Thank you General McAbee for your rebuttal to the CMC's, Brooking Inst. interview. It is spot on. BZ! Let's hope and pray that the Congressional review is not a dog and pony show. The future of our Corps depends on it.
Japanese Naval Blitz of the Netherlands East Indies or How the Dutch Island Chain Strategy gets Blitzed!
There has been a lot of criticism of the “Island Chain Defense” strategy. A major question: Is it really a military strategy? Another criticism is the “Maginot Line” defensive nature of the strategy that concedes the offense to the enemy. All defenses have gaps and weak points that can be exploited. Defensive lines can be penetrated and “rolled up”. The nature of naval warfare’s strategic mobility provides offensive opportunities not only to exploit gaps but also to isolate and neutralize by passed enemy forces. The US Marine Corps role should be the capture of advanced bases and airfields to support the control of SLOCs. Reorganizing the Marine Corps to reduce combat power in order to experiment with the development and employment of anti-ship missiles with the excuse of increasing lethality is an extremely bad idea.
I should also mention the primary reference for this article is: The Netherlands East Indies Campaign 1941-42, A Quest for Oil by Marc Lohnstewin; Osprey Publishing
The Dec 1942 Pearl Harbor attacked kicked off the Japanese War Plan A-Go consisting of three major campaigns: Malaya, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. Why the Dutch East Indies? Japan desperately needed the East Indies natural resources, primarily oil followed by rubber, tin and bauxite (alumina).
The Japanese also planned the Philippines and Malaya Campaigns to provide staging areas in order to launch the attack in the Dutch Islands. On Dec 8, 1941 Japanese conducted an air raid on Singapore. On Dec 9, the Prince of Wales (battleship) and Repulse (cruiser) Task Force departs Singapore without air cover in order to intercept the Japanese Malaya invasion force. Because the British Task Force Commander thought he lost the element of surprise, he ordered the task force return to Singapore. On 10 Dec, both the Prince of Wales and the Repulse are sunk by Japanese air attacks. The British defensive concerns now focused on Singapore and India and they basically abandon their possession of Northern Borneo. Dec 16—24, the Japanese landed and occupy Northern Borneo. The stage is now set for the take down of the Dutch East Indies.
The Dutch knew the Japanese were coming. The Dutch Commander set three defensive lines running west to east building airfields and bases to support each defensive line. They declared war on Japan Dec 8 1941, the day after Pearl Harbor. Interesting Japan declares war on Netherlands on Jan 11, 1942 and makes their first landing on Borneo and Celebes.
Going from West to East: the 1st defensive line starts on the northern tip of Sumatra with the Sabang, Lo Nia and Medan Airfields; the chain moves east to Borneo with the airfield at Tanakan on the northern tip; the Langoan Airfield is next on the northern tip of Celebes Island; the next link in the chain is the island of North Maluku with the Djailolo Airfield; the 1st Island Chain defense finishes on the north tip of Western New Guinea with the Babo Airfield.
The 2nd defensive chain starts in the middle of the Island of Sumatra at the Pakan Barne Airfield; stretches to the Singkwang II Airfield on the western side of Borneo to the Samarinda II Airfield on the eastern side of the Borneo Island (both of these airfields were “secret”); from there to the southern Celebes airfield at Kendari II; Ambon is the next island with the Laha and Namlea Airfields. At Ambon the defensive line takes a hard right to the southwest to Timor Island.
The final defensive line is the Island of Java that contains the government seat, key Naval and Army bases and commercial centers. For these reasons the final Japanese objective was the Island of Java.
The Japanese started the Campaign on 11 Jan 1942 with landings and capture of the airfield on Borneo (Tarakan) and landings (and parachute assault) on Celebes (Menado). The capture of the airfields are wrapped up in approximately 48 hours. The capture of these airfields also represents the breaching of the first defensive chain.
On 24 Jan the next operation began to capture the airfields at Balikpapan (Borneo) and Kendari (Celebes Island). Kendari was a quick capture. Balikpapan was an important oil port on eastern Borneo and the assault there was delayed for three days. The delay was caused by the delayed preparation of the Tarakan Airfield that was captured on Jan 11.
On 15 Jan the America-British-Dutch Australian Command (ABDACOM) is formed and counter attacks with naval forces and air attacks on the Japanese transports headed for Balikpapan. Air attacks sink two and damage three transports, a seaplane tender and a destroyer. A Dutch submarine sinks a transport. After the Japanese landing boats depart for landing, four American destroyers catch the Japanese transports at anchor sinking four and damaging two transports. With the Japanese landing complete Balikpapan is captured with its damaged oil facilities.
With the completion of the Balikpapan Operation the second defensive island chain is penetrated and Java is within Japanese bomber and fighter range. The Japanese then completes the isolation of Java taking Ambon Island on 31 Jan. On 19 Feb a Japanese Carrier Task Force attacks the Port of Darwin to prevent the Allies from using Darwin as a base to contest the invasion of Timor and Java. The attack kills 236, wounding 300-400, 30 aircraft destroyed, 11 vessels sunk, 3 vessels grounded and 25 ships damaged. Timor was captured on 20 Feb.
On 14 Feb the first landings and parachute assaults are conducted on southern Sumatra in order to capture Palembang. On 27 Feb the Battle of Java Sea results in significant Allie losses: 2 light cruisers sunk, 3 destroyers sunk, 1 heavy cruiser damages and 2300 sailors killed. Also the USS Langley (carrying a cargo of fighters) is sunk south of Java.
On Mar 1 the Japanese offensive to capture Java commences. On 12 Mar Allied Force on Java surrender. The final surrenders of Dutch forces on Sumatra occurs on 28 Mar.
Tada! The Japan military, in less than 90 days, secured a strategic oil supply and the southern approaches to the South China Sea. They accomplished this in a series of coordinated economy of force operations on a planned and well executed timeline.
Even though I'm a Red Haired Step Child at this family reunion of commentary, ostensibly intended to help achieve a stronger Marine Corps, I'm going tp continue to speak out. At least we have the same goal. The two most toxic commands I served in during my shortened career were the 12th Marine Corps District Headquarters at Treasure Island, CA from 1976 to 1979 and the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarters, 1983 to 1987. At the 12th MCD it was the lead colonel and at the 4th MAB, it was primarily the staff, especially the majors. At least they all had a National Defense Service Medal in those days. The toxic leadership and staff did not make either command stronger. This is my concern about Compass Points. How does article, after article, after article stating that the FD 2030 is a bad idea help the Marine Corps become stronger?
The answer is, toxic comments do not make the Marine Corps stronger. This is because each military community in the Marine Corps has its own persona. An infantry officer tends to have a different persona than does a C-130 pilot. The infantry officer is the owner of the pointed end of the spear.
The rest of us are there to make sure he can do his, or her, job. It is a rough business out on the pointed end of the spear. It is no place for the faint at heart. Gen. Eric Smith is an infantry officer who has served on the pointed end of the spear and has been wounded in battle for proof of such duty.
The point I am attempting to make is that personal attacks on the Marine infantry officer who is presently the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not helping to make the Marine Corps stronger. A fellow Marine may not agree with his view of Maritime Prepositioning, or the need for the landing Ship Medium, or even his interpretation of Title 10, but the fact remains he is the Commandant. The one and only Commandant. He is also an infantry officer. How likely are you to change his opinion by throwing shade at him? What to do?
There is another path in my humble opinion. The bedrock deficiencies of FD 2030 that existed at its onset, and still exist today, are (1) No logistics support for the MLR, (2) No air support for the MLR, (3) It is Separate from the MAGTF, and (4) The Competition Continuum. There is resolution in plain sight if we can quit disagreeing.
The death grip of FD 2030 began loosening when Gen. Smith expanded the FD 2030 (my way or the highway) terminology to Force Design. During his 75 minute speech recently with the Brookings Institute be expanded the MLR role to defending the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). That is a huge shift in terminology. Defending SLOCs involves ships. It would be Marines on ships with their USN Sailor counterparts. In an even earlier comment, Gen. Smith characterized the MEU as the crown jewel of the Marine Corps. Could it be that an ARG/MAGTF mission is in the making for defending the Indo Pacific SLOCs? The MLR remarried with the MAGTF concept would end the logistics debacle. Compass Points recently mentioned Marines on Expeditionary fast Transport ships. Could they defnd SLOCs? Incorporating the MLR with the MAGTF would end the air support deficiency.
What about the Competition Continuum? A logistics shortage by Marines would not change the Competition Continuum needle move toward war. Neither would an air support deficiency. Putting Marines on islands with missile to attack the PLAN would definitely move the needle toward a war footing. This is why the Philippines will not allow Marines and missiles permanently on their sovereign territory. The Marines presence would change the Competition Continuum for the Philippines. As an alternative, Marines on amphibious ships in international waters capable of defending SLOCs do not disrupt the Competition Continuum. And, they are a huge deterrent!
It was good to see our Commandant able to carry on a very articulate commentary for 75 minutes after the terribly close call he had when the couple walking from the Marine Corps Marathon came upon John Doe laying unconscious on the sidewalk bleeding from the mouth. I believe his health was the main point of the Brookings meeting.
I did not agree with Gen. Smith's ACMC article in the April 2021 USNI Proceedings. I submitted a response telling them why I did not agree with him. My response was not published. After a period, I put a cover letter on it and sent it to him to let him know what I disagreed with. It is what I think everyone should do. It is called speaking truth to power. After spending 19.5 years assigned to Fleet Marine Force units I felt very strongly about what I had to say. Separating his co9ncept from the MAGTF was one of my main objections.
I can envision the timeline for study and report completion to easily take two years. Consider that even with an expedited effort to contract an independent federally funded research and development center, a year to perform the study and prepare a report, followed by a SecDef review, the results presented to Congress will not be timely. Implementation of any recommendations by the Marine Corps will cause further delay. Can we wait that long?
Thank you General McAbee for your rebuttal to the CMC's, Brooking Inst. interview. It is spot on. BZ! Let's hope and pray that the Congressional review is not a dog and pony show. The future of our Corps depends on it.
Japanese Naval Blitz of the Netherlands East Indies or How the Dutch Island Chain Strategy gets Blitzed!
There has been a lot of criticism of the “Island Chain Defense” strategy. A major question: Is it really a military strategy? Another criticism is the “Maginot Line” defensive nature of the strategy that concedes the offense to the enemy. All defenses have gaps and weak points that can be exploited. Defensive lines can be penetrated and “rolled up”. The nature of naval warfare’s strategic mobility provides offensive opportunities not only to exploit gaps but also to isolate and neutralize by passed enemy forces. The US Marine Corps role should be the capture of advanced bases and airfields to support the control of SLOCs. Reorganizing the Marine Corps to reduce combat power in order to experiment with the development and employment of anti-ship missiles with the excuse of increasing lethality is an extremely bad idea.
There is an example, from the World War 2 Pacific War, where the island chain defense failed miserably. The “Sizzle” of this campaign has been missed but there is plenty of steak. The Japanese Naval Blitz of the Dutch East Indies was a planned multi-operation campaign that was executed like clockwork. I like this map because it represents the offensive maneuver of the campaign: https://www.westpoint.edu/sites/default/files/inline-images/academics/academic_departments/history/WWII%20Asia/ww2%2520asia%2520map%252010.jpg This youtube video does a great job providing the strategic content for the Campaign: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vpKTJGUSg6A
I should also mention the primary reference for this article is: The Netherlands East Indies Campaign 1941-42, A Quest for Oil by Marc Lohnstewin; Osprey Publishing
The Dec 1942 Pearl Harbor attacked kicked off the Japanese War Plan A-Go consisting of three major campaigns: Malaya, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies. Why the Dutch East Indies? Japan desperately needed the East Indies natural resources, primarily oil followed by rubber, tin and bauxite (alumina).
The Japanese also planned the Philippines and Malaya Campaigns to provide staging areas in order to launch the attack in the Dutch Islands. On Dec 8, 1941 Japanese conducted an air raid on Singapore. On Dec 9, the Prince of Wales (battleship) and Repulse (cruiser) Task Force departs Singapore without air cover in order to intercept the Japanese Malaya invasion force. Because the British Task Force Commander thought he lost the element of surprise, he ordered the task force return to Singapore. On 10 Dec, both the Prince of Wales and the Repulse are sunk by Japanese air attacks. The British defensive concerns now focused on Singapore and India and they basically abandon their possession of Northern Borneo. Dec 16—24, the Japanese landed and occupy Northern Borneo. The stage is now set for the take down of the Dutch East Indies.
The Dutch knew the Japanese were coming. The Dutch Commander set three defensive lines running west to east building airfields and bases to support each defensive line. They declared war on Japan Dec 8 1941, the day after Pearl Harbor. Interesting Japan declares war on Netherlands on Jan 11, 1942 and makes their first landing on Borneo and Celebes.
Going from West to East: the 1st defensive line starts on the northern tip of Sumatra with the Sabang, Lo Nia and Medan Airfields; the chain moves east to Borneo with the airfield at Tanakan on the northern tip; the Langoan Airfield is next on the northern tip of Celebes Island; the next link in the chain is the island of North Maluku with the Djailolo Airfield; the 1st Island Chain defense finishes on the north tip of Western New Guinea with the Babo Airfield.
The 2nd defensive chain starts in the middle of the Island of Sumatra at the Pakan Barne Airfield; stretches to the Singkwang II Airfield on the western side of Borneo to the Samarinda II Airfield on the eastern side of the Borneo Island (both of these airfields were “secret”); from there to the southern Celebes airfield at Kendari II; Ambon is the next island with the Laha and Namlea Airfields. At Ambon the defensive line takes a hard right to the southwest to Timor Island.
The final defensive line is the Island of Java that contains the government seat, key Naval and Army bases and commercial centers. For these reasons the final Japanese objective was the Island of Java.
The Japanese started the Campaign on 11 Jan 1942 with landings and capture of the airfield on Borneo (Tarakan) and landings (and parachute assault) on Celebes (Menado). The capture of the airfields are wrapped up in approximately 48 hours. The capture of these airfields also represents the breaching of the first defensive chain.
On 24 Jan the next operation began to capture the airfields at Balikpapan (Borneo) and Kendari (Celebes Island). Kendari was a quick capture. Balikpapan was an important oil port on eastern Borneo and the assault there was delayed for three days. The delay was caused by the delayed preparation of the Tarakan Airfield that was captured on Jan 11.
On 15 Jan the America-British-Dutch Australian Command (ABDACOM) is formed and counter attacks with naval forces and air attacks on the Japanese transports headed for Balikpapan. Air attacks sink two and damage three transports, a seaplane tender and a destroyer. A Dutch submarine sinks a transport. After the Japanese landing boats depart for landing, four American destroyers catch the Japanese transports at anchor sinking four and damaging two transports. With the Japanese landing complete Balikpapan is captured with its damaged oil facilities.
With the completion of the Balikpapan Operation the second defensive island chain is penetrated and Java is within Japanese bomber and fighter range. The Japanese then completes the isolation of Java taking Ambon Island on 31 Jan. On 19 Feb a Japanese Carrier Task Force attacks the Port of Darwin to prevent the Allies from using Darwin as a base to contest the invasion of Timor and Java. The attack kills 236, wounding 300-400, 30 aircraft destroyed, 11 vessels sunk, 3 vessels grounded and 25 ships damaged. Timor was captured on 20 Feb.
On 14 Feb the first landings and parachute assaults are conducted on southern Sumatra in order to capture Palembang. On 27 Feb the Battle of Java Sea results in significant Allie losses: 2 light cruisers sunk, 3 destroyers sunk, 1 heavy cruiser damages and 2300 sailors killed. Also the USS Langley (carrying a cargo of fighters) is sunk south of Java.
On Mar 1 the Japanese offensive to capture Java commences. On 12 Mar Allied Force on Java surrender. The final surrenders of Dutch forces on Sumatra occurs on 28 Mar.
Tada! The Japan military, in less than 90 days, secured a strategic oil supply and the southern approaches to the South China Sea. They accomplished this in a series of coordinated economy of force operations on a planned and well executed timeline.
Even though I'm a Red Haired Step Child at this family reunion of commentary, ostensibly intended to help achieve a stronger Marine Corps, I'm going tp continue to speak out. At least we have the same goal. The two most toxic commands I served in during my shortened career were the 12th Marine Corps District Headquarters at Treasure Island, CA from 1976 to 1979 and the 4th Marine Amphibious Brigade Headquarters, 1983 to 1987. At the 12th MCD it was the lead colonel and at the 4th MAB, it was primarily the staff, especially the majors. At least they all had a National Defense Service Medal in those days. The toxic leadership and staff did not make either command stronger. This is my concern about Compass Points. How does article, after article, after article stating that the FD 2030 is a bad idea help the Marine Corps become stronger?
The answer is, toxic comments do not make the Marine Corps stronger. This is because each military community in the Marine Corps has its own persona. An infantry officer tends to have a different persona than does a C-130 pilot. The infantry officer is the owner of the pointed end of the spear.
The rest of us are there to make sure he can do his, or her, job. It is a rough business out on the pointed end of the spear. It is no place for the faint at heart. Gen. Eric Smith is an infantry officer who has served on the pointed end of the spear and has been wounded in battle for proof of such duty.
The point I am attempting to make is that personal attacks on the Marine infantry officer who is presently the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not helping to make the Marine Corps stronger. A fellow Marine may not agree with his view of Maritime Prepositioning, or the need for the landing Ship Medium, or even his interpretation of Title 10, but the fact remains he is the Commandant. The one and only Commandant. He is also an infantry officer. How likely are you to change his opinion by throwing shade at him? What to do?
There is another path in my humble opinion. The bedrock deficiencies of FD 2030 that existed at its onset, and still exist today, are (1) No logistics support for the MLR, (2) No air support for the MLR, (3) It is Separate from the MAGTF, and (4) The Competition Continuum. There is resolution in plain sight if we can quit disagreeing.
The death grip of FD 2030 began loosening when Gen. Smith expanded the FD 2030 (my way or the highway) terminology to Force Design. During his 75 minute speech recently with the Brookings Institute be expanded the MLR role to defending the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs). That is a huge shift in terminology. Defending SLOCs involves ships. It would be Marines on ships with their USN Sailor counterparts. In an even earlier comment, Gen. Smith characterized the MEU as the crown jewel of the Marine Corps. Could it be that an ARG/MAGTF mission is in the making for defending the Indo Pacific SLOCs? The MLR remarried with the MAGTF concept would end the logistics debacle. Compass Points recently mentioned Marines on Expeditionary fast Transport ships. Could they defnd SLOCs? Incorporating the MLR with the MAGTF would end the air support deficiency.
What about the Competition Continuum? A logistics shortage by Marines would not change the Competition Continuum needle move toward war. Neither would an air support deficiency. Putting Marines on islands with missile to attack the PLAN would definitely move the needle toward a war footing. This is why the Philippines will not allow Marines and missiles permanently on their sovereign territory. The Marines presence would change the Competition Continuum for the Philippines. As an alternative, Marines on amphibious ships in international waters capable of defending SLOCs do not disrupt the Competition Continuum. And, they are a huge deterrent!
It was good to see our Commandant able to carry on a very articulate commentary for 75 minutes after the terribly close call he had when the couple walking from the Marine Corps Marathon came upon John Doe laying unconscious on the sidewalk bleeding from the mouth. I believe his health was the main point of the Brookings meeting.
I did not agree with Gen. Smith's ACMC article in the April 2021 USNI Proceedings. I submitted a response telling them why I did not agree with him. My response was not published. After a period, I put a cover letter on it and sent it to him to let him know what I disagreed with. It is what I think everyone should do. It is called speaking truth to power. After spending 19.5 years assigned to Fleet Marine Force units I felt very strongly about what I had to say. Separating his co9ncept from the MAGTF was one of my main objections.
I can envision the timeline for study and report completion to easily take two years. Consider that even with an expedited effort to contract an independent federally funded research and development center, a year to perform the study and prepare a report, followed by a SecDef review, the results presented to Congress will not be timely. Implementation of any recommendations by the Marine Corps will cause further delay. Can we wait that long?