On April 5, 1943, the Kaiser shipyard in Vancouver, Clark County, launches the Alazon Bay (later renamed Casablanca), the first of some 50 escort carriers the yard produces in little over a year. All told, the Vancouver shipyard, opened in early 1942, turns out more than 140 ships and two drydocks during World War II.
Kaiser's Empire
When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, following the Pearl Harbor attack, industrialist Henry Kaiser, who had been involved in constructing the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams on the Columbia River, turned his attention to producing ships for the war. Kaiser operated seven shipyards on the West Coast. His son Edgar became general manager of the Vancouver yard and two across the Columbia River in Portland, Oregon, which all opened in early 1942.
The three shipyards rapidly boosted employment, and population, in the Vancouver-Portland area. In 1940, the largest payroll in Portland was 1,100 workers. By the end of 1942, when Edgar Kaiser was named Portland's first citizen of the year, employment at the three yards had reached 76,000. Employment peaked a year later, when 97,000 men and women worked at the three yards, 38,000 at the Vancouver facility. More than 10,000 workers in the Vancouver yard were women.
There were only around 18,000 people in Vancouver in 1941. In order to provide for the new shipyard workers recruited from across the country and their dependents, six housing projects, accommodating 45,000 people, were constructed in the area during the war.
The Kaiser shipyards, using prefabrication and special construction methods, were able to substantially reduce the time it took to produce ships. By the time the war ended, the Vancouver yard had constructed more than 140 ships for the United States Navy and Maritime Commission, including Liberty cargo ships, LSTs (tank landing crafts), AP-5 troop transports, C-4 transports, and C-4 cargo ships, along with 50 escort aircraft carriers.
The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is and always has been a submarine oriented facility. It is growing rapidly and a new dry dock and massive gantry crane are in construction. The port is deep (tide makes it very challenging) but up until last year the Coast Guard kept two of its larger cutters at a pier near the refit facility. It’s a valuable asset. Can it be more purposeful? One doubts the question has been asked. Point being we have assets all over the place on both coasts north to south and south to north AND the Gulf Coast ports where ship building going on not too mention the Great Lakes. It is strictly an issue of asset Managment and the current regrime in Washington DC both civilians and military have proven that they are the definition of incompetent. Money sloshes around the puzzle palace like bilge water on the Gerald Ford. Any business that was run like the current DOD would be out of business. Further, what are the foreign policy goals or the body politic? Global cops? Okay then you need the navy to step up and start doing it’s job and a Marine Corps that is accretive to that navy presence. If on the other hand the goals were to change and some reduction in the role of global cops reduced to the western hemisphere and specific pacific regions without enormous concerns for the Chinese “peer” foe than a very different navy is needed and the Corps basically remains as is and unchanged only properly supported. What do we gain in Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East? Europe? Since when was NATO an offensive force? It seems the size and scope of the new CVN class has exposed the nakedness of the Emperor. It’s big, it’s beautiful, it can brawl and it’s so damn big and dumb it is relatively useless until it gets matched up with more big and dumb assets. Back to the basics, if the Corps is NOT capable of meeting Title X than it either needs to scale back up and regain the capability or the requirement has to change. But l, that is not up to any damn self important arrongant four star aka the CMC to decide for himself. Rats hate light, the more we shine in the rats, the harder for them to find the dark to carry out their mischief. Now where are those solar panels from China we bought to power up the bridge on the Gerald Ford…they were just here some where…
"Although the Navy says it will be able to fix the amphibious assault ship Boxer’s (LHD-4) rudder issues pierside, the service is now planning for the problem-ridden ship to be docked for at least 18 months starting next spring."
"The service announced its intentions on the government’s contracting website, SAM.gov, in a May 17 solicitation seeking out contractors capable of conducting a maintenance availability on Boxer beginning in April 2025 and scheduled to end in October 2026."
At the same time......this is happening: "Reasons for the maintenance period aside, the longer a Navy vessel goes without successful deployments the more attention it begins to garner from lawmakers. The Los Angeles-class submarine Boise (SSN-764), which has been effectively sidelined since 2017, has been a favorite target of lawmakers aggravated by ongoing Navy ship maintenance issues.
That submarine is now undergoing an engineering overhaul at HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding, and the Navy expects the work to be finished by September 2029, the service announced in February."
Our current SSN submarine fleet consists of 50 SSN (3 variants) of which 37% (or 21) are not available to deploy or even submerge due to a bottle neck of maintenance.
Does anyone really believe that the Navy can handle ship maintenance?
This is an interesting topic regarding using funds from the Ford Class to pay for more L Class amphibs and the substitution of light carriers (lightning carriers) for the larger CVs. There have been many discussions about using large deck amphibs to augment the larger CVs. A quick negative about this concept is that amphibs are not built to the same standard as are the CVs. They also cannot generate the needed aircraft sorties as a true carrier. See the USNI News article: "The Lightning Carrier Isn't Either" (July 23).
I think the problem regarding ship construction and the need for more amphibs is a much larger problem. There have been many Navy ship programs which have failed to produce. The Zumwalt Class of just three destroyers and the Littoral Combat Ship programs are just a few examples. Today there was an article in the USNI News regarding the Constellation Class frigates, which may be heavier than anticipated and unable to be upgraded in the future due to the weight increase. The Congressional Budget Office has reported that the cost of the lead ship of the Constellations was underestimated by 40%. So, along with Commandant Berger's lowering of the need for more L Class amphibs there seems to be poor management of funds or poor program performance of the needed ships. Simply put, there is no accountability for the construction of the ships we need.
Yes, you are absolutely correct about a bigger problem with management of shipbuilding, repair, and maintenance, especially by the Navy / DoD. With respect to shipbuilding, this article from the Conservative Wahoo does a great job breaking down a key aspect of the challenge (self induced from the .gov side)for shipbuilders: https://conservativewahoo.substack.com/p/lets-talk-about-shipbuilding.
The key take away is that high volatility on the order side in the last 10 years of any given 30 year plan is a huge impediment to the industrial base when it comes to preparing to build against projections. There are other issues as well, and there are ways to mitigate them.
One additional note: Also from The Conservative Wahoo. He found the following: "2024 National Defense Authorization Act amended 10 USC Art 3501 to say the following:
(a) In General.-To the extent that funds are otherwise available for obligation, the head of an agency may enter into multiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the head of that agency finds each of the following:
(1) That the use of such a contract will result in-
(A) significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts; or
(B) necessary defense industrial base stability not otherwise achievable through annual contracts.
Right there in black and white, Congress has given the Navy the authority to enter into MYP contracts in order to bring stability to the industrial base, not JUST to get at cost savings." (source-https://conservativewahoo.substack.com/p/the-greatest-gathering-of-men-since).
It is the USMC's vested interest to (by both gentlemanly and ungentlemanly means as neccessary) push the Navy into multi year programs for Amphib acquisition. Granted, it means we could lock in for quicker attainment of LSMs (fyi -LSM stands for undernourished sub-par LST), but I'll take that evil if it means more LHDs.
The concept of letting the USS Gerald Ford pay is interesting. However, it is nothing more than a pipe dream. There are too many bureaucratic hands involved from Congress to the ship builders. These bureaucrats are not about to let this concept become a reality unless there is serious monetary compensation paid to them. Just an opinion.
Meanwhile the US Goal is 100,000 artillery shells per month. “A new Howitzer ammo plant nearly doubles US production, but it's still not nearly enough to match Russia's output
Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
A new 155mm factory in Texas aims to produce 30,000 rounds a month, per The New York Times.
It's part of the US plan to manufacture 100,000 rounds a month by the end of 2025.
But that pales to Russia's annual production estimates, which go up to 3 million to 4.5 million.” … I thought Artillery was an obsolete and definitely not DEI approved.
HI Sutton “Covert Shores”!…Here is a Chinese boat Our Marines could use….Learn EVERYTHING about Special Forces subsCovert Shores 2nd Edition. A world history of naval Special Forces, their missions and their specialist vehicles. SEALs, SBS, COMSUBIN, Sh-13, Spetsnaz, Kampfschwimmers, Commando Hubert, 4RR and many more.
“Check it out on Amazon “..the book not the boat…
Relevance to military
The usefulness of a discrete (read ‘stealthy’) landing craft capable of putting a Main Battle Tank (MBT) ashore undetected has been raised by some Naval Infantry / Marines units in NATO. Current mechanized landing craft (LCM) are susceptible to antitank missiles, and are not discrete enough to take an enemy by surprise. Consequently commando raids to neutralize local air defenses and to secure the landing beach are primarily infantry affairs, landed by small boats or helicopter. Again, both are liable to detection. The ability to land even a single MBT as part of the pre-landing raiding or securing force would be a game changer.
A real American Sea Story.
Kaiser shipyard in Vancouver launches its first escort aircraft carrier on April 5, 1943.
By Kit Oldham Posted 2/21/2003 HistoryLink.org Essay 5266
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On April 5, 1943, the Kaiser shipyard in Vancouver, Clark County, launches the Alazon Bay (later renamed Casablanca), the first of some 50 escort carriers the yard produces in little over a year. All told, the Vancouver shipyard, opened in early 1942, turns out more than 140 ships and two drydocks during World War II.
Kaiser's Empire
When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, following the Pearl Harbor attack, industrialist Henry Kaiser, who had been involved in constructing the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams on the Columbia River, turned his attention to producing ships for the war. Kaiser operated seven shipyards on the West Coast. His son Edgar became general manager of the Vancouver yard and two across the Columbia River in Portland, Oregon, which all opened in early 1942.
The three shipyards rapidly boosted employment, and population, in the Vancouver-Portland area. In 1940, the largest payroll in Portland was 1,100 workers. By the end of 1942, when Edgar Kaiser was named Portland's first citizen of the year, employment at the three yards had reached 76,000. Employment peaked a year later, when 97,000 men and women worked at the three yards, 38,000 at the Vancouver facility. More than 10,000 workers in the Vancouver yard were women.
There were only around 18,000 people in Vancouver in 1941. In order to provide for the new shipyard workers recruited from across the country and their dependents, six housing projects, accommodating 45,000 people, were constructed in the area during the war.
The Kaiser shipyards, using prefabrication and special construction methods, were able to substantially reduce the time it took to produce ships. By the time the war ended, the Vancouver yard had constructed more than 140 ships for the United States Navy and Maritime Commission, including Liberty cargo ships, LSTs (tank landing crafts), AP-5 troop transports, C-4 transports, and C-4 cargo ships, along with 50 escort aircraft carriers.
Look at Active US Navy ship history.
12/31/1944. 2147 Amphibious Ships
https://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/us-ship-force-levels.html
Great reference.
The Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is and always has been a submarine oriented facility. It is growing rapidly and a new dry dock and massive gantry crane are in construction. The port is deep (tide makes it very challenging) but up until last year the Coast Guard kept two of its larger cutters at a pier near the refit facility. It’s a valuable asset. Can it be more purposeful? One doubts the question has been asked. Point being we have assets all over the place on both coasts north to south and south to north AND the Gulf Coast ports where ship building going on not too mention the Great Lakes. It is strictly an issue of asset Managment and the current regrime in Washington DC both civilians and military have proven that they are the definition of incompetent. Money sloshes around the puzzle palace like bilge water on the Gerald Ford. Any business that was run like the current DOD would be out of business. Further, what are the foreign policy goals or the body politic? Global cops? Okay then you need the navy to step up and start doing it’s job and a Marine Corps that is accretive to that navy presence. If on the other hand the goals were to change and some reduction in the role of global cops reduced to the western hemisphere and specific pacific regions without enormous concerns for the Chinese “peer” foe than a very different navy is needed and the Corps basically remains as is and unchanged only properly supported. What do we gain in Africa, Central Asia, the Middle East? Europe? Since when was NATO an offensive force? It seems the size and scope of the new CVN class has exposed the nakedness of the Emperor. It’s big, it’s beautiful, it can brawl and it’s so damn big and dumb it is relatively useless until it gets matched up with more big and dumb assets. Back to the basics, if the Corps is NOT capable of meeting Title X than it either needs to scale back up and regain the capability or the requirement has to change. But l, that is not up to any damn self important arrongant four star aka the CMC to decide for himself. Rats hate light, the more we shine in the rats, the harder for them to find the dark to carry out their mischief. Now where are those solar panels from China we bought to power up the bridge on the Gerald Ford…they were just here some where…
In the mean time....the Navy still can't get the Boxer right....
https://breakingdefense.com/2024/05/amphib-boxer-soon-to-be-sidelined-again-for-18-months-of-maintenance/?utm_campaign=dfn-ebb&utm_medium=email&utm_source=sailthru
"Although the Navy says it will be able to fix the amphibious assault ship Boxer’s (LHD-4) rudder issues pierside, the service is now planning for the problem-ridden ship to be docked for at least 18 months starting next spring."
"The service announced its intentions on the government’s contracting website, SAM.gov, in a May 17 solicitation seeking out contractors capable of conducting a maintenance availability on Boxer beginning in April 2025 and scheduled to end in October 2026."
At the same time......this is happening: "Reasons for the maintenance period aside, the longer a Navy vessel goes without successful deployments the more attention it begins to garner from lawmakers. The Los Angeles-class submarine Boise (SSN-764), which has been effectively sidelined since 2017, has been a favorite target of lawmakers aggravated by ongoing Navy ship maintenance issues.
That submarine is now undergoing an engineering overhaul at HII’s Newport News Shipbuilding, and the Navy expects the work to be finished by September 2029, the service announced in February."
Our current SSN submarine fleet consists of 50 SSN (3 variants) of which 37% (or 21) are not available to deploy or even submerge due to a bottle neck of maintenance.
Does anyone really believe that the Navy can handle ship maintenance?
This is an interesting topic regarding using funds from the Ford Class to pay for more L Class amphibs and the substitution of light carriers (lightning carriers) for the larger CVs. There have been many discussions about using large deck amphibs to augment the larger CVs. A quick negative about this concept is that amphibs are not built to the same standard as are the CVs. They also cannot generate the needed aircraft sorties as a true carrier. See the USNI News article: "The Lightning Carrier Isn't Either" (July 23).
I think the problem regarding ship construction and the need for more amphibs is a much larger problem. There have been many Navy ship programs which have failed to produce. The Zumwalt Class of just three destroyers and the Littoral Combat Ship programs are just a few examples. Today there was an article in the USNI News regarding the Constellation Class frigates, which may be heavier than anticipated and unable to be upgraded in the future due to the weight increase. The Congressional Budget Office has reported that the cost of the lead ship of the Constellations was underestimated by 40%. So, along with Commandant Berger's lowering of the need for more L Class amphibs there seems to be poor management of funds or poor program performance of the needed ships. Simply put, there is no accountability for the construction of the ships we need.
Randy-
Yes, you are absolutely correct about a bigger problem with management of shipbuilding, repair, and maintenance, especially by the Navy / DoD. With respect to shipbuilding, this article from the Conservative Wahoo does a great job breaking down a key aspect of the challenge (self induced from the .gov side)for shipbuilders: https://conservativewahoo.substack.com/p/lets-talk-about-shipbuilding.
The key take away is that high volatility on the order side in the last 10 years of any given 30 year plan is a huge impediment to the industrial base when it comes to preparing to build against projections. There are other issues as well, and there are ways to mitigate them.
One additional note: Also from The Conservative Wahoo. He found the following: "2024 National Defense Authorization Act amended 10 USC Art 3501 to say the following:
(a) In General.-To the extent that funds are otherwise available for obligation, the head of an agency may enter into multiyear contracts for the purchase of property whenever the head of that agency finds each of the following:
(1) That the use of such a contract will result in-
(A) significant savings of the total anticipated costs of carrying out the program through annual contracts; or
(B) necessary defense industrial base stability not otherwise achievable through annual contracts.
Right there in black and white, Congress has given the Navy the authority to enter into MYP contracts in order to bring stability to the industrial base, not JUST to get at cost savings." (source-https://conservativewahoo.substack.com/p/the-greatest-gathering-of-men-since).
It is the USMC's vested interest to (by both gentlemanly and ungentlemanly means as neccessary) push the Navy into multi year programs for Amphib acquisition. Granted, it means we could lock in for quicker attainment of LSMs (fyi -LSM stands for undernourished sub-par LST), but I'll take that evil if it means more LHDs.
The concept of letting the USS Gerald Ford pay is interesting. However, it is nothing more than a pipe dream. There are too many bureaucratic hands involved from Congress to the ship builders. These bureaucrats are not about to let this concept become a reality unless there is serious monetary compensation paid to them. Just an opinion.
Meanwhile the US Goal is 100,000 artillery shells per month. “A new Howitzer ammo plant nearly doubles US production, but it's still not nearly enough to match Russia's output
By Matthew Loh, 2 days ago
Business
Business Insider
Follow
https://img.particlenews.com/image.php?url=3xF4Y6_0tYaj1xv00
A Ukrainian soldier prepares 155mm shells.
Diego Herrera Carcedo/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
A new 155mm factory in Texas aims to produce 30,000 rounds a month, per The New York Times.
It's part of the US plan to manufacture 100,000 rounds a month by the end of 2025.
But that pales to Russia's annual production estimates, which go up to 3 million to 4.5 million.” … I thought Artillery was an obsolete and definitely not DEI approved.
HI Sutton “Covert Shores”!…Here is a Chinese boat Our Marines could use….Learn EVERYTHING about Special Forces subsCovert Shores 2nd Edition. A world history of naval Special Forces, their missions and their specialist vehicles. SEALs, SBS, COMSUBIN, Sh-13, Spetsnaz, Kampfschwimmers, Commando Hubert, 4RR and many more.
“Check it out on Amazon “..the book not the boat…
Relevance to military
The usefulness of a discrete (read ‘stealthy’) landing craft capable of putting a Main Battle Tank (MBT) ashore undetected has been raised by some Naval Infantry / Marines units in NATO. Current mechanized landing craft (LCM) are susceptible to antitank missiles, and are not discrete enough to take an enemy by surprise. Consequently commando raids to neutralize local air defenses and to secure the landing beach are primarily infantry affairs, landed by small boats or helicopter. Again, both are liable to detection. The ability to land even a single MBT as part of the pre-landing raiding or securing force would be a game changer.