General Berger claimed that the US Navy would not be able to operate inside of the Chinese weapons engagement zone (a term fraught with problems) because of that nation’s missile threat. The US Navy’s Arleigh Burke Destroyers have blown that claim right out of the water (no pun intended) as they have routinely downed Houthi drones and missiles now for weeks and as they did early Sunday morning helping protect Israel from the Iranian drone, and cruise and ballistic missile attack. We might note also, reportedly, US Air Force F-15Es performed equally well Sunday morning. So, it is obvious that what many said as the General divested combat capabilities from the Marine Corps’ inventory has been demonstrated—our nation doesn’t need Marines sitting on islands with Naval Strike Missiles waiting for Chinese ships to sail by when the US Navy and US Air Force can handle Chinese missile attacks inside the WEZ. I believe the US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces would perform equally well but we don’t have a real world example to demonstrate their capabilities. Historians will point to General Berger’s clouded view of future warfare as an unprecedented and serious error for a Marine to make.
1. Ships. The proposed LSM is not compatible with ARG operations. To keep construction costs down it is not designed for combat. It will not have safety protections built in for embarked Marines for this reason. The ESB, ESD, and the Expeditionary Fast Transports are all compatible with global ARG operations. They are all available RIGHT NOW. How in heavens name is the LSM still being considered with the potential for global conflict on the precipice?
2. Missillers. Drones, cruise misssiles, and ballistic missiles were fired by Iran at Israel yesterday. Their total number approached 500. Only 2 ballistic missiles made it through of that swarming number. One child was seriouly woundedby schrapnel. They were all countered by allied efforts to protect Israel. In Ukraine, Russia has been able to counter the GPS guided 160,000 dollar HIMARS missile by jamming GPS. Russia is not able to jam a 5000 dollar 155 round once it has been fired.
3. Indo-Pacific. It isvery important that indigenous forces of the Quad alliance (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and India) defend their sovereign territories. In doing so, their forces presence in their respective countries does not upset the DOD defined Competition Continuum that the presence of U. S. Marines would cause in their place. ^Wolf^s^ answer of the combined arms logistic, air, ground amphibious capability to back up the indigenous defenses positioned in the Indo-Pacific provides either the deterrence needed against China aggression, or if that fails, the capability to close with and destroy that missiles do not provide.
“The past is prologue”. The Inchon Landing - Victory over Time and Tide
by Lynn Montross
Historical Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Reprinted from July 1951 issue of The Marine Corps Gazette
Reprinted with permission to The Korean War Educator
There was little to indicate that the Sunday morning of 25 June 1950 was a landmark for thousands of young men all over the United States. As they read their newspapers after breakfast, the pennant chances of the Dodgers probably concerned them more than the outbreak of an intramural war in Korea. It would hardly have occurred to these civilians that it was actually D-Day minus 82 for them. But these young men were Marine reservists, and in less than 12 weeks many of them would be halfway around the earth, making an amphibious landing in a flaming town on an Asiatic peninsula.
The Korean struggle achieved a personal significance for them when the United Nations ordered military sanctions against the Red Korean aggressors. By July 4th, U.S. naval, air, and land forces had been sent to Korea to help enforce those sanctions. It was D-Day minus 73, for an amphibious counterstroke was already being considered by Gen Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of the UN forces assisting the Republic of Korea.
The strategic importance of the Inchon-Seoul area had been obvious ever since its seizure by North Korean invaders during the early days of the war (obvious in fact since the occasion in 1871 when the Marines first landed near Inchon.) Inchon was the principal port of the west coast; Seoul, the hub of the enemy’s communication lines between North Korea and his troops pushing into the Republic of Korea. Capture of the two cities would simultaneously disrupt the North Korean Army’s rear area and provide the UN forces with a valuable staging and supply point as well as air sites for further offensive operations.
At that time no Marine division was available for the proposed operation, and Gen MacArthur tentatively selected the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division. The Marine Corps was then represented in Japan by Mobile Training Group Able, which had arrived before the outbreak of war to instruct Army occupation troops in basic amphibious techniques. Col. Edward H. Forney, chief of the group, was appointed G-5 for the 1st Cavalry Division to assist with planning. Other members were sent in teams to camps in Japan with a mission of training troops for the landings.
The plan was abandoned on 10 July, owing to the rapid deterioration of the military situation in Korea. Red Korean invaders had sliced so deeply into ROK territory that it became necessary to use the 1st Cav Div to bolster the existing defense.
For thousands of Marine reservists, still going about their civilian occupations, the critical scene changed to the Pentagon. There, on 22 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff granted Gen MacArthur’s repeated requests (10, 15, and 19 July) for a full-strength Marine division to be employed in Korea. It was now D-Day minus 54, but nothing resembling a full-strength Marine division was in sight. Old timers might have sighed for the days before the Fleet Marine Force when the mounting out of an expeditionary force was a relatively informal procedure. These veterans fondly recalled that an expeditionary force was simply "put together at the gangplank" of Marines hastily assembled from Navy Yards and equipped in the simple fashion of that day.
Although warfare had become more complex in 1950, it appeared that such drastic measures might have to be revived if the 1st Marine Division was to be re-constituted within a month. It had but a single infantry regiment early in July—the 5th Marines, which became the principal element of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and sailed from San Diego on the 14th to take part in the fight to hold the Pusan Perimeter. Including the brigade troops, the division was merely a skeleton organization, on a peacetime T/O, of approximately 8,000 officers and men. For that matter, the active duty Marine Corps of 30 June numbered only 74,279 troops assigned to a wide variety of security, training, and administrative duties.
Even the nostalgic old timers had to admit, however, that the Corps of 1950 had improved in one respect over the past. Although the troops for a full-strength division were not immediately available on a peacetime basis, most of the heavy equipment had been stored "in mothballs" since World War II at Barstow and other California depots. Some 500 civilians had to be employed for several weeks to recondition this equipment and load it on flatcars to be sent to the port of embarkation. The long columns of vehicles were driven over the road, not only to save shipping space but also to check their reconditioning.
Unfortunately, the personnel could not be stored in warehouses for an emergency. In order to build the 1st Marine Division up to a war-strength T/O of approximately 22,000, it would be necessary to call up the minute-men of 1950—those thousands of Reserve Marines still in their civilian jobs. On 19 July, immediately following presidential authorization, organized reserves were alerted by the Commandant for a call to active duty, with the first units reporting 10 days later. And on 7 August, D-Day minus 39, the Commandant began calling the volunteer reserve. Within a few weeks these Marines would have to be sorted out for assignment to the division, for further training, or to replace regulars who were stripped from posts and stations to join the brigade and the 1st Mar Div. Shades of the gangplank expeditionary forces!
By working an administrative miracle, the 1st Mar Div won the first round of its bout with time and tide when, on 15 August, it reached war-strength (less the 7th Marines) only 27 days after commencing its build-up from a peacetime T/O. A new 1st Marines had been formed, third rifle companies for the 5th Marines organized, support and service units put together—all in an integrated effort by reserves from civilian life, by regulars reporting from other stations, and by supply depots at Barstow and San Francisco.
Round two commenced on 17 August when the 7th Marines were activated, D-Day minus 29. Two under-strength battalions of the 6th Marines arrived at Pendleton from Lejeune to be joined by more regulars and reserves and were designated as 7th Marines. A peace-strength battalion, on duty with the Fleet, sailed from the Mediterranean directly to Japan. A third rifle company and third platoons for the other two companies of this battalion were assembled at Pendleton and embarked with the main body of the 7th Regiment on 3 September, D-Day minus 12.
In Japan, meanwhile, high-level planners were putting the cart before the horse by working on the Inchon-Seoul operation before the landing force was fully organized. As a preliminary measure the Tenth Corps had been activated on 16 August with MajGen Edward S. Almond in command. The principal elements were to be the 1st Mar Div and the U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division, the latter being scarcely more than a cadre in Japan at this time.
General MacArthur wished to land at Inchon not later than favoring tides permitted in September. He considered this the latest date when the operation could be launched with good prospects of being finished before cold weather. The time was short, therefore, when the X Corps staff was formed on 16 August with the title Special Planning Staff, Far East Command.
Some of the problems awaiting the planners had already been approached by Gen MacArthur’s staff. As early as July a Joint Army Navy Intelligence Service report on selected Korean beaches had revealed that high tides and mud flats presented major problems in landing along the entire west coast. When the meteorological and hydrographic data were considered, it became evident than an Inchon landing must surmount unusual if not uni”……the rest can be easily found using your favorite search engine
General Berger claimed that the US Navy would not be able to operate inside of the Chinese weapons engagement zone (a term fraught with problems) because of that nation’s missile threat. The US Navy’s Arleigh Burke Destroyers have blown that claim right out of the water (no pun intended) as they have routinely downed Houthi drones and missiles now for weeks and as they did early Sunday morning helping protect Israel from the Iranian drone, and cruise and ballistic missile attack. We might note also, reportedly, US Air Force F-15Es performed equally well Sunday morning. So, it is obvious that what many said as the General divested combat capabilities from the Marine Corps’ inventory has been demonstrated—our nation doesn’t need Marines sitting on islands with Naval Strike Missiles waiting for Chinese ships to sail by when the US Navy and US Air Force can handle Chinese missile attacks inside the WEZ. I believe the US Army’s Multi-Domain Task Forces would perform equally well but we don’t have a real world example to demonstrate their capabilities. Historians will point to General Berger’s clouded view of future warfare as an unprecedented and serious error for a Marine to make.
1. Ships. The proposed LSM is not compatible with ARG operations. To keep construction costs down it is not designed for combat. It will not have safety protections built in for embarked Marines for this reason. The ESB, ESD, and the Expeditionary Fast Transports are all compatible with global ARG operations. They are all available RIGHT NOW. How in heavens name is the LSM still being considered with the potential for global conflict on the precipice?
2. Missillers. Drones, cruise misssiles, and ballistic missiles were fired by Iran at Israel yesterday. Their total number approached 500. Only 2 ballistic missiles made it through of that swarming number. One child was seriouly woundedby schrapnel. They were all countered by allied efforts to protect Israel. In Ukraine, Russia has been able to counter the GPS guided 160,000 dollar HIMARS missile by jamming GPS. Russia is not able to jam a 5000 dollar 155 round once it has been fired.
3. Indo-Pacific. It isvery important that indigenous forces of the Quad alliance (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, and India) defend their sovereign territories. In doing so, their forces presence in their respective countries does not upset the DOD defined Competition Continuum that the presence of U. S. Marines would cause in their place. ^Wolf^s^ answer of the combined arms logistic, air, ground amphibious capability to back up the indigenous defenses positioned in the Indo-Pacific provides either the deterrence needed against China aggression, or if that fails, the capability to close with and destroy that missiles do not provide.
“The past is prologue”. The Inchon Landing - Victory over Time and Tide
by Lynn Montross
Historical Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Reprinted from July 1951 issue of The Marine Corps Gazette
Reprinted with permission to The Korean War Educator
There was little to indicate that the Sunday morning of 25 June 1950 was a landmark for thousands of young men all over the United States. As they read their newspapers after breakfast, the pennant chances of the Dodgers probably concerned them more than the outbreak of an intramural war in Korea. It would hardly have occurred to these civilians that it was actually D-Day minus 82 for them. But these young men were Marine reservists, and in less than 12 weeks many of them would be halfway around the earth, making an amphibious landing in a flaming town on an Asiatic peninsula.
The Korean struggle achieved a personal significance for them when the United Nations ordered military sanctions against the Red Korean aggressors. By July 4th, U.S. naval, air, and land forces had been sent to Korea to help enforce those sanctions. It was D-Day minus 73, for an amphibious counterstroke was already being considered by Gen Douglas MacArthur, commander in chief of the UN forces assisting the Republic of Korea.
The strategic importance of the Inchon-Seoul area had been obvious ever since its seizure by North Korean invaders during the early days of the war (obvious in fact since the occasion in 1871 when the Marines first landed near Inchon.) Inchon was the principal port of the west coast; Seoul, the hub of the enemy’s communication lines between North Korea and his troops pushing into the Republic of Korea. Capture of the two cities would simultaneously disrupt the North Korean Army’s rear area and provide the UN forces with a valuable staging and supply point as well as air sites for further offensive operations.
At that time no Marine division was available for the proposed operation, and Gen MacArthur tentatively selected the U.S. Army 1st Cavalry Division. The Marine Corps was then represented in Japan by Mobile Training Group Able, which had arrived before the outbreak of war to instruct Army occupation troops in basic amphibious techniques. Col. Edward H. Forney, chief of the group, was appointed G-5 for the 1st Cavalry Division to assist with planning. Other members were sent in teams to camps in Japan with a mission of training troops for the landings.
The plan was abandoned on 10 July, owing to the rapid deterioration of the military situation in Korea. Red Korean invaders had sliced so deeply into ROK territory that it became necessary to use the 1st Cav Div to bolster the existing defense.
For thousands of Marine reservists, still going about their civilian occupations, the critical scene changed to the Pentagon. There, on 22 July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff granted Gen MacArthur’s repeated requests (10, 15, and 19 July) for a full-strength Marine division to be employed in Korea. It was now D-Day minus 54, but nothing resembling a full-strength Marine division was in sight. Old timers might have sighed for the days before the Fleet Marine Force when the mounting out of an expeditionary force was a relatively informal procedure. These veterans fondly recalled that an expeditionary force was simply "put together at the gangplank" of Marines hastily assembled from Navy Yards and equipped in the simple fashion of that day.
Although warfare had become more complex in 1950, it appeared that such drastic measures might have to be revived if the 1st Marine Division was to be re-constituted within a month. It had but a single infantry regiment early in July—the 5th Marines, which became the principal element of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and sailed from San Diego on the 14th to take part in the fight to hold the Pusan Perimeter. Including the brigade troops, the division was merely a skeleton organization, on a peacetime T/O, of approximately 8,000 officers and men. For that matter, the active duty Marine Corps of 30 June numbered only 74,279 troops assigned to a wide variety of security, training, and administrative duties.
Even the nostalgic old timers had to admit, however, that the Corps of 1950 had improved in one respect over the past. Although the troops for a full-strength division were not immediately available on a peacetime basis, most of the heavy equipment had been stored "in mothballs" since World War II at Barstow and other California depots. Some 500 civilians had to be employed for several weeks to recondition this equipment and load it on flatcars to be sent to the port of embarkation. The long columns of vehicles were driven over the road, not only to save shipping space but also to check their reconditioning.
Unfortunately, the personnel could not be stored in warehouses for an emergency. In order to build the 1st Marine Division up to a war-strength T/O of approximately 22,000, it would be necessary to call up the minute-men of 1950—those thousands of Reserve Marines still in their civilian jobs. On 19 July, immediately following presidential authorization, organized reserves were alerted by the Commandant for a call to active duty, with the first units reporting 10 days later. And on 7 August, D-Day minus 39, the Commandant began calling the volunteer reserve. Within a few weeks these Marines would have to be sorted out for assignment to the division, for further training, or to replace regulars who were stripped from posts and stations to join the brigade and the 1st Mar Div. Shades of the gangplank expeditionary forces!
By working an administrative miracle, the 1st Mar Div won the first round of its bout with time and tide when, on 15 August, it reached war-strength (less the 7th Marines) only 27 days after commencing its build-up from a peacetime T/O. A new 1st Marines had been formed, third rifle companies for the 5th Marines organized, support and service units put together—all in an integrated effort by reserves from civilian life, by regulars reporting from other stations, and by supply depots at Barstow and San Francisco.
Round two commenced on 17 August when the 7th Marines were activated, D-Day minus 29. Two under-strength battalions of the 6th Marines arrived at Pendleton from Lejeune to be joined by more regulars and reserves and were designated as 7th Marines. A peace-strength battalion, on duty with the Fleet, sailed from the Mediterranean directly to Japan. A third rifle company and third platoons for the other two companies of this battalion were assembled at Pendleton and embarked with the main body of the 7th Regiment on 3 September, D-Day minus 12.
In Japan, meanwhile, high-level planners were putting the cart before the horse by working on the Inchon-Seoul operation before the landing force was fully organized. As a preliminary measure the Tenth Corps had been activated on 16 August with MajGen Edward S. Almond in command. The principal elements were to be the 1st Mar Div and the U.S. Army 7th Infantry Division, the latter being scarcely more than a cadre in Japan at this time.
General MacArthur wished to land at Inchon not later than favoring tides permitted in September. He considered this the latest date when the operation could be launched with good prospects of being finished before cold weather. The time was short, therefore, when the X Corps staff was formed on 16 August with the title Special Planning Staff, Far East Command.
Some of the problems awaiting the planners had already been approached by Gen MacArthur’s staff. As early as July a Joint Army Navy Intelligence Service report on selected Korean beaches had revealed that high tides and mud flats presented major problems in landing along the entire west coast. When the meteorological and hydrographic data were considered, it became evident than an Inchon landing must surmount unusual if not uni”……the rest can be easily found using your favorite search engine