If my memory serves me the MAGTF concept for the Maiine Corps was conceptualized in the 1950s. Gen. O. P. Smith as CG 1stMarDiv first used helicopters (HRS) in the Korean War.
How the concept of vertical envelopment came about is another interesting segment of aviation history. Fast forwarding to 1983 exemplifies the tactical as well as strategic value of theARG/ MAGTF.
HMLA-167 had been transferred from MAG-29 to MAG-26 as part of the Beirut ARG/MEU support of the Beirut commitment. The ARG/MEU deployed on schedule in Oct 83 for Beirut but was diverted to Grenada where Marines encountered communist and Cuban military forces. American medical students were rescued. A later after action report quoted the USA Chief of Staff being impressed with the maneuver ability of the Marine Bn on the island.
The ARG/MEU proceeded on to the Med where it provided support for the Beirut commitment. While, I dont recollect the timing sequence of Grenada and the Beirut Barracks bombing sequence, the versatility of the ARG/MEU is truly highlighted in the October 1983 sequence of events.
The Grenada-Beirut ARG/MAGTF/vertical envelopment conceptualized in the 1950s came to fruition in any number of instances but was especially highlighted in October 1983.
There will continue to be the need for the ARG/ MAGTF on into the future. The quetion is, are todays Marines, active and retired, up to the task of keeping this unique naval force viable as an option for the National Command Authorities?
Outside the 1stMarDiv conference room there is a large painting that has hung there as long as I can remember. I passed it every day for years, but finally paused one day to examine it. I eventually discovered that it was done sometime around 1954-1956, and depicted the artist's conception of the MAGTF. It depicted an outfitted Marine going ashore in the foreground, with all the weight of the combined arms team behind him and overhead. It was fascinating to identify all the aircraft and weapons systems that the Corps envisioned employing. Some of those systems survived the combat development process, and some did not. It was fascinating to note the origins of this warfighting concept that has endured, even with new systems and new Marines.
Of course, I was dumbfounded when I read the original problem statement of Force Design: That beginning with the commandants of the 1950's, the Marine Corps has followed a fool's errand, to its own detriment, and that this commandant has the opportunity to go down in history as the one who saved the Corps.
It should be noted that the events also included the deployment of elements of the 11th Airborne Div in Germany to Beirut. The 11th was in the midst of being reconfigured into an infantry Division and the Airlift capabilities in Europe were not adequate to support. Hence, the plan had to be repeatedly modified to include sea lift out of Bremerhaven and Italy after rail movement and air deployment out of airheads in Germany and France. Eventually the 11th achieved the mission but execution was late and the logistical support minimal. The USMC BLT came ashore in short order with 30 days of supply and carrier air in support.
Get there the firstus with the mostus still applies.
The likelihood of a major confrontation with a “peer” foe aka China and or Russian Federation is always a possibility. In any event it’s likely that the warning of a larger conflict would build like the storm clouds at Camp LeJeune in summer around 1700. This fhe preconditions likely longer and more involved with many allies and NATO etc.
Far more likely is some local despot gets his ass in sling and starts acting badly and an ARG/MEU would be the immediate and logical answer to the situation. Perhaps with an air contingency unit being the first finger in the dike, it is all situational but no kne can do this sort of work as well as the MEU. Now it is time to reconstitute the MAGTF so we can meet bad actors of the brush fire nature head on. At some point the puzzle palace will be forced to come to the same conclusions. The world is is not sleeping. We need fo be ready.
I enjoy your various essays on the Marine Corps and its historical and evolving missions.
It seemsmarine Corps and it’s historical and evolving missions.
It seems to that using the Marines as a ship based combined arms strike force with tanks, artillery, and air support is no longer what the planning powers in the pentagon desire. Hitting the beaches with a strong, self sustaining fighting force at least for a reasonable time no longer seems to be important.
Hitting the beaches with a force for humanitarian relief seems more likely to be the order of the day.
Is the evolving change in mission, even though sort of covered up, good or bad? Depends on whether hitting the beaches with a strong fighting force remains a strategic necessity.
If my memory serves me the MAGTF concept for the Maiine Corps was conceptualized in the 1950s. Gen. O. P. Smith as CG 1stMarDiv first used helicopters (HRS) in the Korean War.
How the concept of vertical envelopment came about is another interesting segment of aviation history. Fast forwarding to 1983 exemplifies the tactical as well as strategic value of theARG/ MAGTF.
HMLA-167 had been transferred from MAG-29 to MAG-26 as part of the Beirut ARG/MEU support of the Beirut commitment. The ARG/MEU deployed on schedule in Oct 83 for Beirut but was diverted to Grenada where Marines encountered communist and Cuban military forces. American medical students were rescued. A later after action report quoted the USA Chief of Staff being impressed with the maneuver ability of the Marine Bn on the island.
The ARG/MEU proceeded on to the Med where it provided support for the Beirut commitment. While, I dont recollect the timing sequence of Grenada and the Beirut Barracks bombing sequence, the versatility of the ARG/MEU is truly highlighted in the October 1983 sequence of events.
The Grenada-Beirut ARG/MAGTF/vertical envelopment conceptualized in the 1950s came to fruition in any number of instances but was especially highlighted in October 1983.
There will continue to be the need for the ARG/ MAGTF on into the future. The quetion is, are todays Marines, active and retired, up to the task of keeping this unique naval force viable as an option for the National Command Authorities?
Outside the 1stMarDiv conference room there is a large painting that has hung there as long as I can remember. I passed it every day for years, but finally paused one day to examine it. I eventually discovered that it was done sometime around 1954-1956, and depicted the artist's conception of the MAGTF. It depicted an outfitted Marine going ashore in the foreground, with all the weight of the combined arms team behind him and overhead. It was fascinating to identify all the aircraft and weapons systems that the Corps envisioned employing. Some of those systems survived the combat development process, and some did not. It was fascinating to note the origins of this warfighting concept that has endured, even with new systems and new Marines.
Of course, I was dumbfounded when I read the original problem statement of Force Design: That beginning with the commandants of the 1950's, the Marine Corps has followed a fool's errand, to its own detriment, and that this commandant has the opportunity to go down in history as the one who saved the Corps.
It should be noted that the events also included the deployment of elements of the 11th Airborne Div in Germany to Beirut. The 11th was in the midst of being reconfigured into an infantry Division and the Airlift capabilities in Europe were not adequate to support. Hence, the plan had to be repeatedly modified to include sea lift out of Bremerhaven and Italy after rail movement and air deployment out of airheads in Germany and France. Eventually the 11th achieved the mission but execution was late and the logistical support minimal. The USMC BLT came ashore in short order with 30 days of supply and carrier air in support.
Get there the firstus with the mostus still applies.
https://search.app/jbFuGyM37EM1NDV99
If memory serves me correctly, this was or evolved into the 4th MEB under BGen S.S. Wade.
The likelihood of a major confrontation with a “peer” foe aka China and or Russian Federation is always a possibility. In any event it’s likely that the warning of a larger conflict would build like the storm clouds at Camp LeJeune in summer around 1700. This fhe preconditions likely longer and more involved with many allies and NATO etc.
Far more likely is some local despot gets his ass in sling and starts acting badly and an ARG/MEU would be the immediate and logical answer to the situation. Perhaps with an air contingency unit being the first finger in the dike, it is all situational but no kne can do this sort of work as well as the MEU. Now it is time to reconstitute the MAGTF so we can meet bad actors of the brush fire nature head on. At some point the puzzle palace will be forced to come to the same conclusions. The world is is not sleeping. We need fo be ready.
I enjoy your various essays on the Marine Corps and its historical and evolving missions.
It seemsmarine Corps and it’s historical and evolving missions.
It seems to that using the Marines as a ship based combined arms strike force with tanks, artillery, and air support is no longer what the planning powers in the pentagon desire. Hitting the beaches with a strong, self sustaining fighting force at least for a reasonable time no longer seems to be important.
Hitting the beaches with a force for humanitarian relief seems more likely to be the order of the day.
Is the evolving change in mission, even though sort of covered up, good or bad? Depends on whether hitting the beaches with a strong fighting force remains a strategic necessity.
Sorry, bad proofreading. Just delete the second paragraph.