For the last several years, I have been a regular reader of Compass Points and multiple other publications and sources that have both critiqued and defended "Force Design 2030" (and now "Force Design"). I suspect this is common for those of us who were privileged to serve for decades as Marines. While I believe the criticism of Force Design is merited, I am not certain that all those offering their critiques have been completely forthright or fairly introspective.
To say that Force Design was hastily conceived and poorly tested is true. More importantly, its implementation strategy (divest to invest) accepted an inordinate level of both institutional and national risk. Divesting capabilities and capacities associated with the Marine Corps' primary, unique role in global crisis response to invest in an unproven, single theater-focused concept -- one arguably duplicative of other service concepts, and supported by untested, "emerging" technologies -- was imprudent.
But one should closely examine the environment from which Force Design emerged. At the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, we had around 63 L-class amphibious ships. By 2019, we had 34. The maintenance readiness rates of our amphibious ships over that span atrophied even more rapidly than the number of ships. And Maritime Prepositioned Ship (MPS) Squadrons had been reduced from three to two.
We may have had the best-equipped, most capable Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in history, but without the dedicated strategic and operational lift needed to rapidly respond, and the associated systems needed to defend that lift, it is challenging, if not impossible, to serve effectively as the nation's global crisis response force. The host nation permissions required to support prepositioned, land-based special purpose MAGTFs incur similar limitations as those associated with Force Design units.
In short, the 38th Commandant and Force Design did not cause the atrophy of the amphibious fleet. Abandoning the long-accepted Operational Plan rationale for the amphibious ship floor has had no appreciable impact relative to the reduction experienced over the previous three decades. During that time, the Marine Corps had eight Commandants, two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, multiple geographic commanders, a few cabinet secretaries (including a Secretary of Defense), a National Security Advisor, and several sitting Members of Congress (both in the House and the Senate). Even with all of this representation, how effective were we in preserving the strategic and operational lift upon which the MAGTF relies to perform its role in global crisis response?
Having offered a critique of both Force Design and many of its critics, I also humbly acknowledge my own failing to effectively defend the MAGTF and its vital role in our nation's security. For a brief period, I served as the 37th Commandant's senior liaison to Congress. As has historically been the case, the Navy had little interest in advocating for amphibious or maritime prepositioned ships. They view this as a Marine Corps responsibility, and worse, as a competitor to platforms upon which they place more value. It was not uncommon for some senior Navy officers to speak about the vulnerability of amphibious ships in the anti-access/are denial (A2AD) environment without pointing out that other capital ships experience similar vulnerabilities without proper augmentation, enhanced technology, and applicable tactics.
Within Congress itself, Member discussions surrounding social initiatives consumed significantly more time than those associated with specific warfighting capabilities. The professional staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee was convinced that amphibious ships could not be defended in the western Pacific, and they were fixated on the close fight in the first island chain. They had a unique interest in evolving a lightning carrier concept. Despite a parade of our most capable senior officers explaining in great detail the importance of responsive, forward-deployed Amphibious Ready Groups with Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG-MEUs), made scalable by land- and sea-based prepositioned assets, these staffers continued to believe that the MAGTF was synonymous with a World War II-era amphibious assault.
I can assure you that both the Members of the Congressional armed services committees and their staffs were thoroughly familiarized with the many arguments Compass Points and others have been arguing in the last several years. They simply did not resonate, and they had not resonated for years. This is the environment the 38th Commandant inherited.
While I do not believe Force Design is the answer, I do believe that it is serving a unique and valuable purpose. It has brought about the richest discussions concerning Marine Corps roles and concepts since those associated with maneuver warfare. It has mobilized many of our Corps' greatest intellects from all eras (with the notable and unfortunate exception of those in the late 2010s). Most importantly, this debate has promoted greater Congressional and public attention to what the Marine Corps does and what is required for the Corps to do it effectively.
The confluence of current events is also somewhat fortuitous, as the demand for regional crisis response forces has rarely been higher. The public should be made aware of the increased risk in the Pacific when the 31st MEU is deployed out of area. It should also be made aware of the gap U.S. Southern Command experiences when it loses an ARG-MEU and relies instead on a land-based SPMAGTF. Perhaps most importantly, it should be made aware of the consequences of not responding to regional crises.
Finally, and as several senior leaders have noted, it is time to take the lessons of the last decade, apply them to the combat development process, create a newly revised operational concept, and thoroughly vet and test it. This concept should begin with the right assumptions concerning the Marine Corps' unique roles and specifically address the current and emerging technical challenges to executing those roles.
I appreciate your honest critique observations and insights on this, sir! I didn't realize that our amphibious ships were allowed to be cut till the FD2030 insanity was mandated... I still don't rightly understand why there was no pushback or serious reservations from members of the US Congress on the drop off in amphibs and FD2030, especially in light of our Title 10 mission... I'd love to hear your thoughts on VISION2035, especially with restoring tank assets and going with a much better option than the M1 Abrams... Semper Fi sir and Shalom sir!
The versatility of an institution is often revealed in how fast it can adapt or reverse a mistake. The Corps set out on a flawed path and stubbornly doubles down on sticking to a course of action that amounts to Lemmings throw ing themselves off of cliffs. Flawed assumptions led to false conclusions. That sort of behavior is more than ignorance and arrogance. It is not tenacity. It is a form of intellectual idiocy. The leadership of the last seven years just kept digging.
The problem now is the cost and time to recreate and modernize would require resources the Corps is not likely to get, funding Congress will not appropriate and the leadership is not capable of designing. Hence, the Light Brigade continues to advance up the valley.
The only way to salvage this requires a wholesale leadership change. The Corps is now in its 7th year of virtual irrelevance and it is only getting worse.
My attention now turns to the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War. Are they turning a blind eye to the pending disaster? Are there too many other problems or have they just concluded that they’ll just let it destroy itself?
Strange bedfellows in this game. America First isolationists will welcome our inability to operate on a global scale. The ultra liberals will welcome the same. Impotence is welcomed. The Army, Navy and Air Force all have their spending priorities and don’t want a dime spent on the Corps. They secretly cheer the Corps’ march into extinction. Allies see it as another US capability that no longer is a part of their own calculus. Just one more step back from the leadership roll the US no longer wants to exercise. Domestically, the culture warriors of the left have long despised a Corps focused on martial prowess, warrior ethos, self sacrificing discipline and merit. They will cheer its irrelevance.
This is the existential fight for the survival of the Corps.
We have 2 Navy Captains (Retired) serving as the Top Civilian Leaders of what should be called the Department of the United States Marine Corps and United States Navy. Their time in office has been brief. When will they address the debacle of Berger/Smith’s Force Design?
The wisdom and perspectives of Mr Webb have been totally disregarded by former CMC Gen Berger and current CMC Gen Smith and their criminal cohorts as now the Corps has been relegated to a limited regional reaction force instead of a projection of US military presence and power globally and able to respond to any crisis in "every clime and place" with a 24/7 MEU/ARG forward deployed to the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific... Trump's Operation Epic Fury aka EPIC FAILURE is a prime example of this sad truth, as the necessary amphibious ground forces ie: MEUs (SOC) were 3 weeks+ transit from the AO instead of 3 days max transit had they already been forward deployed 24/7 as was the case a decade plus ago, to immediately seize Kharg and the adjacent Iranian islands in the Strait of Hormuz 🇮🇷 as part of a winning strategy for this war...
FD2030 has ruined our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
Brigadier General Cooling headed up my Staff Group during some of my time as CMC and did a superb job. He was highly respected for his leadership, willingness to speak up, and for his superb writing and analytical ability. He is a personal friend and I respect his selfless service and sacrifice to our Country and Corps.
One piece of history that has impacted all Services over the past decades was the decision after Desert Storm to execute what was termed the "Base Force." This was a significant step towards achieving a "peace dividend" at the expense of DOD. Each Service received a mandate that would significantly touch on personnel and equipment as well as future procurement. For the Marine Corps, it meant a reduction in end strength to 159.1K along with actions to marry requirements to that Force. Obviously, our Navy "brothers and sisters" were faced with similar cuts which translated into force structure in toto. If the Marme Corps was going to 159.1 K, how many amphibs did it need?
General Mundy instituted a Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) under MCCDC to determine a) What a 159.1K Marine Corps would look like and what could it accomplish in a National Defense role and b) If the Corps could not viably provide "ready,, relevant, and capable" forces, then build a Corps that could do so. The end result was the Corps was allowed to go to 177K based on the rigor of analysis done by the FSPG and MCCDC. Our sister services did not avoid drastic cuts which, in the case of the Navy, included cuts in the surface fleet (to include Amphibs.). The Marine Corps fought these cuts long and hard within the DON, DOD, and the Hill but the cost savings were already being scraped off the table and used for other requirements. To even think that the Marine Corps did not fight tooth and nail for amphibs is simply wrong. At the end of the day, it was not that the Leadership of the Corps rolled over and played dead as the amphibs were cut...the "peace dividend" demanded what took place. As late as last year, EVERY SINGLE LIVING COMMANDANT signed a letter articulating the need for more amphibs and better maintenance rates. There is no need to regurgitate the comments made by General Berger thet gave the green light to fewer amphibis. Those words are now simply part of our history. What is needed now is what Brigadier General Cooling has articulated...bring back a full up MCCDC and focus on the role of the Marine Corps in National Security..."Quo Vadis?"
First, I am not a marine but I am highly respectful of your abilities and traditions. I’m curious, is not the first island strategy not a good idea? The part of it I’ve never found is just how many total marines would be committed to this? I’ve never heard more than one regiment committed? How many were planned? Could the Corp not afford to commit 2000 marines to this and still maintain past responsibilities?
For the last several years, I have been a regular reader of Compass Points and multiple other publications and sources that have both critiqued and defended "Force Design 2030" (and now "Force Design"). I suspect this is common for those of us who were privileged to serve for decades as Marines. While I believe the criticism of Force Design is merited, I am not certain that all those offering their critiques have been completely forthright or fairly introspective.
To say that Force Design was hastily conceived and poorly tested is true. More importantly, its implementation strategy (divest to invest) accepted an inordinate level of both institutional and national risk. Divesting capabilities and capacities associated with the Marine Corps' primary, unique role in global crisis response to invest in an unproven, single theater-focused concept -- one arguably duplicative of other service concepts, and supported by untested, "emerging" technologies -- was imprudent.
But one should closely examine the environment from which Force Design emerged. At the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, we had around 63 L-class amphibious ships. By 2019, we had 34. The maintenance readiness rates of our amphibious ships over that span atrophied even more rapidly than the number of ships. And Maritime Prepositioned Ship (MPS) Squadrons had been reduced from three to two.
We may have had the best-equipped, most capable Marine Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) in history, but without the dedicated strategic and operational lift needed to rapidly respond, and the associated systems needed to defend that lift, it is challenging, if not impossible, to serve effectively as the nation's global crisis response force. The host nation permissions required to support prepositioned, land-based special purpose MAGTFs incur similar limitations as those associated with Force Design units.
In short, the 38th Commandant and Force Design did not cause the atrophy of the amphibious fleet. Abandoning the long-accepted Operational Plan rationale for the amphibious ship floor has had no appreciable impact relative to the reduction experienced over the previous three decades. During that time, the Marine Corps had eight Commandants, two Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, multiple geographic commanders, a few cabinet secretaries (including a Secretary of Defense), a National Security Advisor, and several sitting Members of Congress (both in the House and the Senate). Even with all of this representation, how effective were we in preserving the strategic and operational lift upon which the MAGTF relies to perform its role in global crisis response?
Having offered a critique of both Force Design and many of its critics, I also humbly acknowledge my own failing to effectively defend the MAGTF and its vital role in our nation's security. For a brief period, I served as the 37th Commandant's senior liaison to Congress. As has historically been the case, the Navy had little interest in advocating for amphibious or maritime prepositioned ships. They view this as a Marine Corps responsibility, and worse, as a competitor to platforms upon which they place more value. It was not uncommon for some senior Navy officers to speak about the vulnerability of amphibious ships in the anti-access/are denial (A2AD) environment without pointing out that other capital ships experience similar vulnerabilities without proper augmentation, enhanced technology, and applicable tactics.
Within Congress itself, Member discussions surrounding social initiatives consumed significantly more time than those associated with specific warfighting capabilities. The professional staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee was convinced that amphibious ships could not be defended in the western Pacific, and they were fixated on the close fight in the first island chain. They had a unique interest in evolving a lightning carrier concept. Despite a parade of our most capable senior officers explaining in great detail the importance of responsive, forward-deployed Amphibious Ready Groups with Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG-MEUs), made scalable by land- and sea-based prepositioned assets, these staffers continued to believe that the MAGTF was synonymous with a World War II-era amphibious assault.
I can assure you that both the Members of the Congressional armed services committees and their staffs were thoroughly familiarized with the many arguments Compass Points and others have been arguing in the last several years. They simply did not resonate, and they had not resonated for years. This is the environment the 38th Commandant inherited.
While I do not believe Force Design is the answer, I do believe that it is serving a unique and valuable purpose. It has brought about the richest discussions concerning Marine Corps roles and concepts since those associated with maneuver warfare. It has mobilized many of our Corps' greatest intellects from all eras (with the notable and unfortunate exception of those in the late 2010s). Most importantly, this debate has promoted greater Congressional and public attention to what the Marine Corps does and what is required for the Corps to do it effectively.
The confluence of current events is also somewhat fortuitous, as the demand for regional crisis response forces has rarely been higher. The public should be made aware of the increased risk in the Pacific when the 31st MEU is deployed out of area. It should also be made aware of the gap U.S. Southern Command experiences when it loses an ARG-MEU and relies instead on a land-based SPMAGTF. Perhaps most importantly, it should be made aware of the consequences of not responding to regional crises.
Finally, and as several senior leaders have noted, it is time to take the lessons of the last decade, apply them to the combat development process, create a newly revised operational concept, and thoroughly vet and test it. This concept should begin with the right assumptions concerning the Marine Corps' unique roles and specifically address the current and emerging technical challenges to executing those roles.
I appreciate your honest critique observations and insights on this, sir! I didn't realize that our amphibious ships were allowed to be cut till the FD2030 insanity was mandated... I still don't rightly understand why there was no pushback or serious reservations from members of the US Congress on the drop off in amphibs and FD2030, especially in light of our Title 10 mission... I'd love to hear your thoughts on VISION2035, especially with restoring tank assets and going with a much better option than the M1 Abrams... Semper Fi sir and Shalom sir!
The versatility of an institution is often revealed in how fast it can adapt or reverse a mistake. The Corps set out on a flawed path and stubbornly doubles down on sticking to a course of action that amounts to Lemmings throw ing themselves off of cliffs. Flawed assumptions led to false conclusions. That sort of behavior is more than ignorance and arrogance. It is not tenacity. It is a form of intellectual idiocy. The leadership of the last seven years just kept digging.
The problem now is the cost and time to recreate and modernize would require resources the Corps is not likely to get, funding Congress will not appropriate and the leadership is not capable of designing. Hence, the Light Brigade continues to advance up the valley.
The only way to salvage this requires a wholesale leadership change. The Corps is now in its 7th year of virtual irrelevance and it is only getting worse.
My attention now turns to the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War. Are they turning a blind eye to the pending disaster? Are there too many other problems or have they just concluded that they’ll just let it destroy itself?
Strange bedfellows in this game. America First isolationists will welcome our inability to operate on a global scale. The ultra liberals will welcome the same. Impotence is welcomed. The Army, Navy and Air Force all have their spending priorities and don’t want a dime spent on the Corps. They secretly cheer the Corps’ march into extinction. Allies see it as another US capability that no longer is a part of their own calculus. Just one more step back from the leadership roll the US no longer wants to exercise. Domestically, the culture warriors of the left have long despised a Corps focused on martial prowess, warrior ethos, self sacrificing discipline and merit. They will cheer its irrelevance.
This is the existential fight for the survival of the Corps.
We have 2 Navy Captains (Retired) serving as the Top Civilian Leaders of what should be called the Department of the United States Marine Corps and United States Navy. Their time in office has been brief. When will they address the debacle of Berger/Smith’s Force Design?
Very sad but true, Colonel.
The wisdom and perspectives of Mr Webb have been totally disregarded by former CMC Gen Berger and current CMC Gen Smith and their criminal cohorts as now the Corps has been relegated to a limited regional reaction force instead of a projection of US military presence and power globally and able to respond to any crisis in "every clime and place" with a 24/7 MEU/ARG forward deployed to the Mediterranean and the Western Pacific... Trump's Operation Epic Fury aka EPIC FAILURE is a prime example of this sad truth, as the necessary amphibious ground forces ie: MEUs (SOC) were 3 weeks+ transit from the AO instead of 3 days max transit had they already been forward deployed 24/7 as was the case a decade plus ago, to immediately seize Kharg and the adjacent Iranian islands in the Strait of Hormuz 🇮🇷 as part of a winning strategy for this war...
FD2030 has ruined our beloved Corps MAGTF capabilities and must be reversed immediately implementing VISION2035 to save our Corps and restore our MAGTF lethality and capabilities!
Brigadier General Cooling headed up my Staff Group during some of my time as CMC and did a superb job. He was highly respected for his leadership, willingness to speak up, and for his superb writing and analytical ability. He is a personal friend and I respect his selfless service and sacrifice to our Country and Corps.
One piece of history that has impacted all Services over the past decades was the decision after Desert Storm to execute what was termed the "Base Force." This was a significant step towards achieving a "peace dividend" at the expense of DOD. Each Service received a mandate that would significantly touch on personnel and equipment as well as future procurement. For the Marine Corps, it meant a reduction in end strength to 159.1K along with actions to marry requirements to that Force. Obviously, our Navy "brothers and sisters" were faced with similar cuts which translated into force structure in toto. If the Marme Corps was going to 159.1 K, how many amphibs did it need?
General Mundy instituted a Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) under MCCDC to determine a) What a 159.1K Marine Corps would look like and what could it accomplish in a National Defense role and b) If the Corps could not viably provide "ready,, relevant, and capable" forces, then build a Corps that could do so. The end result was the Corps was allowed to go to 177K based on the rigor of analysis done by the FSPG and MCCDC. Our sister services did not avoid drastic cuts which, in the case of the Navy, included cuts in the surface fleet (to include Amphibs.). The Marine Corps fought these cuts long and hard within the DON, DOD, and the Hill but the cost savings were already being scraped off the table and used for other requirements. To even think that the Marine Corps did not fight tooth and nail for amphibs is simply wrong. At the end of the day, it was not that the Leadership of the Corps rolled over and played dead as the amphibs were cut...the "peace dividend" demanded what took place. As late as last year, EVERY SINGLE LIVING COMMANDANT signed a letter articulating the need for more amphibs and better maintenance rates. There is no need to regurgitate the comments made by General Berger thet gave the green light to fewer amphibis. Those words are now simply part of our history. What is needed now is what Brigadier General Cooling has articulated...bring back a full up MCCDC and focus on the role of the Marine Corps in National Security..."Quo Vadis?"
First, I am not a marine but I am highly respectful of your abilities and traditions. I’m curious, is not the first island strategy not a good idea? The part of it I’ve never found is just how many total marines would be committed to this? I’ve never heard more than one regiment committed? How many were planned? Could the Corp not afford to commit 2000 marines to this and still maintain past responsibilities?