Once again General Smith wants to have his cake and eat it too. The 39th Commandant wants to shut down sea lines of communication in the Pacific with light Littoral Combat Regiments and still maintain enough combat power to have a Marine Expeditionary Force to back them up. He also wants these Littoral Combat Regiments to be lighter and more mobile. I don't think you can have both. Additionally, due to the lighter LCRs they can be destroyed in detail more easily than a traditional Marine regiment. He said he agrees with CNO Admiral Franchetti that 31 L Class ships is sufficient. We all know that is not enough ships. Commandant Smith is still pursuing the Landing Ship Medium program instead of procuring more of the larger L Class ships for a truly expeditionary capability. Why not let the Navy and the Army with their Multi-Domain Task Force, handle Chinese ships, and let the Marine Corps do what it does best and what it is supposed to do: being a combined arms naval expeditionary force.
“The littoral combat regiment also is capable of attacking and destroying a naval base.”
I’m not sure this is a completely accurate statement. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a final TO/TE for the MLR. What is the makeup of the MLR’s supporting arms? What, at best 2 batteries of M777s, a HIMARS unit, a few 5”/54s, a few more 76mm naval guns? What type of air support will they have? And, most importantly, what type of logistics will provide for the force ashore?
I’m sorry, I for one don’t remotely believe that an MLR by itself is capable of attacking and destroying an enemy advance naval base.
We’re being sold a bill of goods by the current Corps leadership. Congress needs to start asking the HARD questions, and if they’re not adequately answered then the Corps needs to be dictated to by Congress as to what’s expected of them under Title 10.
A superior proposal Compass Points! Your proposal of *at least two other smaller MAGTFs built around Expeditionary Fast Transports constantly patrolling* is superior Marine thinking by adapting to the situation. It is a classic style of Marine thinking. The powers that be might also decide the ETF is a suitable alternative to the LSM.
This writer can not recommend enough that anyone here in regard to General Smith’s comments, view the full hour and ten minute (+/-) interview that he participated in this past Tuesday, at a forum held by the Brookings Institute. We are working on polite rejoineder here, so in that spirit one can report the contradictions are stunning in almost everything he said. As a small example, In one breath, we can never have enough munitions, but when queried about getting rid of the armor, well we only had 162 tanks and they are heavy, and they don’t shoot far enough at 4000 meters max range, to be of value in a stand off environment (authors words in effect) so we don’t really need them. Really? Ask the Marines that were at the Battle of Hue City during Tet of 1968. Max range? 500 meters? How about the Battle Fallujah? Max range? 500M-1000M? If he had said we found the Abrams not suitable, as it is too heavy and the main gun really isn’t what we need, and we want and need something that can really provide armored over watch and support the maneuver elements in any combat environment that might be at least a rationale for divesting the M1. But, he did not. Done and dusted we don’t need tanks. Rather than ruin everyone’s fun, listen to the interview, we ought to have a contest to see how many times the word “sensing” was used. It was a lot. One could go on and on. But no sense to be branded rude.
No way do we want to disparage our CMC. He did a very good job of speaking well, but nowhere in the conversation did he really address what CP just presented in a couple of short paragraphs. Yes, we are in a “grey war” with China, what’s new? Bad actors are with us always like bad weather at sea. Being able to be the fastest most lethal force on the scene when called upon, has been a trade mark of the Marine Corps almost from its inception. It has evolved, and needs to clearly evolve further. But the base of it, the MAGTF which can be beautifully task organized to meet the circumstances is something to behold and no doubt a critical key in the evolution of the Corps fighting capability going forward. It is not sitting in forward island chains with out dated missile armaments, in a “stand off” posture which can be identified easily and attacked and destroyed. “If you can be seen, you will be hit. If you are hit you will be killed.” General William DePuy USATDC.
Thanks to CP for putting broader thinking on the table yesterday. It was a fine dessert after the Fourth of July fare and celebrations.
We should have been continously in the theater a long time ago. That way the Chinese can't say we are now escalating the situation with the introduction of more forces.
Once again General Smith wants to have his cake and eat it too. The 39th Commandant wants to shut down sea lines of communication in the Pacific with light Littoral Combat Regiments and still maintain enough combat power to have a Marine Expeditionary Force to back them up. He also wants these Littoral Combat Regiments to be lighter and more mobile. I don't think you can have both. Additionally, due to the lighter LCRs they can be destroyed in detail more easily than a traditional Marine regiment. He said he agrees with CNO Admiral Franchetti that 31 L Class ships is sufficient. We all know that is not enough ships. Commandant Smith is still pursuing the Landing Ship Medium program instead of procuring more of the larger L Class ships for a truly expeditionary capability. Why not let the Navy and the Army with their Multi-Domain Task Force, handle Chinese ships, and let the Marine Corps do what it does best and what it is supposed to do: being a combined arms naval expeditionary force.
“The littoral combat regiment also is capable of attacking and destroying a naval base.”
I’m not sure this is a completely accurate statement. I’m not sure I’ve ever seen a final TO/TE for the MLR. What is the makeup of the MLR’s supporting arms? What, at best 2 batteries of M777s, a HIMARS unit, a few 5”/54s, a few more 76mm naval guns? What type of air support will they have? And, most importantly, what type of logistics will provide for the force ashore?
I’m sorry, I for one don’t remotely believe that an MLR by itself is capable of attacking and destroying an enemy advance naval base.
We’re being sold a bill of goods by the current Corps leadership. Congress needs to start asking the HARD questions, and if they’re not adequately answered then the Corps needs to be dictated to by Congress as to what’s expected of them under Title 10.
A superior proposal Compass Points! Your proposal of *at least two other smaller MAGTFs built around Expeditionary Fast Transports constantly patrolling* is superior Marine thinking by adapting to the situation. It is a classic style of Marine thinking. The powers that be might also decide the ETF is a suitable alternative to the LSM.
You guys ever hear of the 31st MEU?
This writer can not recommend enough that anyone here in regard to General Smith’s comments, view the full hour and ten minute (+/-) interview that he participated in this past Tuesday, at a forum held by the Brookings Institute. We are working on polite rejoineder here, so in that spirit one can report the contradictions are stunning in almost everything he said. As a small example, In one breath, we can never have enough munitions, but when queried about getting rid of the armor, well we only had 162 tanks and they are heavy, and they don’t shoot far enough at 4000 meters max range, to be of value in a stand off environment (authors words in effect) so we don’t really need them. Really? Ask the Marines that were at the Battle of Hue City during Tet of 1968. Max range? 500 meters? How about the Battle Fallujah? Max range? 500M-1000M? If he had said we found the Abrams not suitable, as it is too heavy and the main gun really isn’t what we need, and we want and need something that can really provide armored over watch and support the maneuver elements in any combat environment that might be at least a rationale for divesting the M1. But, he did not. Done and dusted we don’t need tanks. Rather than ruin everyone’s fun, listen to the interview, we ought to have a contest to see how many times the word “sensing” was used. It was a lot. One could go on and on. But no sense to be branded rude.
No way do we want to disparage our CMC. He did a very good job of speaking well, but nowhere in the conversation did he really address what CP just presented in a couple of short paragraphs. Yes, we are in a “grey war” with China, what’s new? Bad actors are with us always like bad weather at sea. Being able to be the fastest most lethal force on the scene when called upon, has been a trade mark of the Marine Corps almost from its inception. It has evolved, and needs to clearly evolve further. But the base of it, the MAGTF which can be beautifully task organized to meet the circumstances is something to behold and no doubt a critical key in the evolution of the Corps fighting capability going forward. It is not sitting in forward island chains with out dated missile armaments, in a “stand off” posture which can be identified easily and attacked and destroyed. “If you can be seen, you will be hit. If you are hit you will be killed.” General William DePuy USATDC.
Thanks to CP for putting broader thinking on the table yesterday. It was a fine dessert after the Fourth of July fare and celebrations.
We should have been continously in the theater a long time ago. That way the Chinese can't say we are now escalating the situation with the introduction of more forces.