I find it more than a little puzzling that Ian TB who has for many months complained about any document criticizing Force Design 2030 where the author's name was not placed front and center appears to have no problem that those involved in FD 2030 wargames and its integrated planning teams were required to sign nondisclosure agreements or that much of the material supposedly underpinning the plan was classified. Unlike every concept developed by MCCDC from its founding 33 years ago until 2018, the FD 2030 process--such as it was--was hidden from view. There is a very good reason why the Corps has never seen a pushback on previous plans from large numbers of retired Marines; the 39th CMC is the only CMC who twisted the force development beyond recognition. What had been an open process with discourse expected became closed to most Marines. As damaging as Force Design 2030 has been to the Corps' combat capabilities the manner of its development strikes at the very ethos of the Corps. Recreating that ethos will be far harder than rebuilding the MAGTF.
Ian TB, Compass Points is meant to be a site where Marines and friends of Marines can carry on a discourse about the future of our Corps. A discourse is not a debate where each debater tries to “win” but an approach where all who engage are trying to learn. Our discussion has turned into a debate and that is of little value to most readers. Hence, I will send my reply to you in an email.
Too often the memory hole swallows truth and the chosen themes and messages of today are viewed in a vacuum. As I review the past 5 years, attempting to maintain my own historical timeline, this article provides some great context. It clarifies much about the shell game in initial development, and explains some of the message-shifting information operations narrative of the past two years, across the enterprise of leaders and apologists.
Elements of recent official info ops themes and messages seem to be that the retired generals immediately attempted to torpedo and undermine FD2030, and now Marines are torn between honoring our traditions as we’ve been taught since boot camp, or acknowledging the dramatically changing character of war, which is obvious to anyone not stuck in the past. In short, the generals actions have only served to confuse Marines who are forward thinking but have been conditioned to honor our forebears.
Of course this is another narrative of implicit condescension and dismissal (fossils just want to fight the way they used to and while we should grudgingly honor their service, they should stay out of active duty futurist business).
This is where this timeline helps me to again contextualize the setting from 2018-2022 and how confusion might have actually been sown among the recipients of limited information.
July 2019: CPG released. Active duty of all ranks excited at references to maneuver warfare and change. Much positive debate over FMFM-1 themes and how the changes will potentially reinforce our ethos and readiness.
Jul-Dec 2019: OPT/IPT period at HQMC. No news. No representation by FMF major combat formations. Non-Disclosure Agreements prevent any discussion.
Late 2019: FMF major combat formation permitted to send one (1) representative to IPT out-briefs. When he returns, he is unable to disclose anything to other senior leaders. He responds to our questions about divestments with subtle hints and alarming facial expressions (picture a comical scene of a bunch of FMF operational Colonels playing NDA charades over secret future force design!)
Early 2020: FD2030 and MCBUL published with divestments included. Quiet internal debate ensues over seeming contradictions between Warfighting philosophy and future doctrine and design. Doubts about future tech viability, readiness troughs, and reality set in.
Late 2020: someone leaks original OPT documents and FD2030 problem statement. Discussion ensues on some of the finer points, but also on the seeming arrogance and hubris of its premise. Reading this foundational document, understanding GCC requirements, forecasting readiness troughs, and exercising key promised future capabilities create more discussion and uncertainty.
2021: Uncertainty and doubt grow as exercises of notional future tech reveal major unchallenged assumptions and fairy-dusting of capabilities (obviously beyond the usual exercise fairy-dusting that normally occurs). This exacerbates the growing perception that the texts of 2019 do not truly philosophically support the Warfighting concepts.
Apr 2022: James Webb letter claiming signatures of 22 retired generals in opposition. Shortly thereafter, articles published explaining the 2 year journey of private discussions before reluctantly going public.
As I’ve written here before and elsewhere, this was an Aha! moment. It was that proverbial moment that sometimes happens when one looks around and wonders if you’re off your rocker, but then the truth comes out and it all makes sense.
Their writings only came AFTER the uncertainty set in. Far from undermining from the start, the generals were respectful and circumspect for a very long time, and their eventual reveal only confirmed uncertainty among honest and serious thinkers.
2022-2024: Since then, the Occam’s Razor principle “When you hear hoofbeats, don’t think Zebras,” has been apt. The dismissive institutional marginalization and professional debarment of the content of their argument on a largely ad-hominem basis (old, anonymous, untrustworthy) combined with the lack of advancement of meaningful detailed content in favor of various aspects of change (divest to invest, global readiness, etc) has spoken volumes about the good faith or bad faith positions of both camps.
That is why the details of this timeline article are useful. Someone should build an Ops/IO synch matrix.
Incrementally, the details chip away at the uncertainty and some realize they weren’t so crazy after all.
I would just kindly add, since it's been brought up, and not with the aim of enhancing the argument with anonymous authorities or of convincing anyone else, but to simply explain the calculus of those who listen, discern, and personally judge the integrity of the institutional messaging effort.
Part of the calculus of good-faith vs bad-faith is not just observing the origins of the design thought, the timeline of its rollout, contradictions in philosophy, secrecy in planning, shady wargaming techniques, or shifting IO themes. It is all that -and- knowing that the reason the IO themes "old, anonymous, untrustworthy, legacy-obsessed, out-of-touch" are still officially in use is because the institution is confident that key retired officers will remain anonymous and silent.
For valid personal and professional reasons that are their own, those officers with the most potential impact have chosen to allow history to take its course without adding their public input or interference. I certainly wouldn't know their reasoning, but in light of past examples, I wonder if they've simply observed the other senior officers, GCC commanders, and former commandants' fates; one by one, as soon as their names are public, they become just another target for IO.
If that's it, I suspect they're right. In the unlikely event they were to choose to speak publicly, the institution would just change tack once again, with new themes and messages woven into talking points and speech transcripts, scrambling to counter the latest information threat development. Past content-based defenses of design seem consistently secondary to IO. This pattern is what concerns the discerning observer, and culminates all the above data points, resulting in increasing doubt in the integrity of today's leadership.
Jeff your comments in your last paragraph are timely.
To say, General Christopher Mahoney’s (assistant and acting Commandant) Jan 25th comments at the Hudson Institute are disappointing is an understatement. Get a load of this “gobbledygook: word salad:
To summarize the General's comments: I see no changes in the rifle sights here. The 2030 Design is just a road map for the journey and BTW, we need to change the 2030 Design “moniker”. Really?
I say now the same thing I said before - the Marines have a mission that the MAGTF was designed for and proven to be pricelessly effective. It is the ARMY whose mission has included coastal artillery! "The U.S. Army Coast Artillery Corps (CAC) was an administrative corps responsible for coastal, harbor, and anti-aircraft defense of the United States and its possessions between 1901 and 1950." It was abolished in 1950. See more at: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-army-eliminated-the-coast-artillery-corps-in-1950-its-time-to-bring-it-back/ J.C. Tate, CDR USN (Ret)
Divest to invest?? Those of us who have walked the Halls of HQMC remember the ongoing battles with the Navy and the other Services to successfully gain the required funding for critical programs. I am unfortunately not so confident that the Navy or other Services will agree to "Invest" the funds divested by Force 2020 when the bill comes due. The other critical issue of Force 2020 in my humble opinion is the large divestiture of critical Artillery, Tanks, Aviation and other unique Marine capabilities leads to an even greater reliance on our Sister services for support. Any one remember Black Hawk Down where the Army was dependent on Tank support from another Country? This leads to the unthinkable question, "Why do we need a Marine Corps?" I thought we learned our lesson at Guadalcanal and Midway.
I agree with the late Dr Peter Perla that wargames prove nothing, but what a well designed wargame will do is focus your attention on the right questions.
This post was developed partially based on lengthy notes from Dr. Scott Moore the senior analyst and head of wargame analysis at the Marine Corps Wargaming Center from November 2016 to April 2021. I have in my possession written notes from other participants in the subject wargames who for their own reasons have asked to remain anonymous; they are even more damning than Dr. Moore's. I noticed you failed to mention the words of retired Colonel Tim Barrick or Dr. Ben Jensen, which in of themselves tell a sad story.
It would be far more productive for you to address issues rather than attack messengers.
"They can’t have it both ways.... If the situation requires taking a stand, take the stand. Failure to do so means Compass Points doesn’t really believe its own narrative." : Au contraire mon frer, I absolutely can have it both ways and taking a stand doesn't mean we can't use an avatar or platform. "Common Sense" was published anon and "The Federalist Papers" were published pseudononymously. I don't think Paine, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay meet the standard of 'shrinking violets', 'sunshine patriots', and cowards. The ideas were the thing. The same goes for Compass Points. As for me, I simply don't need to paint my eyes in black eyeliner and whine like a baby for personal attention because I have strong thoughts on important subjects (or because some over-emotional retiree thinks I have to...this is the 21st century sir). At some point I grew up past my ten year old sense of the world. If it helps, cFrog is just my call sign on this platform. Cheers.
This seemed like a credible citation: https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20Commandant%27s%20Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700 At least it wasn't written by a guy with a pseudonym. For what it's worth, quite a few of your citations in your article didn't exactly match up with your argument. The Japanese in the article cited for 'critical allies love 2030' were specifically happy for continued Marine presence. 'Robust field experimentation' was Marines playing with different gear and organization. 'In the real world' was a link to PR pieces where Marines are doing exercises and activities with allies not dissimilar to some we've done for years without FD 2030 changes.
I find it more than a little puzzling that Ian TB who has for many months complained about any document criticizing Force Design 2030 where the author's name was not placed front and center appears to have no problem that those involved in FD 2030 wargames and its integrated planning teams were required to sign nondisclosure agreements or that much of the material supposedly underpinning the plan was classified. Unlike every concept developed by MCCDC from its founding 33 years ago until 2018, the FD 2030 process--such as it was--was hidden from view. There is a very good reason why the Corps has never seen a pushback on previous plans from large numbers of retired Marines; the 39th CMC is the only CMC who twisted the force development beyond recognition. What had been an open process with discourse expected became closed to most Marines. As damaging as Force Design 2030 has been to the Corps' combat capabilities the manner of its development strikes at the very ethos of the Corps. Recreating that ethos will be far harder than rebuilding the MAGTF.
Ian TB, Compass Points is meant to be a site where Marines and friends of Marines can carry on a discourse about the future of our Corps. A discourse is not a debate where each debater tries to “win” but an approach where all who engage are trying to learn. Our discussion has turned into a debate and that is of little value to most readers. Hence, I will send my reply to you in an email.
Too often the memory hole swallows truth and the chosen themes and messages of today are viewed in a vacuum. As I review the past 5 years, attempting to maintain my own historical timeline, this article provides some great context. It clarifies much about the shell game in initial development, and explains some of the message-shifting information operations narrative of the past two years, across the enterprise of leaders and apologists.
Elements of recent official info ops themes and messages seem to be that the retired generals immediately attempted to torpedo and undermine FD2030, and now Marines are torn between honoring our traditions as we’ve been taught since boot camp, or acknowledging the dramatically changing character of war, which is obvious to anyone not stuck in the past. In short, the generals actions have only served to confuse Marines who are forward thinking but have been conditioned to honor our forebears.
Of course this is another narrative of implicit condescension and dismissal (fossils just want to fight the way they used to and while we should grudgingly honor their service, they should stay out of active duty futurist business).
This is where this timeline helps me to again contextualize the setting from 2018-2022 and how confusion might have actually been sown among the recipients of limited information.
July 2019: CPG released. Active duty of all ranks excited at references to maneuver warfare and change. Much positive debate over FMFM-1 themes and how the changes will potentially reinforce our ethos and readiness.
Jul-Dec 2019: OPT/IPT period at HQMC. No news. No representation by FMF major combat formations. Non-Disclosure Agreements prevent any discussion.
Late 2019: FMF major combat formation permitted to send one (1) representative to IPT out-briefs. When he returns, he is unable to disclose anything to other senior leaders. He responds to our questions about divestments with subtle hints and alarming facial expressions (picture a comical scene of a bunch of FMF operational Colonels playing NDA charades over secret future force design!)
Early 2020: FD2030 and MCBUL published with divestments included. Quiet internal debate ensues over seeming contradictions between Warfighting philosophy and future doctrine and design. Doubts about future tech viability, readiness troughs, and reality set in.
Late 2020: someone leaks original OPT documents and FD2030 problem statement. Discussion ensues on some of the finer points, but also on the seeming arrogance and hubris of its premise. Reading this foundational document, understanding GCC requirements, forecasting readiness troughs, and exercising key promised future capabilities create more discussion and uncertainty.
2021: Uncertainty and doubt grow as exercises of notional future tech reveal major unchallenged assumptions and fairy-dusting of capabilities (obviously beyond the usual exercise fairy-dusting that normally occurs). This exacerbates the growing perception that the texts of 2019 do not truly philosophically support the Warfighting concepts.
Apr 2022: James Webb letter claiming signatures of 22 retired generals in opposition. Shortly thereafter, articles published explaining the 2 year journey of private discussions before reluctantly going public.
As I’ve written here before and elsewhere, this was an Aha! moment. It was that proverbial moment that sometimes happens when one looks around and wonders if you’re off your rocker, but then the truth comes out and it all makes sense.
Their writings only came AFTER the uncertainty set in. Far from undermining from the start, the generals were respectful and circumspect for a very long time, and their eventual reveal only confirmed uncertainty among honest and serious thinkers.
2022-2024: Since then, the Occam’s Razor principle “When you hear hoofbeats, don’t think Zebras,” has been apt. The dismissive institutional marginalization and professional debarment of the content of their argument on a largely ad-hominem basis (old, anonymous, untrustworthy) combined with the lack of advancement of meaningful detailed content in favor of various aspects of change (divest to invest, global readiness, etc) has spoken volumes about the good faith or bad faith positions of both camps.
That is why the details of this timeline article are useful. Someone should build an Ops/IO synch matrix.
Incrementally, the details chip away at the uncertainty and some realize they weren’t so crazy after all.
I would just kindly add, since it's been brought up, and not with the aim of enhancing the argument with anonymous authorities or of convincing anyone else, but to simply explain the calculus of those who listen, discern, and personally judge the integrity of the institutional messaging effort.
Part of the calculus of good-faith vs bad-faith is not just observing the origins of the design thought, the timeline of its rollout, contradictions in philosophy, secrecy in planning, shady wargaming techniques, or shifting IO themes. It is all that -and- knowing that the reason the IO themes "old, anonymous, untrustworthy, legacy-obsessed, out-of-touch" are still officially in use is because the institution is confident that key retired officers will remain anonymous and silent.
For valid personal and professional reasons that are their own, those officers with the most potential impact have chosen to allow history to take its course without adding their public input or interference. I certainly wouldn't know their reasoning, but in light of past examples, I wonder if they've simply observed the other senior officers, GCC commanders, and former commandants' fates; one by one, as soon as their names are public, they become just another target for IO.
If that's it, I suspect they're right. In the unlikely event they were to choose to speak publicly, the institution would just change tack once again, with new themes and messages woven into talking points and speech transcripts, scrambling to counter the latest information threat development. Past content-based defenses of design seem consistently secondary to IO. This pattern is what concerns the discerning observer, and culminates all the above data points, resulting in increasing doubt in the integrity of today's leadership.
No changes in the sights…Blah, Blah, Blah
Jeff your comments in your last paragraph are timely.
To say, General Christopher Mahoney’s (assistant and acting Commandant) Jan 25th comments at the Hudson Institute are disappointing is an understatement. Get a load of this “gobbledygook: word salad:
https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2024/1/25/just-in-force-design-2030-is-about-the-journey-not-the-destination#:~:text=MARINE%20CORPS%20NEWS-,JUST%20IN%3A%20Marines%27%20Force%20Design%202030%20Is%20About,the%20Journey%2C%20Not%20the%20Destination&text=The%20U.S.%20Marine%20Corps%27%20Force,be%2C%20a%20top%20official%20said.
To summarize the General's comments: I see no changes in the rifle sights here. The 2030 Design is just a road map for the journey and BTW, we need to change the 2030 Design “moniker”. Really?
I say now the same thing I said before - the Marines have a mission that the MAGTF was designed for and proven to be pricelessly effective. It is the ARMY whose mission has included coastal artillery! "The U.S. Army Coast Artillery Corps (CAC) was an administrative corps responsible for coastal, harbor, and anti-aircraft defense of the United States and its possessions between 1901 and 1950." It was abolished in 1950. See more at: https://mwi.westpoint.edu/the-army-eliminated-the-coast-artillery-corps-in-1950-its-time-to-bring-it-back/ J.C. Tate, CDR USN (Ret)
FD 2030 is no longer….its just Force Design…Marine leaders drop ‘2030’ from name of ambitious overhaul plan
By Irene Loewenson
Feb 1, 2024 Marine Times….apparently we have made a dent in this disaster.
Divest to invest?? Those of us who have walked the Halls of HQMC remember the ongoing battles with the Navy and the other Services to successfully gain the required funding for critical programs. I am unfortunately not so confident that the Navy or other Services will agree to "Invest" the funds divested by Force 2020 when the bill comes due. The other critical issue of Force 2020 in my humble opinion is the large divestiture of critical Artillery, Tanks, Aviation and other unique Marine capabilities leads to an even greater reliance on our Sister services for support. Any one remember Black Hawk Down where the Army was dependent on Tank support from another Country? This leads to the unthinkable question, "Why do we need a Marine Corps?" I thought we learned our lesson at Guadalcanal and Midway.
I agree with the late Dr Peter Perla that wargames prove nothing, but what a well designed wargame will do is focus your attention on the right questions.
Outstanding article. How much and how long is burger going to be remembered for trying to eliminate the USMC?
He is just making sure it remains relevant.
This post was developed partially based on lengthy notes from Dr. Scott Moore the senior analyst and head of wargame analysis at the Marine Corps Wargaming Center from November 2016 to April 2021. I have in my possession written notes from other participants in the subject wargames who for their own reasons have asked to remain anonymous; they are even more damning than Dr. Moore's. I noticed you failed to mention the words of retired Colonel Tim Barrick or Dr. Ben Jensen, which in of themselves tell a sad story.
It would be far more productive for you to address issues rather than attack messengers.
"They can’t have it both ways.... If the situation requires taking a stand, take the stand. Failure to do so means Compass Points doesn’t really believe its own narrative." : Au contraire mon frer, I absolutely can have it both ways and taking a stand doesn't mean we can't use an avatar or platform. "Common Sense" was published anon and "The Federalist Papers" were published pseudononymously. I don't think Paine, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay meet the standard of 'shrinking violets', 'sunshine patriots', and cowards. The ideas were the thing. The same goes for Compass Points. As for me, I simply don't need to paint my eyes in black eyeliner and whine like a baby for personal attention because I have strong thoughts on important subjects (or because some over-emotional retiree thinks I have to...this is the 21st century sir). At some point I grew up past my ten year old sense of the world. If it helps, cFrog is just my call sign on this platform. Cheers.
I guess we can say you have fell in love with the plan.
This seemed like a credible citation: https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/Portals/142/Docs/%2038th%20Commandant%27s%20Planning%20Guidance_2019.pdf?ver=2019-07-16-200152-700 At least it wasn't written by a guy with a pseudonym. For what it's worth, quite a few of your citations in your article didn't exactly match up with your argument. The Japanese in the article cited for 'critical allies love 2030' were specifically happy for continued Marine presence. 'Robust field experimentation' was Marines playing with different gear and organization. 'In the real world' was a link to PR pieces where Marines are doing exercises and activities with allies not dissimilar to some we've done for years without FD 2030 changes.