“Every war has two aspects, the defensive and the offensive, to each of which there is a corresponding factor of activity. There is something to gain, the offensive; there is something to lose, the defensive. The ears of men, especially of the uninstructed, are more readily and sympathetically open to the demands of the latter. It appeals to the conservatism which is dominant in the well-to-do, and to the widespread timidity which hesitates to take any risk for the sake of a probable though uncertain gain…When war has been accepted as necessary, success means nothing short of victory; and victory must be sought by offensive measures, and by them only can be ensured,” (Mahan on Naval Warfare by Alfred Thayer Mahan; Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, NY p. 309 – 310)
After reading the last “CP Week in Review” I am thinking that enough torpedoes have sunk the entire wargame justification for the 2030 Design. The good news is, as a “do-over,” this gets us back to the first step, MILITARY strategy.
The “Island Chain” strategy is not a military strategy, it is a containment strategy and therefore it is a political strategy. One of the reasons for the island chain strategy was to move the focus from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific. Doesn’t that make the war in the Ukraine and Gaza a distraction? In addition, the problem with focusing on the Pacific is that China is a global power needing to control its global SLOCs.
The military strategy must focus on the “great power competition” as the primary deterrent to the peer-on-peer war with the CCP.
“The second type of 4GW (Fourth-generation Warfare) enemy we will face is the nation that makes use of a wide network of alliances and 4GW techniques to neutralize the power of the United States… Just as certainly, they (CCP) have seen the successes 4GW opponents have had against the United States and our allies…They can be dangerous to America s position—in particular, they can degrade our influence and economic power in various parts of the world…At the same time, they can limit our ability to concentrate power by ensuring that our enemies throughout the world obtain more advanced weapon that require us to maintain forces in those regions… This is a more sophisticated approach than the Soviet Union’s use of proxies. The Soviets attempted to control the proxies’ .The Chinese simply provide them resources to use for whatever goals the proxies devise. (The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century by Thomas X. Hammes USMC; Zenith Press, 2006, p.257-259)”
Isn’t this what we are currently witnessing in and around the Red Sea?
The Marine Corps missed a golden opportunity with the 2030 Design not only as a Military Service but becoming a strategic leader to the Joint DOD organization. The 2030 Design should have enhanced the standard Marine Corps MAGTF with new proven technology. It should have justified the need for amphibious shipping providing an operational military “Swiss Army Knife” to the five Combatant Commander’s. If you want to plan for the future let’s start working on a MAGTF for sixth Combatant Commander, USSPACECOM. Let’s make the fourth company in the MEU MAGTF’s a “Marine Raider” Company providing the Combatant Commanders with a 911 direct action and captive hostage rescue capability. Instead of trying to figure out how to put a Harpoon into a HIMARS, let’s figure out how to fire one from an F-35. With all the talk about drones, you would think we would have grabbed the old Quad 50s or the GAU-8 Gatling Gun to mount on the back of a truck for anti-drone defense. You already have an anti-air network with the shoulder held FAAD Batteries. Instead of telling the Joint Military Community we will ask the US Army for Tanks, when we need them, why not ask the Joint Community to task the US Army to develop a mobile anti-missile/air defense (IRON Dome) system that we can park on Pacific Islands and also give to our allies.
I would like to think this past week was a stepping off point. Semper Fi
“The ears of men”
“Every war has two aspects, the defensive and the offensive, to each of which there is a corresponding factor of activity. There is something to gain, the offensive; there is something to lose, the defensive. The ears of men, especially of the uninstructed, are more readily and sympathetically open to the demands of the latter. It appeals to the conservatism which is dominant in the well-to-do, and to the widespread timidity which hesitates to take any risk for the sake of a probable though uncertain gain…When war has been accepted as necessary, success means nothing short of victory; and victory must be sought by offensive measures, and by them only can be ensured,” (Mahan on Naval Warfare by Alfred Thayer Mahan; Dover Publications, Inc. Mineola, NY p. 309 – 310)
After reading the last “CP Week in Review” I am thinking that enough torpedoes have sunk the entire wargame justification for the 2030 Design. The good news is, as a “do-over,” this gets us back to the first step, MILITARY strategy.
The “Island Chain” strategy is not a military strategy, it is a containment strategy and therefore it is a political strategy. One of the reasons for the island chain strategy was to move the focus from Europe and the Middle East to the Pacific. Doesn’t that make the war in the Ukraine and Gaza a distraction? In addition, the problem with focusing on the Pacific is that China is a global power needing to control its global SLOCs.
The military strategy must focus on the “great power competition” as the primary deterrent to the peer-on-peer war with the CCP.
“The second type of 4GW (Fourth-generation Warfare) enemy we will face is the nation that makes use of a wide network of alliances and 4GW techniques to neutralize the power of the United States… Just as certainly, they (CCP) have seen the successes 4GW opponents have had against the United States and our allies…They can be dangerous to America s position—in particular, they can degrade our influence and economic power in various parts of the world…At the same time, they can limit our ability to concentrate power by ensuring that our enemies throughout the world obtain more advanced weapon that require us to maintain forces in those regions… This is a more sophisticated approach than the Soviet Union’s use of proxies. The Soviets attempted to control the proxies’ .The Chinese simply provide them resources to use for whatever goals the proxies devise. (The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century by Thomas X. Hammes USMC; Zenith Press, 2006, p.257-259)”
Isn’t this what we are currently witnessing in and around the Red Sea?
The Marine Corps missed a golden opportunity with the 2030 Design not only as a Military Service but becoming a strategic leader to the Joint DOD organization. The 2030 Design should have enhanced the standard Marine Corps MAGTF with new proven technology. It should have justified the need for amphibious shipping providing an operational military “Swiss Army Knife” to the five Combatant Commander’s. If you want to plan for the future let’s start working on a MAGTF for sixth Combatant Commander, USSPACECOM. Let’s make the fourth company in the MEU MAGTF’s a “Marine Raider” Company providing the Combatant Commanders with a 911 direct action and captive hostage rescue capability. Instead of trying to figure out how to put a Harpoon into a HIMARS, let’s figure out how to fire one from an F-35. With all the talk about drones, you would think we would have grabbed the old Quad 50s or the GAU-8 Gatling Gun to mount on the back of a truck for anti-drone defense. You already have an anti-air network with the shoulder held FAAD Batteries. Instead of telling the Joint Military Community we will ask the US Army for Tanks, when we need them, why not ask the Joint Community to task the US Army to develop a mobile anti-missile/air defense (IRON Dome) system that we can park on Pacific Islands and also give to our allies.
I would like to think this past week was a stepping off point. Semper Fi