Compass Points - Swarm Shield
Drones in Ukraine and Taiwan
Compass Points - Swarm Shield
Drones in Ukraine and Taiwan
July 2, 2024
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What do drone swarms over Ukraine have to say about Marine Corps crisis response?
A study from CNAS, "Evolution Not Revolution - Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine" by author Stacie Pettyjohn concluded,
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This report concludes that drones have transformed the battlefield in the war in Ukraine, but in an evolutionary rather than revolutionary fashion.1 While tactical innovation abounds and drones offer some new capabilities, their impact falls short of the truly disruptive change that constitutes a so-called revolution in military affairs. For the most part, Russian and Ukrainian drones remain piloted by humans, are not broadly networked together, and are small, which means their effects tend to be localized. In part, drones have not offered Ukrainians or Russians a decisive edge on the battlefield because both parties are engaged in a fast-paced two-sided cycle of innovation and emulation.
-- Stacie Pettyjohn "Evolution Not Revolution"
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The CNAS drone study on Ukraine was recently expanded to look at China and Taiwan. In the study, "Swarms over the Strait" Stacie Pettyjohn and co-authors found that in any conflict between China and Taiwan drones would be critical. Drone swarms could provide Taiwan with a powerful shield to defend against any amphibious invasion. In addition, however, drone swarms could provide a powerful weapon for China to use as part of any amphibious invasion.
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Today, China is positioned to take advantage of its large fleet of drones, which could provide it with an edge in a war over Taiwan. The United States and Taiwan need to close this gap rapidly and develop a layered system of counterdrone defenses or risk being on the losing side of a war. Washington must also find a way to supply allies and partners, such as Taiwan, with military and commercial drones. And the Pentagon must consider how these diverse technologies enable new operational concepts and doctrine. Ultimately, the United States must recognize that while drones alone would not win a war against China to defend Taiwan, they have become a key part of the competition and the United States cannot afford to remain behind.
-- Stacie Pettyjohn, et al. "Swarms over the Strait"
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The findings of the two CNAS studies are echoed by Marine and author Bing West in his article, "Remember the Wampanoag" that urges the military services to make changes now.
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The tenacity of Marine leaders in denying the laws of physics reflects the obduracy besetting the leaders in all four services. Professionally, they know cheap, AI-equipped unmanned systems armed with missiles, have changed warfare; but emotionally, they resist the divesting of their pricey, vulnerable legacy systems to free up money to invest in upgrades. It’s not just the naval service (Navy and Marines) that rejects change. In land battle, drones now reduce the threat of a successful surprise blitzkrieg and hold vulnerable all supply depots in the rear. All Army (and Marine) platoons, like Ukrainian platoons, should be equipped with disposable attack drones, just as they are equipped with bullets. Yet our ground forces are not adapting to what is the daily reality of the land battles in Ukraine.
-- Bing West
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Drone swarms are here. More drone swarms are coming. But more drone countermeasures are coming as well. As powerful as drones have proven themselves to be in Ukraine, drones have not won victory for either side. Despite millions of drones, the bulk of the fighting in Ukraine remains fought by infantry units in brutal, bloody battles.
Can drone swarms be part of a defensive shield for Taiwan? Undoubtedly. But only a part. What is needed now is more new thinking and a new way forward for all the US services. The Marine Corps needs to rethink its plan to have small units wait on Pacific islands with short range missiles. Drone swarms will change some things, but drone swarms will not change everything. No matter how many drones are manufactured, drones cannot accomplish the mission of global crisis response. Drone technology has not put an end to the need for fully equipped, updated, and enhanced Marine MAGTFs that arrive quickly off a hostile shore prepared to deter, assist, and fight.
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CNAS - 06/20/2024
Swarms over the Strait
Drone Warfare in a Future Fight to Defend Taiwan
By Stacie Pettyjohn, Hannah Dennis and Molly Campbell
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/swarms-over-the-strait
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CNAS - 02/08/2024
Evolution Not Revolution
Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine
By Stacie Pettyjohn
https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/evolution-not-revolution
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Strategika - 07/01/2024
Remember the Wampanoag
Today, millions of drones are battling in the Ukrainian sky, while unmanned naval variants stalk Russian ships. Cheap unmanned kinetic systems have changed the 21st-Century face of war.
By Bing West
https://www.hoover.org/research/remember-wampanoag
An excerpt from Bing West’s article should not be lost in the much larger discussion of drones. This excerpt goes to the very heart of Force Design 2030 and the Stand-in-Force concept. It should drive a stake through the heart of both, but it won’t. Why? Too many uninformed and influential people inside the beltway have already purchased the car without first looking under the hood. To quote Bing West: “…Why build more targets? A classic example is the Marine Corps. A few years ago, the Commandant decided Marines should be ready to sink Chinese warships by shooting missiles from atolls in the South China Sea. At $2 million per unit, 62 missiles with a hundred-mile range were purchased. To get within that hundred-mile range, the Commandant then requested 35 small amphibious ships, each costing $350 million to transport four missiles. At the same time, the Navy was designing a new, cheaper missile with a 350-mile range, to be launched from an aircraft without endangering the crew. Oops. Now there was no need for Marines, at exponentially higher dollar costs, to risk ships and crews venturing into well-defended Chinese waters. But instead of treating the short-range missiles already purchased as a sunk cost and getting back to winning land battles, the Marines have persisted in requesting those 35 vulnerable ships, at a total estimated cost of $11.9 billion and $15 billion. The new Marine mission confounds the U.S Navy; why spend so much for a mission already obsolete?”
I deployed as the BLT S-3 with a MEU to that had a drone detachment in 1986. We all saw the utility and potential. That was 38 years ago. From 1987-90 I was with the Army’s 9th ID at Ft Lewis and experimented with flying and ground based RPVs. I reported to MCRDAC weekly. The good ideas go to Quantico to die. Paralysis through analysis and choked to death by contracting laws red tape and apathy. We had converted tactical aircraft flying as drones for targets since the 1960’s. Is a cruise missile a drone?
Yes, short range reconnaissance drones at the squad level make perfectly good sense. Hence the need for the 15 man squad. Drones for the S-2 and drones as FAC’s for artillery. Could be fielded by Thanksgiving.
The claims of “Revolution” are sexier than “Evolution” when most drone development and defense against drones are rapid evolution. Of course a homemade drone dropping a handgrenade through an open tank hatch captures the imagination of reporters and amateurs. Enemy warehouses have been vulnerable to air attack, commandos, helicopter assault and sabotage for 120 years. A Drone does not change this.
What confuses the issue is that we still lack some definitions and categories for drones. Using “drone” is like using “airplane” or “ship”.
When I came on active duty our shelter half was King Arthur era technology and woefully obsolete. We still had wooden tent pegs. We worse white T Shirts and wore boots you could not give away to the homeless. Less talk, more action.