Hand salute to all Veterans and a special request to befriend and help Our younger Veteran Brothers and Sisters. We recently lost a 38 year old Marine Combat Veteran to suicide. He had 6 combat tours in 16 years. Sadly, even though I had frequent contact w him and always encouraged him to reach out for help he kept his demons hidden and ended his life. Semper Fidelis.
I caught this Nation Defense University article on “Real Clear Politics (RCP) – Defense” about “Joint Forcible Entry Operations” (JFEO). https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol115/iss3/14/ I noticed that RCP has published a number of CP Articles and comments on their “Defense” page. My congratulations to CP for what I feel is an outstanding accomplishment. I have always liked RCP because it collects and presents both pro and con articles on the political issues of the day. https://www.realclearpolitics.com/
The article’s author first gives the “Joint” definition of JFEOs: “A joint forcible entry operation is defined as an action that seizes and holds lodgments against armed opposition in a manner that affords continuous landing of troops and material while providing maneuver space for follow-on operations. (NOTE: Doesn’t that sound like USMC amphibious doctrine?) JFEOs can be executed using an amphibious assault, airborne assault, air assault, or any combination of these methods.” JFEO doctrine requires three tailored forces and the sequencing of assault, follow-up and rear echelons. (see NOTE above).
The author then presents an analysis of the Russian JFEO assault on the Hostomel International Airport during the opening phase of the current Ukraine and Russian War…“even with the threat posed by A2/AD networks”. The Russian assault on the airport, in order to isolate Kyiv, was a failure but not due to Ukrainian A2/AD. (Hmmmm, that statement makes me think) The Russian JFEO failure was due to the assault echelon’s lack of the requisite capabilities (tailored combat forces).
The author then goes on to state a warning. “To avoid a similar outcome, the U.S. military should not divest capabilities that limit its options by favoring one method of attack over the other (ahhh…are we talking about divesting things like tanks, bridging equipment, artillery, aircraft, etc?). Rather, the joint force should make the necessary adaptations to reduce the vulnerabilities associated with JFEOs so that it can maintain its flexibility in future conflicts.” The author is making the recommendation that JFEOs forces instead of divesting combat power, they should be increasing not only traditional combat power but also mobility. “By advocating for the divestment of joint forcible entry capabilities, critics are playing into the operational concepts of our adversaries, which are predicated on using low-cost means to attrite the joint force’s most valuable assets.” Wow! Well said sir.
The article goes on to make other recommendation about mobility of the assault force, and training for “dispersed locations in a multidomain contested environment.” The Marine Corps use to be in the lead on the mobility issue when we established the Marine Corps LAV battalions. On dispersed locations, I was pleased to see the US Air Force and Marine Corps recently open the old airfields on Tinian and Palau, however, there is a lot of supporting airfields and lagoons used in WW2 that the US Joint Force should look at for the purpose of planning the exploitation of dispersion.
For this article, the number one take away for me is the threat of the A2/AD environment is challenging, however, the idea that we can’t conduct an amphibious operation against an A2/AD peer-to-peer adversary is pure dogma. There is a difference between doctrine and dogma. Doctrine is a teaching, dogma is an opinion.
When it comes to JFOE, the US Marine Corps should be leading the charge and for that reason we are going to need a lot of help from the Joint Force. Folks FD2030 gets the US Marne Corps into the right stadium but puts us on the wrong side of the playing field. S/F
Thank you Jonathan Maxwell Cohen, Major, USA for this article. Well done Sir.
This is an excellent article. It has a lot of information to consider for those who support FD. The article shows the importance of a robust, combined arms, expeditionary force. In the section on the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians used naval descents on Peloponnesian League positions, forcing the Spartans to defend their coast, instead of massing combat power to fight the Athenians. This is what we should do in event of war with China. The Chinese have many overseas holdings of importance. The British also did this to the French during the Seven Year's War. This is OMFTS at its finest. The pre-FD MAGTF is a Swiss Army Knife of of military capabilities: infantry, airmobile, mech/tank operations is what the pre-FD MAGTF brought to the table. Such a force can cover all the options of military operations.
Secondly, the author is correct in his assessment of the Army's inability to reinforce the Marine Corps with armor support in amphibious operations. In the November USNI Proceedings, Major Austin T. Schwartz (USA) wrote in, "The Marine Corps and Army Must Integrate Armor in Amphibious Ops," that neither the Army or the Marine Corps are ready to integrate armored combat operations in an amphibious environment. The Army has not conducted an amphibious operation since Inchon. Major Schwartz points out that Army doctrine does not even cover amphibious operations. Also, the new MPF/M10 Booker is not an amphibious ready vehicle. For Joint Forcible Entry Operations to succeed, a robust, combined arms MAGTF is needed to cover all aspects of military operations.
Yes, “British also did this to the French during the Seven Year's War. This is OMFTS at its finest.” A long time ago (early 80s) I met a very smart gentlemen that recommended I read “England in the Seven Years’ War” by the noted Naval Strategist Julian S. Corbett. Historians had labeled “The Seven Years’ War” as the first global war. IMHO this book is a strategic blue print for the deterrent war planning aimed at the CCP. He also wrote “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy: A Theory of War on the High Seas; Naval Warfare and the Command of Fleets”. Another important read. Corbett takes Clausewitz and Mahan moves and expands their strategic thinking up couple notches by applying a Naval Warfare filter. I am surprised that neither of these books never made the Commandant’s reading list. Corbett’s book on the Seven Years war is 2 Volumes, together they are a ”door stop” but worth the read. For those who don’t like to read, a short cut is “Operational Maneuver from the Sea” (MCCP 1) signed by General C.C. Krulak. From the Conclusion: “Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare”. IMO “Strategic” Naval Warfare is and must be Maneuver Warfare and FD2030 is a long way from that mark. S/F Brother
Major Dilan Swift, a mjor in the Marine Corps, wrote an outstanding submission for USNI Marine Corps essay contest entitled, "Mad Max Imperatives for the Stand-In Force", I assume based on the assumption that Force Design 2030 will be implemented. This is, in my opinion, a spot-on article that should be read by every 0-6 and above in the Marine Corps.
"The weapons making the most difference on the battlefield are land mines, hand grenades, tube artillery, and armored personnel carriers—tools that largely work regardless of weather or the sophistication of the force. These simple tools are not just effective; they are also resilient and capable of functioning in harsh conditions in which more advanced systems might fail. Even shotguns have found new life as anti drone weapons—a perfect example of an old and reliable technology repurposed to address modern threats. This reality reinforces the notion that simplicity, reliability, and adaptability are essential attributes for the Marine Corps as it orients on contemporary threats."
Bottom line - that is why The Basic School, MCRD Lejeune and San Diego teach land navigation with a map and a compass followed by using GPS instruments. The AK-47, M-1 rifle, .45 pistol, M-79 thump gun are simple, sustainable, survivable and reliable. Our vehicles and crew-served weapons should be the same. When I was in Iraq and Afghanistan, I operated with British civilians who rode in armored Toyotas. Look at the "techicals" driven by Middle East bad guys - Toyotas with 12.7 mm guns mounted in the back! This young major has his shit together and there are some lessons to be applied here!
Hand salute to all Veterans and a special request to befriend and help Our younger Veteran Brothers and Sisters. We recently lost a 38 year old Marine Combat Veteran to suicide. He had 6 combat tours in 16 years. Sadly, even though I had frequent contact w him and always encouraged him to reach out for help he kept his demons hidden and ended his life. Semper Fidelis.
What a great article!
I caught this Nation Defense University article on “Real Clear Politics (RCP) – Defense” about “Joint Forcible Entry Operations” (JFEO). https://digitalcommons.ndu.edu/joint-force-quarterly/vol115/iss3/14/ I noticed that RCP has published a number of CP Articles and comments on their “Defense” page. My congratulations to CP for what I feel is an outstanding accomplishment. I have always liked RCP because it collects and presents both pro and con articles on the political issues of the day. https://www.realclearpolitics.com/
The article’s author first gives the “Joint” definition of JFEOs: “A joint forcible entry operation is defined as an action that seizes and holds lodgments against armed opposition in a manner that affords continuous landing of troops and material while providing maneuver space for follow-on operations. (NOTE: Doesn’t that sound like USMC amphibious doctrine?) JFEOs can be executed using an amphibious assault, airborne assault, air assault, or any combination of these methods.” JFEO doctrine requires three tailored forces and the sequencing of assault, follow-up and rear echelons. (see NOTE above).
The author then presents an analysis of the Russian JFEO assault on the Hostomel International Airport during the opening phase of the current Ukraine and Russian War…“even with the threat posed by A2/AD networks”. The Russian assault on the airport, in order to isolate Kyiv, was a failure but not due to Ukrainian A2/AD. (Hmmmm, that statement makes me think) The Russian JFEO failure was due to the assault echelon’s lack of the requisite capabilities (tailored combat forces).
The author then goes on to state a warning. “To avoid a similar outcome, the U.S. military should not divest capabilities that limit its options by favoring one method of attack over the other (ahhh…are we talking about divesting things like tanks, bridging equipment, artillery, aircraft, etc?). Rather, the joint force should make the necessary adaptations to reduce the vulnerabilities associated with JFEOs so that it can maintain its flexibility in future conflicts.” The author is making the recommendation that JFEOs forces instead of divesting combat power, they should be increasing not only traditional combat power but also mobility. “By advocating for the divestment of joint forcible entry capabilities, critics are playing into the operational concepts of our adversaries, which are predicated on using low-cost means to attrite the joint force’s most valuable assets.” Wow! Well said sir.
The article goes on to make other recommendation about mobility of the assault force, and training for “dispersed locations in a multidomain contested environment.” The Marine Corps use to be in the lead on the mobility issue when we established the Marine Corps LAV battalions. On dispersed locations, I was pleased to see the US Air Force and Marine Corps recently open the old airfields on Tinian and Palau, however, there is a lot of supporting airfields and lagoons used in WW2 that the US Joint Force should look at for the purpose of planning the exploitation of dispersion.
For this article, the number one take away for me is the threat of the A2/AD environment is challenging, however, the idea that we can’t conduct an amphibious operation against an A2/AD peer-to-peer adversary is pure dogma. There is a difference between doctrine and dogma. Doctrine is a teaching, dogma is an opinion.
When it comes to JFOE, the US Marine Corps should be leading the charge and for that reason we are going to need a lot of help from the Joint Force. Folks FD2030 gets the US Marne Corps into the right stadium but puts us on the wrong side of the playing field. S/F
Thank you Jonathan Maxwell Cohen, Major, USA for this article. Well done Sir.
This is an excellent article. It has a lot of information to consider for those who support FD. The article shows the importance of a robust, combined arms, expeditionary force. In the section on the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians used naval descents on Peloponnesian League positions, forcing the Spartans to defend their coast, instead of massing combat power to fight the Athenians. This is what we should do in event of war with China. The Chinese have many overseas holdings of importance. The British also did this to the French during the Seven Year's War. This is OMFTS at its finest. The pre-FD MAGTF is a Swiss Army Knife of of military capabilities: infantry, airmobile, mech/tank operations is what the pre-FD MAGTF brought to the table. Such a force can cover all the options of military operations.
Secondly, the author is correct in his assessment of the Army's inability to reinforce the Marine Corps with armor support in amphibious operations. In the November USNI Proceedings, Major Austin T. Schwartz (USA) wrote in, "The Marine Corps and Army Must Integrate Armor in Amphibious Ops," that neither the Army or the Marine Corps are ready to integrate armored combat operations in an amphibious environment. The Army has not conducted an amphibious operation since Inchon. Major Schwartz points out that Army doctrine does not even cover amphibious operations. Also, the new MPF/M10 Booker is not an amphibious ready vehicle. For Joint Forcible Entry Operations to succeed, a robust, combined arms MAGTF is needed to cover all aspects of military operations.
Yes, “British also did this to the French during the Seven Year's War. This is OMFTS at its finest.” A long time ago (early 80s) I met a very smart gentlemen that recommended I read “England in the Seven Years’ War” by the noted Naval Strategist Julian S. Corbett. Historians had labeled “The Seven Years’ War” as the first global war. IMHO this book is a strategic blue print for the deterrent war planning aimed at the CCP. He also wrote “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy: A Theory of War on the High Seas; Naval Warfare and the Command of Fleets”. Another important read. Corbett takes Clausewitz and Mahan moves and expands their strategic thinking up couple notches by applying a Naval Warfare filter. I am surprised that neither of these books never made the Commandant’s reading list. Corbett’s book on the Seven Years war is 2 Volumes, together they are a ”door stop” but worth the read. For those who don’t like to read, a short cut is “Operational Maneuver from the Sea” (MCCP 1) signed by General C.C. Krulak. From the Conclusion: “Operational Maneuver from the Sea is a marriage between maneuver warfare and naval warfare”. IMO “Strategic” Naval Warfare is and must be Maneuver Warfare and FD2030 is a long way from that mark. S/F Brother
Exactly. British operations against the French was almost like littoral asymmetric warfare. With a robust
MAGTF, thus should be our strategy against the Chinese. They may be a regional naval force, but not a global force.
Happy Veterans Day to all my fellow Veterans! Thank you for your service to our nation!🇺🇸❤️🇺🇸❤️🇺🇸🫡
Major Dilan Swift, a mjor in the Marine Corps, wrote an outstanding submission for USNI Marine Corps essay contest entitled, "Mad Max Imperatives for the Stand-In Force", I assume based on the assumption that Force Design 2030 will be implemented. This is, in my opinion, a spot-on article that should be read by every 0-6 and above in the Marine Corps.
"The weapons making the most difference on the battlefield are land mines, hand grenades, tube artillery, and armored personnel carriers—tools that largely work regardless of weather or the sophistication of the force. These simple tools are not just effective; they are also resilient and capable of functioning in harsh conditions in which more advanced systems might fail. Even shotguns have found new life as anti drone weapons—a perfect example of an old and reliable technology repurposed to address modern threats. This reality reinforces the notion that simplicity, reliability, and adaptability are essential attributes for the Marine Corps as it orients on contemporary threats."
Bottom line - that is why The Basic School, MCRD Lejeune and San Diego teach land navigation with a map and a compass followed by using GPS instruments. The AK-47, M-1 rifle, .45 pistol, M-79 thump gun are simple, sustainable, survivable and reliable. Our vehicles and crew-served weapons should be the same. When I was in Iraq and Afghanistan, I operated with British civilians who rode in armored Toyotas. Look at the "techicals" driven by Middle East bad guys - Toyotas with 12.7 mm guns mounted in the back! This young major has his shit together and there are some lessons to be applied here!
Semper Fidelis,
Cav
Semper Fidelis my fellow Warriors and thanks for your service and sacrifice to our Republic!