Upgrade the M1’s and buy them. I would have two Bns of them in each Division. 60 per Bn. We know how to task organize and can take all or none depending on the mission. Two Bn’s of LVTPs as well. The next fight will be a slug fest. You’ll need lots of artillery as well to include SP. The modern M-1 can do so much more than anyone talks about. Drones are additional, not substitutes.
Cfrog layed out 90% of why the modern M-1 is the best tank in the world. It will be even better in another year. Enough said in that.
The Corps has yet to launch the midget missile to kill a ship. Not one.
Doug, I like the idea of two tank bns per division. Myself, I would convert an infantry reg into a dedicated motorized reg of 2-3 motorized infantry bns (ACV mounted) and one tank bn. The other tank bn would be task organized to the other two reg as needed. Or, I would tank one of the tank bns and opcon a company to each regiment. The second tank bn would be task organized as needed. I realise this is more armor centric than many would like, but I have always thought we were short on armor.
Agree…There is no substitute for tanks or tracks on our Assault Amphibian Vehicles. Little, or no thought, was given to the loss of tanks and incompetent testing for the wheeled ACV. It has little amphibious capability and cannot compare to tracked vehicles in most land operations. Marines have already paid with their lives due to these mistakes and there’s more to come. Semper Fi
cfrog’s break down of what a good serviceable main battle tank needs particularly the points on the main gun 105mm v. 120mm was very helpful. That said the infantry want and should have the ability to bring armor forward and maybe it is a combination of MBT and the Ontos and Bradley vehicles. While FD2030 was in the main a destructive waste of time and taxpayers money it has brought the Corps to a point where choices can logically be made and reconfiguration of the MAGTF with the right armor and artillery is not the worst outcome if no one is allowed to dawadel along.
Hand in glove is getting the Officer T/O sorted. In 1981 there were 63 general officers. There was one CMC and ACMC in that 63. There was none of this Deputy Commandant BS. That’s like a bunch of Deputy CEO’s. It is just drag on the balance sheet. Get back to basics. Every officer a rifle platoon commander, first then the specific MOS. That will sort some of the issue. More largely, someone make the justification for “Joint” and then “Combantant” commands. More BS. Focus on the Marines and them doing their job of maintaining the top priority of meeting Title X mandates and the rest falls into line. Any command which is not laser focused on Warfighting and maneuver warfare is not very valuable to a Corps with a head count of 172,000. In one sense the Corps is in the best possible position for any significant changes the DOD has cooking. Next seperate the bench warmers from the athletes. Clean up those along for the 20-30 year ride to a pension. We heard our country calling to serve a higher purpose. Not serve to garner a pension and consulting gig at the end of the road. Fire them all, start over.
A couple of points. CMC Smith needs to realise that the Marine Corps is first and foremost, a combined arms naval expeditionary force. It should not be a missile force. The Air Force, Army, and Navy are missile forces. We only have one naval expeditionary force: the Marine Corps. Secondly, this combined arms force needs direct firepower for its ground element. Whether it's called a tank, light tank, mobile protected firepower, the infantry needs a direct mobile firepower system. The M1A2 is probably the best there is. But I also concur with cfrog that the CV90120 appears to be a good weapon. It's in the 40T range and carries a 120 mm gun. We do not have the luxury of starting from scratch to build a new tank. In my opinion, I think the Marine Corps would be wise to purchase the CV90120.
Doug, I like the idea of two tanks bns per division. I would take one of the infantry regiments and convert it to a dedicated motorized reg of 2-3 motorized inf and one tank bn. The other tank bn would be used as it is now. Or, with two tank bn, one would be split for a company per each inf reg and the other tank bn would be used as is now. I realize that's more armor centric than most would go, but I really think we have been short on armor.
Sorry for the duplication. I tried deleting but it did not work.
Be careful of adding tracked or motorized combat formations. That has a slew of downstream ramifications.
1. The most important, logistics. Increased fuel, ammunition and repair part consumption.
2. Increased requirement for supporting arms, especially tubed artillery. Artillery missions are assigned to no lower than a maneuver regiment, i.e. a regiment in the attack has one artillery battalion assigned the mission of direct support. The assignment of an artillery battery to a maneuver battalion, called dedicated battery is in the artillery world a rarely used assigned mission. In the Corps the assignment of an artillery battery to a MEU may seem normal but to artillery officers it’s supposed to be a rarity.
Back to my comments regarding artillery support. Towed artillery supporting motorized or tracked formations is a lot like a juggler with many balls in the air to keep the whole show going. When to move batteries, how far, when move the trains, when to resupply batteries, etc. Using towed artillery in support of motorized or tracked formations may call for heavier artillery battalions or regiments, and even then movement and support may become problematic due to terrain, weather, or the enemy. One of the biggest fears the Army had in the fight of Soviet forces was the terrain denial by use of chemical munitions. If the commenters are seriously discussing motorized or tracked formations then we should be talking the use of wheeled or tracked artillery. I myself love the M109A7, Paladin. It’s a tried and true SP artillery piece and while at 38 tons with its extended tube is somewhat unwieldy it gives the commander the option of every advanced artillery round in the inventory and the latest in combat systems.
IMO the use of motorized or tracked formations of MEF size will require an artillery regiment with at a minimum of 5 tubed artillery battalions and a HIMAR battalion.
The reason I spend so much time on tubed artillery is to illustrate how quickly formations become very heavy when you increase mobility or the number of maneuver units. I’m not an advocate of the Corps becoming another Army mechanized unit. Becoming too heavy has the same drawbacks as being too light, and the Navy doesn’t have a prayer of being able to lift any Marine formation. I only need point out the Navy can’t even lift a reinforced rifle platoon and NEMESIS launcher.
Upgrade the M1’s and buy them. I would have two Bns of them in each Division. 60 per Bn. We know how to task organize and can take all or none depending on the mission. Two Bn’s of LVTPs as well. The next fight will be a slug fest. You’ll need lots of artillery as well to include SP. The modern M-1 can do so much more than anyone talks about. Drones are additional, not substitutes.
Cfrog layed out 90% of why the modern M-1 is the best tank in the world. It will be even better in another year. Enough said in that.
The Corps has yet to launch the midget missile to kill a ship. Not one.
Doug, I like the idea of two tank bns per division. Myself, I would convert an infantry reg into a dedicated motorized reg of 2-3 motorized infantry bns (ACV mounted) and one tank bn. The other tank bn would be task organized to the other two reg as needed. Or, I would tank one of the tank bns and opcon a company to each regiment. The second tank bn would be task organized as needed. I realise this is more armor centric than many would like, but I have always thought we were short on armor.
Agree…There is no substitute for tanks or tracks on our Assault Amphibian Vehicles. Little, or no thought, was given to the loss of tanks and incompetent testing for the wheeled ACV. It has little amphibious capability and cannot compare to tracked vehicles in most land operations. Marines have already paid with their lives due to these mistakes and there’s more to come. Semper Fi
Little or no thought, sounds about right.
cfrog’s break down of what a good serviceable main battle tank needs particularly the points on the main gun 105mm v. 120mm was very helpful. That said the infantry want and should have the ability to bring armor forward and maybe it is a combination of MBT and the Ontos and Bradley vehicles. While FD2030 was in the main a destructive waste of time and taxpayers money it has brought the Corps to a point where choices can logically be made and reconfiguration of the MAGTF with the right armor and artillery is not the worst outcome if no one is allowed to dawadel along.
Hand in glove is getting the Officer T/O sorted. In 1981 there were 63 general officers. There was one CMC and ACMC in that 63. There was none of this Deputy Commandant BS. That’s like a bunch of Deputy CEO’s. It is just drag on the balance sheet. Get back to basics. Every officer a rifle platoon commander, first then the specific MOS. That will sort some of the issue. More largely, someone make the justification for “Joint” and then “Combantant” commands. More BS. Focus on the Marines and them doing their job of maintaining the top priority of meeting Title X mandates and the rest falls into line. Any command which is not laser focused on Warfighting and maneuver warfare is not very valuable to a Corps with a head count of 172,000. In one sense the Corps is in the best possible position for any significant changes the DOD has cooking. Next seperate the bench warmers from the athletes. Clean up those along for the 20-30 year ride to a pension. We heard our country calling to serve a higher purpose. Not serve to garner a pension and consulting gig at the end of the road. Fire them all, start over.
A couple of points. CMC Smith needs to realise that the Marine Corps is first and foremost, a combined arms naval expeditionary force. It should not be a missile force. The Air Force, Army, and Navy are missile forces. We only have one naval expeditionary force: the Marine Corps. Secondly, this combined arms force needs direct firepower for its ground element. Whether it's called a tank, light tank, mobile protected firepower, the infantry needs a direct mobile firepower system. The M1A2 is probably the best there is. But I also concur with cfrog that the CV90120 appears to be a good weapon. It's in the 40T range and carries a 120 mm gun. We do not have the luxury of starting from scratch to build a new tank. In my opinion, I think the Marine Corps would be wise to purchase the CV90120.
Doug, I like the idea of two tanks bns per division. I would take one of the infantry regiments and convert it to a dedicated motorized reg of 2-3 motorized inf and one tank bn. The other tank bn would be used as it is now. Or, with two tank bn, one would be split for a company per each inf reg and the other tank bn would be used as is now. I realize that's more armor centric than most would go, but I really think we have been short on armor.
Sorry for the duplication. I tried deleting but it did not work.
Be careful of adding tracked or motorized combat formations. That has a slew of downstream ramifications.
1. The most important, logistics. Increased fuel, ammunition and repair part consumption.
2. Increased requirement for supporting arms, especially tubed artillery. Artillery missions are assigned to no lower than a maneuver regiment, i.e. a regiment in the attack has one artillery battalion assigned the mission of direct support. The assignment of an artillery battery to a maneuver battalion, called dedicated battery is in the artillery world a rarely used assigned mission. In the Corps the assignment of an artillery battery to a MEU may seem normal but to artillery officers it’s supposed to be a rarity.
Back to my comments regarding artillery support. Towed artillery supporting motorized or tracked formations is a lot like a juggler with many balls in the air to keep the whole show going. When to move batteries, how far, when move the trains, when to resupply batteries, etc. Using towed artillery in support of motorized or tracked formations may call for heavier artillery battalions or regiments, and even then movement and support may become problematic due to terrain, weather, or the enemy. One of the biggest fears the Army had in the fight of Soviet forces was the terrain denial by use of chemical munitions. If the commenters are seriously discussing motorized or tracked formations then we should be talking the use of wheeled or tracked artillery. I myself love the M109A7, Paladin. It’s a tried and true SP artillery piece and while at 38 tons with its extended tube is somewhat unwieldy it gives the commander the option of every advanced artillery round in the inventory and the latest in combat systems.
IMO the use of motorized or tracked formations of MEF size will require an artillery regiment with at a minimum of 5 tubed artillery battalions and a HIMAR battalion.
The reason I spend so much time on tubed artillery is to illustrate how quickly formations become very heavy when you increase mobility or the number of maneuver units. I’m not an advocate of the Corps becoming another Army mechanized unit. Becoming too heavy has the same drawbacks as being too light, and the Navy doesn’t have a prayer of being able to lift any Marine formation. I only need point out the Navy can’t even lift a reinforced rifle platoon and NEMESIS launcher.
Thanks Greg for your indepth summary and review. Those in a particular MOS know their trade well. Thanks for your input!
An erudite analysis by a true professional.