General Robert Barrow always reminded us that “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics.” Supporters of Force Design and Stand-in Forces have never articulated a viable concept of operations for supporting isolated and widely separated SIFs during hostilities. The best they can do is to tell us that the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) will solve the problem once it comes online toward the end of this decade. It will not and here’s why.
In December 2025, the Navy announced the selection of the Damen Dutch Landing Ship Transport 100 (LST 100) as the non-developmental variant for the LSM. These ships are like the U.S. Army’s Besson-class Logistics Vessels (LSVs) in terms of lacking speed (14-15 knots when new and empty), self-defense, and survivability from enemy attack. They are not built to operate in contested areas during hostilities. They are not being built to Navy survivability standards. They will not survive inside an enemy’s WEZ during hostilities.
In a detailed discussion of the LSM, the Navy’s recent shipbuilding plan states “… the LSM is designed to transport and land naval expeditionary forces and their equipment in contested environments to support the Marine Corps’ Force Design in the Indo-Pacific.” This statement is mindboggling. Does the Navy really believe this ship will operate inside the Chinese WEZ during hostilities?
The addition of 35 essentially “LSV type” ships will greatly benefit the Marines during peacetime and probably outside the WEZ during hostilities. They will not solve the larger problem of supporting SIFs inside contested areas during hostilities. The concept of employing the LSM inside contested areas during hostilities is fatally flawed. How can the LSM survive inside contested areas when the assumption is that other Navy surface ships cannot. General Krulak, General Conway, and Read Admiral Picotte summed it up best: “Sailors and embarked Marine must not be sent to war on ships that are not fit for purpose. The mothers and fathers of America will not stand for it.”
I think it is relevant the Japanese are going with an 80m LCU with less draft than the 100m US/Australian LSM/LST. Japan may yet still have their variant of the Army's atrophied MSVL and Australia the larger Landing Craft Medium. Japan appears worried about low draft and speed in the Ryukus and Australia cares more about seakeeping near there home waters. Right now we seem to have a missing link with LCAC/LCU/LSM for the Marines. A well deck capable, higher cargo version of MSVL might better fit the LCU role, truly being flexible enough for independent operation or being assigned to the ships of a MEU.
The entire FD-2030 Missile Battery concept was still born. Seven years later in can do nothing. If it could it would be obsolete. Cannot be deployed or re-deployed. The failure to acknowledge this is a level of stubborn denial that borders on delusional. Or, a gross lack of integrity. This would be totally unacceptable made worse by the fact that the Corps divested so much to make this its top priority. Top priority that cannot take off after seven years and no one relieved? How is that even possible? We won WWII in less than four years. For shame, for shame.
I parted ways with the Gazette when it ceased being a professional journal and became a political propaganda organ long ago. The intellectually bankrupt embrace of radical feminism and a cheerleading platform for the LGBTQI agenda made a mockery of an honest, professional examination of facts. Long ago, when it embraced an electronic format unable to be read on many programs and could not care less. Customer service went away and professional content would soon follow. Surely the Gazette knows how many active duty, reserve and retired officers there are. What percentage subscribe?
If we still had intact MAGTF, our artillery battalions should look at the German RCH-155 as a mobile artillery piece that is being field tested in the Ukraine...but the Marine Corps leadership decided that we don't need artillery just small units of Marines standed on small islands with major security, CAS evac and resupply issues. Perhaps the Ukrainians can teach us a thing or two...
Colonel Gary Anderson pulls no punches when he puts pen to paper. His articles are superb, none more so than the one cited in this post. For seven years the Corps has been living a lie and it continues to do so. One can only hope new leadership next year will see the errors of the current and last CMC and take the actions needed to move the Corps in a better direction, a direction that complies with Title 10 of the US Code.
General Robert Barrow always reminded us that “Amateurs talk tactics, professionals study logistics.” Supporters of Force Design and Stand-in Forces have never articulated a viable concept of operations for supporting isolated and widely separated SIFs during hostilities. The best they can do is to tell us that the Landing Ship Medium (LSM) will solve the problem once it comes online toward the end of this decade. It will not and here’s why.
In December 2025, the Navy announced the selection of the Damen Dutch Landing Ship Transport 100 (LST 100) as the non-developmental variant for the LSM. These ships are like the U.S. Army’s Besson-class Logistics Vessels (LSVs) in terms of lacking speed (14-15 knots when new and empty), self-defense, and survivability from enemy attack. They are not built to operate in contested areas during hostilities. They are not being built to Navy survivability standards. They will not survive inside an enemy’s WEZ during hostilities.
All of this is well known by the Navy and Marine Corps. A March 2, 2026 article authored by General Charles Krulak, General James Conway, and Read Admiral Leonard Picotte laid out the deficiencies clearly and concisely. Much of the first paragraph above is lifted directly from the article. See: https://www.realcleardefense.com/2026/03/02/do_not_sacrifice_marines_and_sailors_on_the_altar_of_expediency_1167792.htmlshipbuilding
In a detailed discussion of the LSM, the Navy’s recent shipbuilding plan states “… the LSM is designed to transport and land naval expeditionary forces and their equipment in contested environments to support the Marine Corps’ Force Design in the Indo-Pacific.” This statement is mindboggling. Does the Navy really believe this ship will operate inside the Chinese WEZ during hostilities?
The addition of 35 essentially “LSV type” ships will greatly benefit the Marines during peacetime and probably outside the WEZ during hostilities. They will not solve the larger problem of supporting SIFs inside contested areas during hostilities. The concept of employing the LSM inside contested areas during hostilities is fatally flawed. How can the LSM survive inside contested areas when the assumption is that other Navy surface ships cannot. General Krulak, General Conway, and Read Admiral Picotte summed it up best: “Sailors and embarked Marine must not be sent to war on ships that are not fit for purpose. The mothers and fathers of America will not stand for it.”
I think it is relevant the Japanese are going with an 80m LCU with less draft than the 100m US/Australian LSM/LST. Japan may yet still have their variant of the Army's atrophied MSVL and Australia the larger Landing Craft Medium. Japan appears worried about low draft and speed in the Ryukus and Australia cares more about seakeeping near there home waters. Right now we seem to have a missing link with LCAC/LCU/LSM for the Marines. A well deck capable, higher cargo version of MSVL might better fit the LCU role, truly being flexible enough for independent operation or being assigned to the ships of a MEU.
Two thoughts:
The entire FD-2030 Missile Battery concept was still born. Seven years later in can do nothing. If it could it would be obsolete. Cannot be deployed or re-deployed. The failure to acknowledge this is a level of stubborn denial that borders on delusional. Or, a gross lack of integrity. This would be totally unacceptable made worse by the fact that the Corps divested so much to make this its top priority. Top priority that cannot take off after seven years and no one relieved? How is that even possible? We won WWII in less than four years. For shame, for shame.
I parted ways with the Gazette when it ceased being a professional journal and became a political propaganda organ long ago. The intellectually bankrupt embrace of radical feminism and a cheerleading platform for the LGBTQI agenda made a mockery of an honest, professional examination of facts. Long ago, when it embraced an electronic format unable to be read on many programs and could not care less. Customer service went away and professional content would soon follow. Surely the Gazette knows how many active duty, reserve and retired officers there are. What percentage subscribe?
“…a gross lack of integrity.” Perfect!
And, comments on Gazette are also spot on. Col Doug always nails it!
If we still had intact MAGTF, our artillery battalions should look at the German RCH-155 as a mobile artillery piece that is being field tested in the Ukraine...but the Marine Corps leadership decided that we don't need artillery just small units of Marines standed on small islands with major security, CAS evac and resupply issues. Perhaps the Ukrainians can teach us a thing or two...
Colonel Gary Anderson pulls no punches when he puts pen to paper. His articles are superb, none more so than the one cited in this post. For seven years the Corps has been living a lie and it continues to do so. One can only hope new leadership next year will see the errors of the current and last CMC and take the actions needed to move the Corps in a better direction, a direction that complies with Title 10 of the US Code.