General Holcomb’s observations and comments are those of an Officer and a Gentleman. The desire for a positive discourse is sought by most of us who dedicated our adult lives to the defense of our nation in uniform and beyond and especially in the Band of Brothers of the Marine Corps. The conversation from the first day was civil and measured by those who were surprised by most aspects of FD-2030. It was most certainly not reciprocated and the insults followed quickly. The litmus tests imposed on active duty officers were unprecedented in an institution known for candor. Disagreement is not disloyalty or disobedience. That has made further discussion to this very day strained.
I personally sought the professional high ground until I realized I was not in a conversation with principled officers. It was no longer an honorable boxing match between athletes who respected each other and were governed by rules and the professional ethos of pugilists. It was a back alley knife fight for the survival of the Corps. I was amazed, shocked and saddened by the development so common in politics and business. I quickly noted the positions taken by the Marine Corps Gazette and the USNI. They did not surprise me as their descent into politically correct mouth pieces had long been noted. My peers and I had long noted the positions of the Pravda on the Chesapeake Bay and the USNI.
I would welcome the outstretched hand but seriously doubt it will be offered. No professional Marine would deny that the Marine Corps of 2018 needed to evolve, expand in some regards, contract in others and adapt to the subtle changes of the modern battlefield. Sadly, that is not what happened. Divest to invest crashed on a rocky shore of the fiscal reality of how appropriations happen. Divest occurred. Invest deteriorated into chaos with no clarity in sight. Some aspects of “ invest” are highly suspect and stretch well into the 2040’s. In the meantime Marine operating forces have become irrelevant to the Combatant Commanders. One Marine Corps was destroyed well before a new one was created. There is no guarantee a new one with battlefield prowess will be birthed. In the course of these actions the intangibles that make an elite fighting force have eroded rapidly. “Fighting Spirit”, “Esprit de Corps” , “Unit Synergy”, “ Band of Brothers”, “ First to Fight” all ring hollow to the outsider and statistician but are the spirit that hold Spartans together. Organization, weaponry, numbers, tactics and firepower can be calculated. The fighting soul is another matter. History proves it time and again.
I have seen institutions destroyed when the members are unable to stand fast in the turbulence of the times. When change for change’s sake becomes the mantra, the outcome can be catastrophic. The right change advances an organization and the wrong change can destroy it. I would suggest that the Boys Scouts of America, the Catholic Church, the FBI, innumerable large businesses, Universities and the entertainment industry embraced change with a limited understanding of the unintended but totally predictable consequences. Those consequences spell the death knell which is eventually reflected in membership, credibility, sales, public confidence or success on the battlefield. The ultimate outcome is extinction. There is no guarantee that anything of value will sprout from the ashes.
I am open to any forum where the professional discussion can flourish among those who respect the opinions of the others. As I have seen no evidence of that I will remain frank and direct. I know when I am in a knife fight and will stab and slash accordingly.
The first guideline that I proposed in the referenced National Interest article was:
"Marines ought to be able to present their thinking without fear of reprisal or personal attacks. Marines ought to be able to present their thoughts and ideas as clearly and directly as possible, without great concern about political correctness or risk to career. Said more directly, no waffling, wordy, or carefully phrased sentences: Authors need to say what they mean so that others can understand and respond appropriately."
So yes, "frank and direct."
BTW, a version of that article was first offered to the Marine Corps Gazette; the editor rejected it.
In my forwarding email to Compass Points, I offered the opinion that we ought to write and discuss as though our target audience is: Whatever part of the rising generation that chooses to commit to the re-building of the Marine Corps and the (re) discovery of its true ethos.
My study and understanding of cognitive behaviors draws on the work of a German scientist Dietrich Dorner who wrote: "The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations" His studies and experiments revealed that when some are given power to implement change in complex systems, they not only focus on a narrow narrative but also seem unable to "pull up, go around, and re-orient" ... even as the simulation revealed that the whole system was collapsing, they remained focused on their pet project.
This cognitive behavior is not a function of intelligence. Dorner's first example has a physicist and an economist as team mates. Noteworthy is that these two collegial colleagues end up criticizing each other/blaming the other as the system fails. It turns out that this behavior is also relatively common. As FD2030 fails or the Marine Corps is carved up and given to the Army and Navy, look for this sort of behavior from FD2030 proponents.
Key point: These are cognitive behaviors, much like those identified and developed Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Thinking: Fast and Slow).
Disciplines and disciplined processes can correct for these cognitive behaviors. I see no evidence that the current leadership is either re-orienting on the problem (Boyd) or engaging in the disciplines necessary for corrective action.
Therefore, my thought is not to waste time trying to convince them to change; their careers and egos are too much invested in FD2030 AND, more importantly, they are caught in the throes of the logic of failure ... they seem quite incapable of pulling up, flying around, and re-orienting."
Rather, I think it is more useful to provide a digital touchstone for the rising generation as they go about the difficult work of rebuilding the Marine Corps ... just as so many of us had to do after the Vietnam War.
General - I’ve followed your commentary, and value highly your insights. Thank you for your fine efforts in this long campaign. As Food For Thought, my question at this point in time is how we retired Marines can best serve in the rebuild effort? Perhaps we serve best by offering our insights to this string of communications. Perhaps we serve best by letter writing campaigns to our Congressional delegations seeking their support of our rebuild effort. Bottom line, I would suggest some thought be given to actionable steps we can take, and when those steps should be taken. Again, the above is intended as food for thought. Semper Fi!
I believe your analysis and comments are correct. Any studies on reversing failure in organizations show that it becomes highly personal and extremely difficult to achieve. The road back to reality is a long one.
I know sticks and stones will be thrown my way for saying this, but here goes - as a reminder - the old TQL field had a slogan that fits us right now in out “get-well” process, to wit: Form. Storm. Perform. With so many ideas swirling about, we’re probably “storming” just now. Keep it up. We’ll put muscle on the skeleton. All of us are smarter than any of us. S/F
IRT Sham Leaders: FD2030 updates are publicly available except where classified. I know a few staffers and members who get the classified briefings and I have not heard them complain. The most common feedback I have heard is that other branches should catch up to the Marine Corps. Are you concerned that the Marine Corps' next great battle is with a tank division? I can assure you that it's not. Gen Smith's health updates were frequent and transparent even though he is under no obligation to disclose personal health information. Barracks issues are being highlighted front and center for the first time I can recall; SMMC testified before Congress about it and rolled out the first campaign plan to address it.
IRT MCU, are you currently taking classes there? I have 5 colleagues who are there right now and reported to me (prior to commenting to you) that they have not seen any "gender queer lady studies" classes or discussion forum offered. Plenty of warfighting courses though, which is ideal given the mission of MCU.
IRT "propaganda branch," you probably recall that the Marine Corps Gazette is a private entity that is run by a private non profit. Often there are articles critiquing one or more policies or expanding upon an existing policy or idea to make it better. That's good right? You want Marines contributing to discussion and offering new ideas and challenging old ones right? Isn't that (ironically) why this substack exists? "Marine Corps Compass Points: Broader Thinking, Deeper Understanding, and Better Decisions, for a Stronger Marine Corps."
Don't know what your background or service history is and frankly it does not matter as we have all earned the title (assuming you are a Marine). Maybe you should reflect on whether those currently serving and trying to solve today's (and tomorrow's) problems deserve your hyperbolic vitriol.
Richard, I won't expand on LtGen Van Riper's Gazette/MCU comments, other than to say that I put those facts in context with a whole/holistic analysis of the retired resistance and the resultant institutional info-ops effort that informs much doubt among the FMF hoi polloi, and unfortunately serves to poison the well of operational-level "trust" in the grand plan happening on the Potomac.
-Nature of War strawmen: What caught my attention in your reply was what we've observed frequently. The setup that your opposition believes the "next great battle is with a tank division." I've heard variations on this theme frequently. No, of course they don't. But that's a handy way to belittle a Nature of War discussion and examination of the unintended Violence/Uncertainty/Friction consequences of Divest to Invest.
-Roots/Lineage of FD2030: Those of us watching carefully, in real time, saw a fait accompli strategy, characterized by sudden and dramatic loss of combat power cloaked in NDAs and subterfuge. The fait accompli strategy was apparent in leaked origin docs, and the NDAs and subterfuge were unprecedented elements of any intellectual debate in the Corps' history.
-Info Ops: The observers know that the lineage story emerged after resistance emerged. The lineage theme didn't stop with Gen Neller, and eventually stretched back as far as HUNTER WARRIOR, in which I participated in 97. It adopted a theme of retroactive justification, with pull-quotes from key CMC predecessors curated for the service home page and MCU presentations--and bordered on outlandish in its assertions and allusions about its premeditation. To the operational folks watching, it was out of synch with what they saw happen, and did not substantively address the planning questions that remained.
Details: Most of the concerns the retired opposition raised were rooted in the unintended consequences of divest-to-invest and the wisdom of this narrowly focused strategy given the Nature of War. These concerns reflected the operational planning concerns in the FMF, and the info-ops effort didn't help ameliorate those concerns. Not to say that operational concerns are the be-all, end-all--but the visionary, futurist language of FD proponents is increasingly out of synch with the grounded GCC requirements language of operational planners.
The sum is greater than its parts. FD may be great, but it sure smells funny.
Also, on the barracks issue. After having personally discussed the issue with I&L while a commander, this current initiative smells like a reframe. The civilian infrastructure has been trying to set up a barracks management bureaucracy for many years. If unit leaders are allowed to abdicate, they may have found a way to finally do it.
Richard, Thanks for the frank comments and "push back" even though I have an entirely different outlook than you do. Let me address several of your comments. Regarding the Marine Corps Gazette, I have the emails from the Editor of the Gazette that he was receiving "heavy fire from HQMC" for his plan to publish three articles from the retired Marine Corps community, two of them by two former Commandants and two former combatant commanders. With a last minute lame excuse he refused to publish these articles even though they were in print form and had been for some weeks. In fact, he had announced that they were forthcoming in an earlier issue. As to the president of MCU, I have her email to me where she told me I did not have the "expertise" to speak at the university despite repeated requests from faculty to attend their seminars. The tone and content of the rest of her email were the most caustic and unprofessional of any correspondence I have ever received. This is not the way Marine officers talk with each other. Finally, there are in fact many "shams" to FD 2030, none more so than the FD 2030 wargames that CMC said informed his decisions. I have ample evidence the games were manipulated--17 pages worth. CMC made all his decisions to divest before the games were conducted. Much more I could add, but I believe you get my points.
Sir, I can’t debate your personal experiences re Gazette, which sound unfortunate. I can only speak to my own and to those with whom I associate and theirs has not been the same. I have had a similar experience with a very respected defense outlet. After weeks of work and interest, the piece got cut at the last minute with no explanation.
With respect to the correspondence you had with MCU, that is also unfortunate, but that’s very different than suggesting that the institution is adopting curriculum that is antithetical to our purpose. I have not seen that and, as I said, I know Marines who are there currently.
I assume by CMC you are referring to Gen Berger. I could be completely mistaken, but I believe that the initial planning and testing for FD 2030 began under Gen Neller and with guidance from the initial drafts and discussion of Secretary Mattis’ 2018 NDS. To your point, it is possible that early wargaming was inadequate and yet the arrow hit its target. I have found in my own conversations, listening and attending panels, and participating in joint events, that not only is FD 2030 relevant and contributing to solutions in today’s problem sets, but USMC is revealing in the other services how far behind they are in addressing the needs of NDS and NMS.
At a high level, I do not understand the resistance to 2030. In talking to my contemporaries and leaders, we can find little critiques at the margins, but I find that there is consensus that we are close. I have seen the scenarios that FD 2030 is intending to address and the high side capabilities upon which we are relying to get the job done. I believe we are competitive in those scenarios and I do not believe that has come at the expense of our other Title X responsibilities.
Thanks for coming into the discussion...I'm going to tag in on this thread.
-NDS 2022, in Risk Mitigation, speaks to Foresight Risks and Implementation Risks. Granted, I am referring to the open source document, but it is relatively thin on speaking to these points and specifically, how to address these factors. I think 90% of the practical commentary on Compass Points is directly related to concerns that Foresight and Implementation risks have been grossly underestimated, under-considered, and not practically addressed, which has resulted in significant challenges as measured by the USMC's crisis response options in the post Force Design Implementation period.
-Referring to General Neller, he has publicly stated that while he oversaw the initial efforts that resulted in FD 2030, he would have hedged differently when in came to considering the particulars of the Risk Mitigation. No doubt, he is a gentlemen and is very supportive of his successor's authority and responsibility to make the decisions that were approved and implemented. That said, while he takes pains to avoid undercutting General Berger's decisions, he does not call the conclusions made by the 38th CMC as matching his own.
Just a few data points to show you what the Corps has lost over the past several CMCs.
There were always ARG/MEUs in the Med and WestPac; 24/7/365. When 26th MEU left the Med a week or so ago there were no ARG/MEUs deployed off the East or West Coasts. The only ARG/MEU the Corps has now is the part-time 31st MEU.
If the Corps was called upon to fight in a conflict similar to what we see in the Ukraine and Gaza today it could only bring seven light infantry regiments supported by TacAir. Before all the recent cuts it could bring nine combined arms regiments, that is, infantry regiments supported by tanks, cannon artillery, engineer breaching and bridging, MPs, snipers, TacAir, and more.
General Neller testified that the Corps needed 50 amphibious ships. At the time there was an agreement with CMC and CNO that the baseline requirement was 43 ships but they would accept a fiscally constrained 38 ship. General Berger removed any bottom line and the Navy went to 26 and CAPE to 24. The current 31 was established by Congress. Of those 31, lack of maintenance has led to a 40% availability.
As to the NDS prepared under SecDef Mattis, I have heard him state he never imagined the Marine Corps would divest the capabilities it has, so the argument that the Corps was only following guidance rings hollow.
Does the Corps need missiles. absolutely. Does it need 14 batteries? Most professionals say no.
Sir, USMC is not being called upon to fight in Ukraine or Gaza. Where it has supported NATO IRT Russia, it has done so under FD 2030 principles successfully. USMC was tasked with the Pacific. Are you suggesting tanks and cannon artillery are relevant to LOCE in the Pacific than MRIC, NMESIS, etc.? I work in the aviation community and I have not seen any drop-off in relevance or capability except to say that we are figuring out how to extend reach physically and in C2. I don’t see the utility of bridging companies when we are less reliant on the heaviest gear that previously required bridging. I don’t see the need for MPs, but you have a reserve battalion that can augment whoever is going down range. Snipers? There are snipers still, but structurally integrated with conventional formations. I don’t see much sniping going on in the Pacific, to be honest. Had I been in the room, I probably would have suggested keeping 4th Tanks for the same reason we have 4th LE.
Congress has failed on ships, I agree. I don’t think you can hold that against General Berger though.
Interesting observations on Secretary Mattis. I’ve met him a few times and seen him speak a few other times and he has been bullish in each of those engagements on where the Marine Corps is and where it is heading.
Your response goes to the crux of the issue, is the Corps to be the nation's global rapid response force able to scale up from a MEU to a MEF in short order as it has for nearly 70 years, or is to be regionally focused on the First Island Chain to contain the Chinese navy in the event of war? The former has been the mark of an offensive minded force, the latter will be defensive minded; the answer will determine the ethos of the Corps. Pointing to the utility of an FD 2030 force outside of China is a late breaking story that followed criticism from the retired Marine community.
Finally, ask yourself, is it likely that one general could have better insights on the best approach for the future of the Corps than 22.four-stars? General Berger claimed he based his plan on highly classified information. Two of the retired four stars were privy to the same information and said it was not true as did five recently retired three stars.
Very lucid. When you meet a barracks lawyer and “general of lady studies,” let me know. Also, please let me know if you want to actually respond to my questions. Finally, thanks for reading the piece ;-) I bet there are other things I’ve written you would like and agree with, but harp on the one you don’t like.
General Holcomb’s observations and comments are those of an Officer and a Gentleman. The desire for a positive discourse is sought by most of us who dedicated our adult lives to the defense of our nation in uniform and beyond and especially in the Band of Brothers of the Marine Corps. The conversation from the first day was civil and measured by those who were surprised by most aspects of FD-2030. It was most certainly not reciprocated and the insults followed quickly. The litmus tests imposed on active duty officers were unprecedented in an institution known for candor. Disagreement is not disloyalty or disobedience. That has made further discussion to this very day strained.
I personally sought the professional high ground until I realized I was not in a conversation with principled officers. It was no longer an honorable boxing match between athletes who respected each other and were governed by rules and the professional ethos of pugilists. It was a back alley knife fight for the survival of the Corps. I was amazed, shocked and saddened by the development so common in politics and business. I quickly noted the positions taken by the Marine Corps Gazette and the USNI. They did not surprise me as their descent into politically correct mouth pieces had long been noted. My peers and I had long noted the positions of the Pravda on the Chesapeake Bay and the USNI.
I would welcome the outstretched hand but seriously doubt it will be offered. No professional Marine would deny that the Marine Corps of 2018 needed to evolve, expand in some regards, contract in others and adapt to the subtle changes of the modern battlefield. Sadly, that is not what happened. Divest to invest crashed on a rocky shore of the fiscal reality of how appropriations happen. Divest occurred. Invest deteriorated into chaos with no clarity in sight. Some aspects of “ invest” are highly suspect and stretch well into the 2040’s. In the meantime Marine operating forces have become irrelevant to the Combatant Commanders. One Marine Corps was destroyed well before a new one was created. There is no guarantee a new one with battlefield prowess will be birthed. In the course of these actions the intangibles that make an elite fighting force have eroded rapidly. “Fighting Spirit”, “Esprit de Corps” , “Unit Synergy”, “ Band of Brothers”, “ First to Fight” all ring hollow to the outsider and statistician but are the spirit that hold Spartans together. Organization, weaponry, numbers, tactics and firepower can be calculated. The fighting soul is another matter. History proves it time and again.
I have seen institutions destroyed when the members are unable to stand fast in the turbulence of the times. When change for change’s sake becomes the mantra, the outcome can be catastrophic. The right change advances an organization and the wrong change can destroy it. I would suggest that the Boys Scouts of America, the Catholic Church, the FBI, innumerable large businesses, Universities and the entertainment industry embraced change with a limited understanding of the unintended but totally predictable consequences. Those consequences spell the death knell which is eventually reflected in membership, credibility, sales, public confidence or success on the battlefield. The ultimate outcome is extinction. There is no guarantee that anything of value will sprout from the ashes.
I am open to any forum where the professional discussion can flourish among those who respect the opinions of the others. As I have seen no evidence of that I will remain frank and direct. I know when I am in a knife fight and will stab and slash accordingly.
I think we are in violent agreement!
The first guideline that I proposed in the referenced National Interest article was:
"Marines ought to be able to present their thinking without fear of reprisal or personal attacks. Marines ought to be able to present their thoughts and ideas as clearly and directly as possible, without great concern about political correctness or risk to career. Said more directly, no waffling, wordy, or carefully phrased sentences: Authors need to say what they mean so that others can understand and respond appropriately."
So yes, "frank and direct."
BTW, a version of that article was first offered to the Marine Corps Gazette; the editor rejected it.
In my forwarding email to Compass Points, I offered the opinion that we ought to write and discuss as though our target audience is: Whatever part of the rising generation that chooses to commit to the re-building of the Marine Corps and the (re) discovery of its true ethos.
My study and understanding of cognitive behaviors draws on the work of a German scientist Dietrich Dorner who wrote: "The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in Complex Situations" His studies and experiments revealed that when some are given power to implement change in complex systems, they not only focus on a narrow narrative but also seem unable to "pull up, go around, and re-orient" ... even as the simulation revealed that the whole system was collapsing, they remained focused on their pet project.
This cognitive behavior is not a function of intelligence. Dorner's first example has a physicist and an economist as team mates. Noteworthy is that these two collegial colleagues end up criticizing each other/blaming the other as the system fails. It turns out that this behavior is also relatively common. As FD2030 fails or the Marine Corps is carved up and given to the Army and Navy, look for this sort of behavior from FD2030 proponents.
Key point: These are cognitive behaviors, much like those identified and developed Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Thinking: Fast and Slow).
Disciplines and disciplined processes can correct for these cognitive behaviors. I see no evidence that the current leadership is either re-orienting on the problem (Boyd) or engaging in the disciplines necessary for corrective action.
Therefore, my thought is not to waste time trying to convince them to change; their careers and egos are too much invested in FD2030 AND, more importantly, they are caught in the throes of the logic of failure ... they seem quite incapable of pulling up, flying around, and re-orienting."
Rather, I think it is more useful to provide a digital touchstone for the rising generation as they go about the difficult work of rebuilding the Marine Corps ... just as so many of us had to do after the Vietnam War.
General - I’ve followed your commentary, and value highly your insights. Thank you for your fine efforts in this long campaign. As Food For Thought, my question at this point in time is how we retired Marines can best serve in the rebuild effort? Perhaps we serve best by offering our insights to this string of communications. Perhaps we serve best by letter writing campaigns to our Congressional delegations seeking their support of our rebuild effort. Bottom line, I would suggest some thought be given to actionable steps we can take, and when those steps should be taken. Again, the above is intended as food for thought. Semper Fi!
I believe your analysis and comments are correct. Any studies on reversing failure in organizations show that it becomes highly personal and extremely difficult to achieve. The road back to reality is a long one.
BGen Holcomb’s views are music to the ear. His thoughts herein may be the first first step in our rebuilding process, and has my buy-in. Semper Fi!
I know sticks and stones will be thrown my way for saying this, but here goes - as a reminder - the old TQL field had a slogan that fits us right now in out “get-well” process, to wit: Form. Storm. Perform. With so many ideas swirling about, we’re probably “storming” just now. Keep it up. We’ll put muscle on the skeleton. All of us are smarter than any of us. S/F
Amen!
IRT Sham Leaders: FD2030 updates are publicly available except where classified. I know a few staffers and members who get the classified briefings and I have not heard them complain. The most common feedback I have heard is that other branches should catch up to the Marine Corps. Are you concerned that the Marine Corps' next great battle is with a tank division? I can assure you that it's not. Gen Smith's health updates were frequent and transparent even though he is under no obligation to disclose personal health information. Barracks issues are being highlighted front and center for the first time I can recall; SMMC testified before Congress about it and rolled out the first campaign plan to address it.
IRT MCU, are you currently taking classes there? I have 5 colleagues who are there right now and reported to me (prior to commenting to you) that they have not seen any "gender queer lady studies" classes or discussion forum offered. Plenty of warfighting courses though, which is ideal given the mission of MCU.
IRT "propaganda branch," you probably recall that the Marine Corps Gazette is a private entity that is run by a private non profit. Often there are articles critiquing one or more policies or expanding upon an existing policy or idea to make it better. That's good right? You want Marines contributing to discussion and offering new ideas and challenging old ones right? Isn't that (ironically) why this substack exists? "Marine Corps Compass Points: Broader Thinking, Deeper Understanding, and Better Decisions, for a Stronger Marine Corps."
Don't know what your background or service history is and frankly it does not matter as we have all earned the title (assuming you are a Marine). Maybe you should reflect on whether those currently serving and trying to solve today's (and tomorrow's) problems deserve your hyperbolic vitriol.
Richard, I won't expand on LtGen Van Riper's Gazette/MCU comments, other than to say that I put those facts in context with a whole/holistic analysis of the retired resistance and the resultant institutional info-ops effort that informs much doubt among the FMF hoi polloi, and unfortunately serves to poison the well of operational-level "trust" in the grand plan happening on the Potomac.
-Nature of War strawmen: What caught my attention in your reply was what we've observed frequently. The setup that your opposition believes the "next great battle is with a tank division." I've heard variations on this theme frequently. No, of course they don't. But that's a handy way to belittle a Nature of War discussion and examination of the unintended Violence/Uncertainty/Friction consequences of Divest to Invest.
-Roots/Lineage of FD2030: Those of us watching carefully, in real time, saw a fait accompli strategy, characterized by sudden and dramatic loss of combat power cloaked in NDAs and subterfuge. The fait accompli strategy was apparent in leaked origin docs, and the NDAs and subterfuge were unprecedented elements of any intellectual debate in the Corps' history.
-Info Ops: The observers know that the lineage story emerged after resistance emerged. The lineage theme didn't stop with Gen Neller, and eventually stretched back as far as HUNTER WARRIOR, in which I participated in 97. It adopted a theme of retroactive justification, with pull-quotes from key CMC predecessors curated for the service home page and MCU presentations--and bordered on outlandish in its assertions and allusions about its premeditation. To the operational folks watching, it was out of synch with what they saw happen, and did not substantively address the planning questions that remained.
Details: Most of the concerns the retired opposition raised were rooted in the unintended consequences of divest-to-invest and the wisdom of this narrowly focused strategy given the Nature of War. These concerns reflected the operational planning concerns in the FMF, and the info-ops effort didn't help ameliorate those concerns. Not to say that operational concerns are the be-all, end-all--but the visionary, futurist language of FD proponents is increasingly out of synch with the grounded GCC requirements language of operational planners.
The sum is greater than its parts. FD may be great, but it sure smells funny.
Also, on the barracks issue. After having personally discussed the issue with I&L while a commander, this current initiative smells like a reframe. The civilian infrastructure has been trying to set up a barracks management bureaucracy for many years. If unit leaders are allowed to abdicate, they may have found a way to finally do it.
Richard, Thanks for the frank comments and "push back" even though I have an entirely different outlook than you do. Let me address several of your comments. Regarding the Marine Corps Gazette, I have the emails from the Editor of the Gazette that he was receiving "heavy fire from HQMC" for his plan to publish three articles from the retired Marine Corps community, two of them by two former Commandants and two former combatant commanders. With a last minute lame excuse he refused to publish these articles even though they were in print form and had been for some weeks. In fact, he had announced that they were forthcoming in an earlier issue. As to the president of MCU, I have her email to me where she told me I did not have the "expertise" to speak at the university despite repeated requests from faculty to attend their seminars. The tone and content of the rest of her email were the most caustic and unprofessional of any correspondence I have ever received. This is not the way Marine officers talk with each other. Finally, there are in fact many "shams" to FD 2030, none more so than the FD 2030 wargames that CMC said informed his decisions. I have ample evidence the games were manipulated--17 pages worth. CMC made all his decisions to divest before the games were conducted. Much more I could add, but I believe you get my points.
Sir, I can’t debate your personal experiences re Gazette, which sound unfortunate. I can only speak to my own and to those with whom I associate and theirs has not been the same. I have had a similar experience with a very respected defense outlet. After weeks of work and interest, the piece got cut at the last minute with no explanation.
With respect to the correspondence you had with MCU, that is also unfortunate, but that’s very different than suggesting that the institution is adopting curriculum that is antithetical to our purpose. I have not seen that and, as I said, I know Marines who are there currently.
I assume by CMC you are referring to Gen Berger. I could be completely mistaken, but I believe that the initial planning and testing for FD 2030 began under Gen Neller and with guidance from the initial drafts and discussion of Secretary Mattis’ 2018 NDS. To your point, it is possible that early wargaming was inadequate and yet the arrow hit its target. I have found in my own conversations, listening and attending panels, and participating in joint events, that not only is FD 2030 relevant and contributing to solutions in today’s problem sets, but USMC is revealing in the other services how far behind they are in addressing the needs of NDS and NMS.
At a high level, I do not understand the resistance to 2030. In talking to my contemporaries and leaders, we can find little critiques at the margins, but I find that there is consensus that we are close. I have seen the scenarios that FD 2030 is intending to address and the high side capabilities upon which we are relying to get the job done. I believe we are competitive in those scenarios and I do not believe that has come at the expense of our other Title X responsibilities.
We do need more ships…
Thanks for coming into the discussion...I'm going to tag in on this thread.
-NDS 2022, in Risk Mitigation, speaks to Foresight Risks and Implementation Risks. Granted, I am referring to the open source document, but it is relatively thin on speaking to these points and specifically, how to address these factors. I think 90% of the practical commentary on Compass Points is directly related to concerns that Foresight and Implementation risks have been grossly underestimated, under-considered, and not practically addressed, which has resulted in significant challenges as measured by the USMC's crisis response options in the post Force Design Implementation period.
-Referring to General Neller, he has publicly stated that while he oversaw the initial efforts that resulted in FD 2030, he would have hedged differently when in came to considering the particulars of the Risk Mitigation. No doubt, he is a gentlemen and is very supportive of his successor's authority and responsibility to make the decisions that were approved and implemented. That said, while he takes pains to avoid undercutting General Berger's decisions, he does not call the conclusions made by the 38th CMC as matching his own.
Just a few data points to show you what the Corps has lost over the past several CMCs.
There were always ARG/MEUs in the Med and WestPac; 24/7/365. When 26th MEU left the Med a week or so ago there were no ARG/MEUs deployed off the East or West Coasts. The only ARG/MEU the Corps has now is the part-time 31st MEU.
If the Corps was called upon to fight in a conflict similar to what we see in the Ukraine and Gaza today it could only bring seven light infantry regiments supported by TacAir. Before all the recent cuts it could bring nine combined arms regiments, that is, infantry regiments supported by tanks, cannon artillery, engineer breaching and bridging, MPs, snipers, TacAir, and more.
General Neller testified that the Corps needed 50 amphibious ships. At the time there was an agreement with CMC and CNO that the baseline requirement was 43 ships but they would accept a fiscally constrained 38 ship. General Berger removed any bottom line and the Navy went to 26 and CAPE to 24. The current 31 was established by Congress. Of those 31, lack of maintenance has led to a 40% availability.
As to the NDS prepared under SecDef Mattis, I have heard him state he never imagined the Marine Corps would divest the capabilities it has, so the argument that the Corps was only following guidance rings hollow.
Does the Corps need missiles. absolutely. Does it need 14 batteries? Most professionals say no.
Sir, USMC is not being called upon to fight in Ukraine or Gaza. Where it has supported NATO IRT Russia, it has done so under FD 2030 principles successfully. USMC was tasked with the Pacific. Are you suggesting tanks and cannon artillery are relevant to LOCE in the Pacific than MRIC, NMESIS, etc.? I work in the aviation community and I have not seen any drop-off in relevance or capability except to say that we are figuring out how to extend reach physically and in C2. I don’t see the utility of bridging companies when we are less reliant on the heaviest gear that previously required bridging. I don’t see the need for MPs, but you have a reserve battalion that can augment whoever is going down range. Snipers? There are snipers still, but structurally integrated with conventional formations. I don’t see much sniping going on in the Pacific, to be honest. Had I been in the room, I probably would have suggested keeping 4th Tanks for the same reason we have 4th LE.
Congress has failed on ships, I agree. I don’t think you can hold that against General Berger though.
Interesting observations on Secretary Mattis. I’ve met him a few times and seen him speak a few other times and he has been bullish in each of those engagements on where the Marine Corps is and where it is heading.
Your response goes to the crux of the issue, is the Corps to be the nation's global rapid response force able to scale up from a MEU to a MEF in short order as it has for nearly 70 years, or is to be regionally focused on the First Island Chain to contain the Chinese navy in the event of war? The former has been the mark of an offensive minded force, the latter will be defensive minded; the answer will determine the ethos of the Corps. Pointing to the utility of an FD 2030 force outside of China is a late breaking story that followed criticism from the retired Marine community.
Finally, ask yourself, is it likely that one general could have better insights on the best approach for the future of the Corps than 22.four-stars? General Berger claimed he based his plan on highly classified information. Two of the retired four stars were privy to the same information and said it was not true as did five recently retired three stars.
Very lucid. When you meet a barracks lawyer and “general of lady studies,” let me know. Also, please let me know if you want to actually respond to my questions. Finally, thanks for reading the piece ;-) I bet there are other things I’ve written you would like and agree with, but harp on the one you don’t like.