Compass Points - The Sizzle
Selling the sizzle
Compass Points - The Sizzle
Selling the sizzle
July 12, 2024
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"Sell the sizzle, not the steak."
In the adverting business, 'selling the sizzle and not the steak' is established wisdom.
There is nothing wrong with putting a little sizzle into presentations. Be interesting and dramatic. Do not be dull and boring.
In advertising there is constant focus on the sizzle, but when the subject is warfighting, too much sizzle is dangerous.
Perhaps that is why the Congress has now required that an independent, FFRDC, federally funded research and development center, undertake a thorough study of the Marine Corps' Force Design.
The Marine Times summarized some of the questions Congress wants answered.
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The outside assessment of Force Design will examine questions that include, in boiled-down form:
--What evidence does the Marine Corps have to back up the changes it has made?
-- Does the war in Ukraine make Force Design changes seem more or less advisable?
-- Can the defense industrial base, in a timely fashion, develop and produce the tech the Corps wants for Force Design?
-- Does Force Design meet the requirements of combatant commanders, who lead forces across the globe?
-- Does Force Design comply with the federal law laying out the required organization and functions of the Marine Corps?
-- How should the Marine Corps prepare for future conflict?
Within a year of inking the contract for the assessment, the research and development center must submit a report on the results of the assessment to the Pentagon. The defense secretary must then provide that report to the congressional defense committees.
-- Marine Times
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It is worth asking, why would the Congress need to order an independent review of Force Design? The senior leaders of the Marine Corps and all DOD are available to Congress at any time. Congress is free to ask any question they want, and the Marine Corps is required to answer. Simple. Ask questions of Marine leaders and get answers. There is no need for any independent, outside review of Force Design. Or rather, there should be no need for an independent study, if the Congress was confident that it was getting straight answers. The very fact that Congress has put into law a requirement for an outside analysis of Force Design is a troubling signal that something is wrong.
The problem is that some of what the Marine Corps has said in defense of Force Design is too often unreliable. For example, in a recent Brookings interview, the current Marine Commandant attempted to defend Force Design. The defense, however, left many questions unanswered. Among many skeptical Marines, BGen Jerry McAbee has reviewed the Brookings interview and written a thorough rebuttal. His conclusion?
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Many of General Smith’s comments and answers to questions were inaccurate, misleading, and in some cases, false.
-- Jerry McAbee
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Inaccurate, misleading, and false? Marines of any rank are traditionally known for their blunt honesty. Marines stand up, speak up, and worry about the fallout later. Deception in the performance of official duties? Never.
Even the Marine Corps' new publication, Deception - MCTP 3-32F, gives clear guidance:
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LEGALITY
. . . Overall, deception activities cannot—
• Mislead the US public, US Congress, or US news media.
-- Deception, MCTP 3-32F
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Marines should use appropriate deception on the battlefield, but not when talking to Congress, the press, or the people. Proponents of Force Design say that war has changed, and the Marine Corps has changed with it; they say that the Marine Corps is now ahead of the curve after having divested so many units, equipment, and capabilities. The Marine Corps cannot divest itself of so many proven capabilities, however, and then claim to still possess the very same capabilities that were tossed aside.
Selling the sizzle and not the steak is established wisdom in the advertising business. There is nothing wrong with selling the sizzle, if there is a steak. If the steak has been degraded and divested, however, then selling the sizzle is just fraud. Marine leaders must not brag on the one hand that the Marine Corps has modernized by divesting and degrading units, equipment, and capabilities, but then say on the other hand, the Marine Corps still has all the strength and capabilities it once had. Claiming both things are true, is too much sizzle. Perhaps that is why Congress wants an FFRDC to look behind the sizzle and get some real answers.
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Congress of the United States
Section 1076 - COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF MARINE CORPS FORCE DESIGN 2030
H.R.2670 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024 118th Congress (2023-2024)
https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/2670/text
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Marine Times - 12/08/2023
Defense bill calls for outside scrutiny of Marines’ modernization plan
By Irene Loewenson
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A Rebuttal to the Commandant’s Remarks at Brookings Institute
By Jerry McAbee, Brigadier General USMC (ret)
https://mega.nz/file/t2xmGABD#5T-dtzCKXUvtutZnfL49cjImfla-rnnG394DYkTo87Y
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Marines.mil
Deception - MCTP 3-32F
Thank you General McAbee for your rebuttal to the CMC's, Brooking Inst. interview. It is spot on. BZ! Let's hope and pray that the Congressional review is not a dog and pony show. The future of our Corps depends on it.
Japanese Naval Blitz of the Netherlands East Indies or How the Dutch Island Chain Strategy gets Blitzed!
There has been a lot of criticism of the “Island Chain Defense” strategy. A major question: Is it really a military strategy? Another criticism is the “Maginot Line” defensive nature of the strategy that concedes the offense to the enemy. All defenses have gaps and weak points that can be exploited. Defensive lines can be penetrated and “rolled up”. The nature of naval warfare’s strategic mobility provides offensive opportunities not only to exploit gaps but also to isolate and neutralize by passed enemy forces. The US Marine Corps role should be the capture of advanced bases and airfields to support the control of SLOCs. Reorganizing the Marine Corps to reduce combat power in order to experiment with the development and employment of anti-ship missiles with the excuse of increasing lethality is an extremely bad idea.
There is an example, from the World War 2 Pacific War, where the island chain defense failed miserably. The “Sizzle” of this campaign has been missed but there is plenty of steak. The Japanese Naval Blitz of the Dutch East Indies was a planned multi-operation campaign that was executed like clockwork. I like this map because it represents the offensive maneuver of the campaign: https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII%20Asia/ww2%2520asia%2520map%252010.jpg This youtube video does a great job providing the strategic content for the Campaign: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpKTJGUSg6A
I should also mention the primary reference for this article is: The Netherlands East Indies Campaign 1941-42, A Quest for Oil by Marc Lohnstewin; Osprey Publishing
The Dec 1942 Pearl Harbor attacked kicked off the Japanese War Plan A-Go consisting of three major campaigns: Malaya, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. Why the Dutch East Indies? Japan desperately needed the East Indies natural resources, primarily oil followed by rubber, tin and bauxite (alumina).
The Japanese also planned the Philippines and Malaya Campaigns to provide staging areas in order to launch the attack in the Dutch Islands. On Dec 8, 1941 Japanese conducted an air raid on Singapore. On Dec 9, the Prince of Wales (battleship) and Repulse (cruiser) Task Force departs Singapore without air cover in order to intercept the Japanese Malaya invasion force. Because the British Task Force Commander thought he lost the element of surprise, he ordered the task force return to Singapore. On 10 Dec, both the Prince of Wales and the Repulse are sunk by Japanese air attacks. The British defensive concerns now focused on Singapore and India and they basically abandon their possession of Northern Borneo. Dec 16—24, the Japanese landed and occupy Northern Borneo. The stage is now set for the take down of the Dutch East Indies.
The Dutch knew the Japanese were coming. The Dutch Commander set three defensive lines running west to east building airfields and bases to support each defensive line. They declared war on Japan Dec 8 1941, the day after Pearl Harbor. Interesting Japan declares war on Netherlands on Jan 11, 1942 and makes their first landing on Borneo and Celebes.
Going from West to East: the 1st defensive line starts on the northern tip of Sumatra with the Sabang, Lo Nia and Medan Airfields; the chain moves east to Borneo with the airfield at Tanakan on the northern tip; the Langoan Airfield is next on the northern tip of Celebes Island; the next link in the chain is the island of North Maluku with the Djailolo Airfield; the 1st Island Chain defense finishes on the north tip of Western New Guinea with the Babo Airfield.
The 2nd defensive chain starts in the middle of the Island of Sumatra at the Pakan Barne Airfield; stretches to the Singkwang II Airfield on the western side of Borneo to the Samarinda II Airfield on the eastern side of the Borneo Island (both of these airfields were “secret”); from there to the southern Celebes airfield at Kendari II; Ambon is the next island with the Laha and Namlea Airfields. At Ambon the defensive line takes a hard right to the southwest to Timor Island.
The final defensive line is the Island of Java that contains the government seat, key Naval and Army bases and commercial centers. For these reasons the final Japanese objective was the Island of Java.
The Japanese started the Campaign on 11 Jan 1942 with landings and capture of the airfield on Borneo (Tarakan) and landings (and parachute assault) on Celebes (Menado). The capture of the airfields are wrapped up in approximately 48 hours. The capture of these airfields also represents the breaching of the first defensive chain.
On 24 Jan the next operation began to capture the airfields at Balikpapan (Borneo) and Kendari (Celebes Island). Kendari was a quick capture. Balikpapan was an important oil port on eastern Borneo and the assault there was delayed for three days. The delay was caused by the delayed preparation of the Tarakan Airfield that was captured on Jan 11.
On 15 Jan the America-British-Dutch Australian Command (ABDACOM) is formed and counter attacks with naval forces and air attacks on the Japanese transports headed for Balikpapan. Air attacks sink two and damage three transports, a seaplane tender and a destroyer. A Dutch submarine sinks a transport. After the Japanese landing boats depart for landing, four American destroyers catch the Japanese transports at anchor sinking four and damaging two transports. With the Japanese landing complete Balikpapan is captured with its damaged oil facilities.
With the completion of the Balikpapan Operation the second defensive island chain is penetrated and Java is within Japanese bomber and fighter range. The Japanese then completes the isolation of Java taking Ambon Island on 31 Jan. On 19 Feb a Japanese Carrier Task Force attacks the Port of Darwin to prevent the Allies from using Darwin as a base to contest the invasion of Timor and Java. The attack kills 236, wounding 300-400, 30 aircraft destroyed, 11 vessels sunk, 3 vessels grounded and 25 ships damaged. Timor was captured on 20 Feb.
On 14 Feb the first landings and parachute assaults are conducted on southern Sumatra in order to capture Palembang. On 27 Feb the Battle of Java Sea results in significant Allie losses: 2 light cruisers sunk, 3 destroyers sunk, 1 heavy cruiser damages and 2300 sailors killed. Also the USS Langley (carrying a cargo of fighters) is sunk south of Java.
On Mar 1 the Japanese offensive to capture Java commences. On 12 Mar Allied Force on Java surrender. The final surrenders of Dutch forces on Sumatra occurs on 28 Mar.
Tada! The Japan military, in less than 90 days, secured a strategic oil supply and the southern approaches to the South China Sea. They accomplished this in a series of coordinated economy of force operations on a planned and well executed timeline.