I recall reading that Marines involved in the development of Force Design were required to sign non-disclosure agreements. This practice seems to contradict the core values of trust and transparency that define Marine leadership. I would genuinely like to hear from someone involved in the planning process—what was so sensitive that it couldn’t be shared with fellow Marines? Was it perhaps to avoid scrutiny or criticism of a potentially flawed concept? To encourage little or no review?
The 38th CMC did indeed require many of his officers to sign NDAs as they worked on FD 2030. This meant that after they returned from Quantico to their commands they could not even brief their own generals on what they were doing. I refused to sign an NDA to attend a retired general officer briefing and was denied access to that meeting.
The AirBnB analogy makes a lot of sense to me. In its closing sentences, this piece strikes me as asking the right questions of the right audience, to wit: U.S. Congress. This will be a most uncomfortable time … no Marine wants to call into question wisdom of its senior leadership: Marines don’t do that. But, here we are, doing just that, and for a very upright reason - the rebuilding of the Corps in a time of global disquiet. We are blessed in having retired senior officers who have moved in that rarified atmosphere, & have a feel for what needs to be done. I think our salvation rests in their hands, as uncomfortable as that may be. Lead on! Semper Fidelis!
This is an accurate litany of the dereliction of duty that unfolded. At various levels leaders failed their oaths and responsibilities. They did so intentionally in some cases and via dereliction in others. In both cases they should be held accountable. The gross lack of accountability across the senior uniformed leadership and the civilian leaders of DOD simply cannot continue.
Having just experienced two of the sharpest generals in the Marine Corps declining further service of their own volition, the view from the outside is clear. The talent always leaves a failing company first, but it is not always of their own choice. It is a reflection of the corporate culture of the organization, that the most talented officers are not most desired, and they even trust their instincts and leave, or are given no choice. Then, there are the ones running their political mouths. The Marine Corps would do well to reach to some of those who got out of the game, and didn't enter the political one, for whatever reason they left.
The 38th CMC failed to keep some exceptionally talented two and three-star generals on board because of their professional questioning of his ill-conceived FD 2030. As you note, others left and will likely continue to leave early unless the Corps returns to its Title 10 mandated mission to be an air-ground combined arms force ready for employment anywhere in the worldon short notice. Few will want to stick around to sit on defense with missiles on Western Pacific islands.
Regardless of the possible good intentions CMC Berger may have had, the fact that so many review steps were omitted and bypassed, to me, shows ill intent. The review process is a safeguard to prevent this from occurring. The fact that these safeguards were bypassed shows dereliction of duty and/or malfeasance.
I still don't understand why the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command wasn't given the anti-ship mission the USMC has embraced. Have a NECC battery with a Marine company security element. But no, gut the USMC.
The Marines surrendered so much ground combat capability to gain what appears to be--as others have noted--inferior anti-ship capabilities. Congratulations, Force Design means the Marines aren't in danger of being a second Army. Or any army at all? I just don't understand why this was done this way. How much damage has been done? How long would it take to fix the damage?
An accessory to the crime: credulity based on the assumption that the clear concerns had in fact been addressed and mitigated before moving forward. I myself am guilty of this. I remember thinking that I may not like the implementation of Force Design, but surely they have all the shortfalls covered. I remember looking forward to seeing how the capability gap was addressed, and I never suspected the MEUs would shift away from overlapping or sequential ARGs. How I long for those days of innocence.
Seems to me issues associated with righting our listing ship have been identified by numerous contributors. For those of us not speaking from the vantage point of senior rank, but who, nonetheless, have good heads on their shoulders, perhaps we should now focus on what is to be done in terms of education in our school houses, getting the right Marines into the right slots, what kinds of units need to be restored, what kinds of new units need to be brought on line, what the Navy needs to do to restore their ability to launch Amphibious operations, and how we need the Corps to look sooner rather than later. Offered as Food For Thought. Semper Fidelis!
And it's not going to get better. Although General Berger (the CMC who started all this) is gone, his Assistant CMC, General Smith, is now the CMC. The two of them purged as many general officers and colonels who were not wholeheartedly on board with the changes as they could.
The main complaint I heard was that the Force Design concept was wargamed at Quantico but never tested in the field. Who makes radical changes that way?
I'm not a Marine but am a Vet. The Marines have a great and storied history. Much of the Story and Greatness derive from the Pacific theater in WWII. Nimitz had the Marines fight an Island-hopping campaign in which they performed magnificently. The distances between battles were huge. The differences between the US Navy at Guadalcanal (where my Uncle served) and at Okinawa were massive. The Guadalcanal Marines barely survived due to heroic actions of the US Navy and the 1st MarDiv. (Note: more Navy personnel died in the surrounding waters than the 1st MarDiv onshore). The Cactus Airforce and other available airpower absolutely mauled remaining Japanese reinforcement and resupply efforts. The awesome sacrifices of our Marines and Navy combined with inexplicable decisions by the Japanese Navy gave us the win there. Guadalcanal was a very near thing. At Okinawa we had a fleet of over 700 ships and thousands of carrier aircraft. Realize by that time we had bypassed FAR more Japanese troops than we fought and killed. The Pacific >(Chinese) theater is an Island by Island battle. Conceivably, the new Marine posture & Allied forces are designed to attrit the Chinese Navy to the point of defeat. At worst the Marine posture is designed to slow or stop the Chinese long enough for the Navy and Air Force to recover and defeat them. What good are tanks when ships that carry them are in such peril? The Chinese will face this same problem. Prepositioned Marines with air defense and ship killing weapons are a serious threat to the Chinese. A very instructive history of the Pacific War is the unauthorized history of the pacific war. This should be required perusal for any planners. The Pacific ain't Europe or Iraq/Afghanistan
This is the most eloquent defense of bureaucracy and the status quo that I have seen in quite some time. As someone who has dealt with this in the army, I can appreciate Berger's desire to negate the endless committees, study groups and others that work to smother any real change.
Richard, I’m not an expert at surging the combat capacity we lost due to ill conceived FD. I would venture to say, it would take the Marine Corps and Navy about a decade to recoup what they have lost…we don’t have that much time because the Chinese and the rest of the world aren’t going to give the time and space to reequip.
Thinking about WW2. 1st Division activated in early 41. Full build out was in late 44 with the activation of 6th Division. The doctrine was developed in the interwar years so it was ready to go when the need arose. The Marines also had assorted detachments like shipboard and embassy and perhaps some units still hanging out in banana republics. The 4th Marine regiment was in China until just before the war when it was moved to Corregidor and destroyed there. Notably, the early war Marine Corps included many base defense forces. The one at Wake was a sitting duck for the Japanese and the one at Midway was saved by the naval battle. These units continued to be established into 1942. Later in the war, they became AA units while their artillery assets were used so form regular artillery battalions.
So say 3.5 years from scattered forces to a full USMC. Of course, we had to get our asses kicked before the lesson was learned. And we clearly lack the shipbuilding capacity of even the pre-war era. The enormous number of ships needed for offensive amphibious operations was one of the great achievements of American industry. So your 10 year estimate may be about right.
Unfortunately, our manufacturing base is not what it used to be. We rely too much on foreign builders. We have shuttered too many shipbuilding ports. We don’t have enough students learning the Trades, etc. etc.
To replace all the equipment the Marine Corps divested from will take a long time. And recruiting and training the manpower needed, again for the Navy and Marine Corps is a huge undertaking that will take years to accomplish.
We don't even have a sniper school anymore, for instance, and the longer this continues the more difficult it will be to reconstitute it - as coaches and mentors and shooters retire their knowledge goes with them so it becomes more and more a case of starting from scratch
A dedicated and extremely talented Marine I have known for 37 years who loves our Corps and is working tirelessly behind the scenes to keep the active and retired marine Corps community informed I beleive the only reward he desires is for his words to be shared far and wide. Want to help, get more folks to subscribe to Compass Points and continue to engage in the daily discussions at this site.
I can't remember any other article I've read by an anonymous author.
Anonymity is usually reserved for cases where someone fears reprisals. Taking on the establishment can involve risks. Is the Marine Corps establishment threatening those who blow the whistle on their hair-brained Force 2030 plans?
I recall reading that Marines involved in the development of Force Design were required to sign non-disclosure agreements. This practice seems to contradict the core values of trust and transparency that define Marine leadership. I would genuinely like to hear from someone involved in the planning process—what was so sensitive that it couldn’t be shared with fellow Marines? Was it perhaps to avoid scrutiny or criticism of a potentially flawed concept? To encourage little or no review?
I've heard that also. It's disgusting.
The 38th CMC did indeed require many of his officers to sign NDAs as they worked on FD 2030. This meant that after they returned from Quantico to their commands they could not even brief their own generals on what they were doing. I refused to sign an NDA to attend a retired general officer briefing and was denied access to that meeting.
I served with a whisnant from 89-93, first name was don. Were you mcsf?
Not me as I retired in 1975.
The AirBnB analogy makes a lot of sense to me. In its closing sentences, this piece strikes me as asking the right questions of the right audience, to wit: U.S. Congress. This will be a most uncomfortable time … no Marine wants to call into question wisdom of its senior leadership: Marines don’t do that. But, here we are, doing just that, and for a very upright reason - the rebuilding of the Corps in a time of global disquiet. We are blessed in having retired senior officers who have moved in that rarified atmosphere, & have a feel for what needs to be done. I think our salvation rests in their hands, as uncomfortable as that may be. Lead on! Semper Fidelis!
This is an accurate litany of the dereliction of duty that unfolded. At various levels leaders failed their oaths and responsibilities. They did so intentionally in some cases and via dereliction in others. In both cases they should be held accountable. The gross lack of accountability across the senior uniformed leadership and the civilian leaders of DOD simply cannot continue.
Having just experienced two of the sharpest generals in the Marine Corps declining further service of their own volition, the view from the outside is clear. The talent always leaves a failing company first, but it is not always of their own choice. It is a reflection of the corporate culture of the organization, that the most talented officers are not most desired, and they even trust their instincts and leave, or are given no choice. Then, there are the ones running their political mouths. The Marine Corps would do well to reach to some of those who got out of the game, and didn't enter the political one, for whatever reason they left.
The 38th CMC failed to keep some exceptionally talented two and three-star generals on board because of their professional questioning of his ill-conceived FD 2030. As you note, others left and will likely continue to leave early unless the Corps returns to its Title 10 mandated mission to be an air-ground combined arms force ready for employment anywhere in the worldon short notice. Few will want to stick around to sit on defense with missiles on Western Pacific islands.
Regardless of the possible good intentions CMC Berger may have had, the fact that so many review steps were omitted and bypassed, to me, shows ill intent. The review process is a safeguard to prevent this from occurring. The fact that these safeguards were bypassed shows dereliction of duty and/or malfeasance.
More likely a case of malpractice than malfeasance.
Agreed, Sir. Thank you.
I appreciate MCCP perspective.
I still don't understand why the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command wasn't given the anti-ship mission the USMC has embraced. Have a NECC battery with a Marine company security element. But no, gut the USMC.
The Marines surrendered so much ground combat capability to gain what appears to be--as others have noted--inferior anti-ship capabilities. Congratulations, Force Design means the Marines aren't in danger of being a second Army. Or any army at all? I just don't understand why this was done this way. How much damage has been done? How long would it take to fix the damage?
Don't sink, don't shoot. What do you do?
An accessory to the crime: credulity based on the assumption that the clear concerns had in fact been addressed and mitigated before moving forward. I myself am guilty of this. I remember thinking that I may not like the implementation of Force Design, but surely they have all the shortfalls covered. I remember looking forward to seeing how the capability gap was addressed, and I never suspected the MEUs would shift away from overlapping or sequential ARGs. How I long for those days of innocence.
Seems to me issues associated with righting our listing ship have been identified by numerous contributors. For those of us not speaking from the vantage point of senior rank, but who, nonetheless, have good heads on their shoulders, perhaps we should now focus on what is to be done in terms of education in our school houses, getting the right Marines into the right slots, what kinds of units need to be restored, what kinds of new units need to be brought on line, what the Navy needs to do to restore their ability to launch Amphibious operations, and how we need the Corps to look sooner rather than later. Offered as Food For Thought. Semper Fidelis!
And it's not going to get better. Although General Berger (the CMC who started all this) is gone, his Assistant CMC, General Smith, is now the CMC. The two of them purged as many general officers and colonels who were not wholeheartedly on board with the changes as they could.
The main complaint I heard was that the Force Design concept was wargamed at Quantico but never tested in the field. Who makes radical changes that way?
I'm not a Marine but am a Vet. The Marines have a great and storied history. Much of the Story and Greatness derive from the Pacific theater in WWII. Nimitz had the Marines fight an Island-hopping campaign in which they performed magnificently. The distances between battles were huge. The differences between the US Navy at Guadalcanal (where my Uncle served) and at Okinawa were massive. The Guadalcanal Marines barely survived due to heroic actions of the US Navy and the 1st MarDiv. (Note: more Navy personnel died in the surrounding waters than the 1st MarDiv onshore). The Cactus Airforce and other available airpower absolutely mauled remaining Japanese reinforcement and resupply efforts. The awesome sacrifices of our Marines and Navy combined with inexplicable decisions by the Japanese Navy gave us the win there. Guadalcanal was a very near thing. At Okinawa we had a fleet of over 700 ships and thousands of carrier aircraft. Realize by that time we had bypassed FAR more Japanese troops than we fought and killed. The Pacific >(Chinese) theater is an Island by Island battle. Conceivably, the new Marine posture & Allied forces are designed to attrit the Chinese Navy to the point of defeat. At worst the Marine posture is designed to slow or stop the Chinese long enough for the Navy and Air Force to recover and defeat them. What good are tanks when ships that carry them are in such peril? The Chinese will face this same problem. Prepositioned Marines with air defense and ship killing weapons are a serious threat to the Chinese. A very instructive history of the Pacific War is the unauthorized history of the pacific war. This should be required perusal for any planners. The Pacific ain't Europe or Iraq/Afghanistan
I'm not sure it can all be rolled back now. How do you get 100s of tanks back...
This is the most eloquent defense of bureaucracy and the status quo that I have seen in quite some time. As someone who has dealt with this in the army, I can appreciate Berger's desire to negate the endless committees, study groups and others that work to smother any real change.
Not a Marine but I would appreciate hearing from those that are how long it will take to fix this mess and restore the capability.
Richard, I’m not an expert at surging the combat capacity we lost due to ill conceived FD. I would venture to say, it would take the Marine Corps and Navy about a decade to recoup what they have lost…we don’t have that much time because the Chinese and the rest of the world aren’t going to give the time and space to reequip.
Thinking about WW2. 1st Division activated in early 41. Full build out was in late 44 with the activation of 6th Division. The doctrine was developed in the interwar years so it was ready to go when the need arose. The Marines also had assorted detachments like shipboard and embassy and perhaps some units still hanging out in banana republics. The 4th Marine regiment was in China until just before the war when it was moved to Corregidor and destroyed there. Notably, the early war Marine Corps included many base defense forces. The one at Wake was a sitting duck for the Japanese and the one at Midway was saved by the naval battle. These units continued to be established into 1942. Later in the war, they became AA units while their artillery assets were used so form regular artillery battalions.
So say 3.5 years from scattered forces to a full USMC. Of course, we had to get our asses kicked before the lesson was learned. And we clearly lack the shipbuilding capacity of even the pre-war era. The enormous number of ships needed for offensive amphibious operations was one of the great achievements of American industry. So your 10 year estimate may be about right.
Unfortunately, our manufacturing base is not what it used to be. We rely too much on foreign builders. We have shuttered too many shipbuilding ports. We don’t have enough students learning the Trades, etc. etc.
To replace all the equipment the Marine Corps divested from will take a long time. And recruiting and training the manpower needed, again for the Navy and Marine Corps is a huge undertaking that will take years to accomplish.
We don't even have a sniper school anymore, for instance, and the longer this continues the more difficult it will be to reconstitute it - as coaches and mentors and shooters retire their knowledge goes with them so it becomes more and more a case of starting from scratch
Who is the author?
A dedicated and extremely talented Marine I have known for 37 years who loves our Corps and is working tirelessly behind the scenes to keep the active and retired marine Corps community informed I beleive the only reward he desires is for his words to be shared far and wide. Want to help, get more folks to subscribe to Compass Points and continue to engage in the daily discussions at this site.
Is there a reason he's writing anonymously?
Many people choose to do so. Base any comments you have on the content, not the "name" of the author.
I can't remember any other article I've read by an anonymous author.
Anonymity is usually reserved for cases where someone fears reprisals. Taking on the establishment can involve risks. Is the Marine Corps establishment threatening those who blow the whistle on their hair-brained Force 2030 plans?