An excerpt from Bing West’s article should not be lost in the much larger discussion of drones. This excerpt goes to the very heart of Force Design 2030 and the Stand-in-Force concept. It should drive a stake through the heart of both, but it won’t. Why? Too many uninformed and influential people inside the beltway have already purchased the car without first looking under the hood. To quote Bing West: “…Why build more targets? A classic example is the Marine Corps. A few years ago, the Commandant decided Marines should be ready to sink Chinese warships by shooting missiles from atolls in the South China Sea. At $2 million per unit, 62 missiles with a hundred-mile range were purchased. To get within that hundred-mile range, the Commandant then requested 35 small amphibious ships, each costing $350 million to transport four missiles. At the same time, the Navy was designing a new, cheaper missile with a 350-mile range, to be launched from an aircraft without endangering the crew. Oops. Now there was no need for Marines, at exponentially higher dollar costs, to risk ships and crews venturing into well-defended Chinese waters. But instead of treating the short-range missiles already purchased as a sunk cost and getting back to winning land battles, the Marines have persisted in requesting those 35 vulnerable ships, at a total estimated cost of $11.9 billion and $15 billion. The new Marine mission confounds the U.S Navy; why spend so much for a mission already obsolete?”
As the official spokesman for FD (2030), I'll take this opportunity to remind this audience that today, the Marine Corps is better prepared to serve as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of joint campaigns. While our continued experimentation and learning will undoubtedly uncover additional refinements to improve our force, we are confident our collective efforts will result in a Marine Corps organized, trained, and equipped to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. Any questions indicate a failure to understand that concepts like EABO and the LSM will allow SIF to persist inside the WEZ.
"Too many uninformed and influential people inside the beltway have already purchased the car without first looking under the hood" - the financial world is rife with stories of very smart money buying into outright scam level deception schemes that played on all the right talking points. Theranos is the modern classic. WeWork another. Nikolai a runner up. For us Gen Xr's, Enron is another. All situations where all the signs were there. This isn't to say that all fields of advancement are grifts, but enough are to say it pays to keep perspective. The USMC would have been in a pickle (as my mom used to say), if we had divested all our '46s, without a hedge, back in 1988 to invest in the future 'promise of sustained operational capability undemonstrated' of the MV-22.
I deployed as the BLT S-3 with a MEU to that had a drone detachment in 1986. We all saw the utility and potential. That was 38 years ago. From 1987-90 I was with the Army’s 9th ID at Ft Lewis and experimented with flying and ground based RPVs. I reported to MCRDAC weekly. The good ideas go to Quantico to die. Paralysis through analysis and choked to death by contracting laws red tape and apathy. We had converted tactical aircraft flying as drones for targets since the 1960’s. Is a cruise missile a drone?
Yes, short range reconnaissance drones at the squad level make perfectly good sense. Hence the need for the 15 man squad. Drones for the S-2 and drones as FAC’s for artillery. Could be fielded by Thanksgiving.
The claims of “Revolution” are sexier than “Evolution” when most drone development and defense against drones are rapid evolution. Of course a homemade drone dropping a handgrenade through an open tank hatch captures the imagination of reporters and amateurs. Enemy warehouses have been vulnerable to air attack, commandos, helicopter assault and sabotage for 120 years. A Drone does not change this.
What confuses the issue is that we still lack some definitions and categories for drones. Using “drone” is like using “airplane” or “ship”.
When I came on active duty our shelter half was King Arthur era technology and woefully obsolete. We still had wooden tent pegs. We worse white T Shirts and wore boots you could not give away to the homeless. Less talk, more action.
"What confuses the issue is that we still lack some definitions and categories for drones. Using “drone” is like using “airplane” or “ship”." - I was just having this discussion with a friend who is in the industry last night. I advised him to keep the Capability/cost=X equation close. It is easy to start talking cheap/rapid replaceable and start hanging expensive capabilities (EW) on that concept like lights on a Christmas Tree. "It doesn't cost as much as an MQ-9 is not the same thing as "it costs $200 at scale"".
What is the definition of a “swarm”? 50-250-1000 drones? With what payload? And what is targeted? If a determined enemy sent over several “swarms” like the drone displays over ballfields at half time, would not many of the first of them be “dumb” ( no payload) to make a defender use precious assets against them? How long can they stay aloft if not a piloted version of what we use for long distance intelligence and attack ? Obviously there are some members who qualify as experts in this field, but there are many here who drag knuckles in these discussions. ( admit to having no hair left on my knuckles)
Extensive research has been carried out for many decades on drones. Here is a peek from 2017. A search of NPS Thesis will reveal much more. A great topic. Comity should abound. “NPS, Academic Partners Take to the Skies in First-Ever UAV Swarm Dogfight
Javier Chagoya | February 22, 2017
Researchers prepare to launch an unmanned aerial vehicle on an NPS-student-designed catapult launcher during swarm vs. swarm field experimentation at Camp Roberts in southern Monterey County. The current research effort, much of which was pioneered in the university’s Advanced Robotics Systems Engineering Laboratory (ARSENL), is a collaboration between NPS, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Georgia Tech Research Institute.
"At the same time, the Navy was designing a new cheaper missile with a 350-mile range, to be launched from an aircraft without endangering the crew. OOps. Now there is no need for the Marines." (Wampanoag Article). "Unmanned drones guarantee that surface warships (like amphibs) must stand further and further from the conflict zone in order to survive, rendering them ineffective." (Wampanoag Article).
There is article after article stating that FD 2030 is a terribly flawed concept. There is very little written on "What to do in lieu of FD 2030?" As Charles states below in his comments, the Commandant is sticking by his guns based in the recent 1 hour interview. What, may I ask, would you expect this distinguished warrior to do? It could be that some original thinking from the Graybeard side could help move the needle toward resolution more than does article after article of dart throwing.
The Commandant remains adamant that the number of amphibious ships required to support Marine Corps MAGTF requirements is 31 ships. Our eyes start glazing over as we try to envision when in the future there will be 31 amphibious ships available to support the MAGTF requirements. This problem presents an opportunity for original thinking.
One way to consider the resolution of sufficient amphibious ship number to meet MAGTF lift requirements is to reconsider the standard 3 ship ARG mix used to support the MEU. Referring back to the Wampanoag Article, unmanned drones guarantee warships (such as the ARG) must stand further and further back from the conflict zone to survive thus rendering them ineffective. This conclusion has to be a major MAGTF planner concern. Along with this caution is information about the Navy purchase of a missile that can be fired from an aircraft that has a 350 mile range. MAGTF planners should also consider this information.
One option is to change the ARG ship mix for MEU support to 2 LHD amphibious ships per ARG/MEU. If there is a need to support a total of 12 MEUs to meet MAGTF lift requirements then the amphibious ship number needed is 24. With this concept, the Commandant doesn't need 31 amphibious ships, he needs 24. Quit building LPD's. What are some other advantages?
Conceptually, the aviation component would place the MV-22 (Rein) on one LPD and the F-35 contingent on the other LPD. Both of these LPDs with the aircraft would be drone compatible. The F-35s, and possible even the Vipers, could be equipped with the Navy's new 350 mile range missile that would aid defense and survivability closer in to the conflict zone where the Marines need to be. The whole premise of FD 2030 at the start was the lack of survivalabilty of the amphibious ships in future naval warfare scenarios because of missiles. Changing the ARG ship mix to 2 LHDs provides a solution to that concern. Besides the increased standoff the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft provide the ARG/MEU, the 2 LHD ARG mix also greatly enhances available aviation firepower support for the infantry once ashore. (You won't have tanks) Finally, FD 2030 ignored USMC aviation doctrine that requires air superiority for operations. The 2 LHD ARG?MEU ship mix resolves that problem.
It use to be when a Marine presented a problem, the Marine also presented a solution. This is my solution. I look forward to others.
Having just spent an hour plus listening to the 39th CMC conducting a love fest interview with some nice beltway warrior from the Brookings Institue has left this old thinker’s head absolutely spinning. It is not until one hears General Smith discuss MLR’s, SIF (sorta) and this concept of peer to peer foe, fight that the gravity of the poor thinking of FD2030 planners and proponents becomes somewhat clear. Throw in a heavy dollop of political correctness and beltway buzz words and there you have it. It’s was painful to watch and listen to, a bit like Mountain Climbers and bends and thrusts until the cows come home or I learn to lock up my foot locker at Camp Upshur painful….that all said you all may find the interview worth listening to, it was my duty to listen to the other side and try hard not to be biased. That said, there is inherent misalignment with current leadership/managers regarding what is going on in reality in the world and the war that they seem to think is happening tomorrow with Mainland China and the CCP/PLA. cfrog, please keep the very clever gallows humor coming, it’s merits are almost unlimited!
An excerpt from Bing West’s article should not be lost in the much larger discussion of drones. This excerpt goes to the very heart of Force Design 2030 and the Stand-in-Force concept. It should drive a stake through the heart of both, but it won’t. Why? Too many uninformed and influential people inside the beltway have already purchased the car without first looking under the hood. To quote Bing West: “…Why build more targets? A classic example is the Marine Corps. A few years ago, the Commandant decided Marines should be ready to sink Chinese warships by shooting missiles from atolls in the South China Sea. At $2 million per unit, 62 missiles with a hundred-mile range were purchased. To get within that hundred-mile range, the Commandant then requested 35 small amphibious ships, each costing $350 million to transport four missiles. At the same time, the Navy was designing a new, cheaper missile with a 350-mile range, to be launched from an aircraft without endangering the crew. Oops. Now there was no need for Marines, at exponentially higher dollar costs, to risk ships and crews venturing into well-defended Chinese waters. But instead of treating the short-range missiles already purchased as a sunk cost and getting back to winning land battles, the Marines have persisted in requesting those 35 vulnerable ships, at a total estimated cost of $11.9 billion and $15 billion. The new Marine mission confounds the U.S Navy; why spend so much for a mission already obsolete?”
As the official spokesman for FD (2030), I'll take this opportunity to remind this audience that today, the Marine Corps is better prepared to serve as a naval expeditionary force-in-readiness and operate inside actively contested maritime spaces in support of joint campaigns. While our continued experimentation and learning will undoubtedly uncover additional refinements to improve our force, we are confident our collective efforts will result in a Marine Corps organized, trained, and equipped to meet the global challenges of the 21st century. Any questions indicate a failure to understand that concepts like EABO and the LSM will allow SIF to persist inside the WEZ.
(How am I doing Phil et al?)
So when I do a Duck Duck Go search for “Official Spokesperson for FD” It will say Cfrog? Cool. Happy 4th.
"Too many uninformed and influential people inside the beltway have already purchased the car without first looking under the hood" - the financial world is rife with stories of very smart money buying into outright scam level deception schemes that played on all the right talking points. Theranos is the modern classic. WeWork another. Nikolai a runner up. For us Gen Xr's, Enron is another. All situations where all the signs were there. This isn't to say that all fields of advancement are grifts, but enough are to say it pays to keep perspective. The USMC would have been in a pickle (as my mom used to say), if we had divested all our '46s, without a hedge, back in 1988 to invest in the future 'promise of sustained operational capability undemonstrated' of the MV-22.
Cfrog pull leg!
I deployed as the BLT S-3 with a MEU to that had a drone detachment in 1986. We all saw the utility and potential. That was 38 years ago. From 1987-90 I was with the Army’s 9th ID at Ft Lewis and experimented with flying and ground based RPVs. I reported to MCRDAC weekly. The good ideas go to Quantico to die. Paralysis through analysis and choked to death by contracting laws red tape and apathy. We had converted tactical aircraft flying as drones for targets since the 1960’s. Is a cruise missile a drone?
Yes, short range reconnaissance drones at the squad level make perfectly good sense. Hence the need for the 15 man squad. Drones for the S-2 and drones as FAC’s for artillery. Could be fielded by Thanksgiving.
The claims of “Revolution” are sexier than “Evolution” when most drone development and defense against drones are rapid evolution. Of course a homemade drone dropping a handgrenade through an open tank hatch captures the imagination of reporters and amateurs. Enemy warehouses have been vulnerable to air attack, commandos, helicopter assault and sabotage for 120 years. A Drone does not change this.
What confuses the issue is that we still lack some definitions and categories for drones. Using “drone” is like using “airplane” or “ship”.
When I came on active duty our shelter half was King Arthur era technology and woefully obsolete. We still had wooden tent pegs. We worse white T Shirts and wore boots you could not give away to the homeless. Less talk, more action.
"What confuses the issue is that we still lack some definitions and categories for drones. Using “drone” is like using “airplane” or “ship”." - I was just having this discussion with a friend who is in the industry last night. I advised him to keep the Capability/cost=X equation close. It is easy to start talking cheap/rapid replaceable and start hanging expensive capabilities (EW) on that concept like lights on a Christmas Tree. "It doesn't cost as much as an MQ-9 is not the same thing as "it costs $200 at scale"".
What is the definition of a “swarm”? 50-250-1000 drones? With what payload? And what is targeted? If a determined enemy sent over several “swarms” like the drone displays over ballfields at half time, would not many of the first of them be “dumb” ( no payload) to make a defender use precious assets against them? How long can they stay aloft if not a piloted version of what we use for long distance intelligence and attack ? Obviously there are some members who qualify as experts in this field, but there are many here who drag knuckles in these discussions. ( admit to having no hair left on my knuckles)
Stream You Tube for Ukrainian Drone use. WSJ has a piece as do many other outlets.
Extensive research has been carried out for many decades on drones. Here is a peek from 2017. A search of NPS Thesis will reveal much more. A great topic. Comity should abound. “NPS, Academic Partners Take to the Skies in First-Ever UAV Swarm Dogfight
Javier Chagoya | February 22, 2017
Researchers prepare to launch an unmanned aerial vehicle on an NPS-student-designed catapult launcher during swarm vs. swarm field experimentation at Camp Roberts in southern Monterey County. The current research effort, much of which was pioneered in the university’s Advanced Robotics Systems Engineering Laboratory (ARSENL), is a collaboration between NPS, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Georgia Tech Research Institute.
Looking out over a hilly landscape, parade”.
"At the same time, the Navy was designing a new cheaper missile with a 350-mile range, to be launched from an aircraft without endangering the crew. OOps. Now there is no need for the Marines." (Wampanoag Article). "Unmanned drones guarantee that surface warships (like amphibs) must stand further and further from the conflict zone in order to survive, rendering them ineffective." (Wampanoag Article).
There is article after article stating that FD 2030 is a terribly flawed concept. There is very little written on "What to do in lieu of FD 2030?" As Charles states below in his comments, the Commandant is sticking by his guns based in the recent 1 hour interview. What, may I ask, would you expect this distinguished warrior to do? It could be that some original thinking from the Graybeard side could help move the needle toward resolution more than does article after article of dart throwing.
The Commandant remains adamant that the number of amphibious ships required to support Marine Corps MAGTF requirements is 31 ships. Our eyes start glazing over as we try to envision when in the future there will be 31 amphibious ships available to support the MAGTF requirements. This problem presents an opportunity for original thinking.
One way to consider the resolution of sufficient amphibious ship number to meet MAGTF lift requirements is to reconsider the standard 3 ship ARG mix used to support the MEU. Referring back to the Wampanoag Article, unmanned drones guarantee warships (such as the ARG) must stand further and further back from the conflict zone to survive thus rendering them ineffective. This conclusion has to be a major MAGTF planner concern. Along with this caution is information about the Navy purchase of a missile that can be fired from an aircraft that has a 350 mile range. MAGTF planners should also consider this information.
One option is to change the ARG ship mix for MEU support to 2 LHD amphibious ships per ARG/MEU. If there is a need to support a total of 12 MEUs to meet MAGTF lift requirements then the amphibious ship number needed is 24. With this concept, the Commandant doesn't need 31 amphibious ships, he needs 24. Quit building LPD's. What are some other advantages?
Conceptually, the aviation component would place the MV-22 (Rein) on one LPD and the F-35 contingent on the other LPD. Both of these LPDs with the aircraft would be drone compatible. The F-35s, and possible even the Vipers, could be equipped with the Navy's new 350 mile range missile that would aid defense and survivability closer in to the conflict zone where the Marines need to be. The whole premise of FD 2030 at the start was the lack of survivalabilty of the amphibious ships in future naval warfare scenarios because of missiles. Changing the ARG ship mix to 2 LHDs provides a solution to that concern. Besides the increased standoff the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft provide the ARG/MEU, the 2 LHD ARG mix also greatly enhances available aviation firepower support for the infantry once ashore. (You won't have tanks) Finally, FD 2030 ignored USMC aviation doctrine that requires air superiority for operations. The 2 LHD ARG?MEU ship mix resolves that problem.
It use to be when a Marine presented a problem, the Marine also presented a solution. This is my solution. I look forward to others.
Camp Upshur 1971, fun times . We shall overcome. Semper Fidelis.
Having just spent an hour plus listening to the 39th CMC conducting a love fest interview with some nice beltway warrior from the Brookings Institue has left this old thinker’s head absolutely spinning. It is not until one hears General Smith discuss MLR’s, SIF (sorta) and this concept of peer to peer foe, fight that the gravity of the poor thinking of FD2030 planners and proponents becomes somewhat clear. Throw in a heavy dollop of political correctness and beltway buzz words and there you have it. It’s was painful to watch and listen to, a bit like Mountain Climbers and bends and thrusts until the cows come home or I learn to lock up my foot locker at Camp Upshur painful….that all said you all may find the interview worth listening to, it was my duty to listen to the other side and try hard not to be biased. That said, there is inherent misalignment with current leadership/managers regarding what is going on in reality in the world and the war that they seem to think is happening tomorrow with Mainland China and the CCP/PLA. cfrog, please keep the very clever gallows humor coming, it’s merits are almost unlimited!