Compass Points - 'Then & Now' Comments

The global crisis response force

Compass Points - 'Then & Now' Comments

The global crisis response force

March 9, 2024

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The Compass Points post of March 5, 2024, "Then and Now" featured an article by Gen Zinni and BGen McAbee which has stimulated a broad discussion of Marine Corps global, crisis response capabilities. The authors provide an amazing review of Marines arriving in Iraq, Luzon, Oman, Somalia, Bangladesh, Guantanamo, Sicily, and even South Central LA. Marines arrived to all these locations on short notice to help in a crisis. And they accomplished all these operations across just 30 months. That was then. Does the Marine Corps have the same ability to respond globally today?

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Although a few readers felt there has been no decline in Marine Corps global, crisis response capabilities, most readers who commented online and off are deeply concerned. Only a portion of reader feedback has been included below. Comments have been edited for length and content. Compass Points thanks all readers for their always thoughtful and often passionate comments.

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Douglas C Rapé

March 5

The 30-month snapshot of history is a superb example of USMC versatility. Not one of these operations had been predicted six months before they occurred and some “popped up” in days. This is what a force in readiness does. Gen Berger unilaterally and secretly decided these capabilities were no longer required. He did not just decide he needed a new capability but destroyed all others in favor of a response that might never be called on and if called could not execute. That is amazing in and of itself. That it was not summarily dismissed and reversed within days is incomprehensible. That it continues to limp along without a chance of being funded on the weaponry being developed. Real world combat developments over the last two years have demonstrated that virtually every founding concept of FD-2030 is bankrupt . . . .

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Raymond Lee Maloy

March 5

People like General Berger have become enamored with special operations because that is all they know, and those operations require limited weaponry and are easy to plan and execute. Their experience, education and mindset has become warped by long periods fighting people with limited resources and ability.

Combined operations require dedication and knowledge of weapons, logistics, planning, communications and tactics. Training has to be continuous, under adverse conditions and terrain. Infantry officers who cannot integrate and employ every weapon in the inventory and communicate that knowledge to their troops are unprofessional and useless . . . .

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Charles Wemyss, Jr.

March 5

“I have only two men out of my company and 20 out of some other company, we need support, but it is almost suicide to try to get it here and we are swept by machine gun fire and constant barrage is on us. I have no one on my left, and only a few on my right. I WILL HOLD.” 1st Lt. Clifton Cates

“I call on all Marines to in step and so smartly.” “If I see a fat Marine he’s got a problem, and so does his commanding officers.” General Louis Wilson.

One could go on and on. We should be skeptical of the special operations siren song, so popular with the politicians because it seemingly absolves them of real accountability for life and death decisions. As a young infantry officer in the 2nd MarDiv, it was easy to dislike the reconnaissance battalion and to a degree the Force Recon Company. Company sized, battalion sized, regiment sized operations being organized to get everyone to the head is difficult, the small, specialized units in the day never had the complication of different levels of ability, fitness, mental acuity, Marines in a unit getting close to their EAS, aka “getting short.” Etc., etc. But it never left the mind that given the resources and time to train, that the straight leg infantry company could be very facile at all manner of “special operations.” Kilo Company 3/2 crossed the New River at night in inflatable boats small, in the summer of 1979. Talk about a risky evolution. Except it wasn’t, because they trained hard for it.

Lastly, if General Smith truly believes “that being a Marine is bonus enough.” Then he should walk the walk and retire. Lead by example. But dimes against doughnuts he will hobble back to the oldest standing structure in Washington, DC, and attempt to finish the work of General Berger. Well, he may sit behind the CMC desk, it is our job to stop the madness, they want an MLR, we are the MLR, we are the Stand In Force, come and get it, only by the way most feel here, we will no longer sit in the defense, rather go on the offense and challenge every FD2030 pile of horse bucky that rolls out of the puzzle palace. Well good luck to them, “WE WILL HOLD.”

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Randy Shetter

March 7

Today's topic fits in with yesterday's subject of crisis response. FONOPS would be considered as deterring war or conflict. If the attacks by the Houthis are not stopped, they will continue to become more brazen. Since the deployment of the first post WWII floating Marine Battalion in 1947, Marines afloat have deterred conflict and have been ready to act in response to conflict. The beauty of having a combined arms naval expeditionary force is that it is ready to respond. It can loiter in the area for long periods of time. To deter conflict from getting worse, you need a credible deterrent.

However, the Navy and Marine Corps cannot presently act to deter this conflict. Former Commandant Berger reduced the required number of amphibious ships to maintain Marines afloat. He even stated as such after an earthquake in Turkey in 2023. He stated: "We didn't have a Marine Expeditionary Unit, a MEU, nearby that could respond...." Marines did help in aiding Turkey, but not with the size of force they should have had. While shipping is a Navy concern, former Commandant Berger scaled back the required number of amphibious ships from 38 to 31. So, this problem by his own admission, is his . . .

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medevicerep

March 7

The lack of critical review and the childish criticism of retired General officers who offered serious thoughts and concerns tells me everything I need to know about Force Design 2030. It is a small cult of careerist officers who pursued this strategy and they have been using secrecy and silencing tactics including censoring The Marine Corps Gazette. Thankfully we are starting to get some traction in correcting this before it is too late.

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Jeffrey Dinsmore

March 7

Careerists. A nomenclature that Al Gray worked to eradicate, but have cropped up again in the NCLB program. As warfighters retire, and NCR careerists dominate, I fear we are headed for the lessons of the next shooting war.

As I hear FG officers of my peer group and lower say that “the days of kicking in the door are over,” and “why are we still doing force on force exercises,” I believe the next shooting war is the only education left. “Experience is the fool’s only teacher.”

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Bob Whitener

March 5

The extraordinary, 30 month, history narrative, provided by Gen. Zinni and BGen. McAbee, can do more to return the Marine Corps to it's prominent 911 role in its service to the nation than can all the technical and philosophical arguments combined. As valid as technical and philosophical arguments may be, those who decide the future of the Marine Corps are not Marines. The 30 month narrative example will have a much more powerful impact on those who will make the political and bureaucratic decisions about the direction the Marine Corps will take in the near future.

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Compass Points thanks Gen Zinni and BGen McAbee for their article, "Then and Now" which provides a motivating review of what a fully capable, global, Marine crisis response force can achieve around the world.

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Compass Points is also deeply grateful for the service and sacrifice of all those across the entire Marine community who have fought long and hard for the best of the Marine Corps and who are still fighting today.

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Compass Points - Then and Now

Why should the Marine Corps ever be weaker?

March 5, 2024

https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-then-and-now