with extraneous cultural issues than mission readiness. A congress in shambles as it fails in its over sight duties. People in the military need to be held to a high standard of performance, members of the elected federal government are only held to the standard of re-election. How can under exposed low IQ politicians hold a sophisticated system like the DoD and downward Navy Department and Department of the Navy and Marine Corps to account for poor leadship, failure to take responsibility for their actions, etc etc. exactly they can’t and ergo the pickle we find ourselves in at the moment..
A follow up to my last comment.....Please not the findings of this compared to the finding from the Bon Homme Richard fire:
BOXER:
"In his letter, Peck said that "every level of senior engineering leadership failed to provide a safe, professional, and procedurally compliant work environment in engineering department" and he stressed that "these failures had direct, measurable impacts on USS Boxer's upcoming deployment and impeded the overall accomplishment of the strike group's mission."
BON HOMME RICHARD:
The training and readiness of Ship’s Force was marked by a pattern of failed drills, minimal crew participation, an absence of basic knowledge on firefighting in an industrial environment, and unfamiliarity on how to integrate supporting civilian firefighters. To illustrate this point, the crew had failed to meet the time standard for applying firefighting agent on the seat of the fire on 14
consecutive occasions leading up to 12 July 2020.
Is the loss of another vessel hinging on training?
Absolutely SPOT ON …..
Can someone tell me the number of times we have engaged in an Actual Amphibious Attack on a defended coastline since Inchon? I thinks its Zero but I could be wrong. If we haven't used a capability for over 70 years is it really a US Military Priority. That's not to say we don't need some number of LPHs and LPDs and RORO Ships but maybe we don't need as many as some here think. Maybe we need more Tankers More Cargo Ships and More Transport Aircraft.
Amphibious ships have enabled Marines to respond to a wide variety of crises around the world in the past 70 years. More recently they allowed then Brigadier General Mattis to take Marines into Afghanistan shortly after 911. They provided the ability to move a brigade to the Middle East in support of Operation Desert Storm. They enabled then Lieutenant General Zinni to conduct the amphibious withdrawal from Somalia in Operation United Shield and the late Lieutenant General Stackpole to provide humanitarian assistance in Bangladesh during Operation Sea Angle. And these are just few examples. As importantly, the Corps has no intention of conducting any sort of an amphibious operation that would mimic Inchon; until CMC got caught up in the FD 2030 nonsense Operational Maneuver From the Sea was the Crops' leading concept, which offered innovative ways to move from ship to shore..
Capt Harry Ellsworth of the Historical Division published a great monograph nearly 100 years ago, called "180 Landings of the Marine Corps: 1800-1934." Great reading, and in the late 90's, I got motivated to bring it up to date. I embarked on a similar research project to document the Corps' foreign expeditions since then. I have it in a binder somewhere in my steamer trunk, but I recall it resulted in similar numbers, increasing notably in the 80's and 90's. The tradition of global readiness at the point of friction has been our hallmark. It would be criminally negligent to discard it intentionally.
During Desert Storm, I seem to recall a MEB floating off the coast of Kuwait occupying the attention of numerous Iraqi divisions. Further, I recall General Schwarzkopf’s briefing to the press in which he praised highly that MEB’s impact on Iraqi forces … all without firing a shot. Not a bad exchange rate of combat power: MEB vs. Iraqi Divisions - all done through our amphibious capability.
In Spring 1972, then Major Walt Boomer landed with a battalion of VMC’s in North VietNam. Opposed? I’d have to say it was. Limited objectives and a very short time on the ground, but they did come from the sea!
The word is deterrence!
Re SecNav CNO pledge to or not build amphibious ships as required by US Law summarized. Speech: “Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow”
BY WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
(from Macbeth, spoken by Macbeth)
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.build amphibious shipsSpeech: “Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow”
BY WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE
(from Macbeth, spoken by Macbeth)
Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow,
Creeps in this petty pace from day to day,
To the last syllable of recorded time;
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools
The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle!
Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player,
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage,
And then is heard no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing.
All your comments are great! And thatk you for making good arguments.
I'm arguing as a contrarian position - how much Amphib Assault capability is needed and what kind?
- I'm not sold on LAW ship concept I think bigger and smaller ships are needed.
I think the Marines are best when they are/stay a multipurpose quick reaction assault force and that means Battalion and even Brigade MEU/MAB capabilities moved by air and sea anywhere in the world.
I am not sold on the China Anti Shipping Mission. I believe the Marines have not coordinated that idea enough with Navy, Air Force and Space Force.
We need a force structure that is highly Integrated with other Sub Sea, Sea, Air, Land and Space forces beyond the Marine Corps to rapidly respond anywhere in the World, plug in & most of all be SUSTAINED. Think Guadalcanal 1942-23.
I think it is imperative to modernize our forces with lessons learned from Ukraine, Yemen & Gaza. I think we have to accept a much smaller Army and Marine Corps Ground Force and a bigger reserve Naval, Air Ground & Logistics Forces force including cargo, oilers and RO/RO ships.
OK I said my piece shoot holes in it.
The Intellectual Warrior
From 1987 to 1991, General Alfred M. Gray Jr.’s commandancy transformed the U.S. Marine Corps and made lasting contributions to the service’s culture.
By Earl J. Catagnus Jr.
November 2014 Proceedings Vol. 140/11/1,341
ARTICLE