Compass Points - Wargame Timeline
No validation, no foundation
Compass Points - Wargame Timeline
No validation, no foundation
February 1, 2024
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It is often claimed that the abrupt and grievous cuts to Marine Corps capabilities over the last several years were based on a solid foundation of wargames. But is that true?
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Gary Anderson, one of the Marine Corps' wargame experts, writes,
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General Berger and the current commandant, whose Quantico command conducted the original games, claimed that they validated FD 2030. However, I always tell the students in my red teaming classes that wargames don’t validate anything.
-- Gary Anderson
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Benjamin Jensen and Matthew Strohmeyer have similar doubts about the value of the Force Design wargames; they call the Force Design wargames 'pseudo-science.'
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The services struggle to conduct force-design experiments in a manner that allows them to compare findings from across wargames and field exercises in a meaningful analytical manner. Take the U.S. Marine Corps: While the service used an iterated series of wargames on the road to Force Design 2030, the use of non-disclosure agreements limited the ability of a larger community to debate the merits of the findings or run competing experiments that falsified the design. The net result? What Karl Popper called pseudo-science and an increasingly emotional as opposed to rational debate.
-- Benjamin Jensen and Matthew Strohmeyer
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In fact, the Marine Corps' Force Design wargames were even worse than the authors suggest. See the wargame timeline below.
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TIMELINE FOR WARGAMES & ASSOCIATED DECISIONS
1. 2016. Concept Paper Expeditionary Advanced Based Operations (EABO) is released by the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab at Quantico.
2. 2017. Concept paper Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment (LOCE) is published by Headquarters Marine Corps. Note: The Marine Corps subsequently cites EABO and LOCE as foundational concepts for Force Design 2030.
3. FY 2017: Wargaming Division conducts 5-6 wargames, but none examine EABO and LOCE in detail. Note: Wargaming Division conducts wargames in accordance with a fiscal year schedule, not a calendar year.
4. FY 2018. Wargaming Division conducts 6-7 wargames. These games minimally examine EABO and LOCE.
5. 2018. Naval War College Title X Naval Services Wargame. According to a Defense News article “How Marine Commandant Berger Become ‘the Poster Child for Change’: “… Though the wargame’s results and details are classified, Berger had clear takeaways for the Marine Corps: Anything heavy was a liability; mobility would be a huge challenge, as would sustaining a force operating so near China’s shores; and Marines with the right command-and-control structure, could be a game-changing tool for sea-control and sea-denial missions… that his primary takeaway from the wargame was the importance of already having forces in the theater before a conflicts starts… Fast forward a few years, and the takeaways from the 2018 wargame directly led to Berger’s Commandant’s Planning Guidance, released the day after he became the Corps’ top officer in July 2019; the Force Design 2030 modernization program, first released in March 2020.…”
6. July 15, 2019. General Berger’s Commandant’s Planning Guidance is released. Published just 4 days after becoming Commandant, General Berger’s guidance states in part: “We will divest of legacy defense programs and force structure that support legacy capabilities. If provided the opportunity to secure additional modernization dollars in exchange for force structure, I am prepared to do so… We will no longer use a ‘2.0 MEB [Marine Expeditionary Brigade] requirement as the foundation for our arguments regarding amphibious ship building, to determine the requisite capacity of vehicles or other capabilities, or as pertains to the Maritime Prepositioning Force. We will no longer reference the 38-ship requirement memo from 2009, or the 2016 Force Structure assessment, as the basis for our arguments and force structure justifications”.
7. FY 2020. Wargaming Division conducts or supports 9-10 wargames. Wargames focus on elements of the proposed Force Design 2030 (as envisioned in the Commandant’s Planning Guidance). In addition, Marine Corps Integrated Planning Teams (group of subject matter experts) conduct detailed force structure analysis. Wargaming Division does not participate in any IPTs. An attempt to provide input to IPTs from previous wargames is rejected. Note: In FY2020 and FY2021, wargame players are required to sign Nondisclosure Agreements. All or nearly all reports are classified.
8. March 2020. Force Design 2030 is published. The document directs a major restructuring and reorganization of the Marine Corps. Most of the Marine Corps’ combat capabilities are divested or significantly reduced to pay for future, experimental capabilities (2030 and beyond) – “divest to invest.” None of the wargames conducted by Wargaming Division to this point support these changes.
9. Early Summer 2019-2021. According to a War on the Rocks article “On Future Wars and the Marine Corps: Asking the Right Questions” by Colonel Tim Barrick, USMC (Ret): “My perspective is informed by my experiences from 2018 to 2021, prior to my own retirement, as the officer responsible for Marine Corps wargaming… Berger in early summer, 2019 formed a small group of colonels and generals… They spent two months crafting Force Design 2030… After becoming Commandant, he spent two months in a cycle of reviews with his three-star generals before issuing a decision memorandum in September 2019 outlining the design. From there the design was handed over to the force development enterprise in Quantico. Given the shroud of secrecy that surrounded the effort up to that point, there were surprises in the scope of the restructuring and divestment decisions… The task sparked an immediate series of wargames, which I oversaw, to examine the divestments… He [the Commandant] handed the force development enterprise a single course of action, which dominated the analysis and wargaming in a way that left little room for a consideration of alternatives…”
10. FY 2021. Wargaming Division conducts 10 wargames. Most use the proposed Force Design 2030 force structure in Pacific scenarios. Headquarters Marines Corps and Combat Development & Integration (Quantico) continuously demand quantitative data from the wargames to inform programmatic decision.
11. April 2021. Force Design 2030 Annual Update is published. The update delineates changes, findings, and guidance that are not supported by any findings or recommendations in Wargaming Division reports.
12. 2019-April 2021. According to a senior wargame analyst at the Marine Corps Warfighting Center at Quantico, who took part in the wargames, “By 2020, the emphasis of the Wargaming Center had fully shifted from assessment of concepts to developing supporting data for programmatic decision-making related to FD2030. Wargame analysts were increasingly pressured to provide quantitative data to support systems acquisition.” He also stated that the wargames were required to use the pre-determined force structure delineated in Force Design 2030; alternatives were not included or assessed. The senior analyst’s recollections paint a disturbing picture of the manipulation of wargames to validate the restructuring and reorganization of the Marine Corps. Marine Corps leaders may have used the results of this flawed process to deceive the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, and the Congress that Force Design 2030 would strengthen deterrence and enhance national defense. His statements concerning wargaming from 2018-2021 revealed the following:
First, the wargames assumed away the most challenging problems, such as logistics, forceable entry, opposing forces, and integrated communication networks. Each of these areas are potential showstoppers that are essentially unresolved today.
Second, the wargames were designed largely to validate predetermined decisions and support associated systems acquisition.
Third, the wargames did not support the radical redesign and restructuring of the Marine Corps, particularly the divestments of tanks, bridging, assault breaching, and law enforcement battalions and significant reductions in infantry, artillery, and aviation.
And fourth, when Army forces were included, the wargames concluded that Army Multi-Domain Task Force capabilities greatly exceeded those of the Marine Littoral Regiments.
It’s also important to note that the Marine Corps conducted other wargames outside the Wargaming Center. The senior analyst was unable to comment of how these games were conducted or on conclusions reached. Regardless, the senior analyst’s evaluation of the games that he observed provides ample ammunition to justify an inquiry into the process and the validly of the wargames.
Conclusion: The evidence is overwhelming. Wargames were used to validate a single course of action, not to uncover weaknesses or explore different potential options. Senior leaders failed to openly discuss and debate other options for transforming the operating forces, relying instead on secrecy, nondisclosure agreements, and the illusion of rigorous and relevant wargames to convince itself and others that Force Design 2030 and Stand-in-Forces were worthy replacements for a Marine Corps capable of global deployment/employment across the spectrum of conflict. Note: CSIS recently conducted an unbiased and extensive wargame on a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. The written report largely found Marine Corps Stand-in-Forces were: (a) duplicative and less effective than capabilities already possessed by other services; and (b) unable to contribute “heavily” in most scenarios.
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The wargame timeline shows the Marine Corps had already started to divest capabilities before the wargames took place. And when the wargames were held, they did not even explore the crucial options and dangers. The wargames did not validate anything. The wargames provide no foundation for Force Design. As time has gone by and the cracks in Force Design have grown into fissures, Congress is beginning to ask questions. As Gary Anderson writes, "Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know."
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Compass Points salutes all those across the entire Marine community and in Congress asking the hard questions and helping to rebuild the Marine Corps' combined arms capabilities.
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The Defense Post (thedefensepost.com) 01/12/2024
Does the Marine Corps Need Course Correction? Congress Wants to Know
If so, necessary changes and funding are needed to restore lost capabilities.
By Gary Anderson
https://www.thedefensepost.com/2024/01/12/marine-corps-fd-2030-study/
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War on the Rocks (warontherocks.com) 05/23/2022
The Changing Character of Combined Arms
By Benjamin Jensen and Matthew Strohmeyer
https://warontherocks.com/2022/05/the-changing-character-of-combined-arms/
I find it more than a little puzzling that Ian TB who has for many months complained about any document criticizing Force Design 2030 where the author's name was not placed front and center appears to have no problem that those involved in FD 2030 wargames and its integrated planning teams were required to sign nondisclosure agreements or that much of the material supposedly underpinning the plan was classified. Unlike every concept developed by MCCDC from its founding 33 years ago until 2018, the FD 2030 process--such as it was--was hidden from view. There is a very good reason why the Corps has never seen a pushback on previous plans from large numbers of retired Marines; the 39th CMC is the only CMC who twisted the force development beyond recognition. What had been an open process with discourse expected became closed to most Marines. As damaging as Force Design 2030 has been to the Corps' combat capabilities the manner of its development strikes at the very ethos of the Corps. Recreating that ethos will be far harder than rebuilding the MAGTF.
Too often the memory hole swallows truth and the chosen themes and messages of today are viewed in a vacuum. As I review the past 5 years, attempting to maintain my own historical timeline, this article provides some great context. It clarifies much about the shell game in initial development, and explains some of the message-shifting information operations narrative of the past two years, across the enterprise of leaders and apologists.
Elements of recent official info ops themes and messages seem to be that the retired generals immediately attempted to torpedo and undermine FD2030, and now Marines are torn between honoring our traditions as we’ve been taught since boot camp, or acknowledging the dramatically changing character of war, which is obvious to anyone not stuck in the past. In short, the generals actions have only served to confuse Marines who are forward thinking but have been conditioned to honor our forebears.
Of course this is another narrative of implicit condescension and dismissal (fossils just want to fight the way they used to and while we should grudgingly honor their service, they should stay out of active duty futurist business).
This is where this timeline helps me to again contextualize the setting from 2018-2022 and how confusion might have actually been sown among the recipients of limited information.
July 2019: CPG released. Active duty of all ranks excited at references to maneuver warfare and change. Much positive debate over FMFM-1 themes and how the changes will potentially reinforce our ethos and readiness.
Jul-Dec 2019: OPT/IPT period at HQMC. No news. No representation by FMF major combat formations. Non-Disclosure Agreements prevent any discussion.
Late 2019: FMF major combat formation permitted to send one (1) representative to IPT out-briefs. When he returns, he is unable to disclose anything to other senior leaders. He responds to our questions about divestments with subtle hints and alarming facial expressions (picture a comical scene of a bunch of FMF operational Colonels playing NDA charades over secret future force design!)
Early 2020: FD2030 and MCBUL published with divestments included. Quiet internal debate ensues over seeming contradictions between Warfighting philosophy and future doctrine and design. Doubts about future tech viability, readiness troughs, and reality set in.
Late 2020: someone leaks original OPT documents and FD2030 problem statement. Discussion ensues on some of the finer points, but also on the seeming arrogance and hubris of its premise. Reading this foundational document, understanding GCC requirements, forecasting readiness troughs, and exercising key promised future capabilities create more discussion and uncertainty.
2021: Uncertainty and doubt grow as exercises of notional future tech reveal major unchallenged assumptions and fairy-dusting of capabilities (obviously beyond the usual exercise fairy-dusting that normally occurs). This exacerbates the growing perception that the texts of 2019 do not truly philosophically support the Warfighting concepts.
Apr 2022: James Webb letter claiming signatures of 22 retired generals in opposition. Shortly thereafter, articles published explaining the 2 year journey of private discussions before reluctantly going public.
As I’ve written here before and elsewhere, this was an Aha! moment. It was that proverbial moment that sometimes happens when one looks around and wonders if you’re off your rocker, but then the truth comes out and it all makes sense.
Their writings only came AFTER the uncertainty set in. Far from undermining from the start, the generals were respectful and circumspect for a very long time, and their eventual reveal only confirmed uncertainty among honest and serious thinkers.
2022-2024: Since then, the Occam’s Razor principle “When you hear hoofbeats, don’t think Zebras,” has been apt. The dismissive institutional marginalization and professional debarment of the content of their argument on a largely ad-hominem basis (old, anonymous, untrustworthy) combined with the lack of advancement of meaningful detailed content in favor of various aspects of change (divest to invest, global readiness, etc) has spoken volumes about the good faith or bad faith positions of both camps.
That is why the details of this timeline article are useful. Someone should build an Ops/IO synch matrix.
Incrementally, the details chip away at the uncertainty and some realize they weren’t so crazy after all.