Speaking of Sea Lanes, in today's news, the HOS Resolution (MCWL Stern Landing test ship), is currently in Subic Bay. It appears to have been assisting in maintaining the pier's buoyancy since May 25th. It would be nice to see even a thin puff piece about the test ship's operations over the last 6 months. In the current PR environment, no news indicates bad news(or good news that the experiment has a definitive result: the stern landing concept used has big problems and few/no advantages). I commend the Captain and crew for their efforts in testing and experimenting with the concept. No mean feat to sail that ship with the monster on it's fantail across the Pacific. Maybe it is time for MCWL to call sunset on this experiment.
Only on briefing slides and in testimony to Congress. The facts speak for themselves: no tanks, no bridging, no instride breaching; insufficient cannon artillery for direct support to infantry, insufficient amphibious lift and maritime propositioning; no resiliency in infantry, aviation, and expeditionary logistics; no capability to position, reposition, or logistically support a SIF in an active contested area; subsonic and short range anti-ship missiles when (if) fielded.
21 percent reduction in infantrymen, 3 less infantry battalions, 2 battalions converted to LCTs, no weapons company, no sniper units, and failure to follow the results of the evaluation of women in ground units. Technology does not replace Marines. I have seen that lie repeated again and again since I signed on in 1956. Having served in nearly every infantry billet from 0311 rifleman to division commander with five tours in combat today's leaders will need more than fancy words to fool me.
The MEU in neither the crown jewell nor North Star of the Marine Corps. A MEU that cannot be quickly reinforced and grown lacks the firepower and sustainment to prevail against a determined enemy. A MAGTF (MEU > Special Purpose > MEB > MEF) that can be tailored to fight and win across the range of military operations should define the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, this capability has been sacrificed on the altar of "divest to invest."
Force Design strengthens the Marine Corps’ role as a key contributor to the joint force, not just an independent actor. The scalable MAGTF remains central, but it’s now optimized to operate seamlessly alongside (and set conditions for) the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Space Force in contested domains. Stand-in Forces enable the joint force to persist forward, sensing, striking, and supporting operations inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. FD enhances naval integration and joint lethality—ensuring the Marine Corps remains the inside force, enabling the outside force to maneuver and dominate.
How do you move the SIF from one island to the next?
How do you provide the need for supporting arms for the SIF, when one, you don’t have any, and two, even if you did, you’ve first stripped the supporting arms from the task organization, and secondly even if you had them there’s no way for them to support an SIF.
Please explain how a subsonic 100 NM obsolete missile will effectively close a SLOC? We now have 155mm artillery shells that out range the NSM at a fraction of the cost, but oops we can’t employ them because we have no artillery!
Please show me the war game that proves the SIF concept. Also show me the assumptions used in that war game. My guess is that you can’t because there never was one conducted. I don’t believe for a second the BS coming out of HQMC that a war game was conducted but it’s classified.
These questions have been asked—and answered—repeatedly, both in open-source and classified venues.
1. Resupply & Mobility:
SIF resupply is built around naval integration and distributed logistics. That includes connectors like the future Landing Ship Medium (LSM), unmanned surface vessels, pre-positioned supplies, and vertical lift. Moving between islands? That’s a Navy-Marine Corps team problem, and it’s being addressed—just not through Cold War-era methods.
2. Supporting Arms:
The claim that the Marine Corps has “no supporting arms” ignores reality. While legacy artillery was reduced, long-range precision fires, loitering munitions, naval gunfire, joint air, and unmanned ISR platforms are being integrated instead. FD2030 isn’t about stripping firepower—it’s about replacing outdated systems with those designed for a contested maritime fight.
3. The NSM “Obsolete” Argument:
Calling the Naval Strike Missile obsolete ignores its stealth, sea-skimming profile, and active seeker. NSM is fielded by NATO allies, the U.S. Navy, and now the Marine Corps for a reason—it works. Comparing it to a 155mm shell is apples to oranges. NSM brings maritime denial at stand-off range with precision. Artillery can’t do that.
4. War Games:
War games absolutely have been conducted—by CSBA, RAND, Center for Naval Analyses, and multiple joint service exercises, many of which remain classified. The assumptions aren’t secret because they’re invalid—they’re classified because they simulate war against peer adversaries. The outcomes helped shape FD2030, not justify it after the fact.
Bottom line: Force Design 2030 is built on serious analysis, threat-informed design, and joint integration—not nostalgia. The holes aren’t in the argument—they’re in the outdated assumptions critics keep clinging to.
Asked and answered? No they haven’t. When boatloads of professional Marine general officers including 5 or 6 former Commandants tell you that your new structure and illegal (not assigned under Title X, therefore illegal) mission won’t work then I’d say that’s pretty much proof that you haven’t answered the questions.
1. Resupply & Mobility:
SIF resupply is built around naval integration and distributed logistics. That includes connectors like the future Landing Ship Medium (LSM), unmanned surface vessels, pre-positioned supplies, and vertical lift. Moving between islands? That’s a Navy-Marine Corps team problem, and it’s being addressed—just not through Cold War-era methods.
A. Define naval integration? It’s a feel good empty phrase, that has no concrete steps associated with it.
B. Distributed Logistics - does that mean “foraging”? The bottom line is can you get ALL classes of supplies to the engaged unit. If you can’t, you’ve failed. And so far FD is failing. I know this because when the Commandant and his minions start talking about foraging I know that it’s failing.
C. LSM? What’s an LSM? Oh, you mean the slow 12 knot target that the Navy JUST CANCELED? So don’t talk about a connector because you don’t have one. And BTW stop calling it a “connector”, it’s a fricking SHIP. The Army and the soy latte boys call it a connector.
D. Pre-Position supplies. Oh you mean the supplies that USED to be in our pre-positioned supply ship squadron that have been reduced? I guess that’s because we don’t have a deployable MEB in the West Pacific AOR. And if you’re going to say well what about the 9th MEB? Don’t go there until you’ve examined their T/O and T/E.
E. Vertical Lift- how will you protect your lift platforms? Oh you say the Navy? So you expect the Navy to assign a CVN to protect a flock of C-130s, MV-22s, etc.? Oh you say the Corps’s aviation will do it. Isn’t the Corps’s aviation dependent on the Navy to get them there? Also how do you resupply you aviation assets, “distributed logistics” again? I’ve never heard of “foraging” for aviation parts and ordnance.
2. Supporting Arms:
The claim that the Marine Corps has “no supporting arms” ignores reality. While legacy artillery was reduced, long-range precision fires, loitering munitions, naval gunfire, joint air, and unmanned ISR platforms are being integrated instead. FD2030 isn’t about stripping firepower—it’s about replacing outdated systems with those designed for a contested maritime fight.
A. So we ignore reality because the Corps now has only 5 batteries of tubed artillery? Outdated? Take a look at the war in Ukraine and tell me how “outdated” tubed artillery is. Long range precision fires? Tell me what weapons systems will provide “long range precision fires” for ground units? How long can the Corps or the Navy provide these “mythical” fires given cost, magazine space, and your distributed logistics concept? Not very long . Loitering munitions? Nice concept except that you need a platform to distribute them. The NSM again? Naval gunfire? Where have you been the last 30 years as the Navy has done away with that ability. A single 5”/54 while nice isn’t a viable gunfire system given the paucity of them in the fleet that the Navy will be willing to send into harms way. Joint air? Again that’s a nice term, but as I mentioned above how do you protect your vertical lift platforms? How will those assets accomplish the six functions of Marine Air; air reconnaissance, anti-air warfare, electronic warfare, offensive air support, assault support, and control of aircraft and missiles. Unmanned ISR platforms? Ok I’ll give you that they are a novel and emerging asset, but they don’t replace any current need for assets, they only support the existing assets.
3. The NSM “Obsolete” Argument:
Calling the Naval Strike Missile obsolete ignores its stealth, sea-skimming profile, and active seeker. NSM is fielded by NATO allies, the U.S. Navy, and now the Marine Corps for a reason—it works. Comparing it to a 155mm shell is apples to oranges. NSM brings maritime denial at stand-off range with precision. Artillery can’t do that.
A. You’re seriously going to argue that a sub-sonic, 100 NM ranged missile is not obsolete? So it has an active seeker. I guess you’re not aware that emitters can be detected and targeted by your enemy at ranges greater than the active emitter? So what does the fact that the NSM is fielded by NATO allies, and the U.S. Navy have to do with our discussion? What platforms carry them? How long have they been in use, because we have FIELDED weapons systems that are much better. So, you’re saying that field artillery can’t bring maritime area denial at standoff ranges with precision? Here’s a link to a new in experimental production that betters the NSM, which oh, by the way the Marine Corps doesn’t have. When the Corps has a unit, its launchers, ancillary equipment, and ADEQUATE stocks of missiles, then you can make that statement.
Bottom line: HQMC has transformed the Marine Corps from the nations 911 force in readiness into a static oriented and minded group of small units that will be stranded and isolated by our enemy. We did it to the Japanese in WW II. Geography hasn’t changed since then. And those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it.
How many of the NMESIS vehicles does the Marine currently have? They have had the 3rd MLR for several years and just got their first NMESIS vehicle last November. How many are currently on hand? Seems that is a very important component of the SIF.
Next question...how do you reload it after shooting its two missiles? How do the missiles get to the SIF for reloading? How many missiles do you think need to be launched to sink or disable a ship to take it out of the fight?
Logistics seems to have been forgotten by the leadership of the Corps
The concern about NMESIS inventory and reloading overlooks key facts and misunderstands the intent of Stand-In Forces (SIF). First, the Marine Corps is fielding NMESIS on a deliberate schedule—IOC (Initial Operational Capability) was reached in 2023, and systems are being produced and delivered in phases, just like any other major weapon system. Quantity is growing in alignment with training, basing, and integration timelines.
Reloading? It’s understood that NMESIS is a shoot-and-scoot system—designed for survivability, not sustained static fires. The plan has always been to rearm from afloat platforms or secured logistics hubs. This isn’t a secret or oversight—it’s by design, and part of the larger naval logistics enterprise.
As for how many missiles are needed to disable a ship—modern naval combat isn’t about flooding the zone with munitions. It’s about precision, cueing, and joint effects. NMESIS is just one part of a layered kill web that includes submarines, aircraft, allied fires, and sensors.
Far from forgetting logistics, Force Design 2030 is pushing the Corps to innovate logistics for contested environments—through experimentation with additive manufacturing, pre-positioning, unmanned resupply, and joint logistics integration. The critics might not see it—but it’s happening.
Yeah...seen that. One NMESIS is taken by AirForce C-130 to pose on a beach. No missiles to fire.
How many times have the Marines shot missiles from this thing without a hoarde of factory tech reps in tow? How many times in "realistic" situations?
Again...how many does the Marine Corps have? They started down this path in 2022 with standing up the 3rd MLR and the key to that formation was something they finally got in late 2024.
Critics point to early NMESIS fielding as failure, but that ignores how all new systems come online. HIMARS, F-35s, and tanks all started with limited inventory and factory tech reps. That’s not dysfunction—it’s how advanced systems are integrated.
Yes, NMESIS was flown by C-130 as a demo—but that was proof of joint mobility and the Corps’ ability to rapidly deploy long-range fires. And yes, the Marine Corps has fired live NMESIS rounds, including in exercises like RIMPAC and Northern Edge, not in a lab but in operational environments.
Inventory is growing deliberately, aligned with basing, training, and joint force integration—not rushed for headlines.
But here’s what critics miss entirely: the MLR isn’t just a missile truck. It’s a sensing node—feeding real-time data to Navy ships, joint aircraft, and allied forces. This is the essence of “any sensor, any shooter”: the MLR finds the target, and the most capable shooter takes the shot—whether that’s a Navy destroyer, a B-1 bomber, or NMESIS itself.
The MLR is a forward-integrated part of the kill web—not a standalone unit. Force Design is about making that network resilient, lethal, and survivable in the face of peer threats.
If you don’t understand the above you don’t understand FD or the MLR. To quote the character Austin Millbarge in Spies Like Us, “We mock what we don’t understand.”
"Shipbuilding all but disappeared in the United States. Today, the U.S. produces five or fewer large commercial vessels a year, and shipyards almost exclusively rely on naval contracts. Worse, at a time of escalating tensions with China, the United States has virtually no surge capacity to build naval or sealift ships. In fact, China builds all the commercial ships that the U.S. government contracts to provide military support."
Quite the damning article about the status of shipbuilding in the US.
"It’s 2027. A Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) is positioned deep in the First Island Chain, ready to support Joint Force operations in a contested Indo-Pacific. But something is wrong. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships, unmanned vessels, and maritime militia move confidently through key chokepoints, exploiting gaps in our coverage. The MLR is stuck, tethered to terrain, short on mobility, and unable to contest the maritime space it was designed to dominate."
"It’s not a failure of strategy. It’s a failure of mobility. It’s a failure of imagination. And most critically, it’s a failure to invest in small boats."
Although, some would argue that it is a failure of strategy to allow the Marines to be put in such a position without know the mobility issue. To solve the mobility issue is to solve the logistics issue.
I am a simple guy but haven't we executed moving small detachments of missile forces hundreds of miles in any direction we want anytime we want? Folks here are thinking LARGE MARINE forces when they should be thinking "tiny". It only took Pathfinders followed by a C17s with tanks and an airborne BN to secure a blocking point in Northern Iraq in '03. Same with FARPs pushing hundreds of miles forward with 2-4 birds in 1991. Bottomline If Marines can't inculcate the NMS and the CMDTs guidance and orders they need to leave..,
Unfortunately, as currently organized the current MEUs cannot seize and hold the SLOCs. The SIFs definitely cannot accomplish this mission.The MEUs are not robust enough. They need their artillery and direct armored firepower returned. Only a robust MEU can accomplish this mission.
Speaking of Sea Lanes, in today's news, the HOS Resolution (MCWL Stern Landing test ship), is currently in Subic Bay. It appears to have been assisting in maintaining the pier's buoyancy since May 25th. It would be nice to see even a thin puff piece about the test ship's operations over the last 6 months. In the current PR environment, no news indicates bad news(or good news that the experiment has a definitive result: the stern landing concept used has big problems and few/no advantages). I commend the Captain and crew for their efforts in testing and experimenting with the concept. No mean feat to sail that ship with the monster on it's fantail across the Pacific. Maybe it is time for MCWL to call sunset on this experiment.
Only on briefing slides and in testimony to Congress. The facts speak for themselves: no tanks, no bridging, no instride breaching; insufficient cannon artillery for direct support to infantry, insufficient amphibious lift and maritime propositioning; no resiliency in infantry, aviation, and expeditionary logistics; no capability to position, reposition, or logistically support a SIF in an active contested area; subsonic and short range anti-ship missiles when (if) fielded.
I’m interested in your comment, “no resiliency in infantry.”
Please explain. . . Is this due to the reduction in size of and numbers of battalions or something else?
Thanks.
21 percent reduction in infantrymen, 3 less infantry battalions, 2 battalions converted to LCTs, no weapons company, no sniper units, and failure to follow the results of the evaluation of women in ground units. Technology does not replace Marines. I have seen that lie repeated again and again since I signed on in 1956. Having served in nearly every infantry billet from 0311 rifleman to division commander with five tours in combat today's leaders will need more than fancy words to fool me.
The MEU in neither the crown jewell nor North Star of the Marine Corps. A MEU that cannot be quickly reinforced and grown lacks the firepower and sustainment to prevail against a determined enemy. A MAGTF (MEU > Special Purpose > MEB > MEF) that can be tailored to fight and win across the range of military operations should define the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, this capability has been sacrificed on the altar of "divest to invest."
Or. .
Force Design strengthens the Marine Corps’ role as a key contributor to the joint force, not just an independent actor. The scalable MAGTF remains central, but it’s now optimized to operate seamlessly alongside (and set conditions for) the Navy, Army, Air Force, and Space Force in contested domains. Stand-in Forces enable the joint force to persist forward, sensing, striking, and supporting operations inside an adversary’s weapons engagement zone. FD enhances naval integration and joint lethality—ensuring the Marine Corps remains the inside force, enabling the outside force to maneuver and dominate.
OK, I’ll posit some questions.
How do you resupply the SIF?
How do you move the SIF from one island to the next?
How do you provide the need for supporting arms for the SIF, when one, you don’t have any, and two, even if you did, you’ve first stripped the supporting arms from the task organization, and secondly even if you had them there’s no way for them to support an SIF.
Please explain how a subsonic 100 NM obsolete missile will effectively close a SLOC? We now have 155mm artillery shells that out range the NSM at a fraction of the cost, but oops we can’t employ them because we have no artillery!
Please show me the war game that proves the SIF concept. Also show me the assumptions used in that war game. My guess is that you can’t because there never was one conducted. I don’t believe for a second the BS coming out of HQMC that a war game was conducted but it’s classified.
Your arguments have more holes than swiss cheese.
These questions have been asked—and answered—repeatedly, both in open-source and classified venues.
1. Resupply & Mobility:
SIF resupply is built around naval integration and distributed logistics. That includes connectors like the future Landing Ship Medium (LSM), unmanned surface vessels, pre-positioned supplies, and vertical lift. Moving between islands? That’s a Navy-Marine Corps team problem, and it’s being addressed—just not through Cold War-era methods.
2. Supporting Arms:
The claim that the Marine Corps has “no supporting arms” ignores reality. While legacy artillery was reduced, long-range precision fires, loitering munitions, naval gunfire, joint air, and unmanned ISR platforms are being integrated instead. FD2030 isn’t about stripping firepower—it’s about replacing outdated systems with those designed for a contested maritime fight.
3. The NSM “Obsolete” Argument:
Calling the Naval Strike Missile obsolete ignores its stealth, sea-skimming profile, and active seeker. NSM is fielded by NATO allies, the U.S. Navy, and now the Marine Corps for a reason—it works. Comparing it to a 155mm shell is apples to oranges. NSM brings maritime denial at stand-off range with precision. Artillery can’t do that.
4. War Games:
War games absolutely have been conducted—by CSBA, RAND, Center for Naval Analyses, and multiple joint service exercises, many of which remain classified. The assumptions aren’t secret because they’re invalid—they’re classified because they simulate war against peer adversaries. The outcomes helped shape FD2030, not justify it after the fact.
Bottom line: Force Design 2030 is built on serious analysis, threat-informed design, and joint integration—not nostalgia. The holes aren’t in the argument—they’re in the outdated assumptions critics keep clinging to.
Asked and answered? No they haven’t. When boatloads of professional Marine general officers including 5 or 6 former Commandants tell you that your new structure and illegal (not assigned under Title X, therefore illegal) mission won’t work then I’d say that’s pretty much proof that you haven’t answered the questions.
1. Resupply & Mobility:
SIF resupply is built around naval integration and distributed logistics. That includes connectors like the future Landing Ship Medium (LSM), unmanned surface vessels, pre-positioned supplies, and vertical lift. Moving between islands? That’s a Navy-Marine Corps team problem, and it’s being addressed—just not through Cold War-era methods.
A. Define naval integration? It’s a feel good empty phrase, that has no concrete steps associated with it.
B. Distributed Logistics - does that mean “foraging”? The bottom line is can you get ALL classes of supplies to the engaged unit. If you can’t, you’ve failed. And so far FD is failing. I know this because when the Commandant and his minions start talking about foraging I know that it’s failing.
C. LSM? What’s an LSM? Oh, you mean the slow 12 knot target that the Navy JUST CANCELED? So don’t talk about a connector because you don’t have one. And BTW stop calling it a “connector”, it’s a fricking SHIP. The Army and the soy latte boys call it a connector.
D. Pre-Position supplies. Oh you mean the supplies that USED to be in our pre-positioned supply ship squadron that have been reduced? I guess that’s because we don’t have a deployable MEB in the West Pacific AOR. And if you’re going to say well what about the 9th MEB? Don’t go there until you’ve examined their T/O and T/E.
E. Vertical Lift- how will you protect your lift platforms? Oh you say the Navy? So you expect the Navy to assign a CVN to protect a flock of C-130s, MV-22s, etc.? Oh you say the Corps’s aviation will do it. Isn’t the Corps’s aviation dependent on the Navy to get them there? Also how do you resupply you aviation assets, “distributed logistics” again? I’ve never heard of “foraging” for aviation parts and ordnance.
2. Supporting Arms:
The claim that the Marine Corps has “no supporting arms” ignores reality. While legacy artillery was reduced, long-range precision fires, loitering munitions, naval gunfire, joint air, and unmanned ISR platforms are being integrated instead. FD2030 isn’t about stripping firepower—it’s about replacing outdated systems with those designed for a contested maritime fight.
A. So we ignore reality because the Corps now has only 5 batteries of tubed artillery? Outdated? Take a look at the war in Ukraine and tell me how “outdated” tubed artillery is. Long range precision fires? Tell me what weapons systems will provide “long range precision fires” for ground units? How long can the Corps or the Navy provide these “mythical” fires given cost, magazine space, and your distributed logistics concept? Not very long . Loitering munitions? Nice concept except that you need a platform to distribute them. The NSM again? Naval gunfire? Where have you been the last 30 years as the Navy has done away with that ability. A single 5”/54 while nice isn’t a viable gunfire system given the paucity of them in the fleet that the Navy will be willing to send into harms way. Joint air? Again that’s a nice term, but as I mentioned above how do you protect your vertical lift platforms? How will those assets accomplish the six functions of Marine Air; air reconnaissance, anti-air warfare, electronic warfare, offensive air support, assault support, and control of aircraft and missiles. Unmanned ISR platforms? Ok I’ll give you that they are a novel and emerging asset, but they don’t replace any current need for assets, they only support the existing assets.
3. The NSM “Obsolete” Argument:
Calling the Naval Strike Missile obsolete ignores its stealth, sea-skimming profile, and active seeker. NSM is fielded by NATO allies, the U.S. Navy, and now the Marine Corps for a reason—it works. Comparing it to a 155mm shell is apples to oranges. NSM brings maritime denial at stand-off range with precision. Artillery can’t do that.
A. You’re seriously going to argue that a sub-sonic, 100 NM ranged missile is not obsolete? So it has an active seeker. I guess you’re not aware that emitters can be detected and targeted by your enemy at ranges greater than the active emitter? So what does the fact that the NSM is fielded by NATO allies, and the U.S. Navy have to do with our discussion? What platforms carry them? How long have they been in use, because we have FIELDED weapons systems that are much better. So, you’re saying that field artillery can’t bring maritime area denial at standoff ranges with precision? Here’s a link to a new in experimental production that betters the NSM, which oh, by the way the Marine Corps doesn’t have. When the Corps has a unit, its launchers, ancillary equipment, and ADEQUATE stocks of missiles, then you can make that statement.
https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/aerospace-news/2025/tiberius-aerospace-reveals-sceptre-trbm-155hg-a-new-ramjet-artillery-round-for-precision-strikes-up-to-150-km
Bottom line: HQMC has transformed the Marine Corps from the nations 911 force in readiness into a static oriented and minded group of small units that will be stranded and isolated by our enemy. We did it to the Japanese in WW II. Geography hasn’t changed since then. And those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it.
This isn’t divestment for its own sake—it’s reinvestment in relevance and lethality.
How many of the NMESIS vehicles does the Marine currently have? They have had the 3rd MLR for several years and just got their first NMESIS vehicle last November. How many are currently on hand? Seems that is a very important component of the SIF.
Next question...how do you reload it after shooting its two missiles? How do the missiles get to the SIF for reloading? How many missiles do you think need to be launched to sink or disable a ship to take it out of the fight?
Logistics seems to have been forgotten by the leadership of the Corps
The concern about NMESIS inventory and reloading overlooks key facts and misunderstands the intent of Stand-In Forces (SIF). First, the Marine Corps is fielding NMESIS on a deliberate schedule—IOC (Initial Operational Capability) was reached in 2023, and systems are being produced and delivered in phases, just like any other major weapon system. Quantity is growing in alignment with training, basing, and integration timelines.
Reloading? It’s understood that NMESIS is a shoot-and-scoot system—designed for survivability, not sustained static fires. The plan has always been to rearm from afloat platforms or secured logistics hubs. This isn’t a secret or oversight—it’s by design, and part of the larger naval logistics enterprise.
As for how many missiles are needed to disable a ship—modern naval combat isn’t about flooding the zone with munitions. It’s about precision, cueing, and joint effects. NMESIS is just one part of a layered kill web that includes submarines, aircraft, allied fires, and sensors.
Far from forgetting logistics, Force Design 2030 is pushing the Corps to innovate logistics for contested environments—through experimentation with additive manufacturing, pre-positioning, unmanned resupply, and joint logistics integration. The critics might not see it—but it’s happening.
https://www.newsweek.com/us-philippines-news-nmesis-missile-system-batanes-luzon-china-2077267
Yeah...seen that. One NMESIS is taken by AirForce C-130 to pose on a beach. No missiles to fire.
How many times have the Marines shot missiles from this thing without a hoarde of factory tech reps in tow? How many times in "realistic" situations?
Again...how many does the Marine Corps have? They started down this path in 2022 with standing up the 3rd MLR and the key to that formation was something they finally got in late 2024.
Critics point to early NMESIS fielding as failure, but that ignores how all new systems come online. HIMARS, F-35s, and tanks all started with limited inventory and factory tech reps. That’s not dysfunction—it’s how advanced systems are integrated.
Yes, NMESIS was flown by C-130 as a demo—but that was proof of joint mobility and the Corps’ ability to rapidly deploy long-range fires. And yes, the Marine Corps has fired live NMESIS rounds, including in exercises like RIMPAC and Northern Edge, not in a lab but in operational environments.
Inventory is growing deliberately, aligned with basing, training, and joint force integration—not rushed for headlines.
But here’s what critics miss entirely: the MLR isn’t just a missile truck. It’s a sensing node—feeding real-time data to Navy ships, joint aircraft, and allied forces. This is the essence of “any sensor, any shooter”: the MLR finds the target, and the most capable shooter takes the shot—whether that’s a Navy destroyer, a B-1 bomber, or NMESIS itself.
The MLR is a forward-integrated part of the kill web—not a standalone unit. Force Design is about making that network resilient, lethal, and survivable in the face of peer threats.
If you don’t understand the above you don’t understand FD or the MLR. To quote the character Austin Millbarge in Spies Like Us, “We mock what we don’t understand.”
Seize the SLOCS Vice FORAGING DEATH OR Fxxxxxg Disaster!
https://open.substack.com/pub/cpldanusmcret764175/p/heafs-fist?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=ohc7t
https://www.theatlantic.com/economy/archive/2025/05/american-shipbuilding-decline/682945/
"Shipbuilding all but disappeared in the United States. Today, the U.S. produces five or fewer large commercial vessels a year, and shipyards almost exclusively rely on naval contracts. Worse, at a time of escalating tensions with China, the United States has virtually no surge capacity to build naval or sealift ships. In fact, China builds all the commercial ships that the U.S. government contracts to provide military support."
Quite the damning article about the status of shipbuilding in the US.
https://breakingdefense.com/2025/05/the-marines-need-to-invest-in-small-boats-for-a-big-payoff/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
"It’s 2027. A Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) is positioned deep in the First Island Chain, ready to support Joint Force operations in a contested Indo-Pacific. But something is wrong. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ships, unmanned vessels, and maritime militia move confidently through key chokepoints, exploiting gaps in our coverage. The MLR is stuck, tethered to terrain, short on mobility, and unable to contest the maritime space it was designed to dominate."
"It’s not a failure of strategy. It’s a failure of mobility. It’s a failure of imagination. And most critically, it’s a failure to invest in small boats."
Although, some would argue that it is a failure of strategy to allow the Marines to be put in such a position without know the mobility issue. To solve the mobility issue is to solve the logistics issue.
I am a simple guy but haven't we executed moving small detachments of missile forces hundreds of miles in any direction we want anytime we want? Folks here are thinking LARGE MARINE forces when they should be thinking "tiny". It only took Pathfinders followed by a C17s with tanks and an airborne BN to secure a blocking point in Northern Iraq in '03. Same with FARPs pushing hundreds of miles forward with 2-4 birds in 1991. Bottomline If Marines can't inculcate the NMS and the CMDTs guidance and orders they need to leave..,
Unfortunately, as currently organized the current MEUs cannot seize and hold the SLOCs. The SIFs definitely cannot accomplish this mission.The MEUs are not robust enough. They need their artillery and direct armored firepower returned. Only a robust MEU can accomplish this mission.
https://open.substack.com/pub/cpldanusmcret764175/p/operation-trident-dawn?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=ohc7t
Retakes the SLOCS
You are correct about MEUs not deploying with 4x tanks and a wrecker (requiring one connector each).
MEUs still deploy with towed artillery. Some with HIMARS.