This entire article shows how much of a farce the Armys plan is. You can get a company of Bradleys on 10 C-17. Where is its logistical support? Where is its air cover? One never commits troops and vehicles without adequate air cover. What you have in the scenario that you laid out is some light armored vehicles and troops stranded on an airfield.
The Army Times article calls the task force "America's Contingency Corps." I thought we were America's contingency/rapid deployment force? At least we used to be! I wonder if the Commandant is aware of this deployment? Better yet, I wonder if he sees the connection?? Once again, too many questions and no real answers.
I don’t care what the US Army and US Airforce says, you cannot sustain an US Army armored battalion or brigade in combat with airlift. If you need an Armored Battalion or Brigade, you are going to need the rest of the armored or mechanized division plus their support. You will not get that until the cargo ships show up with follow on units and the sustainment arrives at the port of debarkation. The biggest lift requirement will be ammo and that has to go by sea. The only ammo that will go by air will be an emergency resupply. During Desert Shield the Air Mobility Command bragged that they were sucking Patriot Missiles off the production line into the back of C-141s to resupply the launchers in Saudi Arabia.
Air Mobility Command can take up to 10 days to establish the air bridge and get the air crews, tankers and ground teams into place to provide full airlift operational support. Even then the problem is not the number of aircraft; the problem is MOG (Maximum On the Ground). MOG is the US Air Force measure of the number of aircraft that can be landed, parked, unloaded, serviced and launched from the airfield. The first problems for the US Central Command Restore Hope Operation was establishing 24hr operations at the Mogadishu Airfield. Once Central Command declared Mogadishu is ready for 24hr ops US Air Mobility Command stated 24 hour ops could not be established until two auxiliary airfields were established. The SECNAV, by not building and maintaining amphibious ships, has established a “gap” in all the Combatant Commanders contingency deployment plans.
What provides the capability to fill the gap between airlift and arrival of cargo ships at a secure port are US Marine Amphibious MEUs, MEBs and MPFs. This is how the deployment went for Desert Storm/Shield.
This entire article shows how much of a farce the Armys plan is. You can get a company of Bradleys on 10 C-17. Where is its logistical support? Where is its air cover? One never commits troops and vehicles without adequate air cover. What you have in the scenario that you laid out is some light armored vehicles and troops stranded on an airfield.
The Army Times article calls the task force "America's Contingency Corps." I thought we were America's contingency/rapid deployment force? At least we used to be! I wonder if the Commandant is aware of this deployment? Better yet, I wonder if he sees the connection?? Once again, too many questions and no real answers.
Who will secure the airfields and hold the surrounding area while all this unloading is taking place. Semper Fi
I don’t care what the US Army and US Airforce says, you cannot sustain an US Army armored battalion or brigade in combat with airlift. If you need an Armored Battalion or Brigade, you are going to need the rest of the armored or mechanized division plus their support. You will not get that until the cargo ships show up with follow on units and the sustainment arrives at the port of debarkation. The biggest lift requirement will be ammo and that has to go by sea. The only ammo that will go by air will be an emergency resupply. During Desert Shield the Air Mobility Command bragged that they were sucking Patriot Missiles off the production line into the back of C-141s to resupply the launchers in Saudi Arabia.
Air Mobility Command can take up to 10 days to establish the air bridge and get the air crews, tankers and ground teams into place to provide full airlift operational support. Even then the problem is not the number of aircraft; the problem is MOG (Maximum On the Ground). MOG is the US Air Force measure of the number of aircraft that can be landed, parked, unloaded, serviced and launched from the airfield. The first problems for the US Central Command Restore Hope Operation was establishing 24hr operations at the Mogadishu Airfield. Once Central Command declared Mogadishu is ready for 24hr ops US Air Mobility Command stated 24 hour ops could not be established until two auxiliary airfields were established. The SECNAV, by not building and maintaining amphibious ships, has established a “gap” in all the Combatant Commanders contingency deployment plans.
What provides the capability to fill the gap between airlift and arrival of cargo ships at a secure port are US Marine Amphibious MEUs, MEBs and MPFs. This is how the deployment went for Desert Storm/Shield.