Change for the sake of change is a road to ruin. It is a double edged sword and the wise leader anticipates the unintended consequences. They are often totally predictable. The poor leader only sees the benefit he hopes for and dismisses the unintended consequences. In the military those unintended and ignored consequences later extract a terrible toll. The EABO concept was a terrible idea and recognized as such by experienced Marines right away. Nothing has changed except it is almost six years later and the first operational unit has yet to be fielded despite misleading statements to the contrary.
This is where human nature again raises its head as stubborn arrogance infuses leaders as they double down on the bad idea. Their own view is that they have tenacity. In reality they just keep charging off of the cliff like Lemmings and their ego simply cannot accept facts. Like a petulant child they stomp their feet and insist their flawed concept is wonderful. They believe they are the exceptional genius. Their ignorance is reinforced by their arrogance.
I hope they will be held accountable at some future date.
…and another recommended reading for General Smith and his staff. “Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II” by Christopher M. Rein (Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS; published 29 July 2019.). It is available on Amazon.
I thought this analysis of Multi-Domain Warfare History was important enough to send a copy to General Eric M. Smith, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 3000 Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-3000 via Amazon. I will let CP know if I get a “Thank You Note”. If interested, I recommend you order a copy before, hopefully, the Commandant’s staff picks the shelf clean.
I feel that Mr. Rein’s analysis of WW2 multi-domain warfare is outstanding. He demonstrates the obvious, that control of the SLOC should be the strategic focus of any conflict in the Pacific Ocean. Securing the SLOC is essential for military operational communications and coordination, especially regarding amphibious operations.
Notable quote from Chapter 1 Single-Domain Battle: “Amphibious forces, under an umbrella of naval air cover, would first seize an air base, allowing land-based aircraft to be flown in and establish their own protective umbrella. Air raids from this new base could interdict the supplies flowing into the next target, thereby, weakening defenders and enabling subsequent amphibious assaults to succeed.”
The Japanese used this operational technique in their invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese, after neutralizing General MacArthur’s air force (and naval forces), conducted amphibious landing in Northern Luzon to seize airfields to support their main effort amphibious assault in the Lingayen Gulf. MacArthur was forced into fighting a losing single domain battle without reinforcement or sustainment against an enemy able to operate in all three domains.
Of the WW2 Pacific Theater domains, the air domain played the key role in combat operations to control SLOC. Today we have the additional domains of cyber, space and I would include the “seabed” domain because trans-ocean communications and power cables follow the globes major SLOC.
In a near future conflict with the CCP, the air domain will again play a key role in multi-domain battles. Missiles and drones will have a role, but aircraft will be the key weapon. Traditionally, shore-based artillery to attack targets at sea is the US Army’s responsibilities. The US Navy and Marine Corps Team (TFs and MAGTFs) will be responsible for gaining and maintaining the SLOC control and amphibious assaults will be essential in seizing and maintaining control. Mr. Rein’s book also demonstrates, in order to accomplish this mission, the Navy is going to need amphibious ships not only for the Marines but also for the US Army. Another reason that 31 or 33 amphibs misses the mark.
The Marine Corps, instead of focusing on land-based missiles should focus on the Marine Air Wings. Squadrons of 18 F35s are not going to be big enough. They need to be push to 24 aircraft (or increase the number of squadrons) with the associated ground equipment for each squadron to establish multiple disbursed FOBs and/or FARPs, especially for the V/STOL aircraft.
Let’s hope that Mr. Rein’s book is a good start for a “Turn Around”
The loss of close combat capabilities, such as tanks and tube artillery is detrimental to the Marine Corps. Even if the Marines got rid of the weak NMESIS and relied on just HIMARS, they would still be weak in close combat capabilities. How can Marines fight in a close battle without tanks and tube artillery? In 93, the best Army units, Delta and Rangers, needed the help of Pakistani and Malaysian armor support to get out of Mogadishu. It's time to abandon this ill-fated concept of FD, and return to what we do best: as a combined-arms naval expeditionary force.
There is famous story about the Dallas Cowboy’s coach Jimmy Johnson trading for 49er’s defensive player Charles Haley. He was vehemently advised against it. Haley a brilliant player was known to be “difficult.” Read that, no one knew how to handle him. Johnson realized in discussions with Haley prior to the trade that he was dealing with a very bright man, not only very high football IQ but high intellect. Johnson “knew” he could reason with Haley, because Haley was reasonable when in a discussion whether it was football or other things. The partnership now long ago in the record books, 3 Super Bowl wins in 4 years, was very much a credit to the collaboration of Haley and Johnson on the defensive side of the ball. It didn’t hurt to have near unlimited talent on the other side of the ball either.
Those here accused of being old thinkers, 0302 Captains from the 1970’s focused on squad tactics can be reasoned with, those diametrically opposed to the MAGTF, to maneuver warfare and tied tightly a one peer foe, one theater of conflict with a poorly developed, untested scheme that has cost combat power effectiveness at best can be said to be unreasonable. It’s our way or the highway. No need for the Marines. Really, except in the last week, the Marines of 2/7 have deployed to Los Angeles, and Eric Prince has been hired by the Haitian government to go deal with rival Haitian gangs, one might argue a mission the Marines could handle as well, if it was deemed in the national interest. What’s the point? The world doesn’t revolve on a day to day basis with a presumed world war with China. It revolves around the unexpected, the terrorist cells alive and kicking and waiting for the go signal, a typhoon, an earthquake, or jerk in a country, no one can find on a map, that jumps ugly and does something really stupid. Then? Send in the Marines. Well we can’t do that Mr. President, they are all standing around somewhere, with a T/O that is flatulent with senior SNCO’s in a SIF (sounds like a social disease) with old gear talking about when China invades Taiwan. Tick tock tick tock the earth still spins at 1,000 miles per hour at the equator, it does not stop, best to be ready for the unexpected.
Excellent points. A Marine force tailored to just being an SIF, right now, can't even do the missile mission, even after 4 yrs. However, if the LCR was fully equipped it could do very little else other than be a missile force. However, a pre-FD MEU with the addition of missiles (HIMARs), can execute the full range of military missions in addition to the anti-ship mission. The pre-FD MEU is the Swiss Army Knife. The LCR/SIF is just a missile force with sensors and nothing more!!
Well, indeed, it was this old 0302 from the 70’s that suggested that the young Corporal work on his squad tactics. Let’s refine that a bit. Stick to squad in the defense. The SIF will be in the defense, so basic range cards, sectors of fire and so forth are always handy. But as a Corporal in the SIF he will have plenty of supervision, Staff Sargent squad leaders, Gunnery Sargent for a Platoon Sargent. Surely with that knowledge base in hand after firing all their missiles, they will last as long as their water, and chow allow them to survive, on an island, unsupported and now waiting for either the PLAN or someone else to come for them, because surely with 31 Amphibious vessels it won’t be us.
Thank you for the continued advice, Skipper. I’m very familiar with the FPF and am confident our Marines are still ready and able to deliver.
Here is some advice for you. Please review the Marine Officer Guide and refresh yourself on the expectations of USMC Officers.
To assist you, I provided a few highlights.
“As a Marine Corps Officer, you represent the Corps. Conduct yourself with dignity, courtesy, and self-restraint.
Avoid any show of importance. Do not bluster, especially towards civilians or enlisted personnel.
Be weary of situations beyond your depth. . . (this is an important one for you).
Avoid the habit of complaining or whining . . .
In your relations with your fellow officers, avoid joining factions or, if there is any bad feelings others, avoid taking sides. Do not gossip; gossip always finds it way back. Only say of a fellow officer what you would say to his or her face.
Never, under any circumstance, speak ill of the Corps, or of your own organization, in the presence of civilians or members of the other services. Before you voice any criticism, however merited or carefully thought out, be sure it cannot be construed by outsiders so as to derogate the Corps.”
I look forward to you being a shinning example of Ductus Exemplo in future posts.
President Trump appointed David Berger commandant in 2019. It was one of his many poor personnel choices. Can they recall Berger from retirement and reduce him in rank? Who were Berger’s accomplices and are they still around? There must be accountability.
Great...now I have to be a serious apologist for the FD side. Anyway, think about what you are saying. You are advocating for a political revisionist court to attack senior military leaders who served in previous administrations. Think what that would do to the Republic. We don't need Kommisar courts every four years in a never ending spy v spy (kids, google 'Mad Magazine Spy v Spy'). That's what this would entail. General Berger had the support of the Executive Branch and the Congress. Not to mention a fair portion of the USMC, especially the senior staffers who helped him develop it. No matter how short sighted and deficient I think FD is, it was not illegal and no, I don't think it was done to deliberately degrade the USMC. And, truth be told, it has not been unusual for there to be subtle undercurrents of tension inside and outside the USMC regarding the composition and future of the USMC that play out as one CMC turns into another. They typically are not so overtly controversial as played out with the 38th CMC.
Now, as far as full accountability, The Afghanistan Withdrawal is a 'whole nother ball of wax', and CMC had some role to play in that. Definitely the CentCom Commander and the JCS also. That should be the focal point for accountability, in my opinion. Simply terrible, with strategic and policy repercussions far beyond the actual operation. A TBS class could have staffed and executed an infinitely better theatre withdrawal with the same constraints and restraints. Never would have happened with Gen Dunford or Gen Powell in the JCS seat. Much less other JCS Chairmen, Centcom's, and / or CMCs I can think of.
Time to Pound the Table for Amphibs; https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-turn-around-dont-drown/comments Hey Commandant, why not pound the table over amphibs? Instead, we get the same old excuses and empty talking points that do not solve the problem. (via a “Garbly Cpl”) If the Commandant is worried about the “viability” of the Martine Corps, it seems that "viability" would not be in question if the Navy could built and maintain their amphibs. The US Navy is denying the “Joint Force” an essential amphibious force capability. Let’s not forget that an elite fighting force will now need to compete for strategic lift, if the balloon goes up with the CCP. No matter what action you take as Commandant, it will not get you a fifth star. I am thinking if you are truly committed to maintaining and restoring the Marine Corps “viability”, an early retirement letter containing a “Bent Knee” Speech would be the brave and honorable course. BTW Chowder 2 would be glad to help with that letter and repeat history. S/F
Come on, Polarbear—you’re choosing method over end state. Pounding the table doesn’t build amphibs. Office calls, strategic engagement, and steady pressure do. And that’s exactly what CMC Smith is doing.
He’s not chasing headlines—he’s delivering results. Berger set the floor at 31. Smith is holding that line and building toward Force Design 3.0. Why would he resign? He’s not losing—he’s winning.
He has support from the Hill, the administration, the Joint Force, and—most importantly—his Marines. The viability of the Corps isn’t in question unless you’re still clinging to an outdated model and hoping someone else does the hard work of adapting.
And if Chowder II wants to help draft that resignation letter—well, the only thing they’ve helped with lately is reminding the rest of us why the future doesn’t belong to them.
Funny thing, though—CMC might not be chasing headlines, but they sure chase him. That’s what happens when you’re actually leading change, not just shouting from the sidelines.
One speech he says the MAGTF the “crown jewel” of the Corps and the next he says full steam ahead on FD. Which is it, as the Corps doesn’t have the assets to do both.
He states that the Corps’s organizational structure has a 3 MEU capability. So how many ARG/MEUs are afloat? I believe it’s one, the 31st MEU. Has legislation been passed that changes Title X? You state that Gen. Smith is “knocking on doors”. For what, to change Title X, because right now if he was hauled before Congress and asked how FD adheres to the Corps statutory Title X mission and organization, he couldn’t truthfully say that he’s in compliance.
At some point a member of Congress will ask that question and it will be interesting to hear Gen. Smith’s response.
Anyone catch the SASC hearing today? After five years of Chowder II meetings with “principals” and senior officials, did they finally land the knockout blow?
I would’ve tuned in, but a Captain on this forum who got out in the 1970s reminded me I should stick to squad tactics.
Change for the sake of change is a road to ruin. It is a double edged sword and the wise leader anticipates the unintended consequences. They are often totally predictable. The poor leader only sees the benefit he hopes for and dismisses the unintended consequences. In the military those unintended and ignored consequences later extract a terrible toll. The EABO concept was a terrible idea and recognized as such by experienced Marines right away. Nothing has changed except it is almost six years later and the first operational unit has yet to be fielded despite misleading statements to the contrary.
This is where human nature again raises its head as stubborn arrogance infuses leaders as they double down on the bad idea. Their own view is that they have tenacity. In reality they just keep charging off of the cliff like Lemmings and their ego simply cannot accept facts. Like a petulant child they stomp their feet and insist their flawed concept is wonderful. They believe they are the exceptional genius. Their ignorance is reinforced by their arrogance.
I hope they will be held accountable at some future date.
…and another recommended reading for General Smith and his staff. “Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II” by Christopher M. Rein (Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, KS; published 29 July 2019.). It is available on Amazon.
I thought this analysis of Multi-Domain Warfare History was important enough to send a copy to General Eric M. Smith, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 3000 Marine Corps, Pentagon, Washington, DC 20350-3000 via Amazon. I will let CP know if I get a “Thank You Note”. If interested, I recommend you order a copy before, hopefully, the Commandant’s staff picks the shelf clean.
I feel that Mr. Rein’s analysis of WW2 multi-domain warfare is outstanding. He demonstrates the obvious, that control of the SLOC should be the strategic focus of any conflict in the Pacific Ocean. Securing the SLOC is essential for military operational communications and coordination, especially regarding amphibious operations.
Notable quote from Chapter 1 Single-Domain Battle: “Amphibious forces, under an umbrella of naval air cover, would first seize an air base, allowing land-based aircraft to be flown in and establish their own protective umbrella. Air raids from this new base could interdict the supplies flowing into the next target, thereby, weakening defenders and enabling subsequent amphibious assaults to succeed.”
The Japanese used this operational technique in their invasion of the Philippines. The Japanese, after neutralizing General MacArthur’s air force (and naval forces), conducted amphibious landing in Northern Luzon to seize airfields to support their main effort amphibious assault in the Lingayen Gulf. MacArthur was forced into fighting a losing single domain battle without reinforcement or sustainment against an enemy able to operate in all three domains.
Of the WW2 Pacific Theater domains, the air domain played the key role in combat operations to control SLOC. Today we have the additional domains of cyber, space and I would include the “seabed” domain because trans-ocean communications and power cables follow the globes major SLOC.
In a near future conflict with the CCP, the air domain will again play a key role in multi-domain battles. Missiles and drones will have a role, but aircraft will be the key weapon. Traditionally, shore-based artillery to attack targets at sea is the US Army’s responsibilities. The US Navy and Marine Corps Team (TFs and MAGTFs) will be responsible for gaining and maintaining the SLOC control and amphibious assaults will be essential in seizing and maintaining control. Mr. Rein’s book also demonstrates, in order to accomplish this mission, the Navy is going to need amphibious ships not only for the Marines but also for the US Army. Another reason that 31 or 33 amphibs misses the mark.
The Marine Corps, instead of focusing on land-based missiles should focus on the Marine Air Wings. Squadrons of 18 F35s are not going to be big enough. They need to be push to 24 aircraft (or increase the number of squadrons) with the associated ground equipment for each squadron to establish multiple disbursed FOBs and/or FARPs, especially for the V/STOL aircraft.
Let’s hope that Mr. Rein’s book is a good start for a “Turn Around”
The loss of close combat capabilities, such as tanks and tube artillery is detrimental to the Marine Corps. Even if the Marines got rid of the weak NMESIS and relied on just HIMARS, they would still be weak in close combat capabilities. How can Marines fight in a close battle without tanks and tube artillery? In 93, the best Army units, Delta and Rangers, needed the help of Pakistani and Malaysian armor support to get out of Mogadishu. It's time to abandon this ill-fated concept of FD, and return to what we do best: as a combined-arms naval expeditionary force.
There is famous story about the Dallas Cowboy’s coach Jimmy Johnson trading for 49er’s defensive player Charles Haley. He was vehemently advised against it. Haley a brilliant player was known to be “difficult.” Read that, no one knew how to handle him. Johnson realized in discussions with Haley prior to the trade that he was dealing with a very bright man, not only very high football IQ but high intellect. Johnson “knew” he could reason with Haley, because Haley was reasonable when in a discussion whether it was football or other things. The partnership now long ago in the record books, 3 Super Bowl wins in 4 years, was very much a credit to the collaboration of Haley and Johnson on the defensive side of the ball. It didn’t hurt to have near unlimited talent on the other side of the ball either.
Those here accused of being old thinkers, 0302 Captains from the 1970’s focused on squad tactics can be reasoned with, those diametrically opposed to the MAGTF, to maneuver warfare and tied tightly a one peer foe, one theater of conflict with a poorly developed, untested scheme that has cost combat power effectiveness at best can be said to be unreasonable. It’s our way or the highway. No need for the Marines. Really, except in the last week, the Marines of 2/7 have deployed to Los Angeles, and Eric Prince has been hired by the Haitian government to go deal with rival Haitian gangs, one might argue a mission the Marines could handle as well, if it was deemed in the national interest. What’s the point? The world doesn’t revolve on a day to day basis with a presumed world war with China. It revolves around the unexpected, the terrorist cells alive and kicking and waiting for the go signal, a typhoon, an earthquake, or jerk in a country, no one can find on a map, that jumps ugly and does something really stupid. Then? Send in the Marines. Well we can’t do that Mr. President, they are all standing around somewhere, with a T/O that is flatulent with senior SNCO’s in a SIF (sounds like a social disease) with old gear talking about when China invades Taiwan. Tick tock tick tock the earth still spins at 1,000 miles per hour at the equator, it does not stop, best to be ready for the unexpected.
Excellent points. A Marine force tailored to just being an SIF, right now, can't even do the missile mission, even after 4 yrs. However, if the LCR was fully equipped it could do very little else other than be a missile force. However, a pre-FD MEU with the addition of missiles (HIMARs), can execute the full range of military missions in addition to the anti-ship mission. The pre-FD MEU is the Swiss Army Knife. The LCR/SIF is just a missile force with sensors and nothing more!!
Just so we’re clear, Skipper—you’re the one who told me to stick to squad tactics. One of your many greatest hits. Ring a bell?
Maybe you should listen. It’s good advice.
Well, indeed, it was this old 0302 from the 70’s that suggested that the young Corporal work on his squad tactics. Let’s refine that a bit. Stick to squad in the defense. The SIF will be in the defense, so basic range cards, sectors of fire and so forth are always handy. But as a Corporal in the SIF he will have plenty of supervision, Staff Sargent squad leaders, Gunnery Sargent for a Platoon Sargent. Surely with that knowledge base in hand after firing all their missiles, they will last as long as their water, and chow allow them to survive, on an island, unsupported and now waiting for either the PLAN or someone else to come for them, because surely with 31 Amphibious vessels it won’t be us.
Sounds like good advice.
I’m an old crusty 0802 from the 70s. If you need help firing in your FPF and artillery defensive fires let me know.
I’m sure some on here think defensive fires and FPFs went the way of the Dodo bird.
Semper Fidelis
https://openlibrary.org/books/OL26947090M/The_Marine_Officer's_Guide
Thank you for the continued advice, Skipper. I’m very familiar with the FPF and am confident our Marines are still ready and able to deliver.
Here is some advice for you. Please review the Marine Officer Guide and refresh yourself on the expectations of USMC Officers.
To assist you, I provided a few highlights.
“As a Marine Corps Officer, you represent the Corps. Conduct yourself with dignity, courtesy, and self-restraint.
Avoid any show of importance. Do not bluster, especially towards civilians or enlisted personnel.
Be weary of situations beyond your depth. . . (this is an important one for you).
Avoid the habit of complaining or whining . . .
In your relations with your fellow officers, avoid joining factions or, if there is any bad feelings others, avoid taking sides. Do not gossip; gossip always finds it way back. Only say of a fellow officer what you would say to his or her face.
Never, under any circumstance, speak ill of the Corps, or of your own organization, in the presence of civilians or members of the other services. Before you voice any criticism, however merited or carefully thought out, be sure it cannot be construed by outsiders so as to derogate the Corps.”
I look forward to you being a shinning example of Ductus Exemplo in future posts.
President Trump appointed David Berger commandant in 2019. It was one of his many poor personnel choices. Can they recall Berger from retirement and reduce him in rank? Who were Berger’s accomplices and are they still around? There must be accountability.
Great...now I have to be a serious apologist for the FD side. Anyway, think about what you are saying. You are advocating for a political revisionist court to attack senior military leaders who served in previous administrations. Think what that would do to the Republic. We don't need Kommisar courts every four years in a never ending spy v spy (kids, google 'Mad Magazine Spy v Spy'). That's what this would entail. General Berger had the support of the Executive Branch and the Congress. Not to mention a fair portion of the USMC, especially the senior staffers who helped him develop it. No matter how short sighted and deficient I think FD is, it was not illegal and no, I don't think it was done to deliberately degrade the USMC. And, truth be told, it has not been unusual for there to be subtle undercurrents of tension inside and outside the USMC regarding the composition and future of the USMC that play out as one CMC turns into another. They typically are not so overtly controversial as played out with the 38th CMC.
Now, as far as full accountability, The Afghanistan Withdrawal is a 'whole nother ball of wax', and CMC had some role to play in that. Definitely the CentCom Commander and the JCS also. That should be the focal point for accountability, in my opinion. Simply terrible, with strategic and policy repercussions far beyond the actual operation. A TBS class could have staffed and executed an infinitely better theatre withdrawal with the same constraints and restraints. Never would have happened with Gen Dunford or Gen Powell in the JCS seat. Much less other JCS Chairmen, Centcom's, and / or CMCs I can think of.
Time to Pound the Table for Amphibs; https://marinecorpscompasspoints.substack.com/p/compass-points-turn-around-dont-drown/comments Hey Commandant, why not pound the table over amphibs? Instead, we get the same old excuses and empty talking points that do not solve the problem. (via a “Garbly Cpl”) If the Commandant is worried about the “viability” of the Martine Corps, it seems that "viability" would not be in question if the Navy could built and maintain their amphibs. The US Navy is denying the “Joint Force” an essential amphibious force capability. Let’s not forget that an elite fighting force will now need to compete for strategic lift, if the balloon goes up with the CCP. No matter what action you take as Commandant, it will not get you a fifth star. I am thinking if you are truly committed to maintaining and restoring the Marine Corps “viability”, an early retirement letter containing a “Bent Knee” Speech would be the brave and honorable course. BTW Chowder 2 would be glad to help with that letter and repeat history. S/F
Come on, Polarbear—you’re choosing method over end state. Pounding the table doesn’t build amphibs. Office calls, strategic engagement, and steady pressure do. And that’s exactly what CMC Smith is doing.
He’s not chasing headlines—he’s delivering results. Berger set the floor at 31. Smith is holding that line and building toward Force Design 3.0. Why would he resign? He’s not losing—he’s winning.
He has support from the Hill, the administration, the Joint Force, and—most importantly—his Marines. The viability of the Corps isn’t in question unless you’re still clinging to an outdated model and hoping someone else does the hard work of adapting.
And if Chowder II wants to help draft that resignation letter—well, the only thing they’ve helped with lately is reminding the rest of us why the future doesn’t belong to them.
Funny thing, though—CMC might not be chasing headlines, but they sure chase him. That’s what happens when you’re actually leading change, not just shouting from the sidelines.
One speech he says the MAGTF the “crown jewel” of the Corps and the next he says full steam ahead on FD. Which is it, as the Corps doesn’t have the assets to do both.
He states that the Corps’s organizational structure has a 3 MEU capability. So how many ARG/MEUs are afloat? I believe it’s one, the 31st MEU. Has legislation been passed that changes Title X? You state that Gen. Smith is “knocking on doors”. For what, to change Title X, because right now if he was hauled before Congress and asked how FD adheres to the Corps statutory Title X mission and organization, he couldn’t truthfully say that he’s in compliance.
At some point a member of Congress will ask that question and it will be interesting to hear Gen. Smith’s response.
Anyone catch the SASC hearing today? After five years of Chowder II meetings with “principals” and senior officials, did they finally land the knockout blow?
I would’ve tuned in, but a Captain on this forum who got out in the 1970s reminded me I should stick to squad tactics.
ADDRAC and EMLCOA, sir. Always.
Folks who have experience in DC and on the Hill know that the most important discussions seldom occur in open hearings but in office calls.
Well, apparently the CMC’s been busy with office calls—because all we heard today was praise for the Corps and our Marines.
M