Compass Points - Strike Ships?
Are Marine Stand-in-Forces needed to strike ships?
Compass Points - Strike Ships?
Are Marine Stand-in-Forces needed to strike ships?
June 10, 2026
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The theory of the Marine Force Design Stand-in-Force units is that small sensor and missile units of Marines hiding on islands off the coast of China will be able to destroy enemy ships at a distance. Marine Corps senior leaders were quick to adopt the controversial theory and make it the focus of the Marine Corps. Now, nearly seven years have past and the Marine Corps has never been able to emplace a string of operational sensor and missile units off the coast of China. With each passing year, the limited range and subsonic Navy Strike Missile, the weapon the Marines would use to strike enemy ships, becomes more dated and deficient.
Is there any way to fix the long the delayed Marine sensor and missile units? One Marine Corps Captain has suggested a needed upgrade to the sensor and missile units. It is the US Air Force, however, that may have found an even better solution to the Marine sensor and missile units deficiencies.
In the pages of USNI Proceedings, Marine Corps Captain, Justin T. Vetterl, warns that there is a gap in the defensive capabilities of the Marine Stand-in-Force sensor and missile units.
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The Marine Littoral Regiment relies on small, dispersed units to control key maritime terrain. The Tentative Manual for Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) states that for littoral combat teams to succeed, they must be “organically equipped, starting at the squad level, with resilient, networked communications and precision fires capabilities, including loitering munitions.”1 Yet, as the Marine Corps prioritizes strategic lethality through assets such as the Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), the infantry units tasked with protecting these assets face a severe kinetic deficit, because the service has not adopted loitering munitions.2 Meanwhile, the divestment of towed artillery batteries has stripped battalion commanders of responsive indirect fires, creating a mid-range gap, between 6 and 20 kilometers, where Marines lack organic strike capabilities.3
Without these fires, littoral combat teams are highly vulnerable to adversary maneuver and massed fires. To bridge this critical capability gap and ensure force survivability, the Marine Corps must urgently accelerate the procurement of commercial-off-the-shelf loitering munitions and make FPV drones organic down to the squad level.
-- Captain Justin T. Vetterl, USMC “The Urgency of Dispersed Lethality”
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Beyond improving the defensive abilities of the sensor and missile units, recent work by the US Air Force may drastically reduce the need for any Marine senor and missile units off the coast of China. Why put vulnerable missile units on islands when there are alternatives in the air?
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The Joint Strike Missile (JSM) is a weapon specifically designed to fit inside the F-35 Lightning II’s internal weapons bay while preserving that fifth-generation multirole warplane’s stealth characteristics. The contract, designed by Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace, is worth $240.9 million. The contract covers missile production, containers, test hardware, and support equipment. Work will run through late 2028 on this new system.
The Kongsberg Defense & Aerospace JSM is the air-launched companion to the iconic Naval Strike Missile (NSM). Unlike older cruise missiles that require external carriages for launch, the JSM fits within the F-35’s internal weapons bays. That means an F-35 can remain low-observable while carrying a serious long-range precision-strike weapon.
JSMs are designed to attack surface warships, land targets, air defense systems, and high-value infrastructure. A combination of GPS, inertial navigation, terrain matching, and an imaging infrared seeker ensures the weapon’s accuracy as it travels from the F-35 to its intended target.
-- National Security Journal
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Compass Points salutes Captain Vetterl for his fine article that warns of the need to accelerate the purchase of commercial-off-the-shelf loitering munitions as a way to increase the safety of the Marine Corps’ dangerously unprotected and unsupported sensor and missile units. Captain Vetterl’s proposal is on target as far as it goes. Perhaps the US Air Force suggests an even more comprehensive solution to the outgoing difficulties of the Marine sensor and missile units.
The Air Force is procuring the new Joint Strike Missile. The JSM is specifically designed to fit inside the F-35 Lightning II’s internal weapons bay. This allows the F-35 to remain stealthy and still strike enemy ships from a distance. With the JSM inside Navy and Marine F-35s, is there really a need for the Marine sensor and missile units hiding on islands? The Marine units — if they were ever in place — would be lightly armed, difficult to move, and dangerously vulnerable. What the Nation requires is not a Marine Corps focused on sensor and missile units designed for one mission in one region; instead, the Nation needs a global, combined arms, crisis response Marine Corps, forward deployed around the globe, prepared to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight.
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USNI Proceedings - June 2026 - Vol. 152/6/1,480
The Urgency of Dispersed Lethality
Accelerate precision fires and first person view drone integration to Marine littoral combat teams.
By Captain Justin T. Vetterl, U.S. Marine Corps
https://www.usni.org/DisperseMarineLethality
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National Security Journal - 06/08/2026
The U.S. Air Force Wants to Turn Every F-35 Into a Stealth Ship-Killer — and a New Missile Hidden in Its Belly Makes It Possible
By Brandon Weicher
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By failing to use an integrated and disciplined combat development process to better prepare the Marine Corps for the challenges of the 21st Century, the senior leadership significantly degraded the Corps’ combined arms and global response capabilities. As a result, the Marine Corps is no longer the Nation’s global 911 force, able to quickly deploy and win across the range of military operations. Nor are the purpose-built Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) and Stand-In Forces (SIF) relevant in the Western Pacific today or in the future.
The senior leadership could and should have done better. If the goal was to create a “sense and make sense” and anti-ship capability, it could have been better accomplished by task organizing for the mission from the Corps’ traditional toolkit of capabilities, augmented with new and better equipment as appropriate. Consider the following:
The U.S. Army is conducting live-fire tests of increment 2 of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is scheduled for FY 2028. This version of the ballistic PrSM has an unclassified range of 300 miles and can hit moving targets on land or at sea. Future increments are expected to increase the range to 600 miles. The Marine Corps has seven batteries of HIMARS in the active force and three batteries in the Reserves. Each battery consists of six missile launchers, for a total of 60 launchers.
And the Marines have other anti-ship options in their toolkit that are better than the ground launched subsonic, 115-mile range Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
One option is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), which is the air-launched joint version of the NSM. The JSM can be carried in the F-35C’s internal weapons bay, which allows the aircraft to maintain its stealth capabilities. Capable of attacking both land and sea targets, the JSM has an unclassified range of 200 miles. When coupled with the combat range of the F-35C (600 miles), targets can be struck at distances approximating 800 miles. The Marines have six squadrons of F-35Cs in the active force and 2 squadrons in the reserve force. Each squadron has a Primary Aircraft Authorization of 12 aircraft, for a total of 96 aircraft.
The JSM can also be carried externally by the F-35B, which degrades some of the aircraft’s stealth capabilities. The combat range of the F-35B is 450 miles, which is 150 miles less than the F-35C. The Marines have twelve squadrons of F-35Bs in the active force, with a PAA of12 aircraft per squadron, for a total of 144 aircraft.
Another anti-ship option available to the Marines is the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (AGM-158 LRASM). The LRASM is designed to strike targets at significantly greater range than other older air-delivered anti-ship missiles. The exact range is classified, although the US Navy states the range is “greater than 200 nautical miles.” The LRASM can be carried by both the F-35C and F-35B but externally on both aircraft. See https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/the-f-35-fighter-can-now-sink-your-battleship/
Clearly, the Marine Corps has better options than the purpose-built MLR and SIF and the subsonic, short-range NSM. There is no need to continue down the current path of a largely purpose-built, regional defense force that is neither survivable nor sustainable inside contested areas. The Marines already have the HIMARS and F-35s and can task organize for an anti-ship mission if necessary. The same case can be made for a “sense and make sense” mission.
The radical restructuring and reorganization of the Marine Corps was never necessary. The planned procurement of 14 Naval Strike Missile Batteries (at the expense of 14 cannon artillery batteries) makes no sense. Aside from the operational limitations of the batteries, the Rogue fires and NMESIS systems are only in the Marine Corps inventory in limited numbers. Budget documents indicate that the 3rd MLR has only received 6 of the required 18 launchers for a full battery and the 12th MLR will not receive an initial 6 launches until FY28. Training and maintenance will be a nightmare. These systems are only in the Marine Corps. This is not the case with the HIMARS and F-35s.
It's not too late for the senior leaders to change course and do the right thing for the Marine Corps, the combatant commanders, and the Nation. Simply stated, reorganize III MEF into a traditional division, wing, and CSS structure; divest the NMESIS and NSM; and task organize for missions from a robust and resilient toolkit of MEF capabilities.
The good Captain's observation that “ . . . the divestment of towed artillery batteries has stripped battalion commanders of responsive indirect fires, creating a mid-range gap, between 6 and 20 kilometers, where Marines lack organic strike capabilities” is another damning indictment of the 38th Commandant’s abandonment of the Combat Development Process. That process was designed to ensure such problems were identified at the outset and before implementation of an operating concept. In recent days Chowder Society II has received confirming information that the 38th Commandant deliberately walked away from that process and turned to a small cabal of retired Marines to undertake what was the primary mission of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Hubris is undeniable in this case and the results an institutional disaster. History will undoubtably condemn him for Force Design 2030 and the Stand-in Force, but the initial act of dereliction of duty was that he caused them to be born outside of a tried and true process.