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Douglas C Rapé's avatar

Change for the sake of change is a road to ruin. It is a double edged sword and the wise leader anticipates the unintended consequences. They are often totally predictable. The poor leader only sees the benefit he hopes for and dismisses the unintended consequences. In the military those unintended and ignored consequences later extract a terrible toll. The EABO concept was a terrible idea and recognized as such by experienced Marines right away. Nothing has changed except it is almost six years later and the first operational unit has yet to be fielded despite misleading statements to the contrary.

This is where human nature again raises its head as stubborn arrogance infuses leaders as they double down on the bad idea. Their own view is that they have tenacity. In reality they just keep charging off of the cliff like Lemmings and their ego simply cannot accept facts. Like a petulant child they stomp their feet and insist their flawed concept is wonderful. They believe they are the exceptional genius. Their ignorance is reinforced by their arrogance.

I hope they will be held accountable at some future date.

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Polarbear's avatar

…and another recommended reading for General Smith and his staff. “Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II” by Christopher M. Rein (Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS; published 29 July 2019.). It is available on Amazon.

I thought this analysis of Multi-Domain Warfare History was important enough to send a copy to General Eric M. Smith, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 3000 Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-3000 via Amazon. I will let CP know if I get a “Thank You Note”. If interested, I recommend you order a copy before, hopefully, the Commandant’s staff picks the shelf clean.

I feel that Mr. Rein’s analysis of WW2 multi-domain warfare is outstanding. He demonstrates the obvious, that control of the SLOC should be the strategic focus of any conflict in the Pacific Ocean. Securing the SLOC is essential for military operational communications and coordination, especially regarding amphibious operations.

Notable quote from Chapter 1 Single-Domain Battle: “Amphibious forces, under an umbrella of naval air cover, would first seize an air base, allowing land-based aircraft to be flown in and establish their own protective umbrella. Air raids from this new base could interdict the supplies flowing into the next target, thereby, weakening defenders and enabling subsequent amphibious assaults to succeed.”

The Japanese used this operational technique in their invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese, after neutralizing General MacArthur’s air force (and naval forces), conducted amphibious landing in Northern Luzon to seize airfields to support their main effort amphibious assault in the Lingayen Gulf. MacArthur was forced into fighting a losing single domain battle without reinforcement or sustainment against an enemy able to operate in all three domains.

Of the WW2 Pacific Theater domains, the air domain played the key role in combat operations to control SLOC. Today we have the additional domains of cyber, space and I would include the “seabed” domain because trans-ocean communications and power cables follow the globes major SLOC.

In a near future conflict with the CCP, the air domain will again play a key role in multi-domain battles. Missiles and drones will have a role, but aircraft will be the key weapon. Traditionally, shore-based artillery to attack targets at sea is the US Army’s responsibilities. The US Navy and Marine Corps Team (TFs and MAGTFs) will be responsible for gaining and maintaining the SLOC control and amphibious assaults will be essential in seizing and maintaining control. Mr. Rein’s book also demonstrates, in order to accomplish this mission, the Navy is going to need amphibious ships not only for the Marines but also for the US Army. Another reason that 31 or 33 amphibs misses the mark.

The Marine Corps, instead of focusing on land-based missiles should focus on the Marine Air Wings. Squadrons of 18 F35s are not going to be big enough. They need to be push to 24 aircraft (or increase the number of squadrons) with the associated ground equipment for each squadron to establish multiple disbursed FOBs and/or FARPs, especially for the V/STOL aircraft.

Let’s hope that Mr. Rein’s book is a good start for a “Turn Around”

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