Compass Points – Senate Testimony

What is the Marine Corps saying to Congress?

Compass Points – Senate Testimony

What is the Marine Corps saying to Congress?

September 5, 2024

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Just about everyone loves, admires, and trusts the Marine Corps. Even those few who do not love the Marine Corps will grudgingly admit that Marines have done great things on battlefields around the world. When senior Marine leaders go to testify in front of Congress, they arrive surrounded by the lustrous battle history of the Marine Corps. They come wearing the amazing exploits of the Corps like a cape. Every word they say to Congress echoes with the honor of Marines who have gone before.

Even members of Congress are not immune from the powerful reputation of Marines. When a senior Marine leader testifies in front of Congress, the members want to support the Marine leader and Marine proposals. The tendency of members of Congress to support Marine Corps proposals makes it easy for Marine leaders -- intentionally or unintentionally – to exaggerate the readiness of the Corps. Just a few examples of distorted testimony are compiled below.

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HQMC:

                      “We are the eyes and ears for the joint force, ideally positioned within the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) to conduct both reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, to act as a joint tactical air controller for the combined joint force, and to strike the enemy from land to sea with organic sensors and precision fires.” ⁱ

Analysis:

Since pre-World War II days, the Marine Corps has recognized the need for reconnaissance and has established units from platoons to battalions to conduct this function.  These units have always been an important adjunct to the division and aircraft wings that make up air-ground combined arms teams.  This HQMC statement and other similar ones give the distinct impression surveillance and reconnaissance are new and   principal roles for the Marine Corps, at least for III Marine Expeditionary Forces.  This almost myopic focus on surveillance and reconnaissance appears to be inconsistent with the requirement of Title 10, USC for Marine Corps forces to be responsible for “the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”

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HQMC:

“The Marine Corps is, first and foremost, a warfighting organization. We exist to fight and win our country’s battles. Everything we do is with that one goal in mind. The character of war may change, but its essence never will – it is the violent struggle between two irreconcilable wills. That struggle is where Marines thrive. We ask for nothing more than the chance to be First to Fight” and “[T]he Marine Corps’ ability to task-organize for specific missions will continue to be a source of competitive advantage for the service. . . .” ⁱⁱ and “Should our adversaries foolishly choose to fight, Marines will be ready with the tools necessary to destroy and defeat them in combat.” ⁱⁱⁱ

Analysis:

 Title 10, USC states that the Marine Corps must be able to “conduct . . . such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.”  To fight in sustained land operations requires needed capabilities (armor, cannon artillery, breaching and bridging equipment) that the Marine Corps no longer possesses because several senior leaders said they do not want the Corps to become a “second land army.”  However, the nation has called upon the Marine Corps to conduct sustained land operations in World War I, World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, Operation Desert Storm, Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Operation Enduring Freedom.  The demand signal has been high for over 100 years.  The Force Design Marine Corps will essentially consist of three MLRs in the Western Pacific and three light infantry regiments on the West Coast and two light infantry regiments on the East Coast, all lacking robust and resilient supporting arms.  Other than to reinforce US Army ground forces, how would the Marine Corps engage in sustained operations ashore?

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HQMC:

“Marine Stand-in Forces are task-organized, mobile, low-signature, sustainable formations, built to maneuver across all domains, sense and understand the battlefield, enable combined kill webs, and apply all-domain combined arms.” ^iv

Analysis:

HQMC has used the terms “low observable” and “low signature” to describe Stand-in Forces (SIF).  An examination of the weapons and equipment of the units from which the MLR will task organize the SIF reveals that none are low observable or low signature.  Major items of the SIF such as the NMESIS consists of a JTLV carrier and a Naval Strike Missile Launcher, neither of which has low signature characteristics.  The same can be said of the trucks, command and control vehicles, and the material handling equipment of the Missile Battery.  The same is true for elements of the Littoral Anti-Air Battalion and Combat Logistics Battalion, which the Marine Littoral Regiment task organizes with the SIF.

The Marine Corps has admitted that currently it does not have the capability to logistically support SIFs, which undermines the words “sustainable formations.”  Neither does it have the means (Medium Landing Ships—LSMs) to move and hence “maneuver across all domains”

Statements like this may go unchallenged by those less well informed but to the professionally knowledgeable they undermine the credibility of Marine Corps leaders.

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HQMC:

“By balancing crisis response and modernization, we will continue our modernization effort under Force Design while remaining unwavering in our commitment to a persistent, global forward presence and to our Marine Expeditionary Units.” ^v

Analysis:

Persistent means “to continue to exist or endure over a long period.”  The Marine Corps has been unable to keep a MEU in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Western Pacific 365 days a year (“heel to toe”) for many years.  Until the US Navy achieves an amphibious ship readiness rate of approximately 80 percent, there will not be enough ships for the Marine Corps to maintain a persistent presence in these two regions, thus the statement is not accurate. 

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HQMC:

 “The Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Expeditionary Unit remain a flexible, scalable, and multirole capability for our Combatant Commanders. The training, readiness, and deployment of these formations support day-to-day activities in critical theaters, as well as provide a rapid response capability for contingency operations around the globe.” ^vi

Analysis:

The Marine Corps has long been the nation’s “force in readiness”— “most ready when the Nation is least ready” – a force prepared to respond to any crisis, anywhere, at any time, across the range of military operations.  In the past, this meant the capability of the Marine Corps to fight at the corps-level, that is, as a MEF with one or multiple divisions.  It has also meant that the Marine Corps could respond as a counterforce when an enemy seized friendly territory.  If the statement is accurate, HQMC should be able to easily answer the following question:

• ·      Does the Corps have sufficient forces to maintain a “heel-to-toe” presence in the Mediterranean and Western Pacific to “support day-to-day activities” and to respond to other emerging crises or contingencies?

• ·      Can the Marine Corps’ operating forces rapidly deploy, quickly composite, and fight as MEBs or as a MEF with the current inventory of combined arms, amphibious and MPF ships?

• ·      What MEF-level exercises have MEF command elements participated in during the past five years?

• ·      Are there standing MEB command elements with designated ground, aviation, and logistics elements prepared to conduct amphibious or MPF operations and build to a combined arms MEF?  If not, what does “scalable” mean?

• ·      When did the Marine Corps last conduct a combined arms MEB amphibious exercise?

• ·      When did the Marine Corps last conduct an MPF offload with a MEB?

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HQMC:

“Combined arms operations today are more than coordinating ground maneuver, indirect fires, and close air support – already the most difficult task for any fighting force to master. To fight and win against a peer adversary, combined arms must now be all-domain, incorporating effects in and from cyberspace, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum.” ^vii

Analysis:

Combined arms are universally recognized as the coordinated employment of infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, and close air support.  The Corps no longer has armor, in-stride breaching and bridging equipment; nor does it possess sufficient cannon artillery, and resiliency in close support aircraft to conduct true combined arms operations.  Moreover, the Corps cut 21 percent of its infantrymen though they are the centerpiece of combined arms operations.  The divestiture of these weapons and equipment raises such questions as how will ground forces (1) Breach and clear minefields? (2) Cross gaps and bodies of water? (3) Bring direct fire at extended distances to fixed enemy positions? (4) Provide sufficient direct fire support to units in contact. The effects of cyber, space, and electromagnetic systems can accomplish none of these tasks.

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HQMC:

“Marines at the tactical edge will maneuver under multi-domain supporting fires to seize terrain and destroy the enemy.” ^viii

Analysis:

Fires are needed for the deep battle and for the close and rear battles.  Missiles and rockets are excellent munitions for shaping operations in the deep battle where range and precision are required.  However, missiles have no utility for the close and rear fight where close, continuous, and accurate fire support is needed to support Marine infantry.   Rockets are effective in the close battle for general support and reinforcing fires but are ill-suited for direct support missions.  Neither missiles nor rockets have the warheads for smoke needed to screen movement, white phosphorous (WP) to mark targets or set structures on fire, or illumination to light up the battlefield at night.  Only cannon artillery can provide Marine infantry with the close, continuous, accurate, and all-weather fire support needed to fight and win the close and rear battles.  Marines cannot reasonably expect other elements of the joint force to provide this needed support.  “Multi-domain supporting fires,” whatever these might be, are extremely unlikely to be of much use in close or rear battles.

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HQMC:

“Maneuver Warfare, encapsulated in our Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, is integral to how we fight, but our understanding of “maneuver” must evolve along with the changing character of war.” ^ix

Analysis:

The DOD Dictionary of terms defines maneuver as: “A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy” or  “Employment of forces in the operational area, through movement in combination with fires and information, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy.”  It is difficult to see how this understanding of maneuver is to evolve or why it must do so as the term has existed for decades through major transformations in weapons, equipment, and operational methods without a change of definition. 

Concerning MCDP 1, General Al Gray on several occasions including a meeting he co-chaired with Senator Jim Webb in July 2022 with a group of retired Marine Generals stated unmistakably that Force Design 2030 did not comply with maneuver warfare tenants as expressed in MCDP 1 Warfighting. 

John Schmitt, author of the FMFM 1 and MCDP 1 editions of Warfighting, has stated emphatically in several venues that Force Design 2030 and its supporting concepts such as the Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Stand-in Forces do not reflect the ideas or philosophy of that manual.  He was very clear about this in a Marine Corps Gazette article writing, “Boldness is a tenet of maneuver warfare, but we fear that the TMEABO and Force Design 2030 risk transforming the Marine Corps into a niche force optimized for one specific war that must be considered unlikely while rendering it ill-equipped to respond to the many types of crises and conflicts that history tells us are certain. By stripping the Marine Corps of the ability to carry out the crisis-response and combat missions the Nation has long expected of it, the Commandant instead may be consigning it to irrelevance—or worse. As Warfighting advises, ‘boldness must be tempered with judgment lest it border on recklessness.’”^x

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i Statement of General Eric M. Smith Commandant of the United States Marine Corps,  as Delivered to Congressional Defense Committees on 10 April 2024, p. 3.

ii Ibid., p.2.

iii Ibid., pp.6,7.

iv Ibid., p.3.

v Ibid., p.6.

vi Senate Armed Service Committee Advance Policy Questions as the Nominee for Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commandant of the Marine Corps, p. 9.

vii Ibid., p. 2.

viii Ibid., p. 2.

ix Op. cit. Statement of General Eric Smith, 10 April 2024, p. 2.

x Marinus (Pseudonym for John Schmitt author of Warfighting), “Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations,” Marine Corps Gazette, April 2022, p. 107.

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Just about everyone loves, admires, and trusts the Marine Corps. Even those few who do not love the Marine Corps will grudgingly admit that Marines have done great things on battlefields around the world. When senior Marine leaders go to testify in front of Congress, they arrive surrounded by the lustrous battle history of the Marine Corps. Unfortunately, there have been too many recent occasions when Marine Congressional testimony about readiness has not fully reflected the actual state of Marine Corps readiness. The United States is facing a growing storm of worldwide threats and challenges. To deter these dangers will take much more than just words in a hearing room. It will take a deeply involved Congress to upgrade all the military services, including the worldwide, crisis response, Marine Corps.