Compass Points - The Real State
Seven years of detour
Compass Points - The Real State
Seven years of detour
May 28, 2026
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Seven years of detour. Seven years of divestments. Seven years of destruction.
As the negotiations between the US and Iran reach a critical point, US Marines in the Middle East remain at the ready to execute a variety of missions. Elsewhere around the globe, Marines have been patrolling the waters of the Caribbean. Now, USNI News is reporting, “Iwo Jima ARG, 22nd MEU are Heading Home After 10 Months.”
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USS Iwo Jima (LHD-7), USS Fort Lauderdale (LPD-28) and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit are heading home after nearly 10 months in U.S. Southern Command, the Marines announced on Wednesday.
The Iwo Jima Amphibious Ready Group and the 22nd MEU deployed in August and headed to the Caribbean, where the group was part of Operation Southern Spear, the name for U.S. strikes on boats suspected of carrying illicit narcotics. The Iwo Jima ARG, which was comprised of Iwo Jima, Fort Lauderdale and USS San Antonio (LPD-17), was also in SOUTHCOM for the U.S. operation to capture Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores.
San Antonio returned home last month, while Iwo Jima and Fort Lauderdale remained in the Caribbean.
. . . The Iwo Jima ARG was initially slated to deploy to Europe but was redirected to SOUTHCOM. While the ARG initially deployed on Aug. 14, it returned to Norfolk a few days later to avoid Hurricane Erin.
While in SOUTHCOM, the 22nd MEU, which included the Battalion Landing Team 3/6, Combat Logistics Battalion 26 and Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron 263, were part of operations to reinforce U.S. embassies in Haiti and Venezuela, deliver humanitarian aid to Jamaica as part of hurricane relief efforts and participate in bilateral exercises, in addition to Operation Southern Spear, according to a Marine Corps release.
-- USNI News
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With the US conducting operations in both the Caribbean and the Middle East, the US regional Combatant Commanders called for Marines. Which Marine units did the Combatant Commanders want most? For seven years the Marine Corps has been focusing on creating some specialized sensor and missile units. When the effort to build these so-called Marine Stand-in-Forces began, the promise was that in the next missile war, these Marine sensor and missile units would play a central role.
The recent conflict, Operation Epic Fury, has been a missile heavy operation. Yet, the US Marine sensor and missile units have not shouldered a central role. They have not been in high demand. Despite the central missile nature of the conflict, the Combatant Commander called for combined arms, Marine MAGTFs embarked on Navy amphibious ships. These are the flexible, Marine crisis response units, that can standby at sea while remaining prepared to deter, assist, rescue, strike, and fight.
Over the last seven years, regional Combatant Commanders have continually expressed a need for more Marine MAGTFs, on more amphibious ships, on more oceans around the world.
What about the Marine sensor and missile units? They are still not nearly as capable, ready, or in demand.
After nearly seven years of the disappointing sensor and missile detour, seven years of divestments, seven years of destruction, what is the operational status of the Marine sensor and missile units?
One author and Marine reviews a recent article that attempts to bolster the dubious achievements of the controversial sensor and missile units. Gary Anderson is not persuaded by all the happy talk,
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THE REAL STATE OF FORCE DESIGN AT SEVEN
A reply to “How Is Force Design Holding Up at Seven?”
By Gary Anderson
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I am one of the diminishing number of former and retired Marines who still subscribe to the Marine Corps Gazette. I rarely publicly comment on an article, but I am making an exception to Major Robert D. Cameron’s June piece, “How Is Force Design Holding Up at Seven? I chose to make my counterarguments in Compass Points rather than the Gazette for two reasons. First, although the Gazette’s current editor is a principled individual and would probably print it, he would likely be taken to task by the Corps’ current leadership for doing so, Second, Compass Points has a larger readership.
Major Cameron paints a rosy picture of where the Force Design/Stand-in-Force implementation is today. He attempts to say, “all is well, nothing to see here” regarding a concept that has become a dismal failure in execution. He approaches the subject from a standpoint of several warfighting functions (WFF), so I will use that construct in my rebuttal. Before doing that, however, I will point out the major intellectual flaw in his piece. In his citations, the vast majority (10 of 15) are from Berger/Smith era Headquarters Marine Corps publications. This is the moral equivalent of grading your own work.
Now, to the WFF. From a command and control and information standpoint, the Major correctly states that the Marine Corps has greatly improved its capabilities in this WFF. The Marine Corps’ increased ability to integrate with the joint force is undeniable. Marines recently coordinated command, control, and information for the recent Balikatan exercise in the Philippines. Unfortunately. that’s all the Corps contributed. The Army did the heavy lifting regarding fires and maneuver. C2I integration with the joint force is not unique to the Marine Corps. It is now required of all the services.
As to logistics, the Major writes at length about the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Program. This is curious because MPS is a decades old capability that has nothing to do with Force Design. As a matter of fact, MPS had been largely defanged with the total loss of tanks and heavy engineering equipment, along with much of the artillery. What he fails to mention is that the logistics mainstay of Force Design, the Landing Ship Medium (or whatever it is now being called), has not had a single ship launched after seven years.
From a fires standpoint, the Major fails to mention that the short-range and subsonic Marine NMESIS missile system has been rendered virtually obsolete by the longer range hypersonic systems fielded by the other services. During Balikatan exercise, the Army successfully engaged targets at sea. The Marine NMESIS, however, just sat on shore and did nothing. Not a single NMESIS was fired. That is because, even after seven years, not a single NMESIS system is combat ready. Not ready after seven years, despite the fact that former commandant Berger claimed the Combat Development Process had to be circumvented because Force Design was time critical.
While Major Cameron is likely a very competent financial planner and foreign affairs officer, in writing to praise Force Design, he has been, at best, badly mislead by the continual stream of Force Design press releases from HQMC. The article is typical of those by Force Design defenders. It lacks intellectual rigor and solid academic reasoning. It is worth at least pausing to consider that every retired Marine Commandant -- except the one responsible for Force Design -- and virtually every senior retired Marine general officer, all reject the damage and dangers of Force Design. After seven long years, there is indeed much to be seen in Force Design and much to review, but little of it is good
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Compass Points salutes the Marines and sailors of the 22nd MEU, now heading home after their long deployment, and also salutes author and Marine, Gary Anderson, for his long service to Corps and country. On active duty, Gary Anderson was an infantry and light armored officer. In his retirement, he writes widely on the Marine Corps and US defense. Gary Anderson has done so much to chronicle the sad seven years of Force Design — years detour, divestment, and destruction.
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USNI News - 05/27/2026
Iwo Jima ARG, 22nd MEU are Heading Home After 10 Months
By Heather Mongilio
https://news.usni.org/2026/05/27/iwo-jima-arg-22nd-meu-are-heading-home-after-10-months
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General Robert Barrow always reminded us that “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics.” Supporters of Force Design and Stand-in Forces have never articulated a viable concept of operations for supporting isolated and widely separated SIFs during hostilities. The best they can do is to tell us that the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) will solve the problem once it comes online toward the end of this decade. It will not and here’s why.
In December 2025, the Navy announced the selection of the Damen Dutch Landing Ship Transport 100 (LST 100) as the non-developmental variant for the LSM. These ships are like the U.S. Army’s Besson-class Logistics Vessels (LSVs) in terms of lacking speed (14-15 knots when new and empty), self-defense, and survivability from enemy attack. They are not built to operate in contested areas during hostilities. They are not being built to Navy survivability standards. They will not survive inside an enemy’s WEZ during hostilities.
All of this is well known by the Navy and Marine Corps. A March 2, 2026 article authored by General Charles Krulak, General James Conway, and Read Admiral Leonard Picotte laid out the deficiencies clearly and concisely. Much of the first paragraph above is lifted directly from the article. See: https://www.realcleardefense.com/2026/03/02/do_not_sacrifice_marines_and_sailors_on_the_altar_of_expediency_1167792.htmlshipbuilding
In a detailed discussion of the LSM, the Navy’s recent shipbuilding plan states “… the LSM is designed to transport and land naval expeditionary forces and their equipment in contested environments to support the Marine Corps’ Force Design in the Indo-Pacific.” This statement is mindboggling. Does the Navy really believe this ship will operate inside the Chinese WEZ during hostilities?
The addition of 35 essentially “LSV type” ships will greatly benefit the Marines during peacetime and probably outside the WEZ during hostilities. They will not solve the larger problem of supporting SIFs inside contested areas during hostilities. The concept of employing the LSM inside contested areas during hostilities is fatally flawed. How can the LSM survive inside contested areas when the assumption is that other Navy surface ships cannot. General Krulak, General Conway, and Read Admiral Picotte summed it up best: “Sailors and embarked Marine must not be sent to war on ships that are not fit for purpose. The mothers and fathers of America will not stand for it.”
Two thoughts:
The entire FD-2030 Missile Battery concept was still born. Seven years later in can do nothing. If it could it would be obsolete. Cannot be deployed or re-deployed. The failure to acknowledge this is a level of stubborn denial that borders on delusional. Or, a gross lack of integrity. This would be totally unacceptable made worse by the fact that the Corps divested so much to make this its top priority. Top priority that cannot take off after seven years and no one relieved? How is that even possible? We won WWII in less than four years. For shame, for shame.
I parted ways with the Gazette when it ceased being a professional journal and became a political propaganda organ long ago. The intellectually bankrupt embrace of radical feminism and a cheerleading platform for the LGBTQI agenda made a mockery of an honest, professional examination of facts. Long ago, when it embraced an electronic format unable to be read on many programs and could not care less. Customer service went away and professional content would soon follow. Surely the Gazette knows how many active duty, reserve and retired officers there are. What percentage subscribe?