When a Marine in uniform steps in front of Congress to speak he/she cloaks themselves in two centuries of Marine legend, lore, honor, sacrifice and reputation. The testimony must be without a hint of deception, misdirection or deceit. It must be unimpeachable. The facts put forth rest on the lives and sacrifice of Marines across the history of this Republic who made the ultimate sacrifice. The slightest deception, by commission or omission, intentional or unintentional is simply unacceptable. This is not the case in this testimony. It is steeped in caveats and “read the fine print” modifiers that seek to confuse or mislead. It is salesman and lawyer lingo and not the straight talk of Warrior Leaders on whose shoulders we place the responsibility for victory and the lives of Marines. This is, frankly and sadly, an embarrassment by those better versed in Public Relations than the hard cold language of global deployment and battle field reality. It begs the question: “ So, you can do everything and more than the Corps could do in past but you can do it with far fewer resources, assets, units and people? And, you can expand your mission to do even more than the missions Congress assigned you?”
Is there any possibility that any former CMCs could testify before Congress as witnesses? After all, they have all their years of experience. The current CMC has his butt to save. The former CMC have their loyalty to the Corps for its best interest and the interests of the Nation.
Has there been any pushback to Congress on HQMC's testimony? Most people who have no military knowledge don't know the difference between a SIF or a JLTV. They hear HQMC's answers and it's word salad. At present, I do not think the Marine Corps as organized can back up the Army. It only has 5 light infantry regiments, 7 artillery batteries, and three MLRs. Not a very robust force. Finally and most importantly, does Congress understand what the Marine Corps has eliminated to acquire the FD Marine Corps? HQMC has decimated the one and only robust naval expeditionary force this Nation has. It was a unique and needed force, that no other US Military force possesses.
Members of chowder Society II have had opportunities to brief members of Congress, mostly those on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. There are very few members with the experience of their predecessors such as Senators Nunn, Warner, and McCain, so they fail to catch the deceptive statements that the Compass Points post revealed. Exceptions are Senator Sullivan (Retired Marine Corps Colonel) and Senator Cotton.
As impolite as it is, the short, succinct yet complete description of what "HQMC" has been and is doing is prevaricating/ lying/ deceiving our government. We cannot do what Title 10 says we are to do. I cannot accept that there is not deep seated anger in Marine professionals but I recognize and applaud the potentially more helpful and productive approach Compass Point is taking.
“We are the eyes and ears for the joint force, ideally positioned within the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) to conduct both reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, to act as a joint tactical air controller for the combined joint force, and to strike the enemy from land to sea with organic sensors and precision fires.” i
i Statement of General Eric M. Smith Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, as Delivered to Congressional Defense Committees on 10 April 2024, p. 3.
That is bold talk and nothing more than talk. To say the US Marine Corps is the “eyes and ears of the joint force” is a hollow boast. If true, what Combatant Commander is using (and planning to use) Marines in their “WEZ” as counter reconnaissance, and joint tactical air control? General McKenzie’s book “The Melting Point” is an interesting read on how a Combatant Commander uses the joint force strategic reconnaissance, counter reconnaissance, and intelligence resources. There is no mention of Marines in this role when describing his combat operations and planning. In addition, when the CENTCOM Commander held a meeting to request deterrent forces after these combat operations, General McKenzie states: “After me, the chiefs (Service Chiefs) each spoke. It was the usual litany of complaints: too hard, too painful, not enough of this or that. I was particularly disappointed in my own service, which seemed intent on shaking the dust of CENTCOM off its boots while looking wholly to the Pacific.” P. 105 And there it is, the Marine Corps Commandant is not ready to fill a Combatant Commanders request because he is busy experimenting with notional units in the Pacific.
Well thank you General Smith for your experimental reorganizational of the US Marine Corps, however, where was your offer to the CENTCOM Combatant Commander of a Marine Corps MAGTF to act as the “eyes and ears” in his weapons engagement zone?
Gen McKenzie was fighting a totally different war, against a totally different opponent, with units that were equipped totally different. McKenzie didn't have an MLR to do recon and counter recon. nor did he need one for the land based conflicts he was in. nor did he have long range fires to prosecute the enemy with. nor did he need to stay out of his enemy's WEZ.
FO you are correct “a totally different war, against a totally different opponent, with units that were equipped totally different”, however, the point here is the Combatant Commander had all the capability he needed from joint force strategic reconnaissance (satellites and operational MQ drones), counter reconnaissance, and intelligence resources to execute the "Soleimani" operation. I hope you are not trying to convince me that the MLR is going to be better than the current joint strategic reconnaissance resources that the Combatant Commander utilized. As far as the WEZ is concerned, Iran responded to the attack with a missile attack on Ai Asad Air Base in Iraq. The Combatant Commander knew the number (16) of missiles, the type of missiles (Zolfaghars and Qiam on mobile launchers), when they were launched and from where. He also had time to issue a warning to the targeted air base. In addition, he knew one of the missiles exploded on launch and four broke up in flight.
The other point is that when the Combatant Commander asked for deterrent forces, the US Marine Commandant’s reply was, the Pacific is my only mission. In my mind, that statement represents a narrow minded approach to establishing deterrence and planning on providing US Marine forces for a global peer-to-peer war. The sin is not experimenting with the MLR, the sin is eliminating combat power and discounting Marine MAGTF doctrine in order to experiment. Semper Fi
"I hope you are not trying to convince me that the MLR is going to be better than the current joint strategic reconnaissance resources that the Combatant Commander utilized."
I am. All indicators point to the XQ-58A Valkyrie [already in testing] having superior survivability to all the MQ drones in a peer conflict. Someone [a SIF] needs to operate them and maintain them in theater. The F-35Bs attached to the MLR will also have superior survivability to USAF runway dependent assets after the first salvo.
And I would rephrase "when the Combatant Commander asked for deterrent forces, the US Marine Commandant’s reply was, the Pacific is my only mission." as "a land based conflict against a non-peer can't be the focus of a sea-based service with bigger fish to fry." I don't get why it's the Marines' responsibility to do land-locked ballistic missile defense in a theater where the Army has troops deployed and the rest of the joint force is perfectly capable. Iran isn't crisis response or a near peer fight, it's an ongoing land deterrence fight. That's like asking the Air Force why they don't have artillery.
I am not following you. I thought we were talking “strategic” reconnaissance, counter reconnaissance, and intelligence resources as the “eyes and ears of the joint force”. If we are talking the three levels of warfare as in Strategic, Operational and Tactical, clearly, at least in my mind, the XQ-58A drone will be an operational asset. Especially, since the plan (after development) is to team it with the F35 squadrons. If you can agree that satellites are a strategic resource, they certainly did the heavy lifting in the Iran and Syria legs of the Soleimani operation. Yes, the operational Level MQ drones were used to designate the vehicles and deliver ordinance in Iraq. I once asked on CP: What can drones provide at the strategic level that satellites do not? The bottom line here, at least for me, is that I have not seen or heard of any Combatant Commander requesting that the US Marine Corps should be (or have the mission of) the eyes and eyes of the Joint Force. FD 2030 is a bad USMC driven idea, looking for relevance and pulling the US Marine Corps into irrelevance.
I agree with you that “I don't get why it's the Marines' responsibility to do land-locked ballistic missile defense in a theater where the Army has troops deployed and the rest of the joint force is perfectly capable”, neither do I. Nor do I get leaving Marines behind to man a “WEZ” by hiding HIMAR launchers with anti-ship missiles on small island chains.
The Marine Corps is also the topic of so many famous quotes. Heres mine;
“The Marines I have seen around the world have the cleanest bodies, the filthiest minds, the highest morale, and the lowest morals of any group of animals I have ever seen. Thank God for the United States Marine Corps!”
Compass Points asks questions as a result of CMC statements. There are answers to some of the questions.
First CP question. What MEF level exercises have MEF command elements participated in during the past five years?
The answer is Northern Response 2024. Originally a MAB commitment for the northern flank of NATO, after the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO it became a MEF commitment. The ACMC, Gen. Mahoney, acted as the Land Component Commander for Northern Response.
Gen. Lou Wilson as CMC agreed to the NATO Northern Flank commitment for 2 reasons. One, it allowed the USMC to retain its MAGTF warfighting structure vice having its ground and aviation commands placed individualy, under Army and Air Force commands for an European War. Second. The Norway prepositioned equipment as War Reserve Equipment was additive to Marine Corps allowances.
Second CP question. Are there standing MEB commitments? The answer is NATOs Northern Flank.
There should be more however!
Third CP question. When was the last MEB level combined arms ecercise?
The answer is the just completed amphibious landings with follow on land operstions in South Korea that also included Army airborne operations and participation by a UK Commando unit.
Particularly notewothy is the fact the ARG ships supporting the MAGTF were the LHD Boxer and the LHA America. No other Navy amphibs were used. At the same time the ROKN ARG amphib ships used were 2 LPH amphibs.
The adjustment to limit the supporting ARG to amphibious carriers is noteworthy.
1. What units made up the MEF's GCE, ACE, and LCE for the NATO exercise? What means did they use to deploy?
2. Did the MEB amphibious exercise in Korea have an infantry regimental headquarters as an RLT and did it command at least two BLTs? What units made up the ACE and LCE? Was the MEB command element a full-up organization or one drawn out of the III MEF CE staff? I ask these question because ,as you know, the assault echelon of a MEB requires approximately 17 amphibious ships with the follow-on echelon largely coming from and MPS and the fly-in echelon, but you list only two "big deck" amphibious ships.
In 4 years as a G-4 and occasional COS with the 4th MAB and yearly "exercises" in North Norway, there was never a time we had a full MAB deployed to Norway. Even for Teamwork 84, the largest amphibious "exercise" in history above the Arctic Circle, there was not a full MAB. I am very familiar with what a MAB, or MEB, is or isn't. I also know the difference between an "exercise" and a rehearsal for an amphibious assault. They are very different events. For me, a retired Marine officer who flew aircraft, and who was involved in amphibious assault operations It is gratifying to see the Marine Corps involved in substantial MAGTF "exercises."
Bob, You are too young. I was the S-3 of RLT 8 , which was part of 4th MAB when General Al Gray took it to Teamwork/Bonded Item in 1976. The RLT had two infantry battalions and a tank battalion plus an AVV company, engineers, and other attachments. Seems like a full up MAB to me and we believed we were. PKVR
My initial response was too lengthy for a CP reply post. The truncated response is inserted in Comments below. These were both MAGTF "exercises" conducted by active duty Marines. The MAGTF "exercises" are not rehearsals for an amphibious assault. Both "exercises" test the capability of the Marine Corps and allies to meet vital, strategic, warfighting responsibilities. Please know, the NATO Northern Flank commitment is not in competition with Maritime Prepositioning. It is "additive" to Maritime Prepositioning. Biases against the NATO Northern Flank commitment by CP and Chowder ll do not serve the best interests of the Marine Corps.
"we fear that the TMEABO and Force Design 2030 risk transforming the Marine Corps into a niche force optimized for one specific war that must be considered unlikely while rendering it ill-equipped to respond to the many types of crises and conflicts that history tells us are certain. By stripping the Marine Corps of the ability to carry out the crisis-response and combat missions the Nation has long expected of it, the Commandant instead may be consigning it to irrelevance—or worse."
This quote seems to ignore the recent deployment of Marines to Estonia at the outset of the Russia-Ukraine war using a small stand-in force designed on the FD 2030 model. The fact that they were deployed in a European theater against a different peer-ish adversary contradicts the "niche" label and validates it as a crisis-response force in a modern conflict that works multiple places. Seems relevant.
"Neither missiles nor rockets have the warheads for smoke needed to screen movement, white phosphorous (WP) to mark targets or set structures on fire, or illumination to light up the battlefield at night."
I don't think using white phosphorus to "set structures on fire" is a legal use of WP on the battlefield, even though it's commonly used this way. Feel free to cite a source to the contrary.
The use of incendiary and other flame weapons against matériel, including enemy military personnel, is not directly forbidden by any treaty. The United States Military mandates that incendiary weapons, where deployed, not be used "in such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering."[64] The term "unnecessary suffering" is defined Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone
Citing
International Humanitarian Law Databases / Practice relating to Rule 85. / The Use of Incendiary Weapons against Combatants / Section A. The use of incendiary weapons in general / VI. Other National Practice
"Persistent means “to continue to exist or endure over a long period.” The Marine Corps has been unable to keep a MEU in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Western Pacific 365 days a year (“heel to toe”) for many years."
You've omitted the word afloat here. They've been unable to keep a MEU afloat in westpac recently. But the whole concept of the SIF is that it will be land based, on partner nations' soil, thus reducing the need to keep the same level of amphibious shipping in theater 24/7/365 while maintaining a persistent force presence. This is about an entire paradigm change using rotational forces modeled off the Darwin presence, it won't be a ship based MEU force anymore, but the force will still be in theater.
"To fight in sustained land operations requires needed capabilities (armor, cannon artillery, breaching and bridging equipment) that the Marine Corps no longer possesses because several senior leaders said they do not want the Corps to become a “second land army.”"
Army Futures Command's Gen Rainey this April called towed artillery "sitting ducks" and went on to say "I personally believe that we have witnessed the end of the effectiveness of towed artillery”, that certainly doesn't sound like "resilient supporting arms". And last time I checked *all* the Marines' cannon artillery is towed. So are you agreeing they should ditch the rest of it and immediately invest in more mobile wheeled artillery, or are you disagreeing with Gen Rainey and Army Futures Command that the Marines' towed artillery is unsurvivable in a peer conflict and saying they should stick with towing around M777s in a Pacific fight, or that they should go all in with 100% missile artillery? it's unclear.
Continuing to the next post on the same topic, "An examination of the weapons and equipment of the units from which the MLR will task organize the SIF reveals that none are low observable or low signature. Major items of the SIF such as the NMESIS consists of a JTLV carrier and a Naval Strike Missile Launcher, neither of which has low signature characteristics."
Losses of American equipment during the war in Ukraine has proven that HIMARS units are significantly low*er* observable and more survivable than towed M777s based on recorded losses over a multi-year peer-ish level conflict. Wheeled units like JLTV and LAVs/Strykers also vastly outnumbered tracked units and towed artillery in the recent Kursk invasion. Some of your analysis assertions seem to ignore the most recent data we have on comparing these systems in the kind of conflict we're preparing for and tactics that would be employed.
I am not advocating for towed cannon artillery, clearly the need is for wheeled or tracked cannon artillery. I believe the former suits the Corps best.
Cannon artillery accounts for 80% of the casualties on both sides in the war in Ukraine. Whether it's towed, wheeled, or tracked is a Service requirement. Regardless, cannon artillery remains the king of battle.
That's true, but according to Oryx, Russians have lost at least 382 towed artillery and 783 self-propelled tracked cannons but only a handful of wheeled mortar carrier losses as effectively all of their mobile cannon artillery is tracked.
Do you honestly think the US Marines or Army would tolerate the kind of casualties before they pulled cannon artillery back leaving troops with *no* cannon artillery?
Dismissing the potential loss of *thousands* of gun crews as a "service requirement" isn't a serious counter argument, it's completely ignoring the dynamics of the current fight. This is very typical of the Chowder II arguments, they don't ever address the ideas that disprove their dated experience, they just argue past them.
Forward observer, Because many members of Chowder Society II served in Iraq and Afghanistan and retired in the last two or three years your charge that the group is dated is simply not true.
We are not advocating ro towed artillery, but wheeled.
History speaks to us if we will listen. First, Norway. The German Nazi's conquered Norway in short order with their land, airborne, aviation and naval forces attacked Norway almost simultaneously. The Norwegians airfields along the coast became German airfields. As such, German aircraft raised havoc for allied ships in the North Sea and the Atlantic SLOCs. It is a historical fact that the German air attacks launched from these these coastal Norwegian airfields against allied shipping, especially in the GIUK Gap, imperiled the war effort.
A foremost reason for the defense of NATO's northern flank is to defend these same airfields against the Russians occupying them should there be war with Russia. Russia's Northern Fleet and bombers are based just beyond Norway's northern, national boundary. The defense of the North Sea is therefore vital to the defense of the Atlantic SLOC's that are, in turn, vital to the national security of both the United States and Europe.
It has been reported that during the Carter administration the Marine Corps was presented two options for war planning for Europe. Option (1) was for the Marine Corps to provide units that would be placed under U. S. Army command in case of a general war in Europe. The Marine MAGTF integrity would not be maintained in this option. Option (2) was for the Marine Corps to be assigned the defense of the NATO's Northern Flank. In option (2) the Marine MAGTF integrity would be maintained. As CMC, Gen. Lou Wilson opted for the Northern Flank commitment for a MAB. Prepositioned War Reserve equipment and supplies would be established in Norway for use by an Air Landed MAB that would be airlifted to Norway. Importantly, the PWR equipment and supplies stored in Norway would be "additive" to Marine Corps supply allowances. In agreeing to the Northern Flank option for the Marine Corps, Gen Wilson assured continued MAGTF integrity for the Marine Corps warfighting ideology. Wilson also assured an important, future, strategic role for the Marine Corps should there be a future war in Europe. It is important to note that the MAB MAGTF Gen. Wilson agreed to is now a MEF MAGTF with the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO.
The Land Component Commander (LCC) for Nordic Response 24 was the ll Marine Expeditionary Force (ll MEF) command element. ll MEF was responsible for coordinating land based operations. The commanding general of ll MEF, Lt. Gen. David A. Ottignon, acts as the Land Component Commander. The ll MEF command element synchronized operations between the U. S. MAGTF, Norwegian Army units, and a combined Swedish and Finnish Brigade under a NATO JTF.
Thirteen nations participated in Nordic response 24. There were reported to be 30,000 participants from these nations. Nordic Response 24 is also tied to Steadfast Defender 24 that will involve 90,000 troops across Europe. Gen. Lou Wilson's wisdom kept the Marine MAGTF alive and well for European war planners.
History also speaks to us with exercise Ssang Yong 24 in South Korea if we will listen Ssang Yong 24 was termed as being a combined-joint force forcible entry operation in the Pohang area of South Korea. The exercise mission was to test the interoperability between allied forces of a division level amphibious operation followed by land operations ashore.
For a historical perspective, it was reported that the new CG of the 8th Army during the Korean War, Lt. Gen. Ridgeway sought the advice of Maj. Gen. O. P. Smith as to the best use of the 1stMARDIV Smith commanded. Maj. Gen. Smith recommended coastal assignments of the division because of its amphibious capability.
Ridgeway agreed with Smith but assigned the division to interior duties. Ridgeway explained to Smith that he would prefer to use the Marine division for amphibious operations. Ridgeway claimed that To be able to use the 1stMARDIV for amphibious operation's along the Korean peninsula would drive the North Koreans crazy wondering about his next move. Unfortunately, battlefield exigencies elsewhere precluded the division's use for it's preferred amphibious capability.
The exercise, Operation Ssang Yong 24, meaning Twin Dragons, conducted in the Pohang area of South Korea from Aug26 to September 7 exemplified a concept Lt. Gen. Ridgeway could only dream about during the Korean War. It's significance is history speaking. The purpose of the biannual exercise is to strengthen the ROK-U. S. Alliance's combat readiness and to improve interoperability. The exercise has been conducted regularly since 2012 between the ROK, the U. S. Navy, and the U. S. Marine Corps. This year's exercise involved division level Marine Corps landing forces.
Ssang Yong 24 will feature a combined ROK-U. S. Marine Corps staff group afloat. The biannual exercise will, " showcase the overwhelming power of the alliance and its capability to carry out combined amphibious operations." For the second year in a row, the U. K. Commando Force participated in the exercise. Last year was their first return to Korea since the Korean War.
The strategic importance of MAGTF operations in South Korea is tied to the amphibious capability Lt. Gen. Ridgeway wished he had for the Korean War. The Marines in the MAGTF business should be hugely supported of this demonstrated capability. Furthermore, the biannual capability showcased by Ssang Yong exercises is not necessarily tied solely to the Korean peninsula. The combined force amphibious capability obviously has the attention of China's client state in North Korea. A military planner can also be pretty much assured the exercise in South Korea has the attention of China and its designs on Taiwan. Surely, Russia is taking note as well. What could possibly be the Compass Points objection to the ARG/MAGTF strategic capability Ssang Yong demonstrates?
The numbers of ships and aircraft involved in the division level; interoperability exercise are covered in internet Ssang Yong 24 articles. On another matter, why would Compass Points not consider the sole use of Big Deck amphibious forces for the landing force. It has been presented previously to Compass Points that 2 LHDs can be used to support each MEU. For Sang Yong 24, the MAGTF used the LHA America and the LHD Boxer. The Boxer ARG did not use the LSD for the exercise LF, and sent the LPD home to San Diego. The ROKN used 2 of their LPH's. Other ships, vessels and landing craft were part of the exercise, but the use of the Big Deck carriers for the LF should be of considerable interest to Compass Points. At 2 LHD's per MEU a total of 24 LHD's would be needed for 2 MAGTF MEFs. A percentage would have to be added to this number to ensure the number required are available.
The absence of tanks always come up. I am not qualified to discuss Marine infantry and tanks. I do believe a 60 ton Sherman is too big, too complex and too expensive. What is the alternative to no tanks? I have participated in heliborne assaults. Two notable such assaults were both with Operations Hastings and Prairie in RVN in 1966. The UH-34D squadron, HMM-363, was aboard the new LPH-1 Iwo Jima on its first deployment with the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. There were no tanks. There were the battalion Marines and their organic gear. The absence of tanks is not a war stopper. So, what is the alternative? Why doesn't Compass Points address the alternatives to tanks?
The 2 LHD support of the MEU is an alternative to the absence of tanks. In this scenario the Osprey squadron (Rein) would be on one LHD and the F-35 squadron would be on the second LHD. Both LHDs would have defensive and offensive drone capability. The Vipers and the F-35's would provide close in CAS and air superiority. They would also provide drone defense and the drone offense capability. Once the artillery is moved ashore the air superiority and CAS would continue in support of the LF. Am I supporting doing away with tanks? No! I am presenting an alternative to no tanks if Marines go to battle tomorrow. If there is an alternative to tanks what is it? From personal experience I do know marines can go to war without tanks.
I know my "trust and confidence" are lacking in today's leadership of our Corps. Tomorrow is the start of my 65th year as a MARINE so you can understand why the above statement makes me sad
When a Marine in uniform steps in front of Congress to speak he/she cloaks themselves in two centuries of Marine legend, lore, honor, sacrifice and reputation. The testimony must be without a hint of deception, misdirection or deceit. It must be unimpeachable. The facts put forth rest on the lives and sacrifice of Marines across the history of this Republic who made the ultimate sacrifice. The slightest deception, by commission or omission, intentional or unintentional is simply unacceptable. This is not the case in this testimony. It is steeped in caveats and “read the fine print” modifiers that seek to confuse or mislead. It is salesman and lawyer lingo and not the straight talk of Warrior Leaders on whose shoulders we place the responsibility for victory and the lives of Marines. This is, frankly and sadly, an embarrassment by those better versed in Public Relations than the hard cold language of global deployment and battle field reality. It begs the question: “ So, you can do everything and more than the Corps could do in past but you can do it with far fewer resources, assets, units and people? And, you can expand your mission to do even more than the missions Congress assigned you?”
Is there any possibility that any former CMCs could testify before Congress as witnesses? After all, they have all their years of experience. The current CMC has his butt to save. The former CMC have their loyalty to the Corps for its best interest and the interests of the Nation.
Has there been any pushback to Congress on HQMC's testimony? Most people who have no military knowledge don't know the difference between a SIF or a JLTV. They hear HQMC's answers and it's word salad. At present, I do not think the Marine Corps as organized can back up the Army. It only has 5 light infantry regiments, 7 artillery batteries, and three MLRs. Not a very robust force. Finally and most importantly, does Congress understand what the Marine Corps has eliminated to acquire the FD Marine Corps? HQMC has decimated the one and only robust naval expeditionary force this Nation has. It was a unique and needed force, that no other US Military force possesses.
Members of chowder Society II have had opportunities to brief members of Congress, mostly those on the Senate and House Armed Services Committees. There are very few members with the experience of their predecessors such as Senators Nunn, Warner, and McCain, so they fail to catch the deceptive statements that the Compass Points post revealed. Exceptions are Senator Sullivan (Retired Marine Corps Colonel) and Senator Cotton.
As impolite as it is, the short, succinct yet complete description of what "HQMC" has been and is doing is prevaricating/ lying/ deceiving our government. We cannot do what Title 10 says we are to do. I cannot accept that there is not deep seated anger in Marine professionals but I recognize and applaud the potentially more helpful and productive approach Compass Point is taking.
“We are the eyes and ears for the joint force, ideally positioned within the weapons engagement zone (WEZ) to conduct both reconnaissance and counter-reconnaissance, to act as a joint tactical air controller for the combined joint force, and to strike the enemy from land to sea with organic sensors and precision fires.” i
i Statement of General Eric M. Smith Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, as Delivered to Congressional Defense Committees on 10 April 2024, p. 3.
That is bold talk and nothing more than talk. To say the US Marine Corps is the “eyes and ears of the joint force” is a hollow boast. If true, what Combatant Commander is using (and planning to use) Marines in their “WEZ” as counter reconnaissance, and joint tactical air control? General McKenzie’s book “The Melting Point” is an interesting read on how a Combatant Commander uses the joint force strategic reconnaissance, counter reconnaissance, and intelligence resources. There is no mention of Marines in this role when describing his combat operations and planning. In addition, when the CENTCOM Commander held a meeting to request deterrent forces after these combat operations, General McKenzie states: “After me, the chiefs (Service Chiefs) each spoke. It was the usual litany of complaints: too hard, too painful, not enough of this or that. I was particularly disappointed in my own service, which seemed intent on shaking the dust of CENTCOM off its boots while looking wholly to the Pacific.” P. 105 And there it is, the Marine Corps Commandant is not ready to fill a Combatant Commanders request because he is busy experimenting with notional units in the Pacific.
Well thank you General Smith for your experimental reorganizational of the US Marine Corps, however, where was your offer to the CENTCOM Combatant Commander of a Marine Corps MAGTF to act as the “eyes and ears” in his weapons engagement zone?
Gen McKenzie was fighting a totally different war, against a totally different opponent, with units that were equipped totally different. McKenzie didn't have an MLR to do recon and counter recon. nor did he need one for the land based conflicts he was in. nor did he have long range fires to prosecute the enemy with. nor did he need to stay out of his enemy's WEZ.
FO you are correct “a totally different war, against a totally different opponent, with units that were equipped totally different”, however, the point here is the Combatant Commander had all the capability he needed from joint force strategic reconnaissance (satellites and operational MQ drones), counter reconnaissance, and intelligence resources to execute the "Soleimani" operation. I hope you are not trying to convince me that the MLR is going to be better than the current joint strategic reconnaissance resources that the Combatant Commander utilized. As far as the WEZ is concerned, Iran responded to the attack with a missile attack on Ai Asad Air Base in Iraq. The Combatant Commander knew the number (16) of missiles, the type of missiles (Zolfaghars and Qiam on mobile launchers), when they were launched and from where. He also had time to issue a warning to the targeted air base. In addition, he knew one of the missiles exploded on launch and four broke up in flight.
The other point is that when the Combatant Commander asked for deterrent forces, the US Marine Commandant’s reply was, the Pacific is my only mission. In my mind, that statement represents a narrow minded approach to establishing deterrence and planning on providing US Marine forces for a global peer-to-peer war. The sin is not experimenting with the MLR, the sin is eliminating combat power and discounting Marine MAGTF doctrine in order to experiment. Semper Fi
"I hope you are not trying to convince me that the MLR is going to be better than the current joint strategic reconnaissance resources that the Combatant Commander utilized."
I am. All indicators point to the XQ-58A Valkyrie [already in testing] having superior survivability to all the MQ drones in a peer conflict. Someone [a SIF] needs to operate them and maintain them in theater. The F-35Bs attached to the MLR will also have superior survivability to USAF runway dependent assets after the first salvo.
And I would rephrase "when the Combatant Commander asked for deterrent forces, the US Marine Commandant’s reply was, the Pacific is my only mission." as "a land based conflict against a non-peer can't be the focus of a sea-based service with bigger fish to fry." I don't get why it's the Marines' responsibility to do land-locked ballistic missile defense in a theater where the Army has troops deployed and the rest of the joint force is perfectly capable. Iran isn't crisis response or a near peer fight, it's an ongoing land deterrence fight. That's like asking the Air Force why they don't have artillery.
I am not following you. I thought we were talking “strategic” reconnaissance, counter reconnaissance, and intelligence resources as the “eyes and ears of the joint force”. If we are talking the three levels of warfare as in Strategic, Operational and Tactical, clearly, at least in my mind, the XQ-58A drone will be an operational asset. Especially, since the plan (after development) is to team it with the F35 squadrons. If you can agree that satellites are a strategic resource, they certainly did the heavy lifting in the Iran and Syria legs of the Soleimani operation. Yes, the operational Level MQ drones were used to designate the vehicles and deliver ordinance in Iraq. I once asked on CP: What can drones provide at the strategic level that satellites do not? The bottom line here, at least for me, is that I have not seen or heard of any Combatant Commander requesting that the US Marine Corps should be (or have the mission of) the eyes and eyes of the Joint Force. FD 2030 is a bad USMC driven idea, looking for relevance and pulling the US Marine Corps into irrelevance.
I agree with you that “I don't get why it's the Marines' responsibility to do land-locked ballistic missile defense in a theater where the Army has troops deployed and the rest of the joint force is perfectly capable”, neither do I. Nor do I get leaving Marines behind to man a “WEZ” by hiding HIMAR launchers with anti-ship missiles on small island chains.
The Marine Corps is also the topic of so many famous quotes. Heres mine;
“The Marines I have seen around the world have the cleanest bodies, the filthiest minds, the highest morale, and the lowest morals of any group of animals I have ever seen. Thank God for the United States Marine Corps!”
Eleanor Roosevelt
Compass Points asks questions as a result of CMC statements. There are answers to some of the questions.
First CP question. What MEF level exercises have MEF command elements participated in during the past five years?
The answer is Northern Response 2024. Originally a MAB commitment for the northern flank of NATO, after the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO it became a MEF commitment. The ACMC, Gen. Mahoney, acted as the Land Component Commander for Northern Response.
Gen. Lou Wilson as CMC agreed to the NATO Northern Flank commitment for 2 reasons. One, it allowed the USMC to retain its MAGTF warfighting structure vice having its ground and aviation commands placed individualy, under Army and Air Force commands for an European War. Second. The Norway prepositioned equipment as War Reserve Equipment was additive to Marine Corps allowances.
Second CP question. Are there standing MEB commitments? The answer is NATOs Northern Flank.
There should be more however!
Third CP question. When was the last MEB level combined arms ecercise?
The answer is the just completed amphibious landings with follow on land operstions in South Korea that also included Army airborne operations and participation by a UK Commando unit.
Particularly notewothy is the fact the ARG ships supporting the MAGTF were the LHD Boxer and the LHA America. No other Navy amphibs were used. At the same time the ROKN ARG amphib ships used were 2 LPH amphibs.
The adjustment to limit the supporting ARG to amphibious carriers is noteworthy.
A few questions:
1. What units made up the MEF's GCE, ACE, and LCE for the NATO exercise? What means did they use to deploy?
2. Did the MEB amphibious exercise in Korea have an infantry regimental headquarters as an RLT and did it command at least two BLTs? What units made up the ACE and LCE? Was the MEB command element a full-up organization or one drawn out of the III MEF CE staff? I ask these question because ,as you know, the assault echelon of a MEB requires approximately 17 amphibious ships with the follow-on echelon largely coming from and MPS and the fly-in echelon, but you list only two "big deck" amphibious ships.
Calling an exercise a MEB or MEF level exercise does make it so. Words are cheap.
In 4 years as a G-4 and occasional COS with the 4th MAB and yearly "exercises" in North Norway, there was never a time we had a full MAB deployed to Norway. Even for Teamwork 84, the largest amphibious "exercise" in history above the Arctic Circle, there was not a full MAB. I am very familiar with what a MAB, or MEB, is or isn't. I also know the difference between an "exercise" and a rehearsal for an amphibious assault. They are very different events. For me, a retired Marine officer who flew aircraft, and who was involved in amphibious assault operations It is gratifying to see the Marine Corps involved in substantial MAGTF "exercises."
Bob, You are too young. I was the S-3 of RLT 8 , which was part of 4th MAB when General Al Gray took it to Teamwork/Bonded Item in 1976. The RLT had two infantry battalions and a tank battalion plus an AVV company, engineers, and other attachments. Seems like a full up MAB to me and we believed we were. PKVR
No tank support to get off the beach or move inland either. You are not going to get shockpower from a Marine in a JLTV armed with Javelin.
My initial response was too lengthy for a CP reply post. The truncated response is inserted in Comments below. These were both MAGTF "exercises" conducted by active duty Marines. The MAGTF "exercises" are not rehearsals for an amphibious assault. Both "exercises" test the capability of the Marine Corps and allies to meet vital, strategic, warfighting responsibilities. Please know, the NATO Northern Flank commitment is not in competition with Maritime Prepositioning. It is "additive" to Maritime Prepositioning. Biases against the NATO Northern Flank commitment by CP and Chowder ll do not serve the best interests of the Marine Corps.
Bob, Appears to me you are talking about command post exercises, not exercises where the entire unit is in the field. PKVR
"we fear that the TMEABO and Force Design 2030 risk transforming the Marine Corps into a niche force optimized for one specific war that must be considered unlikely while rendering it ill-equipped to respond to the many types of crises and conflicts that history tells us are certain. By stripping the Marine Corps of the ability to carry out the crisis-response and combat missions the Nation has long expected of it, the Commandant instead may be consigning it to irrelevance—or worse."
This quote seems to ignore the recent deployment of Marines to Estonia at the outset of the Russia-Ukraine war using a small stand-in force designed on the FD 2030 model. The fact that they were deployed in a European theater against a different peer-ish adversary contradicts the "niche" label and validates it as a crisis-response force in a modern conflict that works multiple places. Seems relevant.
further reading:
https://www.defensenews.com/interviews/2022/08/03/how-us-marines-put-force-design-2030-to-work-in-europe-against-russian-naval-forces/
"Neither missiles nor rockets have the warheads for smoke needed to screen movement, white phosphorous (WP) to mark targets or set structures on fire, or illumination to light up the battlefield at night."
I don't think using white phosphorus to "set structures on fire" is a legal use of WP on the battlefield, even though it's commonly used this way. Feel free to cite a source to the contrary.
Forward observe, for your edification:
The use of incendiary and other flame weapons against matériel, including enemy military personnel, is not directly forbidden by any treaty. The United States Military mandates that incendiary weapons, where deployed, not be used "in such a way as to cause unnecessary suffering."[64] The term "unnecessary suffering" is defined Sent from Yahoo Mail for iPhone
Citing
International Humanitarian Law Databases / Practice relating to Rule 85. / The Use of Incendiary Weapons against Combatants / Section A. The use of incendiary weapons in general / VI. Other National Practice
"Persistent means “to continue to exist or endure over a long period.” The Marine Corps has been unable to keep a MEU in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Western Pacific 365 days a year (“heel to toe”) for many years."
You've omitted the word afloat here. They've been unable to keep a MEU afloat in westpac recently. But the whole concept of the SIF is that it will be land based, on partner nations' soil, thus reducing the need to keep the same level of amphibious shipping in theater 24/7/365 while maintaining a persistent force presence. This is about an entire paradigm change using rotational forces modeled off the Darwin presence, it won't be a ship based MEU force anymore, but the force will still be in theater.
Over the past several years there has on average only been one MEU a year in WestPac.
As to being in theater, that is not of much value when there are no ships to move them.
"To fight in sustained land operations requires needed capabilities (armor, cannon artillery, breaching and bridging equipment) that the Marine Corps no longer possesses because several senior leaders said they do not want the Corps to become a “second land army.”"
Army Futures Command's Gen Rainey this April called towed artillery "sitting ducks" and went on to say "I personally believe that we have witnessed the end of the effectiveness of towed artillery”, that certainly doesn't sound like "resilient supporting arms". And last time I checked *all* the Marines' cannon artillery is towed. So are you agreeing they should ditch the rest of it and immediately invest in more mobile wheeled artillery, or are you disagreeing with Gen Rainey and Army Futures Command that the Marines' towed artillery is unsurvivable in a peer conflict and saying they should stick with towing around M777s in a Pacific fight, or that they should go all in with 100% missile artillery? it's unclear.
Continuing to the next post on the same topic, "An examination of the weapons and equipment of the units from which the MLR will task organize the SIF reveals that none are low observable or low signature. Major items of the SIF such as the NMESIS consists of a JTLV carrier and a Naval Strike Missile Launcher, neither of which has low signature characteristics."
Losses of American equipment during the war in Ukraine has proven that HIMARS units are significantly low*er* observable and more survivable than towed M777s based on recorded losses over a multi-year peer-ish level conflict. Wheeled units like JLTV and LAVs/Strykers also vastly outnumbered tracked units and towed artillery in the recent Kursk invasion. Some of your analysis assertions seem to ignore the most recent data we have on comparing these systems in the kind of conflict we're preparing for and tactics that would be employed.
I am not advocating for towed cannon artillery, clearly the need is for wheeled or tracked cannon artillery. I believe the former suits the Corps best.
Cannon artillery accounts for 80% of the casualties on both sides in the war in Ukraine. Whether it's towed, wheeled, or tracked is a Service requirement. Regardless, cannon artillery remains the king of battle.
That's true, but according to Oryx, Russians have lost at least 382 towed artillery and 783 self-propelled tracked cannons but only a handful of wheeled mortar carrier losses as effectively all of their mobile cannon artillery is tracked.
Do you honestly think the US Marines or Army would tolerate the kind of casualties before they pulled cannon artillery back leaving troops with *no* cannon artillery?
Dismissing the potential loss of *thousands* of gun crews as a "service requirement" isn't a serious counter argument, it's completely ignoring the dynamics of the current fight. This is very typical of the Chowder II arguments, they don't ever address the ideas that disprove their dated experience, they just argue past them.
Forward observer, Because many members of Chowder Society II served in Iraq and Afghanistan and retired in the last two or three years your charge that the group is dated is simply not true.
We are not advocating ro towed artillery, but wheeled.
History speaks to us if we will listen. First, Norway. The German Nazi's conquered Norway in short order with their land, airborne, aviation and naval forces attacked Norway almost simultaneously. The Norwegians airfields along the coast became German airfields. As such, German aircraft raised havoc for allied ships in the North Sea and the Atlantic SLOCs. It is a historical fact that the German air attacks launched from these these coastal Norwegian airfields against allied shipping, especially in the GIUK Gap, imperiled the war effort.
A foremost reason for the defense of NATO's northern flank is to defend these same airfields against the Russians occupying them should there be war with Russia. Russia's Northern Fleet and bombers are based just beyond Norway's northern, national boundary. The defense of the North Sea is therefore vital to the defense of the Atlantic SLOC's that are, in turn, vital to the national security of both the United States and Europe.
It has been reported that during the Carter administration the Marine Corps was presented two options for war planning for Europe. Option (1) was for the Marine Corps to provide units that would be placed under U. S. Army command in case of a general war in Europe. The Marine MAGTF integrity would not be maintained in this option. Option (2) was for the Marine Corps to be assigned the defense of the NATO's Northern Flank. In option (2) the Marine MAGTF integrity would be maintained. As CMC, Gen. Lou Wilson opted for the Northern Flank commitment for a MAB. Prepositioned War Reserve equipment and supplies would be established in Norway for use by an Air Landed MAB that would be airlifted to Norway. Importantly, the PWR equipment and supplies stored in Norway would be "additive" to Marine Corps supply allowances. In agreeing to the Northern Flank option for the Marine Corps, Gen Wilson assured continued MAGTF integrity for the Marine Corps warfighting ideology. Wilson also assured an important, future, strategic role for the Marine Corps should there be a future war in Europe. It is important to note that the MAB MAGTF Gen. Wilson agreed to is now a MEF MAGTF with the addition of Sweden and Finland to NATO.
The Land Component Commander (LCC) for Nordic Response 24 was the ll Marine Expeditionary Force (ll MEF) command element. ll MEF was responsible for coordinating land based operations. The commanding general of ll MEF, Lt. Gen. David A. Ottignon, acts as the Land Component Commander. The ll MEF command element synchronized operations between the U. S. MAGTF, Norwegian Army units, and a combined Swedish and Finnish Brigade under a NATO JTF.
Thirteen nations participated in Nordic response 24. There were reported to be 30,000 participants from these nations. Nordic Response 24 is also tied to Steadfast Defender 24 that will involve 90,000 troops across Europe. Gen. Lou Wilson's wisdom kept the Marine MAGTF alive and well for European war planners.
History also speaks to us with exercise Ssang Yong 24 in South Korea if we will listen Ssang Yong 24 was termed as being a combined-joint force forcible entry operation in the Pohang area of South Korea. The exercise mission was to test the interoperability between allied forces of a division level amphibious operation followed by land operations ashore.
For a historical perspective, it was reported that the new CG of the 8th Army during the Korean War, Lt. Gen. Ridgeway sought the advice of Maj. Gen. O. P. Smith as to the best use of the 1stMARDIV Smith commanded. Maj. Gen. Smith recommended coastal assignments of the division because of its amphibious capability.
Ridgeway agreed with Smith but assigned the division to interior duties. Ridgeway explained to Smith that he would prefer to use the Marine division for amphibious operations. Ridgeway claimed that To be able to use the 1stMARDIV for amphibious operation's along the Korean peninsula would drive the North Koreans crazy wondering about his next move. Unfortunately, battlefield exigencies elsewhere precluded the division's use for it's preferred amphibious capability.
The exercise, Operation Ssang Yong 24, meaning Twin Dragons, conducted in the Pohang area of South Korea from Aug26 to September 7 exemplified a concept Lt. Gen. Ridgeway could only dream about during the Korean War. It's significance is history speaking. The purpose of the biannual exercise is to strengthen the ROK-U. S. Alliance's combat readiness and to improve interoperability. The exercise has been conducted regularly since 2012 between the ROK, the U. S. Navy, and the U. S. Marine Corps. This year's exercise involved division level Marine Corps landing forces.
Ssang Yong 24 will feature a combined ROK-U. S. Marine Corps staff group afloat. The biannual exercise will, " showcase the overwhelming power of the alliance and its capability to carry out combined amphibious operations." For the second year in a row, the U. K. Commando Force participated in the exercise. Last year was their first return to Korea since the Korean War.
The strategic importance of MAGTF operations in South Korea is tied to the amphibious capability Lt. Gen. Ridgeway wished he had for the Korean War. The Marines in the MAGTF business should be hugely supported of this demonstrated capability. Furthermore, the biannual capability showcased by Ssang Yong exercises is not necessarily tied solely to the Korean peninsula. The combined force amphibious capability obviously has the attention of China's client state in North Korea. A military planner can also be pretty much assured the exercise in South Korea has the attention of China and its designs on Taiwan. Surely, Russia is taking note as well. What could possibly be the Compass Points objection to the ARG/MAGTF strategic capability Ssang Yong demonstrates?
The numbers of ships and aircraft involved in the division level; interoperability exercise are covered in internet Ssang Yong 24 articles. On another matter, why would Compass Points not consider the sole use of Big Deck amphibious forces for the landing force. It has been presented previously to Compass Points that 2 LHDs can be used to support each MEU. For Sang Yong 24, the MAGTF used the LHA America and the LHD Boxer. The Boxer ARG did not use the LSD for the exercise LF, and sent the LPD home to San Diego. The ROKN used 2 of their LPH's. Other ships, vessels and landing craft were part of the exercise, but the use of the Big Deck carriers for the LF should be of considerable interest to Compass Points. At 2 LHD's per MEU a total of 24 LHD's would be needed for 2 MAGTF MEFs. A percentage would have to be added to this number to ensure the number required are available.
The absence of tanks always come up. I am not qualified to discuss Marine infantry and tanks. I do believe a 60 ton Sherman is too big, too complex and too expensive. What is the alternative to no tanks? I have participated in heliborne assaults. Two notable such assaults were both with Operations Hastings and Prairie in RVN in 1966. The UH-34D squadron, HMM-363, was aboard the new LPH-1 Iwo Jima on its first deployment with the 1st Battalion, 26th Marines. There were no tanks. There were the battalion Marines and their organic gear. The absence of tanks is not a war stopper. So, what is the alternative? Why doesn't Compass Points address the alternatives to tanks?
The 2 LHD support of the MEU is an alternative to the absence of tanks. In this scenario the Osprey squadron (Rein) would be on one LHD and the F-35 squadron would be on the second LHD. Both LHDs would have defensive and offensive drone capability. The Vipers and the F-35's would provide close in CAS and air superiority. They would also provide drone defense and the drone offense capability. Once the artillery is moved ashore the air superiority and CAS would continue in support of the LF. Am I supporting doing away with tanks? No! I am presenting an alternative to no tanks if Marines go to battle tomorrow. If there is an alternative to tanks what is it? From personal experience I do know marines can go to war without tanks.
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I know my "trust and confidence" are lacking in today's leadership of our Corps. Tomorrow is the start of my 65th year as a MARINE so you can understand why the above statement makes me sad