The more one studies Force Design, the worse it looks. One's imagination is truly boggled by the incompetence that created this disaster. One's faith is tested by the arrogance that perpetuates it.
Concur, sir. But, our faith must hold firm. I am reminded of days (we’ve all studied) immediately after WW I - a new foe, a rising power with new capabilities & vastly expanded territory, and we had nothing to deal with that situation. The reconstitution of the Corps is a campaign worth waging.
In August 1993, Col Gary Anderson, a frequent critic of FD2030, published a Naval War College paper entitled: “Beyond Mahan: Proposal for the Naval Strategy in the Twenty First”. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/6/. This paper first recognizes the importance and need for a Naval “Littoral” Strategy. He discusses the topics of “Forward Presence” and “Crisis Response” in relation to the key idea of the US Navy’s (and US Marine Corps) need to shift from a “Mahan” Strategy to a regional “Littoral” Strategy.
Col Anderson’s paper was written after Desert Shield/Storm, the Soviet Union collapse and before the emergence CCP threat in the Pacific. His discussion on the expanding and contracting of “The Littoral Battle Space Control Area (LBCA)” (p.19) is very insightful and definitely turns on a “light bulb” or two. He also breaks down Littoral Operations into Phases. Phase 1 is “Achieving Superiority In the Littoral Battle Space Control Area” establishing control of the land. sea, air, and space areas. Phase II is “Probing for the Seams” where we probe multiple points with the “LCAC-LAV-helicopter” (LLH) teams to find a seam to land “where the enemy is not”. “The LLH team becomes the moral equivalent of the swift German reconnaissance forces that made the blitzkrieg so successful by finding and exploiting seams in enemy defenses in order to allow forces to flow through in what Liddle Hart called the raging torrent”. Phase III “Seizing the Lodgment” fits nicely into existing amphibious doctrine. Phase VI “The Joint Raging Torrent” is the introduction of Army and Air Force packages providing the “hammer to end the conflict”. Phase V “Turning Out the Lights and Closing the Door” closes the operation where the Naval Forces are the last out.
Remarkably, Col Anderson makes no recommendations to change FMF Force structure. We cannot say the same for General Smith’s continued support and experimentation of the MLR. Col Anderson keeps the flexibility, adaptability and combat power of the Marine Corps MAGTF. His recommended changes are directed at C&C and Doctrine. His strategy is a Naval “Littoral Strategy” but can support the national military strategy addressing the CCP threat. In addition, Col Anderson’s paper is something that should have been studied and WAR GAMED before we embarked on FD2030. I salute Col Anderson for a forgotten but a job well done. His paper helps me with my “sinking feeling”. If there was a Marine Corps Hall of Fame, I would save Col Anderson a spot next to LtCol “Pete” Ellis. Semper Fi Brother.
With China's Maritime Silk Road heavily invested in the Arabian and Sea and the Bay of Bengal,
the area begs for a MEU or two, to be operational in the Indian Ocean. These MEU's could seize one or more of these ports, conduct HIMARS raids in the area, or establish expeditionary airfields for aircraft armed with "Quick Sink" munitions. The same goes for Chinese ports/areas in South America. Thus the utility of the MEU "Swiss Army Knife" as opposed to the single mission Littoral Regiment.
Yes. Col Gary Anderson's 1993 paper established the need for three CBVGs and ARG/MEU(SOC) constantly on station with three MPS in the "three regions deemed to be of vital interest the United States". A lot of the US "vital" interests has changed since then and the need for Amphibious MEUs has increased substantially. As Commandant, General Neller stated we needed 50 amphibious ships for the Combatant Commanders. He was waiving the red flag that the global situation was changing increasing the regional Combatant Commanders need for amphibious MEUs. I think we need 5 Amphibious MEUs (EURCOM, CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and 2 for INDIOPACOM). Yep, that is 65 amphibs and that number (and anything over 31 amphibs) is inconceivable as long as the US Navy can't solve its ship maintenance problem.
Congratulations to the USAF for an innovative solution to this threat. The race to Force Design 2030 has caused a loss of its crisis response mission capability and an inability to respond to its new intended mission. Such a drastic change of mission without congressional approval or even peer review by retired general officers with multi war experience has turned into a potential disaster.
"The Quicksink can never arrive off the coast of a troubled shore ready to deter, assist, or fight" - Compass Point channels Rowdy Roddy Piper coming off the top rope.
The more one studies Force Design, the worse it looks. One's imagination is truly boggled by the incompetence that created this disaster. One's faith is tested by the arrogance that perpetuates it.
Concur, sir. But, our faith must hold firm. I am reminded of days (we’ve all studied) immediately after WW I - a new foe, a rising power with new capabilities & vastly expanded territory, and we had nothing to deal with that situation. The reconstitution of the Corps is a campaign worth waging.
Agree 100%, sir. A reconstituted pre-FD Marine Corps, will prove more valuable than the Marine missile force.
“Want a new idea, read an old book (or paper)”
In August 1993, Col Gary Anderson, a frequent critic of FD2030, published a Naval War College paper entitled: “Beyond Mahan: Proposal for the Naval Strategy in the Twenty First”. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/6/. This paper first recognizes the importance and need for a Naval “Littoral” Strategy. He discusses the topics of “Forward Presence” and “Crisis Response” in relation to the key idea of the US Navy’s (and US Marine Corps) need to shift from a “Mahan” Strategy to a regional “Littoral” Strategy.
IMHO a war with the CCP will be a global war, however, that war will be fought not only in the littoral areas of the Pacific but also multiple littoral regions across the globe. Read this: https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-maritime-silk-road-strategic-and-economic-implications-indo-pacific-region The CCP’s BRI recognizes their important need to access SLOCs in order to feed their population and keep their people working. Currently, the only shipping moving through the Red Sea is oil tankers sailing to CCP Ports. https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2024/08/21/greek-tanker-drifting-ablaze-after-suspected-houthi-attacks-in-red-sea/?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=dfn-dnr To think that the CCP has not added this scenario to their warfighting bag of tricks is naive. The CCP has watched and taken note that the US has striped forces from the Pacific in order to sit in CENTCOM’s AOA to watch Hamas, Hizballah, the Houthis, and Iran to shoot missiles at Israel.
Col Anderson’s paper was written after Desert Shield/Storm, the Soviet Union collapse and before the emergence CCP threat in the Pacific. His discussion on the expanding and contracting of “The Littoral Battle Space Control Area (LBCA)” (p.19) is very insightful and definitely turns on a “light bulb” or two. He also breaks down Littoral Operations into Phases. Phase 1 is “Achieving Superiority In the Littoral Battle Space Control Area” establishing control of the land. sea, air, and space areas. Phase II is “Probing for the Seams” where we probe multiple points with the “LCAC-LAV-helicopter” (LLH) teams to find a seam to land “where the enemy is not”. “The LLH team becomes the moral equivalent of the swift German reconnaissance forces that made the blitzkrieg so successful by finding and exploiting seams in enemy defenses in order to allow forces to flow through in what Liddle Hart called the raging torrent”. Phase III “Seizing the Lodgment” fits nicely into existing amphibious doctrine. Phase VI “The Joint Raging Torrent” is the introduction of Army and Air Force packages providing the “hammer to end the conflict”. Phase V “Turning Out the Lights and Closing the Door” closes the operation where the Naval Forces are the last out.
Remarkably, Col Anderson makes no recommendations to change FMF Force structure. We cannot say the same for General Smith’s continued support and experimentation of the MLR. Col Anderson keeps the flexibility, adaptability and combat power of the Marine Corps MAGTF. His recommended changes are directed at C&C and Doctrine. His strategy is a Naval “Littoral Strategy” but can support the national military strategy addressing the CCP threat. In addition, Col Anderson’s paper is something that should have been studied and WAR GAMED before we embarked on FD2030. I salute Col Anderson for a forgotten but a job well done. His paper helps me with my “sinking feeling”. If there was a Marine Corps Hall of Fame, I would save Col Anderson a spot next to LtCol “Pete” Ellis. Semper Fi Brother.
With China's Maritime Silk Road heavily invested in the Arabian and Sea and the Bay of Bengal,
the area begs for a MEU or two, to be operational in the Indian Ocean. These MEU's could seize one or more of these ports, conduct HIMARS raids in the area, or establish expeditionary airfields for aircraft armed with "Quick Sink" munitions. The same goes for Chinese ports/areas in South America. Thus the utility of the MEU "Swiss Army Knife" as opposed to the single mission Littoral Regiment.
Yes. Col Gary Anderson's 1993 paper established the need for three CBVGs and ARG/MEU(SOC) constantly on station with three MPS in the "three regions deemed to be of vital interest the United States". A lot of the US "vital" interests has changed since then and the need for Amphibious MEUs has increased substantially. As Commandant, General Neller stated we needed 50 amphibious ships for the Combatant Commanders. He was waiving the red flag that the global situation was changing increasing the regional Combatant Commanders need for amphibious MEUs. I think we need 5 Amphibious MEUs (EURCOM, CENTCOM, AFRICOM, and 2 for INDIOPACOM). Yep, that is 65 amphibs and that number (and anything over 31 amphibs) is inconceivable as long as the US Navy can't solve its ship maintenance problem.
Congratulations to the USAF for an innovative solution to this threat. The race to Force Design 2030 has caused a loss of its crisis response mission capability and an inability to respond to its new intended mission. Such a drastic change of mission without congressional approval or even peer review by retired general officers with multi war experience has turned into a potential disaster.
"The Quicksink can never arrive off the coast of a troubled shore ready to deter, assist, or fight" - Compass Point channels Rowdy Roddy Piper coming off the top rope.