By failing to use an integrated and disciplined combat development process to better prepare the Marine Corps for the challenges of the 21st Century, the senior leadership significantly degraded the Corps’ combined arms and global response capabilities. As a result, the Marine Corps is no longer the Nation’s global 911 force, able to quickly deploy and win across the range of military operations. Nor are the purpose-built Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) and Stand-In Forces (SIF) relevant in the Western Pacific today or in the future.
The senior leadership could and should have done better. If the goal was to create a “sense and make sense” and anti-ship capability, it could have been better accomplished by task organizing for the mission from the Corps’ traditional toolkit of capabilities, augmented with new and better equipment as appropriate. Consider the following:
The U.S. Army is conducting live-fire tests of increment 2 of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is scheduled for FY 2028. This version of the ballistic PrSM has an unclassified range of 300 miles and can hit moving targets on land or at sea. Future increments are expected to increase the range to 600 miles. The Marine Corps has seven batteries of HIMARS in the active force and three batteries in the Reserves. Each battery consists of six missile launchers, for a total of 60 launchers.
And the Marines have other anti-ship options in their toolkit that are better than the ground launched subsonic, 115-mile range Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
One option is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), which is the air-launched joint version of the NSM. The JSM can be carried in the F-35C’s internal weapons bay, which allows the aircraft to maintain its stealth capabilities. Capable of attacking both land and sea targets, the JSM has an unclassified range of 200 miles. When coupled with the combat range of the F-35C (600 miles), targets can be struck at distances approximating 800 miles. The Marines have six squadrons of F-35Cs in the active force and 2 squadrons in the reserve force. Each squadron has a Primary Aircraft Authorization of 12 aircraft, for a total of 96 aircraft.
The JSM can also be carried externally by the F-35B, which degrades some of the aircraft’s stealth capabilities. The combat range of the F-35B is 450 miles, which is 150 miles less than the F-35C. The Marines have twelve squadrons of F-35Bs in the active force, with a PAA of12 aircraft per squadron, for a total of 144 aircraft.
Another anti-ship option available to the Marines is the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (AGM-158 LRASM). The LRASM is designed to strike targets at significantly greater range than other older air-delivered anti-ship missiles. The exact range is classified, although the US Navy states the range is “greater than 200 nautical miles.” The LRASM can be carried by both the F-35C and F-35B but externally on both aircraft. See https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/the-f-35-fighter-can-now-sink-your-battleship/
Clearly, the Marine Corps has better options than the purpose-built MLR and SIF and the subsonic, short-range NSM. There is no need to continue down the current path of a largely purpose-built, regional defense force that is neither survivable nor sustainable inside contested areas. The Marines already have the HIMARS and F-35s and can task organize for an anti-ship mission if necessary. The same case can be made for a “sense and make sense” mission.
The radical restructuring and reorganization of the Marine Corps was never necessary. The planned procurement of 14 Naval Strike Missile Batteries (at the expense of 14 cannon artillery batteries) makes no sense. Aside from the operational limitations of the batteries, the Rogue fires and NMESIS systems are only in the Marine Corps inventory in limited numbers. Budget documents indicate that the 3rd MLR has only received 6 of the required 18 launchers for a full battery and the 12th MLR will not receive an initial 6 launches until FY28. Training and maintenance will be a nightmare. These systems are only in the Marine Corps. This is not the case with the HIMARS and F-35s.
It's not too late for the senior leaders to change course and do the right thing for the Marine Corps, the combatant commanders, and the Nation. Simply stated, reorganize III MEF into a traditional division, wing, and CSS structure; divest the NMESIS and NSM; and task organize for missions from a robust and resilient toolkit of MEF capabilities.
The good Captain's observation that “ . . . the divestment of towed artillery batteries has stripped battalion commanders of responsive indirect fires, creating a mid-range gap, between 6 and 20 kilometers, where Marines lack organic strike capabilities” is another damning indictment of the 38th Commandant’s abandonment of the Combat Development Process. That process was designed to ensure such problems were identified at the outset and before implementation of an operating concept. In recent days Chowder Society II has received confirming information that the 38th Commandant deliberately walked away from that process and turned to a small cabal of retired Marines to undertake what was the primary mission of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Hubris is undeniable in this case and the results an institutional disaster. History will undoubtably condemn him for Force Design 2030 and the Stand-in Force, but the initial act of dereliction of duty was that he caused them to be born outside of a tried and true process.
A traditionally organized Marine Corps has more utility than the way it is currently organized. The 3rd MarDiv is not functional as a division and is basically combat ineffective. The lack of field artillery prevents fire support for the MLR. The 81mm is a sad excuse for field artillery in this type of organization. I am sure PLA Spec-Ops teams are aware of every move the SIF makes. They are under constant surveillance and will be under fire the moment they deploy. However, a traditionally organized Marine Corps can be the robust combined-arms expeditionary force it is meant to be, plus it can fulfill the anti-ship mission with HIMARS PrSM.
I see your quote from the Captain and raise you a quote from Senator Sullivan of Alaska, “I led the charge in the Congress on the 31 amphibious ship requirement last year… I want to begin with Marine Corps Force Design 2030, a bold and important initiative that I have complimented the Commandant of the Marine Corps on.” - Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Navy and Marine Corps Readiness, May 2023 (with similar supportive remarks in 2025–2026 hearings).
Nice try my good corporal, but our team has worked closely with Senator Sullivan from the outset. Among his many supportive actions was the legislated requirement to have an independent study of Force Design 2030. DOD's decision to task CNA was hardly one that met the requirement of an independent entity, nonetheless CNA's unclassified report was pretty damning but it has yet to see the light of day. Several of us will be with the good Senator again in a few days and we know your quote does not reflect his true feelings. By the way, are you not ashamed that you need to use a pseudonym? Stand up and be counted my friend or you will never have much respect from our team.
If I remember correctly, there was supposed to be a Congressional study done on the FD2030 stuff and submitted to Congress. That was a couple years ago. Has it ever been done? If not, how is the Corps getting away with ignoring this?
If the study supports the Commandant’s FD decision why hasn’t HQMC released the report? Cpl., me thinks that you’re not being truthful with what the report actually says about FD. If FD is everything that the Commandant says it is then why not put it through the Corps’s combat development process? Why, because the process would expose every fallacy that FD is based on.
The point is not whether Senator Sullivan has heard your concerns — he clearly has. The point is that after nearly seven years of engagement on the Hill, hearings, letters, and briefings, the public record still shows continued congressional support for Marine Corps modernization efforts.
I have provided transcripts and links to previous hearings. . . You can go back and (re)watch the film.
Congress has heard the arguments against Force Design. They have also heard from the Marine Corps, the Department, and Combatant Commanders. They are doing their oversight job.
The question is not whether the concerns were heard. The question is why, after hearing them, Congress continues to fund and support the direction.
Ah, a 2023 comment. Wonder how that’s aged. Let’s see:
1. Still saddled with the NSM, still a subsonic, short-ranged and now probably obsolete missile in terms of electronics and infrared countermeasures. I also notice that the Corps has not funded any Block 2 or Block 3 weapons enhancement. Could it be that the real professionals at HQMC know that the NSM is a POS?
2. Still saddled with an active emitter radar that not only paints a target but makes an NMESIS unit quite a nice target also.
3. The MLR, a unit that is a one trick pony. It has NO supporting arms. Its organic indirect supporting arms are limited to 81 mm mortars with an approximate range of 6,000 m.
4. The SIF, is nothing more than, at best, a reinforced rifle company, ill-suited for either offensive or defensive operations without external support. Their only job is to provide security to the NMESIS systems, and then DIP, because there’s no way to displace.
5. The inability to position any size SIF covertly. Given the criminally short range of the NMESIS it’s a basic ISR and targeting task to preplan fires on likely or known SIF sites. Hell we even tell them year after year where we practice emplacing SIF units.
6. The inability to logistically resupply any SIF with any class of supplies, to evacuate wounded, or move an exposed unit from one location to another. The Corps’s answer to the logistics problem is the LSM, a 14 knot (flank speed), target, or to (ahem) forage? If the Commandant’s analysis is correct, that the Navy, INCLUDING full sized amphibious ships cannot operate within the Chinese WEZ without prohibitive losses, what special abilities or characteristics does the LSM possess? What, repainting itself to look like a Chinese junk, or a Carnival Cruise Line ship with the captain dressed as Capt. Von Steuben?
I’m sorry Cpl., your regurgitation of old no longer germane comments by a Congress, an institution that grabs onto shiny baubles like a 2-year, old carries zero weight in professional circles both in this forum and in my guess the active duty arena.
From my 21 May post (you should go back and read all of my testimony summaries from May):
“The 21 May 2026 Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing on the Navy budget provided another remarkably clear indicator of where Congress, the Administration, and senior military leadership currently stand on Force Design and the future role of the Marine Corps.
Contrary to some online narratives, the hearing was not centered on undoing Force Design. It was centered on accelerating and resourcing it.
Several notable themes emerged:
• Continued bipartisan congressional support for Force Design. In his opening statement, Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) stated:
*******“This committee has been very supportive of the Marine Corps force design reforms. They were thoughtfully put together, executed efficiently, and better placed Marines for modern combat.”******
That is a significant statement from the ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee.
• Strong support for LSM and distributed maritime operations. Sen. Baldwin repeatedly pressed the witnesses on accelerating Landing Ship Medium procurement, specifically tying the requirement to deterrence of the PRC inside the First Island Chain.
Gen. Smith described the LSM as “vital,” explaining:
“We’re going to need to move the forces from III MEF and I MEF around the First Island Chain.”
When asked whether rapid acquisition was important given the Davidson Window, Gen. Smith answered in the affirmative and added:
“There’s a saying that if your neighbor says he is going to kill you, you should believe him.”
Acting SECNAV Hung Cao also repeatedly reaffirmed support for full LSM funding regardless of whether it arrives through reconciliation or the base budget.
• Continued validation of NMESIS and stand-in force concepts. Sen. Coons asked directly what the Marine Corps would lose without LSM procurement moving forward.
Gen. Smith responded that the Corps would be:
“Less mobile, with less ability to aggregate and disaggregate and less able to contend with the PRC.”
That statement matters because it directly ties mobility, distributed operations, and stand-in force concepts to the Marine Corps’ operational approach in the Indo-Pacific.
The hearing also reinforced continued congressional and Department support for NMESIS, distributed fires, and sea-denial capabilities as part of a broader joint deterrence framework inside the First Island Chain.
• Continued validation of unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities. The hearing heavily focused on lessons from Ukraine and the rapid proliferation of unmanned systems.
Sen. Collins specifically praised the Marine Corps for rapid experimentation and investment in autonomous systems. Gen. Smith reaffirmed his commitment to unmanned capabilities and summarized the philosophy succinctly:
“Never send a Marine where you can send a bullet.”
• Clear Indo-Pacific alignment. Multiple senators discussed the PRC threat, Taiwan, distributed operations, and maritime maneuver throughout the hearing. Gen. Smith openly confirmed that the Marine Corps’ pacing threat remains the PRC and emphasized the importance of mobility, missile depth, and allied integration in the First Island Chain.
Taken together, the hearing reinforced several realities that are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore:
Force Design remains fully funded.
Force Design remains aligned with the National Defense Strategy.
Force Design continues to receive bipartisan congressional support.
And Force Design continues to be integrated into how senior leaders are thinking about deterrence and warfighting in the Indo-Pacific.
At the same time, the hearing also reinforced something Gen. Smith has consistently emphasized: modernization and crisis response are not mutually exclusive. The Corps continues to push both distributed maritime capabilities and restored amphibious readiness/ARG-MEU presence simultaneously.
That balance — not a retreat from modernization — is what Congress and the Administration continue to support.
All that pablum is great for the uninitiated, but it’s still pablum. Your responses are typical. You haven’t answered any of my questions or rebutted any of my statements. And that’s why no one takes you seriously. If you’d go about honestly answering criticisms of FD it would go a long way in this forum.
But when HQMC gave you the task of carrying water for FD, I guess you salute and carry on.
No — it’s a direct breakdown of congressional testimony.
Watch the video.
Members of Congress have had nearly seven years to hear every argument against Force Design. Many have visited operating forces, seen Stand-in Force concepts firsthand, received classified briefings, reviewed assessments, and exercised oversight most here don’t have.
But after six-plus years of retired leader engagement, hearings, articles, letters, studies, and direct outreach, the public record still shows continued congressional support for Marine Corps modernization.
Why do you think that is? If the concerns you listed (all false) are so compelling, why no change?
Like you, I’m eager to hear about how the meeting with Senator Sullivan goes. More so, I’m eager to hear if the good Senator says anything other than continued compliments to the Corps for their modernization efforts..
so, while I agree that it's good that this missile can ride internal carriage for the F-35, it's imperative to remember that having a slick F-35A/B/C significantly limits the range, necessitating greater mid-air refueling, and therefore generating range rings for our planes to be hunted (as well as at-risk expeditionary ACE bases that they would launch from). All this to say, it's not a perfect solution, but certainly an improvement.
By failing to use an integrated and disciplined combat development process to better prepare the Marine Corps for the challenges of the 21st Century, the senior leadership significantly degraded the Corps’ combined arms and global response capabilities. As a result, the Marine Corps is no longer the Nation’s global 911 force, able to quickly deploy and win across the range of military operations. Nor are the purpose-built Marine Littoral Regiments (MLR) and Stand-In Forces (SIF) relevant in the Western Pacific today or in the future.
The senior leadership could and should have done better. If the goal was to create a “sense and make sense” and anti-ship capability, it could have been better accomplished by task organizing for the mission from the Corps’ traditional toolkit of capabilities, augmented with new and better equipment as appropriate. Consider the following:
The U.S. Army is conducting live-fire tests of increment 2 of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is scheduled for FY 2028. This version of the ballistic PrSM has an unclassified range of 300 miles and can hit moving targets on land or at sea. Future increments are expected to increase the range to 600 miles. The Marine Corps has seven batteries of HIMARS in the active force and three batteries in the Reserves. Each battery consists of six missile launchers, for a total of 60 launchers.
And the Marines have other anti-ship options in their toolkit that are better than the ground launched subsonic, 115-mile range Naval Strike Missile (NSM).
One option is the Joint Strike Missile (JSM), which is the air-launched joint version of the NSM. The JSM can be carried in the F-35C’s internal weapons bay, which allows the aircraft to maintain its stealth capabilities. Capable of attacking both land and sea targets, the JSM has an unclassified range of 200 miles. When coupled with the combat range of the F-35C (600 miles), targets can be struck at distances approximating 800 miles. The Marines have six squadrons of F-35Cs in the active force and 2 squadrons in the reserve force. Each squadron has a Primary Aircraft Authorization of 12 aircraft, for a total of 96 aircraft.
The JSM can also be carried externally by the F-35B, which degrades some of the aircraft’s stealth capabilities. The combat range of the F-35B is 450 miles, which is 150 miles less than the F-35C. The Marines have twelve squadrons of F-35Bs in the active force, with a PAA of12 aircraft per squadron, for a total of 144 aircraft.
Another anti-ship option available to the Marines is the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (AGM-158 LRASM). The LRASM is designed to strike targets at significantly greater range than other older air-delivered anti-ship missiles. The exact range is classified, although the US Navy states the range is “greater than 200 nautical miles.” The LRASM can be carried by both the F-35C and F-35B but externally on both aircraft. See https://www.19fortyfive.com/2025/03/the-f-35-fighter-can-now-sink-your-battleship/
Clearly, the Marine Corps has better options than the purpose-built MLR and SIF and the subsonic, short-range NSM. There is no need to continue down the current path of a largely purpose-built, regional defense force that is neither survivable nor sustainable inside contested areas. The Marines already have the HIMARS and F-35s and can task organize for an anti-ship mission if necessary. The same case can be made for a “sense and make sense” mission.
The radical restructuring and reorganization of the Marine Corps was never necessary. The planned procurement of 14 Naval Strike Missile Batteries (at the expense of 14 cannon artillery batteries) makes no sense. Aside from the operational limitations of the batteries, the Rogue fires and NMESIS systems are only in the Marine Corps inventory in limited numbers. Budget documents indicate that the 3rd MLR has only received 6 of the required 18 launchers for a full battery and the 12th MLR will not receive an initial 6 launches until FY28. Training and maintenance will be a nightmare. These systems are only in the Marine Corps. This is not the case with the HIMARS and F-35s.
It's not too late for the senior leaders to change course and do the right thing for the Marine Corps, the combatant commanders, and the Nation. Simply stated, reorganize III MEF into a traditional division, wing, and CSS structure; divest the NMESIS and NSM; and task organize for missions from a robust and resilient toolkit of MEF capabilities.
The good Captain's observation that “ . . . the divestment of towed artillery batteries has stripped battalion commanders of responsive indirect fires, creating a mid-range gap, between 6 and 20 kilometers, where Marines lack organic strike capabilities” is another damning indictment of the 38th Commandant’s abandonment of the Combat Development Process. That process was designed to ensure such problems were identified at the outset and before implementation of an operating concept. In recent days Chowder Society II has received confirming information that the 38th Commandant deliberately walked away from that process and turned to a small cabal of retired Marines to undertake what was the primary mission of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Hubris is undeniable in this case and the results an institutional disaster. History will undoubtably condemn him for Force Design 2030 and the Stand-in Force, but the initial act of dereliction of duty was that he caused them to be born outside of a tried and true process.
A traditionally organized Marine Corps has more utility than the way it is currently organized. The 3rd MarDiv is not functional as a division and is basically combat ineffective. The lack of field artillery prevents fire support for the MLR. The 81mm is a sad excuse for field artillery in this type of organization. I am sure PLA Spec-Ops teams are aware of every move the SIF makes. They are under constant surveillance and will be under fire the moment they deploy. However, a traditionally organized Marine Corps can be the robust combined-arms expeditionary force it is meant to be, plus it can fulfill the anti-ship mission with HIMARS PrSM.
Okinawa has a robust Communist Party infrastructure, and to assume that the CCP doesn’t have intelligence assets imbedded there is to ignore reality.
For Captain Justin T. Vetterl, U.S. Marine Corps:. BZ Captain, great analysis!
What? Am I seeing cracks in the FD2030 armor coming from the company grade officers that have been "thoroughly indoctrinated" into this since OCS?
They are seeing what the rest of us have seen since this lunacy was announced.
I see your quote from the Captain and raise you a quote from Senator Sullivan of Alaska, “I led the charge in the Congress on the 31 amphibious ship requirement last year… I want to begin with Marine Corps Force Design 2030, a bold and important initiative that I have complimented the Commandant of the Marine Corps on.” - Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Navy and Marine Corps Readiness, May 2023 (with similar supportive remarks in 2025–2026 hearings).
Nice try my good corporal, but our team has worked closely with Senator Sullivan from the outset. Among his many supportive actions was the legislated requirement to have an independent study of Force Design 2030. DOD's decision to task CNA was hardly one that met the requirement of an independent entity, nonetheless CNA's unclassified report was pretty damning but it has yet to see the light of day. Several of us will be with the good Senator again in a few days and we know your quote does not reflect his true feelings. By the way, are you not ashamed that you need to use a pseudonym? Stand up and be counted my friend or you will never have much respect from our team.
If I remember correctly, there was supposed to be a Congressional study done on the FD2030 stuff and submitted to Congress. That was a couple years ago. Has it ever been done? If not, how is the Corps getting away with ignoring this?
If the study supports the Commandant’s FD decision why hasn’t HQMC released the report? Cpl., me thinks that you’re not being truthful with what the report actually says about FD. If FD is everything that the Commandant says it is then why not put it through the Corps’s combat development process? Why, because the process would expose every fallacy that FD is based on.
Yes. The study was done. The fact that nothing came of it tells you all you need to know.
“Nice try?”
That is a direct quote from Senator Sullivan.
The point is not whether Senator Sullivan has heard your concerns — he clearly has. The point is that after nearly seven years of engagement on the Hill, hearings, letters, and briefings, the public record still shows continued congressional support for Marine Corps modernization efforts.
I have provided transcripts and links to previous hearings. . . You can go back and (re)watch the film.
Congress has heard the arguments against Force Design. They have also heard from the Marine Corps, the Department, and Combatant Commanders. They are doing their oversight job.
The question is not whether the concerns were heard. The question is why, after hearing them, Congress continues to fund and support the direction.
And my question still remains as to why you feel the need to use a pseudonym? Could you be an officer at HQMC as many suspect?
Ah, a 2023 comment. Wonder how that’s aged. Let’s see:
1. Still saddled with the NSM, still a subsonic, short-ranged and now probably obsolete missile in terms of electronics and infrared countermeasures. I also notice that the Corps has not funded any Block 2 or Block 3 weapons enhancement. Could it be that the real professionals at HQMC know that the NSM is a POS?
2. Still saddled with an active emitter radar that not only paints a target but makes an NMESIS unit quite a nice target also.
3. The MLR, a unit that is a one trick pony. It has NO supporting arms. Its organic indirect supporting arms are limited to 81 mm mortars with an approximate range of 6,000 m.
4. The SIF, is nothing more than, at best, a reinforced rifle company, ill-suited for either offensive or defensive operations without external support. Their only job is to provide security to the NMESIS systems, and then DIP, because there’s no way to displace.
5. The inability to position any size SIF covertly. Given the criminally short range of the NMESIS it’s a basic ISR and targeting task to preplan fires on likely or known SIF sites. Hell we even tell them year after year where we practice emplacing SIF units.
6. The inability to logistically resupply any SIF with any class of supplies, to evacuate wounded, or move an exposed unit from one location to another. The Corps’s answer to the logistics problem is the LSM, a 14 knot (flank speed), target, or to (ahem) forage? If the Commandant’s analysis is correct, that the Navy, INCLUDING full sized amphibious ships cannot operate within the Chinese WEZ without prohibitive losses, what special abilities or characteristics does the LSM possess? What, repainting itself to look like a Chinese junk, or a Carnival Cruise Line ship with the captain dressed as Capt. Von Steuben?
I’m sorry Cpl., your regurgitation of old no longer germane comments by a Congress, an institution that grabs onto shiny baubles like a 2-year, old carries zero weight in professional circles both in this forum and in my guess the active duty arena.
How has it aged, you ask?
Like fine wine.
From my 21 May post (you should go back and read all of my testimony summaries from May):
“The 21 May 2026 Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing on the Navy budget provided another remarkably clear indicator of where Congress, the Administration, and senior military leadership currently stand on Force Design and the future role of the Marine Corps.
Contrary to some online narratives, the hearing was not centered on undoing Force Design. It was centered on accelerating and resourcing it.
Several notable themes emerged:
• Continued bipartisan congressional support for Force Design. In his opening statement, Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE) stated:
*******“This committee has been very supportive of the Marine Corps force design reforms. They were thoughtfully put together, executed efficiently, and better placed Marines for modern combat.”******
That is a significant statement from the ranking member of the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee.
• Strong support for LSM and distributed maritime operations. Sen. Baldwin repeatedly pressed the witnesses on accelerating Landing Ship Medium procurement, specifically tying the requirement to deterrence of the PRC inside the First Island Chain.
Gen. Smith described the LSM as “vital,” explaining:
“We’re going to need to move the forces from III MEF and I MEF around the First Island Chain.”
When asked whether rapid acquisition was important given the Davidson Window, Gen. Smith answered in the affirmative and added:
“There’s a saying that if your neighbor says he is going to kill you, you should believe him.”
Acting SECNAV Hung Cao also repeatedly reaffirmed support for full LSM funding regardless of whether it arrives through reconciliation or the base budget.
• Continued validation of NMESIS and stand-in force concepts. Sen. Coons asked directly what the Marine Corps would lose without LSM procurement moving forward.
Gen. Smith responded that the Corps would be:
“Less mobile, with less ability to aggregate and disaggregate and less able to contend with the PRC.”
That statement matters because it directly ties mobility, distributed operations, and stand-in force concepts to the Marine Corps’ operational approach in the Indo-Pacific.
The hearing also reinforced continued congressional and Department support for NMESIS, distributed fires, and sea-denial capabilities as part of a broader joint deterrence framework inside the First Island Chain.
• Continued validation of unmanned systems and autonomous capabilities. The hearing heavily focused on lessons from Ukraine and the rapid proliferation of unmanned systems.
Sen. Collins specifically praised the Marine Corps for rapid experimentation and investment in autonomous systems. Gen. Smith reaffirmed his commitment to unmanned capabilities and summarized the philosophy succinctly:
“Never send a Marine where you can send a bullet.”
• Clear Indo-Pacific alignment. Multiple senators discussed the PRC threat, Taiwan, distributed operations, and maritime maneuver throughout the hearing. Gen. Smith openly confirmed that the Marine Corps’ pacing threat remains the PRC and emphasized the importance of mobility, missile depth, and allied integration in the First Island Chain.
Taken together, the hearing reinforced several realities that are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore:
Force Design remains fully funded.
Force Design remains aligned with the National Defense Strategy.
Force Design continues to receive bipartisan congressional support.
And Force Design continues to be integrated into how senior leaders are thinking about deterrence and warfighting in the Indo-Pacific.
At the same time, the hearing also reinforced something Gen. Smith has consistently emphasized: modernization and crisis response are not mutually exclusive. The Corps continues to push both distributed maritime capabilities and restored amphibious readiness/ARG-MEU presence simultaneously.
That balance — not a retreat from modernization — is what Congress and the Administration continue to support.
Full hearing:
https://www.appropriations.senate.gov/hearings/a-review-of-the-presidents-fiscal-year-2027-budget-request-for-the-navy
All that pablum is great for the uninitiated, but it’s still pablum. Your responses are typical. You haven’t answered any of my questions or rebutted any of my statements. And that’s why no one takes you seriously. If you’d go about honestly answering criticisms of FD it would go a long way in this forum.
But when HQMC gave you the task of carrying water for FD, I guess you salute and carry on.
You think what I provided is pablum?
No — it’s a direct breakdown of congressional testimony.
Watch the video.
Members of Congress have had nearly seven years to hear every argument against Force Design. Many have visited operating forces, seen Stand-in Force concepts firsthand, received classified briefings, reviewed assessments, and exercised oversight most here don’t have.
But after six-plus years of retired leader engagement, hearings, articles, letters, studies, and direct outreach, the public record still shows continued congressional support for Marine Corps modernization.
Why do you think that is? If the concerns you listed (all false) are so compelling, why no change?
Like you, I’m eager to hear about how the meeting with Senator Sullivan goes. More so, I’m eager to hear if the good Senator says anything other than continued compliments to the Corps for their modernization efforts..
You are entitled to your own opinions, but not your own facts.
It literally took me less than a minute to find this counter to your first statement about “block 2 not funded”.
https://oshkoshdefense.com/u-s-marine-corps-expands-autonomous-fires-capability-with-oshkosh-defense-rogue-fires-block-2-award/
I highly encourage you to do your own research before posting. To not do so really undermines your statements.
so, while I agree that it's good that this missile can ride internal carriage for the F-35, it's imperative to remember that having a slick F-35A/B/C significantly limits the range, necessitating greater mid-air refueling, and therefore generating range rings for our planes to be hunted (as well as at-risk expeditionary ACE bases that they would launch from). All this to say, it's not a perfect solution, but certainly an improvement.